What is the Barbarossa plan? The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Plan Barbarossa, Master Plan Ost

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its allies launched a major operation to invade the Soviet Union, which they called Plan Barbarossa - about 4.5 million soldiers crossed the borders of the USSR without warning from Poland, Finland and Romania. Hitler had his own plans for the USSR's resources, despite the fact that Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in 1939. Both sides had long suspected each other, and the treaty simply gave them some time to prepare for a possible war. The Soviet Union was unprepared for a surprise attack on a border almost 2,900 km away and suffered terrible losses. In one week, German forces advanced 200 miles (321 km) into Soviet territory, destroyed nearly 4,000 aircraft, and killed, captured, or wounded approximately 600,000 Red Army soldiers. By December 1941, Germany had approached Moscow and laid siege to the city, but the notoriously harsh Russian winter had taken hold and the German advance was stalled. As a result of one of the largest and worst military operations in history, Germany lost 775 thousand soldiers, more than 800 thousand Soviet soldiers were killed, and another 6 million were wounded or captured. But Operation Barbarossa was thwarted despite its successful start, and Hilter’s plan for a blitzkrieg in the USSR failed, which was a turning point in World War II.

(Total 45 photos)

1. A German soldier and the corpse of a Soviet soldier lying on the ground near a burning BT-7 tank in 1941, during the first days of Operation Barbarossa. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

2. Soviet guards mortars fire at the enemy. (AFP/Getty Images)

3. A German tank regiment prepares to attack on July 21, 1941, somewhere on the Eastern Front during Germany's successful attempt to invade the USSR. (AP Photo)

4. A German radio operator in an armored personnel carrier on the territory of the USSR in August 1941. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

5. German infantrymen monitor the movement of the enemy from a trench on the territory of the USSR on July 10, 1941. (AP Photo)

6. German Stuka dive bombers en route to their target over the area between the Dnieper and Crimea on November 6, 1941. (AP Photo)

7. German soