"White" army: goals, driving forces, fundamental ideas. Reds in the Civil War

By the beginning of the Civil War, the whites were superior to the reds in almost everything - it seemed that the Bolsheviks were doomed. However, it was the Reds who were destined to emerge victorious from this confrontation. Among the entire huge complex of reasons that led to this, three key ones stand out clearly.

Under the rule of chaos

"...I will immediately point out three reasons for the failure of the white movement:
1) insufficient and untimely,
aid from the allies, guided by narrow selfish considerations,
2) gradual strengthening of reactionary elements within the movement and
3) as a consequence of the second, the disappointment of the masses in the white movement...

P. Milyukov. Report on the white movement.
Newspaper Latest News (Paris), August 6, 1924

To begin with, it is worth stipulating that the definitions of “red” and “white” are largely arbitrary, as is always the case when describing civil unrest. War is chaos, and civil war is chaos raised to an infinite degree. Even now, almost a century later, the question “so who was right?” remains open and difficult to resolve.

At the same time, everything that was happening was perceived as a real end of the world, a time of complete unpredictability and uncertainty. The color of the banners, the declared beliefs - all this existed only “here and now” and in any case did not guarantee anything. Sides and beliefs changed with amazing ease, and this was not considered something abnormal or unnatural. Revolutionaries with many years of experience in the struggle - for example, the Socialist Revolutionaries - became ministers of new governments and were branded by their opponents as counter-revolutionaries. And the Bolsheviks were helped to create an army and counterintelligence by proven personnel of the tsarist regime - including nobles, guards officers, and graduates of the General Staff Academy. People, trying to somehow survive, were thrown from one extreme to another. Or the “extremes” themselves came to them - in the form of an immortal phrase: “The whites came and robbed, the reds came and robbed, so where should the poor peasant go?” Both individuals and entire military units regularly changed sides.

In the best traditions of the 18th century, prisoners could be released on parole, killed in the most savage ways, or placed in their own system. An orderly, harmonious division “these are red, these are white, those over there are green, and these are morally unstable and undecided” took shape only years later.

Therefore, it should always be remembered that when we talk about any side of a civil conflict, we are not talking about the strict ranks of regular formations, but rather “centers of power.” Points of attraction for many groups that were in constant motion and incessant conflicts of everyone with everyone.

But why did the center of power, which we collectively call “red”, win? Why did the “gentlemen” lose to the “comrades”?

Question about the "Red Terror"

"Red Terror" is often used as ultima ratio, a description of the main tool of the Bolsheviks, which allegedly threw a frightened country at their feet. This is wrong. Terror has always gone hand in hand with civil unrest, because it is derived from the extreme ferocity of this kind of conflict, in which the opponents have nowhere to run and nothing to lose. Moreover, opponents could not, in principle, avoid organized terror as a means.

It was said earlier that initially the opponents were small groups surrounded by a sea of ​​anarchist freemen and apolitical peasant masses. White general Mikhail Drozdovsky brought about two thousand people from Romania. Mikhail Alekseev and Lavr Kornilov initially had approximately the same number of volunteers. But the majority simply did not want to fight, including a very significant part of the officers. In Kyiv, officers happened to work as waiters, wearing uniforms and all the awards - “they serve more this way, sir.”

Second Drozdovsky Cavalry Regiment
rusk.ru

In order to win and realize their vision of the future, all participants needed an army (that is, conscripts) and bread. Bread for the city (military production and transport), for the army and for rations for valuable specialists and commanders.

People and bread could only be obtained in the village, from the peasant, who was not going to give either one or the other “for nothing”, and had nothing to pay with. Hence the requisitions and mobilizations, which both the Whites and the Reds (and before them, the Provisional Government) had to resort to with equal zeal. The result is unrest in the village, opposition, and the need to suppress disturbances using the most brutal methods.

Therefore, the notorious and terrible “Red Terror” was not a decisive argument or something that stood out sharply against the general background of the atrocities of the Civil War. Everyone was involved in terrorism and it was not he who brought victory to the Bolsheviks.

1. Unity of command.
2. Organization.
3. Ideology.

Let's consider these points sequentially.

1. Unity of command, or “When there is no agreement among the masters...”.

It should be noted that the Bolsheviks (or, more broadly, “socialist-revolutionaries” in general) initially had very good experience working in conditions of instability and chaos. A situation where there are enemies all around, in our own ranks there are secret police agents and in general" trust no one"- was an ordinary production process for them. With the beginning of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks, in general, continued what they had been doing before, only under more favorable conditions, because now they themselves became one of the main players. They knew how maneuver in conditions of complete confusion and everyday betrayal. But their opponents used the skill “attract an ally and betray him in time before he betrays you” much worse. Therefore, at the peak of the conflict, many white groups fought against the relatively unified (by the presence of one leader) Red camp, and each waged its own war according to its own plans and understandings.

Actually, this discord and the slowness of the overall strategy deprived White of victory back in 1918. The Entente desperately needed a Russian front against the Germans and was ready to do a lot just to maintain at least the appearance of it, pulling German troops away from the western front. The Bolsheviks were extremely weak and disorganized, and help could have been demanded at least for partial deliveries of military orders already paid for by the tsarism. But... the Whites preferred to take shells from the Germans through Krasnov for the war against the Reds - thereby creating a corresponding reputation in the eyes of the Entente. The Germans, having lost the war in the West, disappeared. The Bolsheviks steadily created an organized army instead of semi-partisan detachments and tried to establish a military industry. And in 1919, the Entente had already won its war and did not want, and could not, bear large, and most importantly, expenses that did not provide any visible benefit in a distant country. The interventionist forces left the fronts of the Civil War one after another.

White was unable to come to an agreement with any of the limitrophes - as a result, their rear (almost all of it) hung in the air. And, as if this were not enough, each white leader had his own “chieftain” in the rear, poisoning life with all his might. Kolchak has Semenov, Denikin has the Kuban Rada with Kalabukhov and Mamontov, Wrangel has the Oryol war in Crimea, Yudenich has Bermondt-Avalov.

White movement propaganda poster
statehistory.ru

So, although outwardly the Bolsheviks seemed surrounded by enemies and a doomed camp, they were able to concentrate on selected areas, transferring at least some resources along internal transport lines - despite the collapse of the transport system. Each individual white general could beat the enemy as harshly as he wanted on the battlefield - and the reds admitted these defeats - but these pogroms did not add up to a single boxing combination that would knock out the fighter in the red corner of the ring. The Bolsheviks withstood each individual attack, accumulated strength and struck back.

The year is 1918: Kornilov goes to Yekaterinodar, but other white detachments have already left there. Then the Volunteer Army gets bogged down in battles in the North Caucasus, and at the same time Krasnov’s Cossacks go to Tsaritsyn, where they get theirs from the Reds. In 1919, thanks to foreign assistance (more on this below), Donbass fell, Tsaritsyn was finally taken - but Kolchak in Siberia was already defeated. In the fall, Yudenich marches on Petrograd, having excellent chances to take it - and Denikin in the south of Russia is defeated and retreats. Wrangel, having excellent aviation and tanks, left the Crimea in 1920, the battles were initially successful for the Whites, but the Poles were already making peace with the Reds. And so on. Khachaturian - “Sabre Dance”, only much scarier.

The Whites were fully aware of the seriousness of this problem and even tried to solve it by choosing a single leader (Kolchak) and trying to coordinate actions. But by then it was already too late. Moreover, there was in fact no real coordination as a class.

“The white movement did not end in victory because the white dictatorship did not emerge. And what prevented it from taking shape were centrifugal forces, inflated by the revolution, and all the elements associated with the revolution and not breaking with it... Against the red dictatorship, a white “concentration of power...” was needed.

N. Lvov. "White Movement", 1924.

2. Organization - “the war is won on the home front”

As again mentioned above, for a long time whites had clear superiority on the battlefield. It was so tangible that to this day it is a source of pride for supporters of the white movement. Accordingly, all sorts of conspiracy theories are invented to explain why everything ended this way and where did the victories go?.. Hence the legends about the monstrous and unparalleled “Red Terror”.

And the solution is actually simple and, alas, graceless - the Whites won tactically, in battle, but lost the main battle - in their own rear.

“Not one of the [anti-Bolshevik] governments... was able to create a flexible and strong apparatus of power that could quickly and quickly overtake, coerce, act and force others to act. The Bolsheviks also did not capture the people’s soul, they also did not become a national phenomenon, but they were infinitely ahead of us in the pace of their actions, in energy, mobility and ability to coerce. We, with our old techniques, old psychology, old vices of the military and civil bureaucracy, with Peter’s table of ranks, could not keep up with them ... "

In the spring of 1919, the commander of Denikin’s artillery had only two hundred shells a day... For a single gun? No, for the entire army.

England, France and other powers, despite the later curses of the whites against them, provided considerable or even enormous assistance. In the same year, 1919, the British supplied Denikin alone with 74 tanks, one and a half hundred aircraft, hundreds of cars and dozens of tractors, more than five hundred guns, including 6-8-inch howitzers, thousands of machine guns, more than two hundred thousand rifles, hundreds of millions of cartridges and two million shells... These are very decent numbers even on the scale of the just ended Great War; it would not be a shame to cite them in the context of, say, the battle of Ypres or the Somme, describing the situation on a separate section of the front. And for a civil war, forcedly poor and ragged, this is a fabulous amount. Such an armada, concentrated in several “fists,” could by itself tear apart the Red Front like a rotten rag.

A detachment of tanks from the Shock Fire Brigade before being sent to the front
velikoe-sorokoletie.diary.ru

However, this wealth was not united into compact, crushing groups. Moreover, the overwhelming majority did not reach the front at all. Because the logistics supply organization was completely failed. And cargo (ammunition, food, uniforms, equipment...) was either stolen or filled up remote warehouses.

New British howitzers were damaged by untrained white crews within three weeks, which repeatedly dismayed the British advisers. 1920 - Wrangel, according to the Reds, fired no more than 20 shells per gun on the day of the battle. Some of the batteries had to be moved to the rear.

On all fronts, ragged soldiers and no less ragged officers of the white armies, without food or ammunition, desperately fought Bolshevism. And in the rear...

“Looking at these hosts of scoundrels, at these dressed up ladies with diamonds, at these polished young men, I felt only one thing: I prayed: “Lord, send the Bolsheviks here, at least for a week, so that at least in the midst of the horrors of the Emergency, these animals understand that they do."

Ivan Nazhivin, Russian writer and emigrant

Lack of coordination of actions and the inability to organize, in modern terms, logistics and rear discipline, led to the fact that the purely military victories of the White movement dissolved in smoke. Whites were chronically unable to “put the pressure on” the enemy, while slowly and irreversibly losing their fighting qualities. The White armies at the beginning and end of the Civil War differed fundamentally only in the degree of raggedness and mental breakdown - and not for the better by the end. But the red ones changed...

“Yesterday there was a public lecture by Colonel Kotomin, who fled the Red Army; those present did not understand the bitterness of the lecturer, who pointed out that in the commissar army there is much more order and discipline than ours, and they created a huge scandal, with an attempt to beat the lecturer, one of the most ideological workers of our national Center; They were especially offended when K. noted that in the Red Army a drunken officer is impossible, because any commissar or communist would immediately shoot him.”

Baron Budberg

Budberg somewhat idealized the picture, but appreciated the essence correctly. And not only him. There was an evolution in the nascent Red Army, the Reds fell, received painful blows, but rose and moved on, drawing conclusions from the defeats. And even in tactics, more than once or twice the efforts of the Whites were defeated by the stubborn defense of the Reds - from Ekaterinodar to the Yakut villages. On the contrary, the Whites fail and the front collapses for hundreds of kilometers, often forever.

1918, summer - Taman campaign, for prefabricated Red detachments of 27,000 bayonets and 3,500 sabers - 15 guns, at best from 5 to 10 rounds of ammunition per soldier. There is no food, fodder, convoys or kitchens.

Red Army in 1918.
Drawing by Boris Efimov
http://www.ageod-forum.com

1920, autumn - The shock fire brigade on Kakhovka has a battery of six-inch howitzers, two light batteries, two detachments of armored cars (another detachment of tanks, but it did not have time to take part in battles), more than 180 machine guns for 5.5 thousand people, a flamethrower team, the fighters are dressed to the nines and impress even the enemy with their training; the commanders received leather uniforms.

Red Army in 1921.
Drawing by Boris Efimov
http://www.ageod-forum.com

The red cavalry of Dumenko and Budyonny forced even the enemy to study their tactics. Whereas the Whites most often “shone” with a frontal attack by full-length infantry and outflanking cavalry. When the White army under Wrangel, thanks to the supply of equipment, began to resemble a modern one, it was already too late.

The Reds have a place for career officers - like Kamenev and Vatsetis, and for those making a successful career “from the bottom” of the army - Dumenko and Budyonny, and for nuggets - Frunze.

And among the whites, with all the wealth of choice, one of Kolchak’s armies is commanded by... a former paramedic. Denikin’s decisive attack on Moscow is led by Mai-Maevsky, who stands out for his drinking bouts even against the general background. Grishin-Almazov, a major general, “works” as a courier between Kolchak and Denikin, where he dies. Contempt for others flourishes in almost every part.

3. Ideology - “Vote with your rifle!”

What was the Civil War like for the average citizen, the average person? To paraphrase one of the modern researchers, in essence these turned out to be grandiose democratic elections stretched over several years under the slogan “vote with a rifle!” The man could not choose the time and place where he happened to witness amazing and terrible events of historical significance. However, he could - albeit limitedly - choose his place in the present. Or, at worst, your attitude towards him.

Let us remember what was already mentioned above - the opponents were in dire need of armed force and food. People and food could be obtained by force, but not always and not everywhere, multiplying enemies and haters. Ultimately, the winner was not determined by how brutal he was or how many individual battles he could win. And what he can offer to the huge apolitical masses, insanely tired of the hopeless and protracted end of the world. Will it be able to attract new supporters, maintain the loyalty of the former, make neutrals hesitate, and undermine the morale of enemies.

The Bolsheviks succeeded. But their opponents do not.

“What did the Reds want when they went to war? They wanted to defeat the whites and, strengthened by this victory, create from it the foundation for the solid construction of their communist statehood.

What did the whites want? They wanted to defeat the Reds. And then? Then - nothing, because only state babies could not understand that the forces that supported the building of the old statehood were destroyed to the ground, and that there were no opportunities to restore these forces.

Victory for the Reds was a means, for Whites it was a goal, and, moreover, the only one.”

Von Raupach. "Reasons for the failure of the white movement"

Ideology is a tool that is difficult to calculate mathematically, but it also has its weight. In a country where the majority of the population could barely read, it was extremely important to be able to clearly explain why it was proposed to fight and die. The Reds did it. The Whites were unable to even decide among themselves what they were fighting for. On the contrary, they considered it right to postpone ideology “for later.” » , conscious non-predetermination. Even among the whites themselves, the alliance between the "owning classes" » , officers, Cossacks and “revolutionary democracy” » They called it unnatural - how could they convince the hesitant?

« ...We have created a huge blood-sucking bank for sick Russia... The transfer of power from Soviet hands to ours would not have saved Russia. Something new is needed, something hitherto unconscious - then we can hope for a slow revival. But neither the Bolsheviks nor we will be in power, and that’s even better!”

A. Lampe. From the Diary. 1920

A Tale of Losers

In essence, our forcedly brief note became a story about the weaknesses of the Whites and, to a much lesser extent, about the Reds. This is no coincidence. In any civil war, all sides demonstrate an unimaginable, prohibitive level of chaos and disorganization. Naturally, the Bolsheviks and their fellow travelers were no exception. But the whites set an absolute record for what would now be called “gracelessness.”

In essence, it was not the Reds who won the war, they, in general, did what they had done before - fought for power and solved problems that blocked the path to their future.

It was the whites who lost the confrontation, they lost at all levels - from political declarations to tactics and organization of supplies for the active army.

The irony of fate is that the majority of whites did not defend the tsarist regime, or even took an active part in its overthrow. They knew very well and criticized all the ills of tsarism. However, at the same time, they scrupulously repeated all the main mistakes of the previous government, which led to its collapse. Only in a more explicit, even caricatured form.

Finally, I would like to cite words that were originally written in relation to the Civil War in England, but are also perfectly suitable for those terrible and great events that shook Russia almost a hundred years ago...

“They say that these people were caught in a whirlwind of events, but the matter is different. No one was dragging them anywhere, and there were no inexplicable forces or invisible hands. It’s just that every time they were faced with a choice, they made the right decisions, from their point of view, but in the end a chain of individually correct intentions led them into a dark forest... All that remained was to get lost in the evil thickets until, finally, the survivors came to light , looking in horror at the road with corpses left behind. Many have gone through this, but blessed are those who understood their enemy and then did not curse him.”

A. V. Tomsinov “The Blind Children of Kronos”.

Literature:

1. Budberg A. Diary of a White Guard. - Mn.: Harvest, M.: AST, 2001
2. Gul R.B. Ice March (with Kornilov). http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/gul_rb/index.html
3. Drozdovsky M. G. Diary. - Berlin: Otto Kirchner and Ko, 1923.
4. Zaitsov A. A. 1918. Essays on the history of the Russian Civil War. Paris, 1934.
5. Kakurin N. E., Vatsetis I. I. Civil war. 1918–1921. - St. Petersburg: Polygon, 2002.
6. Kakurin N. E. How the revolution fought. 1917–1918. M., Politizdat, 1990.
7. Kovtyukh E.I. “Iron Stream” in a military presentation. Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1935
8. Kornatovsky N. A. The struggle for Red Petrograd. - M: ACT, 2004.
9. Essays by E. I. Dostovalov.
10. http://feb-web.ru/feb/rosarc/ra6/ra6–637-.htm
11. Reden. Through the hell of the Russian revolution. Memoirs of a midshipman. 1914–1919. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007.
12. Wilmson Huddleston. Farewell to Don. The Russian Civil War in the diaries of a British officer. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007.
13. LiveJournal of Evgenia Durneva http://eugend.livejournal.com - it contains various educational materials, incl. Some issues of red and white terror are considered in relation to the Tambov region and Siberia.

Every Russian knows that in the Civil War of 1917-1922 there were two movements – “red” and “white” – that opposed each other. But among historians there is still no consensus on where it began. Some believe that the reason was Krasnov's March on the Russian capital (October 25); others believe that the war began when, in the near future, the commander of the Volunteer Army Alekseev arrived on the Don (November 2); There is also an opinion that the war began with Miliukov proclaiming the “Declaration of the Volunteer Army”, delivering a speech at the ceremony called the Don (December 27). Another popular opinion, which is far from unfounded, is the opinion that the Civil War began immediately after the February Revolution, when the entire society was split into supporters and opponents of the Romanov monarchy.

"White" movement in Russia

Everyone knows that “whites” are adherents of the monarchy and the old order. Its beginnings were visible back in February 1917, when the monarchy was overthrown in Russia and a total restructuring of society began. The development of the “white” movement took place during the period when the Bolsheviks came to power and the formation of Soviet power. They represented a circle of people dissatisfied with the Soviet government, who disagreed with its policies and principles of its conduct.
The “Whites” were fans of the old monarchical system, refused to accept the new socialist order, and adhered to the principles of traditional society. It is important to note that the “whites” were often radicals; they did not believe that it was possible to agree on anything with the “reds”; on the contrary, they had the opinion that no negotiations or concessions were acceptable.
The “Whites” chose the Romanov tricolor as their banner. The white movement was commanded by Admiral Denikin and Kolchak, one in the South, the other in the harsh regions of Siberia.
The historical event that became the impetus for the activation of the “whites” and the transition of most of the former army of the Romanov Empire to their side was the rebellion of General Kornilov, which, although suppressed, helped the “whites” strengthen their ranks, especially in the southern regions, where, under the leadership of the general Alekseev began to gather enormous resources and a powerful, disciplined army. Every day the army was replenished with new arrivals, it grew rapidly, developed, hardened, and trained.
Separately, it is necessary to say about the commanders of the White Guards (that was the name of the army created by the “white” movement). They were unusually talented commanders, prudent politicians, strategists, tacticians, subtle psychologists, and skillful speakers. The most famous were Lavr Kornilov, Anton Denikin, Alexander Kolchak, Pyotr Krasnov, Pyotr Wrangel, Nikolai Yudenich, Mikhail Alekseev. We can talk about each of them for a long time; their talent and services to the “white” movement can hardly be overestimated.
The White Guards won the war for a long time, and even let down their troops in Moscow. But the Bolshevik army grew stronger, and they were supported by a significant part of the Russian population, especially the poorest and most numerous strata - workers and peasants. In the end, the forces of the White Guards were smashed to smithereens. For some time they continued to operate abroad, but without success, the “white” movement ceased.

"Red" movement

Like the “Whites,” the “Reds” had many talented commanders and politicians in their ranks. Among them, it is important to note the most famous, namely: Leon Trotsky, Brusilov, Novitsky, Frunze. These military leaders showed themselves excellently in battles against the White Guards. Trotsky was the main founder of the Red Army, which acted as the decisive force in the confrontation between the “whites” and the “reds” in the Civil War. The ideological leader of the “red” movement was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, known to every person. Lenin and his government were actively supported by the most massive sections of the population of the Russian State, namely the proletariat, the poor, land-poor and landless peasants, and the working intelligentsia. It was these classes that most quickly believed the tempting promises of the Bolsheviks, supported them and brought the “Reds” to power.
The main party in the country became the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party of the Bolsheviks, which was later turned into a communist party. In essence, it was an association of intelligentsia, adherents of the socialist revolution, whose social base was the working classes.
It was not easy for the Bolsheviks to win the Civil War - they had not yet completely strengthened their power throughout the country, the forces of their fans were dispersed throughout the vast country, plus the national outskirts began a national liberation struggle. A lot of effort went into the war with the Ukrainian People's Republic, so the Red Army soldiers had to fight on several fronts during the Civil War.
Attacks by the White Guards could come from any direction on the horizon, because the White Guards surrounded the Red Army from all sides with four separate military formations. And despite all the difficulties, it was the “Reds” who won the war, mainly thanks to the broad social base of the Communist Party.
All representatives of the national outskirts united against the White Guards, and therefore they became forced allies of the Red Army in the Civil War. To attract residents of the national outskirts to their side, the Bolsheviks used loud slogans, such as the idea of ​​​​a “united and indivisible Russia.”
The Bolshevik victory in the war was brought about by the support of the masses. The Soviet government played on the sense of duty and patriotism of Russian citizens. The White Guards themselves also added fuel to the fire, since their invasions were most often accompanied by mass robbery, looting, and violence in other forms, which could not in any way encourage people to support the “white” movement.

Results of the Civil War

As has already been said several times, victory in this fratricidal war went to the “reds”. The fratricidal civil war became a real tragedy for the Russian people. The material damage caused to the country by the war was estimated to be about 50 billion rubles - unimaginable money at that time, many times greater than the amount of Russia's external debt. Because of this, the level of industry decreased by 14%, and agriculture by 50%. According to various sources, human losses ranged from 12 to 15 million. Most of these people died from hunger, repression, and disease. During the hostilities, more than 800 thousand soldiers on both sides gave their lives. Also, during the Civil War, the balance of migration fell sharply - about 2 million Russians left the country and went abroad.

>>History: Civil War: Reds

Civil War: Reds

1.Creation of the Red Army.

2. War communism.

3. "Red Terror". Execution of the royal family.

4. Decisive victories for the Reds.

5.War with Poland.

6. End of the civil war.

Creation of the Red Army.

On January 15, 1918, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars proclaimed the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and on January 29 - the Red Fleet. The army was built on the principles of voluntariness and a class approach, which excluded the penetration of “exploiting elements” into it.

But the first results of the creation of a new revolutionary army did not inspire optimism. The volunteer principle of recruitment inevitably led to organizational disunity and decentralization in command and control, which had the most detrimental effect on the combat effectiveness and discipline of the Red Army. Therefore, V.I. Lenin considered it possible to return to the traditional, “ bourgeois»principles of military development, i.e., universal conscription and unity of command.

In July 1918, a decree was published on universal military service for the male population aged 18 to 40 years. A network of military commissariats was created throughout the country to keep records of those liable for military service, organize and conduct military training, mobilize the population fit for military service, etc. During the summer - autumn of 1918, 300 thousand people were mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army. By the spring of 1919, the number of Red Army soldiers increased to 1.5 million people, and by October 1919 - to 3 million. In 1920, the number of Red Army soldiers approached 5 million. Much attention was paid to command personnel. Short-term courses and schools were created to train mid-level commanders from the most distinguished Red Army soldiers. In 1917 - 1919 the highest military were opened educational establishments: Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, Artillery, Military Medical, Military Economic, Naval, Military Engineering Academies. A notice was published in the Soviet press about the recruitment of military specialists from the old army to serve in the Red Army.

The widespread involvement of military experts was accompanied by strict “class” control over their activities. For this purpose, in April 1918, the institute of military commissars was introduced in the Red Army, who not only supervised the command cadres, but also carried out the political education of the Red Army soldiers.

In September 1918, a unified structure for command and control of troops of the fronts and armies was organized. At the head of each front (army) was the Revolutionary Military Council (Revolutionary Military Council, or RVS), which consisted of the commander of the front (army) and two political commissars. All front-line and military institutions were headed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, headed by L. D. Trotsky.

Measures were taken to tighten discipline. Representatives of the Revolutionary Military Council, endowed with emergency powers up to and including the execution of traitors and cowards without trial, went to the most tense areas of the front.

In November 1918, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was formed, headed by V.I. Lenin. He concentrated in his hands all the power of the state.

War communism.

Social-Soviet power also underwent significant changes.
The activities of the poor commanders heated the situation in the village to the limit. In many areas, the Pobedy Committees entered into conflicts with local Soviets, seeking to usurp power. In the village, “a dual power was created, which led to a fruitless waste of energy and confusion in relations,” which the congress of committees of the poor of the Petrograd province in November 1918 was forced to admit.

On December 2, 1918, a decree was promulgated on the dissolution of the committees. This was not only a political, but also an economic decision. The calculations that the poor committees would help increase the supply of grain did not materialize. The price of the bread that was obtained as a result of the “armed campaign in the village” turned out to be immeasurably high - the general indignation of the peasants, which resulted in a series of peasant uprisings against the Bolsheviks. Civil War this factor could be decisive in the overthrow of the Bolshevik government. It was necessary to regain the trust, first of all, of the middle peasantry, which, after the redistribution of the land, determined the face of the village. The dissolution of the committees of the village poor was the first step towards a policy of pacification of the middle peasantry.

On January 11, 1919, the decree “On the allocation of grain and fodder” was issued. According to this decree, the state communicated in advance the exact figure of its grain needs. Then this amount was distributed (developed) among provinces, districts, volosts and peasant households. Fulfillment of the grain procurement plan was mandatory. Moreover, surplus appropriation was based not on the capabilities of peasant farms, but on very conditional “state needs,” which in reality meant the confiscation of all surplus grain, and often necessary supplies. What was new compared to the policy of food dictatorship was that the peasants knew in advance the intentions of the state, and this was an important factor for peasant psychology. In 1920, surplus appropriation extended to potatoes, vegetables and other agricultural products.

In the field of industrial production, a course was set for the accelerated nationalization of all industries, and not just the most important ones, as provided for by the decree of July 28, 1918.

The government introduced universal labor conscription and labor mobilization of the population to carry out work of national importance: logging, road, construction, etc. The introduction of labor conscription influenced the solution to the problem of wages. Instead of money, workers were given food rations, food stamps in the canteen, and basic necessities. Payments for housing, transport, utilities and other services were canceled. The state, having mobilized the worker, almost completely took over his maintenance.

Commodity-money relations were virtually abolished. First, the free sale of food was prohibited, then other consumer goods, which were distributed by the state as naturalized wages. However, despite all the prohibitions, illegal market trade continued to exist. According to various estimates, the state distributed only 30 - 45% of real consumption. Everything else was purchased on black markets, from “baggers” - illegal food sellers.

Such a policy required the creation of special super-centralized economic bodies in charge of accounting and distribution of all available products. The central boards (or centers) created under the Supreme Economic Council controlled the activities of certain industries, were in charge of their financing, material and technical supplies, and distribution of manufactured products.

The entire set of these emergency measures was called the policy of “war communism.” Military because this policy was subordinated to the sole goal - to concentrate all forces for military victory over one’s political opponents, communism because the measures undertaken Bolsheviks the measures surprisingly coincided with the Marxist forecast of some socio-economic features of the future communist society. The new program of the RCP(b), adopted in March 1919 at the VIII Congress, already linked “military-communist” measures with theoretical ideas about communism.

"Red Terror". Execution of the royal family.

Along with economic and military measures, the Soviet government on a national scale began to pursue a policy of intimidation of the population, called “red terror.”

In the cities, the “red terror” took on widespread proportions from September 1918 - after the murder of the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritsky, and the attempt on the life of V. I. Lenin. On September 5, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a resolution that “in this situation, ensuring the rear through terror is an immediate necessity”, that “it is necessary to liberate the Soviet Republic from class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps”, that “all persons related to White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions.” The terror was widespread. Only in response to the assassination attempt on V.I. Lenin, the Petrograd Cheka shot, according to official reports, 500 hostages.

In the armored train on which L. D. Trotsky made his journeys along the fronts, there was a military revolutionary tribunal with unlimited powers. The first concentration camps were created in Murom, Arzamas, and Sviyazhsk. Between the front and the rear, special barrage detachments were formed to fight deserters.

One of the ominous pages of the “Red Terror” was the execution of the former royal family and other members of the imperial family.
Oktyabrskaya revolution found the former Russian emperor and his family in Tobolsk, where he was sent into exile by order of A.F. Kerensky. The Tobolsk imprisonment lasted until the end of April 1918. Then the royal family was transferred to Yekaterinburg and housed in a house that previously belonged to the merchant Ipatiev.

On July 16, 1918, apparently in agreement with the Council of People's Commissars, the Ural Regional Council decided to shoot Nikolai Romanov and members of his family. 12 people were selected to carry out this secret “operation”. On the night of July 17, the awakened family was transferred to the basement, where the bloody tragedy took place. Along with Nikolai, his wife, five children and servants were shot. There are 11 people in total.

Even earlier, on July 13, the Tsar’s brother Mikhail was killed in Perm. On July 18, 18 members of the imperial family were shot and thrown into a mine in Alapaevsk.

Decisive victories for the Reds.

On November 13, 1918, the Soviet government annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and began making every effort to expel German troops from the territories they occupied. At the end of November, Soviet power was proclaimed in Estonia, in December - in Lithuania, Latvia, in January 1919 - in Belarus, in February - March - in Ukraine.

In the summer of 1918, the main danger to the Bolsheviks was the Czechoslovak corps, and above all its units in the Middle Volga region. In September - early October, the Reds took Kazan, Simbirsk, Syzran and Samara. Czechoslovak troops retreated to the Urals. At the end of 1918 - beginning of 1919, large-scale military operations took place on the Southern Front. In November 1918, Krasnov's Don Army broke through the Southern Front of the Red Army, inflicted a serious defeat on it and began to advance north. At the cost of incredible efforts, in December 1918 it was possible to stop the advance of the White Cossack troops.

In January - February 1919, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, and by March 1919, Krasnov's army was virtually defeated, and a significant part of the Don region returned to Soviet rule.

In the spring of 1919, the Eastern front again became the main front. Here the troops of Admiral Kolchak began their offensive. In March - April they captured Sarapul, Izhevsk, and Ufa. The advanced units of Kolchak’s army were located several tens of kilometers from Kazan, Samara and Simbirsk.

This success allowed the Whites to outline a new perspective - the possibility of Kolchak’s march on Moscow while the left flank of his army simultaneously reached the junction with Denikin’s forces.

The current situation seriously alarmed the Soviet leadership. Lenin demanded that emergency measures be taken to organize a rebuff to Kolchak. A group of troops under the command of M.V. Frunze in battles near Samara defeated selected Kolchak units and took Ufa on June 9, 1919. On July 14, Yekaterinburg was occupied. In November, Kolchak's capital, Omsk, fell. The remnants of his army rolled further east.

In the first half of May 1919, when the Reds were winning their first victories over Kolchak, General Yudenich’s attack on Petrograd began. At the same time, anti-Bolshevik protests took place among the Red Army soldiers in the forts near Petrograd. Having suppressed these protests, the troops of the Petrograd Front went on the offensive. Yudenich's units were driven back to Estonian territory. Yudenich’s second offensive against St. Petersburg in October 1919 also ended in failure.
In February 1920, the Red Army liberated Arkhangelsk, and in March - Murmansk. The "white" north became "red".

The real danger to the Bolsheviks was Denikin's Volunteer Army. By June 1919, it captured the Donbass, a significant part of Ukraine, Belgorod, and Tsaritsyn. In July, Denikin's attack on Moscow began. In September, the Whites entered Kursk and Orel and occupied Voronezh. The critical moment had come for the Bolshevik power. The Bolsheviks organized the mobilization of forces and resources under the motto: “Everything to fight Denikin!” The First Cavalry Army of S. M. Budyonny played a major role in changing the situation at the front. Significant assistance to the Red Army was provided by rebel peasant detachments led by N. I. Makhno, who deployed a “second front” in the rear of Denikin’s army.

The rapid advance of the Reds in the fall of 1919 forced the Volunteer Army to retreat south. In February - March 1920, its main forces were defeated and the Volunteer Army itself ceased to exist. A significant group of whites led by General Wrangel took refuge in the Crimea.

War with Poland.

The main event of 1920 was the war with Poland. In April 1920, the head of Poland, J. Pilsudski, gave the order to attack Kyiv. It was officially announced that it was only about providing assistance to the Ukrainian people in eliminating the illegal Soviet power and restoring the independence of Ukraine. On the night of May 6–7, Kyiv was taken, but the intervention of the Poles was perceived by the population of Ukraine as an occupation. The Bolsheviks took advantage of these sentiments and managed to unite various layers of society in the face of external danger. Almost all the available forces of the Red Army, united as part of the Western and Southwestern Fronts, were thrown against Poland. Their commanders were former officers of the tsarist army M. N. Tukhachevsky and A. I. Egorov. On June 12, Kyiv was liberated. Soon the Red Army reached the border with Poland, which raised hopes among some Bolshevik leaders for the speedy implementation of the idea of ​​world revolution in Western Europe.

In an order on the Western Front, Tukhachevsky wrote: “With our bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working humanity. To the west!"
However, the Red Army, which entered Polish territory, received rebuff from the enemy. The Polish “class brothers” did not support the idea of ​​a world revolution either; they preferred the state sovereignty of their country to the world proletarian revolution.

On October 12, 1920, a peace treaty with Poland was signed in Riga, according to which the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were transferred to it.

The end of the civil war.

Having made peace with Poland, the Soviet command concentrated all the power of the Red Army to fight the last major White Guard hotbed - the army of General Wrangel.

The troops of the Southern Front under the command of M. V. Frunze in early November 1920 stormed the seemingly impregnable fortifications of Perekop and Chongar and crossed the Sivash Bay.

The last battle between the Reds and Whites was especially fierce and cruel. The remnants of the once formidable Volunteer Army rushed to the ships of the Black Sea squadron concentrated in the Crimean ports. Almost 100 thousand people were forced to leave their homeland.
Thus, the civil war in Russia ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks. They managed to mobilize economic and human resources for the needs of the front, and most importantly, to convince huge masses of people that they were the only defenders of Russia’s national interests, and to captivate them with the prospects for a new life.

Documentation

A. I. Denikin about the Red Army

By the spring of 1918, the complete insolvency of the Red Guard was finally revealed. The organization of the workers' and peasants' Red Army began. It was built on old principles, swept aside by the revolution and the Bolsheviks in the first period of their rule, including normal organization, autocracy and discipline. “Universal compulsory training in the art of war” was introduced, instructor schools were founded for the training of command personnel, the old officer corps was registered, officers of the General Staff were brought into service without exception, etc. The Soviet government considered itself already strong enough to pour in without fear the ranks of their army are tens of thousands of “specialists”, obviously alien or hostile to the ruling party.

Order of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to the troops and Soviet institutions of the southern front No. 65. November 24, 1918

1. Any scoundrel who incites retreat, desertion, or failure to carry out a combat order will be SHOOTED.
2. Any Red Army soldier who leaves his combat post without permission will be SHOOTED.
3. Any soldier who throws down his rifle or sells part of his uniform will be SHOOTED.
4. Barrage detachments are distributed in every front-line zone to catch deserters. Any soldier who tries to resist these detachments must be SHOOTED on the spot.
5. All local councils and committees undertake, for their part, to take all measures to catch deserters, organizing raids twice a day: at 8 o’clock in the morning and at 8 o’clock in the evening. Those caught should be taken to the headquarters of the nearest unit and to the nearest military commissariat.
6. For harboring deserters, the perpetrators are subject to SHOOTING.
7. Houses in which deserters are hidden will be burned.

Death to selfish people and traitors!

Death to deserters and Krasnov agents!

Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic

Questions and tasks:

1. Explain how and why the views of the Bolshevik leadership on the principles of organizing the armed forces in a proletarian state changed.

2. What is the essence of military policy?

White movement(also met "White Guard", "White Case", "White Army", "White Idea", "Counter-revolution") - a military-political movement of politically heterogeneous forces, formed during the Civil War of 1917-1923 in Russia with the goal of overthrowing Soviet power. It included representatives of both moderate socialists and republicans, as well as monarchists, united against Bolshevik ideology and acting on the basis of the principle of “one and indivisible Russia.” The White movement was the largest anti-Bolshevik military-political force during the Russian Civil War and existed alongside other democratic anti-Bolshevik governments, nationalist separatist movements in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. The term "White Movement" originated in Soviet Russia, and since the 1920s. began to be used in Russian emigration.

A number of features distinguish the White movement from the rest of the anti-Bolshevik forces of the Civil War:

1. The White movement was an organized military-political movement against Soviet power and its allied political structures; its intransigence towards Soviet power excluded any peaceful, compromise outcome of the Civil War.
2. The White movement was distinguished by its emphasis on the priority of individual power over collegial power, and military power over civilian power in wartime. White governments were characterized by the absence of a clear separation of powers; representative bodies either did not play any role or had only advisory functions.
3. The White movement tried to legalize itself on a national scale, proclaiming its continuity from pre-February and pre-October Russia.
4. Recognition by all regional white governments of the all-Russian power of Admiral A.V. Kolchak led to the desire to achieve commonality of political programs and coordination of military actions. The solution to agrarian, labor, national and other basic issues was fundamentally similar.
5. The white movement had common symbols: a tricolor white-blue-red flag, a double-headed eagle, and the official anthem “How Glorious is Our Lord in Zion.”

The ideological origins of the White movement can begin with the preparation of the Kornilov speech in August 1917. The organizational development of the White movement began after the October Revolution and the liquidation of the Constituent Assembly in October 1917 - January 1918 and ended after Kolchak came to power on November 18, 1918 and the recognition of the Supreme Ruler of Russia as the main centers of the White movement in the North, North-West and South of Russia.

Despite the fact that there were serious differences in the ideology of the White movement, it was dominated by the desire to restore a democratic, parliamentary political system, private property and market relations in Russia.

Modern historians emphasize the national-patriotic nature of the struggle of the White movement, consolidating on this issue with the ideologists of the White movement, who, since the Civil War, have interpreted it as a Russian national patriotic movement.

Origin and identification

Some participants in discussions about the date of the emergence of the White movement considered its first step to be the Kornilov speech in August 1917. The key participants in this speech (Kornilov, Denikin, Markov, Romanovsky, Lukomsky, etc.), later prisoners of the Bykhov prison, became leading figures of the White movement in the South Russia. There was an opinion about the beginning of the White movement from the day General Alekseev arrived on the Don on November 15, 1917.

Some participants in the events expressed the opinion that the White movement originated in the spring of 1917. According to the theorist of the Russian counter-revolution, General of the General Staff N. N. Golovin, positive idea movement was that it originated exclusively to save the collapsing statehood and army.

Most researchers agreed that October 1917 interrupted the development of the counter-revolution that began after the fall of the autocracy in the direction of saving the collapsing statehood and initiated its transformation into an anti-Bolshevik force that included the most diverse and even political groups hostile to each other.

The White movement was characterized by its state purpose. It was interpreted as a necessary and mandatory restoration of law and order in the name of preserving national sovereignty and maintaining Russia's international authority.

In addition to the struggle against the Reds, the White movement also opposed the Greens and separatists during the Russian Civil War of 1917-1923. In this regard, the White struggle was differentiated into all-Russian (the struggle of Russians among themselves) and regional (the struggle of White Russia, which gathered forces on the lands of non-Russian peoples, both against Red Russia and against the separatism of peoples trying to separate from Russia).

Participants in the movement are called “White Guards” or “Whites”. The White Guards do not include anarchists (Makhno) and the so-called “greens”, who fought against both the “reds” and the “whites”, and national-separatist armed formations created on the territory of the former Russian Empire with the aim of gaining the independence of certain national territories.

According to Denikin’s general P.I. Zalessky, and the leader of the Cadet Party P.N. Milyukov, who agreed with him, who based this idea on his concept of the Civil War in the work “Russia at the Turning Point,” the White Guards (or White Army soldiers, or simply whites) - these are people of all strata of the Russian people persecuted by the Bolsheviks, who, by the force of events, because of the murders and violence perpetrated against them by the Leninists, were forced to take up arms and organize White Guard fronts.

The origin of the term “White Army” is associated with the traditional symbolism of white as the color of supporters of legal order and the idea of ​​sovereignty, as opposed to the destructive “red”. The color white has been used in politics since the days of the “white lilies of the Bourbons” and symbolized purity and nobility of aspirations.

The Bolsheviks called various rebels who fought with the Bolsheviks, both in Soviet Russia itself and in the border regions of the country, “White bandits,” although for the most part they had nothing to do with the White movement. When naming foreign armed units that provided support to the White Guard troops or acted independently against the Soviet troops, the Bolshevik press and in everyday life also used the root “White-”: “White Czechs”, “White Finns”, “White Poles”, “White Estonians”. The name “White Cossacks” was used similarly. It is also noteworthy that in Soviet journalism, “whites” were often used to refer to any representatives of the counter-revolution in general, regardless of their party and ideological affiliation.

The backbone of the White movement was the officers of the old Russian army. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of junior officers, as well as cadets, came from peasant backgrounds. The very first persons of the White Movement - generals Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin and others - were also of peasant origin.

Management. During the first period of the struggle - representatives of the generals of the Russian Imperial Army:

• General Staff Infantry General L. G. Kornilov,
• General Staff, Infantry General M.V. Alekseev,
• Admiral, Supreme Ruler of Russia since 1918 A. V. Kolchak
• General Staff, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin,
• cavalry general Count F.A. Keller,
• cavalry general P. N. Krasnov,
• cavalry general A. M. Kaledin,
• Lieutenant General E. K. Miller,
• Infantry General N.N. Yudenich,
• Lieutenant General V. G. Boldyrev
• Lieutenant General M. K. Diterichs
• General Staff, Lieutenant General I. P. Romanovsky,
• General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L. Markov and others.

In subsequent periods, military leaders who ended the First World War as officers and received general ranks during the Civil War came to the fore:

• General Staff Major General M. G. Drozdovsky
• General Staff, Lieutenant General V. O. Kappel,
• cavalry general A.I. Dutov,
• Lieutenant General Ya. A. Slashchev-Krymsky,
• Lieutenant General A. S. Bakich,
• Lieutenant General A. G. Shkuro,
• Lieutenant General G. M. Semenov,
• Lieutenant General Baron R. F. Ungern von Sternberg,
• Major General Prince P. R. Bermondt-Avalov,
• Major General N.V. Skoblin,
• Major General K.V. Sakharov,
• Major General V. M. Molchanov,

as well as military leaders who, for various reasons, did not join the white forces at the start of their armed struggle:

• future Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Crimea of ​​the General Staff, Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel,
• Commander of the Zemstvo Army, Lieutenant General M.K. Diterichs.

Goals and ideology

A significant part of the Russian emigration of the 20-30s of the XX century, led by the political theorist I. A. Ilyin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel and Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, equated the concepts of “White Idea” " and "state idea". In his works, Ilyin wrote about the colossal spiritual power of the anti-Bolshevik movement, which manifested itself “not in everyday passion for the homeland, but in love for Russia as a truly religious shrine.” Modern scientist and researcher V.D. Zimina emphasizes in her scientific work:

General Baron Wrangel, during his speech on the occasion of the formation of the empowered anti-Soviet government of the Russian Council, said that the White movement “with limitless sacrifices and the blood of its best sons” brought back to life the “lifeless body of the Russian national idea,” and Prince Dolgorukov, who supported it, argued that the White movement , even in emigration, the idea of ​​state power must be preserved.

The leader of the cadets, P. N. Milyukov, called the White movement “a core with a high patriotic spirit,” and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia of the General Staff, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin, called “the natural desire of the national body for self-preservation, for state existence.” Denikin very often emphasized that white leaders and soldiers died “not for the triumph of this or that regime... but for the salvation of Russia,” and A. A. von Lampe, the general of his army, believed that the White movement was one of the stages of a great patriotic movements.

There were differences in the ideology of the White movement, but the prevailing desire was to restore a democratic, parliamentary political system, private property and market relations in Russia. The goal of the White movement was proclaimed - after the liquidation of Soviet power, the end of the civil war and the advent of peace and stability in the country - to determine the future political structure and form of government of Russia through the convening of the National Constituent Assembly (the Principle of Non-Decision). During the Civil War, the White governments set themselves the task of overthrowing Soviet power and establishing a military dictatorship in the held territories. At the same time, the legislation in force in the Russian Empire before the revolution was reintroduced, adjusted taking into account the legislative norms of the Provisional Government acceptable to the White movement and the laws of new “state formations” on the territory of the former Empire after October 1917. Political program of the White movement in the field of foreign policy proclaimed the need to comply with all obligations under treaties with allied states. The Cossacks were promised to maintain independence in the formation of their own government bodies and armed forces. While maintaining the territorial integrity of the country for Ukraine, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, the possibility of “regional autonomy” was considered.

According to the historian General N.N. Golovin, who attempted a scientific assessment of the White movement, one of the reasons for the failure of the White movement was that, unlike its first stage (spring 1917 - October 1917), with its positive idea, for the sake of whose service the White movement appeared - solely for the purpose of saving the collapsing statehood and army, after the October events of 1917 and the Bolsheviks' dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, which was called upon to peacefully resolve the issue of the state structure of Russia after the February Revolution of 1917, the counter-revolution lost positive idea, understood as a general political and/or social ideal. Now only negative idea- the fight against the destructive forces of revolution.

The White movement in general gravitated toward cadet socio-political values, and it was the interaction of cadets with the officer environment that determined both the strategic and tactical guidelines of the White movement. Monarchists and Black Hundreds made up only a small part of the White movement and did not enjoy the right to cast a decisive vote.

Historian S. Volkov writes that “in general, the spirit of the White armies was moderate-monarchical,” while the White movement did not put forward monarchist slogans. A.I. Denikin noted that the vast majority of the command staff and officers of his army were monarchists, while he also writes that the officers themselves were of little interest in politics and the class struggle, and for the most part they were purely service elements, typical “intelligent proletariat ". Historian Slobodin warns against viewing the White movement as a party monarchist movement, since no monarchist party led the White movement.

The White movement consisted of forces that were heterogeneous in their political composition, but united in the idea of ​​​​rejection of Bolshevism. This was, for example, the Samara government, “KOMUCH”, in which the main role was played by representatives of the left parties - the Socialist Revolutionaries. According to the head of the defense of Crimea against the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1920, General Ya. A. Slashchev-Krymsky, the White movement was a mixture of the Cadets and Octobrist upper classes and the Menshevik-Esserist lower classes.

As General A.I. Denikin noted:

The famous Russian philosopher and thinker P. B. Struve also wrote in “Reflections on the Russian Revolution” that the counter-revolution must unite with other political forces that arose as a result and during the revolution, but were antagonistic in relation to it. The thinker saw in this the fundamental difference between the Russian counter-revolution of the early 20th century and the anti-revolutionary movement during the time of Louis XVI

Whites used the slogan “Law and Order!” and hoped to discredit the power of their opponents by this, while simultaneously strengthening the people’s perception of themselves as the saviors of the Fatherland. The intensification of unrest and the intensity of the political struggle made the arguments of the white leaders more convincing and led to the automatic perception of whites as allies by that part of the population that psychologically did not accept the unrest. However, soon this slogan about law and order manifested itself in the population’s attitude towards whites from a side that was completely unexpected for them and, to the surprise of many, played into the hands of the Bolsheviks, becoming one of the reasons for their final victory in the Civil War:

A participant in the White resistance, and later its researcher, General A. A. von Lampe testified that the slogans of the Bolshevik leaders, who played on the base instincts of the crowd, such as “Beat the bourgeoisie, rob the loot,” and told the population that everyone can take everything they have whatever, were infinitely more attractive to the people who had experienced a catastrophic decline in morals as a result of the 4-year war than the slogans of the white leaders who said that everyone was entitled only to what was due by law.

Denikin’s General von Lampe, the author of the above quote, further continuing his thought, wrote that “the Reds absolutely denied everything and elevated arbitrariness to law; Whites, denying the Reds, of course could not help but deny the methods of arbitrariness and violence used by the Reds...... The Whites failed or could not be fascists, who from the first moment of their existence began to fight using the methods of their opponent! And perhaps it was the unsuccessful experience of the whites that later taught the fascists?”

General von Lampe's conclusion was as follows:

A big problem for Denikin and Kolchak was the separatism of the Cossacks, especially the Kuban. Although the Cossacks were the most organized and worst enemies of the Bolsheviks, they sought first of all to liberate their Cossack territories from the Bolsheviks, had difficulty obeying the central government and were reluctant to fight outside their lands.

The white leaders envisioned the future structure of Russia as a democratic state in its Western European traditions, adapted to the realities of the Russian political process. Russian democracy was supposed to be based on democracy, the elimination of estate and class inequality, the equality of all before the law, and the dependence of the political position of individual nationalities on their culture and their historical traditions. So the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, argued that:

And the Commander-in-Chief of V.S.Yu.R. General A.I. Denikin wrote that after...

The Supreme Ruler pointed to the elimination of the autonomy of local self-government by the Bolsheviks and the first task in his policy was the establishment of universal suffrage and the free operation of zemstvo and city institutions, which together he considered the beginning of the revival of Russia. He said that he would convene the Constituent Assembly only when all of Russia was cleared of the Bolsheviks and law and order was established in it. Alexander Vasilyevich argued that he would disperse Kerensky’s elected party if it gathered on its own. Kolchak also said that when convening the Constituent Assembly, he would focus only on state-healthy elements. “This is the kind of democrat I am,” Kolchak summed up. According to the theorist of the Russian counter-revolution N. N. Golovin, of all the white leaders, only the Supreme Ruler, Admiral A. V. Kolchak, “found the courage not to leave the state point of view.”

Speaking about the political programs of the white leaders, it should be noted that the policy of “non-decision” and the desire to convene a Constituent Assembly was not, however, a generally accepted tactic. The white opposition, represented by the extreme right - primarily the top officers - demanded monarchist banners, overshadowed by the call “ For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!" This part of the White movement looked at the struggle against the Bolsheviks, who disgraced Russia with the Brest-Litovsk Peace, as a continuation of the Great War. Such views were expressed, in particular, by M. V. Rodzianko and V. M. Purishkevich. “The first checker of the Empire,” cavalry general Count F.A. Keller, who exercised overall command of all white troops in Ukraine from November 15, 1918, criticized Denikin for the “uncertainty” of his political program and explained to him his refusal to join his Volunteer Army :

The people are waiting for the Tsar and will follow the one who promises to return him!

According to I. L. Solonevich and some other authors, the main reasons for the defeat of the White cause were the absence of a monarchist slogan among the Whites. Solonevich also provides information that one of the Bolshevik leaders, the organizer of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky, agreed with this explanation of the reasons for the failure of the Whites and the victory of the Bolsheviks. In support of this, Solonevich cited a quotation that, according to him, belonged to Trotsky:

At the same time, according to historian S.V. Volkov, the tactic of not putting forward monarchist slogans in the conditions of the Civil War was the only correct one. He cites the example of the Southern and Astrakhan white armies, which openly marched with the monarchical banner, and by the autumn of 1918 suffered complete defeat due to the rejection of monarchical ideas by the peasantry, confirming this.

If we consider the struggle of ideas and slogans of whites and reds during the Civil War, then it should be noted that the Bolsheviks were in the ideological vanguard, who took the first step towards the people with plans to end the First World War and develop a world revolution, forcing the whites to defend themselves with their main slogan “ Great and United Russia”, understood as the obligation to restore and respect the territorial integrity of Russia and the pre-war borders of 1914. At the same time, “integrity” was perceived as identical to the concept of “Great Russia”. In 1920, Baron Wrangel tried to deviate from the generally accepted course towards a “Unified and Indivisible Russia,” whose head of the Department of Foreign Relations, P. B. Struve, stated that “Russia will have to co-organize on a federal basis through a free agreement between the state entities created on its territories.”

Already in exile, the whites regretted and repented that they could not formulate clearer political slogans that took into account changes in Russian realities, General A. S. Lukomsky testified to this.

Summarizing the analysis of the political and ideological models proposed by the white rulers, historian and researcher of the White movement and the Civil War V.D. Zimina writes:

One thing remained unchanged - the White movement was an alternative process to the Bolshevik process of leading (saving) Russia out of a multilateral imperial crisis by combining world and domestic traditions of political, socio-economic and cultural development. In other words, torn from the hands of Bolshevism and democratically renewed, Russia was supposed to remain “Great and United” in the community of developed countries of the world

- Zimina V.D. White matter of rebellious Russia: Political regimes of the Civil War. 1917-1920 - M.: Ros. humanist univ., 2006. - P. 103. - ISBN 5-7281-0806-7

Hostilities

Fighting in the South of Russia

The core of the White movement in southern Russia was the Volunteer Army, created in early 1918 under the leadership of generals Alekseev and Kornilov in Novocherkassk. The areas of initial action of the Volunteer Army were the Don Army Region and Kuban. After the death of General Kornilov during the siege of Yekaterinodar, command of the white forces passed to General Denikin. In June 1918, the 8,000-strong Volunteer Army began its second campaign against Kuban, which had completely rebelled against the Bolsheviks. Having defeated the Kuban Red group consisting of three armies (about 90 thousand bayonets and sabers), volunteers and Cossacks took Yekaterinodar on August 17, and by the end of August they completely cleared the territory of the Kuban army from the Bolsheviks (see also Development of the war in the South).

Winter 1918-1919 Denikin's troops established control over the North Caucasus, defeating and destroying the 90,000-strong 11th Red Army operating there. Having repulsed the offensive of the Red Southern Front (100 thousand bayonets and sabers) in the Donbass and Manych in March-May, on May 17, 1919, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (70 thousand bayonets and sabers) launched a counter-offensive. They broke through the front and, having inflicted a heavy defeat on units of the Red Army, by the end of June they captured Donbass, Crimea, Kharkov on June 24, Ekaterinoslav on June 27, and Tsaritsyn on June 30. On July 3, Denikin set his troops the task of capturing Moscow.

During the attack on Moscow (for more details, see Denikin’s March on Moscow) in the summer and autumn of 1919, the 1st Corps of the Volunteer Army under the command of General. Kutepov took Kursk (September 20), Orel (October 13) and began moving towards Tula. October 6 parts of the general. Shkuro occupied Voronezh. However, White did not have enough strength to develop success. Since the main provinces and industrial cities of central Russia were in the hands of the Reds, the latter had an advantage both in the number of troops and in weapons. In addition, the Polish leader Pilsudski betrays Denikin and, contrary to the agreement, at the height of the attack on Moscow, concludes a truce with the Bolsheviks, temporarily stopping hostilities and allowing the Reds to transfer additional divisions from their no longer threatened flank to the Oryol area and increase the already overwhelming quantitative advantage over parts of the AFSR. Denikin would later (in 1937) write that if the Poles had made any minimal military efforts at that moment on their front, the Soviet government would have fallen, directly stating that Pilsudski saved the Soviet government from destruction. In addition, in the difficult situation that had arisen, Denikin had to withdraw significant forces from the front and send them to the Yekaterinoslav region against Makhno, who had broken through the White front in the Uman region and, with his raid across Ukraine in October 1919, destroyed the rear of the AFSR. As a result, the attack on Moscow failed, and under the pressure of superior forces of the Red Army, Denikin's troops began to retreat to the south.

On January 10, 1920, the Reds occupied Rostov-on-Don, a large center that opened the road to Kuban, and on March 17, 1920, Yekaterinodar. The Whites fought back to Novorossiysk and from there crossed by sea to the Crimea. Denikin resigned and left Russia. Thus, by the beginning of 1920, Crimea turned out to be the last bastion of the White movement in the south of Russia (for more details, see Crimea - the last bastion of the White movement). Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel took command of the army. The size of Wrangel's army in mid-1920 was about 25 thousand people. In the summer of 1920, the Russian Army of General Wrangel launched a successful offensive in Northern Tavria. In June, Melitopol was occupied, significant Red forces were defeated, in particular, the Zhloba cavalry corps was destroyed. In August, an amphibious landing was undertaken on Kuban under the command of General S.G. Ulagai, but this operation ended in failure.

On the northern front of the Russian army, stubborn battles took place throughout the summer of 1920 in Northern Tavria. Despite some successes for the Whites (Aleksandrovsk was occupied), the Reds, during stubborn battles, occupied a strategic bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper near Kakhovka, creating a threat to Perekop. Despite all the efforts of the Whites, it was not possible to eliminate the bridgehead.

The situation in Crimea was made easier by the fact that in the spring and summer of 1920 large Red forces were diverted to the west, in the war with Poland. However, at the end of August 1920, the Red Army near Warsaw was defeated, and on October 12, 1920, the Poles signed a truce with the Bolsheviks, and Lenin’s government threw all its forces into the fight against the White Army. In addition to the main forces of the Red Army, the Bolsheviks managed to win over Makhno’s army, which also took part in the assault on Crimea.

To storm Crimea, the Reds gathered significant forces (up to 200 thousand people versus 35 thousand for the Whites). The attack on Perekop began on November 7. The fighting was characterized by extraordinary tenacity on both sides and was accompanied by unprecedented losses. Despite the gigantic superiority in manpower and weapons, the Red troops for several days could not break the defenses of the defenders of the Crimea, and only after, having crossed the shallow Chongar Strait, units of the Red Army and Makhno’s allied detachments entered the rear of the main white positions (see. scheme), and on November 11, the Makhnovists defeated Barbovich’s cavalry corps near Karpova Balka, and the White defense was broken through. The Red Army broke into Crimea. By November 13 (October 31), Wrangel's army and many civilian refugees on ships of the Black Sea Fleet sailed to Constantinople. The total number of people who left Crimea was about 150 thousand people.

Fighting in Siberia and the Far East

• Eastern Front - Admiral A.V. Kolchak, General Staff Lieutenant General V.O. Kappel
• People's Army
• Siberian Army
• Western Army
• Ural Army
• Orenburg separate army

Fight in the North-West

General Nikolai Yudenich created the North-Western Army on the territory of Estonia to fight Soviet power. The army numbered from 5.5 to 20 thousand soldiers and officers.

On August 11, 1919, the Government of the North-Western Region was created in Tallinn (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance - Stepan Lianozov, Minister of War - Nikolai Yudenich, Minister of Marine - Vladimir Pilkin, etc.). On the same day, the Government of the North-Western Region, under pressure from the British, who promised recognition, weapons and equipment for the army for this, recognized the state independence of Estonia. However, Kolchak's all-Russian government did not approve this decision.

After the recognition of Estonia's independence by the Government of the Russian North-Western Region, Great Britain provided him with financial assistance and also made minor supplies of weapons and ammunition.

N.N. Yudenich tried to take Petrograd twice (in spring and autumn), but was unsuccessful each time.

The spring offensive (5.5 thousand bayonets and sabers for the Whites against 20 thousand for the Reds) of the Northern Corps (from July 1, the North-Western Army) on Petrograd began on May 13, 1919. The Whites broke through the front near Narva and, by moving around Yamburg, forced the Reds to retreat. On May 15 they captured Gdov. Yamburg fell on May 17, and Pskov fell on May 25. By the beginning of June, the Whites reached the approaches to Luga and Gatchina, threatening Petrograd. But the Reds transferred reserves to Petrograd, increasing the size of their group operating against the North-Western Army to 40 thousand bayonets and sabers, and in mid-July they launched a counteroffensive. During heavy fighting, they pushed back the small units of the North-Western Army beyond the Luga River, and on August 28 they captured Pskov.

Autumn offensive on Petrograd. On October 12, 1919, the North-Western Army (20 thousand bayonets and sabers versus 40 thousand for the Reds) broke through the Soviet front near Yamburg and on October 20, 1919, having taken Tsarskoye Selo, it reached the suburbs of Petrograd. The Whites captured the Pulkovo Heights and, on the far left flank, broke into the outskirts of Ligovo, and scout patrols began fighting at the Izhora plant. But, having no reserves and not receiving support from Finland and Estonia, after ten days of fierce and unequal battles near Petrograd with the Red troops (whose numbers had grown to 60 thousand people), the North-Western Army was unable to capture the city. Finland and Estonia refused assistance because the leadership of the White Army never recognized the independence of these countries. On November 1, the retreat of the Northwestern White Army began.

By mid-November 1919, Yudenich's army retreated to Estonia with stubborn fighting. After the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty between the RSFSR and Estonia, 15 thousand soldiers and officers of Yudenich’s North-Western Army, under the terms of this treaty, were first disarmed, and then 5 thousand of them were captured by the Estonian authorities and sent to concentration camps.

Despite the exodus of the White armies from their native land as a result of the Civil War, from a historical perspective the White movement was by no means defeated: once in exile, it continued to fight against the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia and beyond.

White Army in exile

White emigration, which has become massive since 1919, was formed in several stages. The first stage is associated with the evacuation of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin from Novorossiysk in February 1920. The second stage - with the departure of the Russian Army of Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel from Crimea in November 1920,

The third - with the defeat of the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak and the evacuation of the Japanese army from Primorye in the 1920-1921s.

After the evacuation of Crimea, the remnants of the Russian Army were stationed in Turkey, where General P. N. Wrangel, his headquarters and senior commanders had the opportunity to restore it as a fighting force. The key task of the command was, firstly, to obtain from the Entente allies material assistance in the required amount, secondly, to fend off all their attempts to disarm and disband the army and, thirdly, disorganized and demoralized by defeats and evacuation of the units as soon as possible to reorganize and put things in order, restoring discipline and morale.

The legal position of the Russian Army and military alliances was complex: the legislation of France, Poland and a number of other countries in whose territory they were located did not allow the existence of any foreign organizations “looking like formations organized on a military model.” The Entente powers sought to turn the Russian army, which had retreated but retained its fighting spirit and organization, into a community of emigrants. “Even more than physical deprivation, complete political lack of rights weighed on us. No one was guaranteed against the arbitrariness of any agent of power of each of the Entente powers. Even the Turks, who themselves were under the regime of arbitrariness of the occupation authorities, were guided in relation to us by the rule of the strong,” wrote N.V. Savich, Wrangel’s employee responsible for finance. That is why Wrangel decides to transfer his troops to the Slavic countries.

In the spring of 1921, Baron P.N. Wrangel turned to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments with a request for the possibility of resettling Russian Army personnel in Yugoslavia. The units were promised maintenance at the expense of the treasury, which included rations and a small salary. On September 1, 1924, P. N. Wrangel issued an order on the formation of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). It included all units, as well as military societies and unions that accepted the order for execution. The internal structure of individual military units was kept intact. The EMRO itself acted as a unifying and governing organization. The Commander-in-Chief became its head, and the general management of the affairs of the EMRO was concentrated at Wrangel’s headquarters. From this moment on, we can talk about the transformation of the Russian Army into an emigrant military organization. The Russian General Military Union became the legal successor of the White Army. This can be discussed by referring to the opinion of its creators: “The formation of the EMRO prepares the opportunity, in case of need, under the pressure of the general political situation, for the Russian Army to adopt a new form of existence in the form of military alliances.” This “form of being” made it possible to fulfill the main task of the military command in exile - maintaining existing and training new army personnel.

An integral part of the confrontation between the military-political emigration and the Bolshevik regime on the territory of Russia was the struggle of the special services: reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the EMRO with the organs of the OGPU - NKVD, which took place in various regions of the planet.

White emigration in the political spectrum of Russian diaspora

The political moods and preferences of the initial period of Russian emigration represented a fairly wide range of trends, almost completely reproducing the picture of the political life of pre-October Russia. In the first half of 1921, a characteristic feature was the strengthening of monarchical tendencies, explained, first of all, by the desire of ordinary refugees to rally around a “leader” who could protect their interests in exile, and in the future ensure their return to their homeland. Such hopes were associated with the personality of P. N. Wrangel and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, to whom General Wrangel reassigned the EMRO as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

White emigration lived in hope of returning to Russia and liberating it from the totalitarian regime of communism. However, the emigration was not united: from the very beginning of the existence of the Russian Abroad, there was a fierce struggle between supporters of reconciliation with the regime established in sub-Soviet Russia (“Smenovekhovtsy”) and supporters of an irreconcilable position in relation to communist power and its legacy. White emigration, led by the EMRO and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, formed the camp of irreconcilable opponents of the “anti-national regime in Russia.” In the thirties, part of the emigrant youth, children of white fighters, decided to go on the offensive against the Bolsheviks. This was the national youth of the Russian emigration, first calling itself the “National Union of Russian Youth”, later renamed the “National Labor Union of the New Generation” (NTSNP). The goal was simple: to contrast Marxism-Leninism with another idea based on solidarity and patriotism. At the same time, the NTSNP never identified itself with the White movement, criticized the Whites, considering itself a political party of a fundamentally new type. This ultimately led to an ideological and organizational break between the NTSNP and the ROWS, which continued to remain in the previous positions of the White movement and was critical of the “national boys” (as NTSNP members began to be called in emigration).

In 1931, in Harbin in the Far East, in Manchuria, where a large Russian colony lived, the Russian Fascist Party was also formed among part of the Russian emigration. The party was created on May 26, 1931 at the 1st Congress of Russian Fascists, held in Harbin. The leader of the Russian Fascist Party was K.V. Rodzaevsky.

During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the Bureau of Russian Emigrants was created, headed by Vladimir Kislitsyn.

Cossacks

Cossack units also emigrated to Europe. Russian Cossacks appeared in the Balkans. All villages, or rather, only village atamans and boards, were subordinate to the “United Council of the Don, Kuban and Terek” and the “Cossack Union,” which were headed by Bogaevsky.

One of the largest was the Belgrade General Cossack village named after Peter Krasnov, founded in December 1921 and numbering 200 people. By the end of the 20s. its number was reduced to 70 - 80 people. For a long time, the ataman of the village was the captain N.S. Sazankin. Soon the Terets left the village, forming their own village - Terskaya. The Cossacks who remained in the village joined the EMRO and it received representation in the “Council of Military Organizations” of the IV Department, where the new ataman, General Markov, had the same voting rights as other members of the council.

In Bulgaria by the end of the 20s, there were no more than 10 villages. One of the most numerous was Kaledinskaya in Ankhialo (ataman - Colonel M.I. Karavaev), formed in 1921 with 130 people. Less than ten years later, only 20 people remained in it, and 30 left for Soviet Russia. The social life of Cossack villages and farms in Bulgaria consisted of helping the needy and disabled, as well as holding military and traditional Cossack holidays.

Burgas Cossack village, formed in 1922 with 200 people by the end of the 20s. also consisted of no more than 20 people, and half of the original composition returned home.

During the 30s - 40s. Cossack villages ceased to exist due to the events of the Second World War.

On December 16, 1872, one of the main leaders of the White movement during the Civil War, Anton Denikin, was born. We decided to remember the other most famous white generals

2013-12-15 19:30

Anton Denikin

Anton Ivanovich Denikin was one of the main leaders of the White movement during the Civil War, its leader in the south of Russia. He achieved the greatest military and political results among all the leaders of the White movement. One of the main organizers and then commander of the Volunteer Army. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Deputy Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Admiral Kolchak.

After the death of Kolchak, all-Russian power was supposed to pass to Denikin, but on April 4, 1920, he transferred command to General Wrangel and on the same day he left with his family for Europe. Denikin lived in England, Belgium, Hungary, and France, where he was engaged in literary activities. While remaining a staunch opponent of the Soviet system, he nevertheless refused German offers of cooperation. Soviet influence in Europe forced Denikin to move to the United States in 1945, where he continued to work on the autobiographical story “The Path of a Russian Officer,” but never finished it. General Anton Ivanovich Denikin died of a heart attack on August 8, 1947 at the University of Michigan Hospital in Ann Arbor and was buried in a cemetery in Detroit. In 2005, the ashes of General Denikin and his wife were transported to Moscow for burial in the Holy Don Monastery.

Alexander Kolchak

The leader of the White movement during the Civil War, Supreme Ruler of Russia Alexander Kolchak was born on November 16, 1874 in St. Petersburg.

In November 1919, under the pressure of the Red Army, Kolchak left Omsk. In December, Kolchak’s train was blocked in Nizhneudinsk by the Czechoslovaks. On January 4, 1920, he transferred the entirety of the already mythical power to Denikin, and the command of the armed forces in the east to Semyonov. Kolchak's safety was guaranteed by the allied command. But after the transfer of power in Irkutsk to the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee, Kolchak was also at his disposal. Upon learning of Kolchak's capture, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin gave orders to shoot him. Alexander Kolchak was shot along with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pepelyaev on the banks of the Ushakovka River. The corpses of those shot were lowered into an ice hole on the Angara.

Lavr Kornilov

Lavr Kornilov - Russian military leader, participant in the Civil War, one of the organizers and Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, leader of the White movement in the South of Russia.

On April 13, 1918, he was killed during the assault on Yekaterinodar by an enemy grenade. The coffin with Kornilov's body was secretly buried during the retreat through the German colony of Gnachbau. The grave was razed to the ground. Later, organized excavations discovered only the coffin with the body of Colonel Nezhentsev. In Kornilov’s dug up grave, only a piece of a pine coffin was found.

Peter Krasnov

Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov - general of the Russian Imperial Army, ataman of the All-Great Don Army, military and political figure, writer and publicist. During World War II, he served as head of the Main Directorate of Cossack Troops of the Imperial Ministry of Eastern Occupied Territories. In June 1917, he was appointed head of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division, in September - commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, and promoted to lieutenant general. He was arrested during the Kornilov speech upon arrival in Pskov by the commissar of the Northern Front, but was then released. On May 16, 1918, Krasnov was elected ataman of the Don Cossacks. Having relied on Germany, relying on its support and not obeying A.I. To Denikin, who was still focused on the “allies,” he launched a fight against the Bolsheviks at the head of the Don Army.

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR announced the decision to execute Krasnov P.N., Krasnov S.N., Shkuro, Sultan-Girey Klych, von Pannwitz - for the fact that “through the White Guard detachments they formed, they waged an armed struggle against the Soviet Union and carried out active espionage, sabotage and terrorist activities against the USSR”. On January 16, 1947, Krasnov and others were hanged in Lefortovo prison.

Peter Wrangel

Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel - Russian military commander from the main leaders of the White movement during the Civil War. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Crimea and Poland. Lieutenant General of the General Staff. Knight of St. George. He received the nickname “Black Baron” for his traditional everyday dress - a black Cossack Circassian coat with gazyrs.

On April 25, 1928, he died suddenly in Brussels after suddenly contracting tuberculosis. According to his family, he was poisoned by the brother of his servant, who was a Bolshevik agent. He was buried in Brussels. Subsequently, Wrangel's ashes were transferred to Belgrade, where they were solemnly reburied on October 6, 1929 in the Russian Church of the Holy Trinity.

Nikolai Yudenich

Nikolai Yudenich - a Russian military leader, an infantry general - during the Civil War he led the forces operating against Soviet power in the northwestern direction.

He died in 1962 from pulmonary tuberculosis. He was buried first in the Lower Church in Cannes, but subsequently his coffin was transferred to Nice to the Cocade cemetery. On October 20, 2008, in the church fence near the altar of the Church of the Holy Cross Church in the village of Opole, Kingisepp district, Leningrad region, as a tribute to the memory of the fallen ranks of General Yudenich’s army, a monument to the soldiers of the North-Western Army was erected.

Mikhail Alekseev

Mikhail Alekseev was an active participant in the White movement during the Civil War. One of the creators, Supreme Leader of the Volunteer Army.

He died on October 8, 1918 from pneumonia and after a two-day farewell to thousands of people, he was buried in the Military Cathedral of the Kuban Cossack Army in Yekaterinodar. Among the wreaths laid on his grave, one attracted the attention of the public with its genuine touchingness. It was written on it: “They didn’t see, but they knew and loved.” During the retreat of the white troops at the beginning of 1920, his ashes were taken to Serbia by relatives and colleagues and reburied in Belgrade. During the years of communist rule, in order to avoid the destruction of the grave of the founder and leader of the “White Cause,” the slab on his grave was replaced with another, on which only two words were laconically written: “Mikhail the Warrior.”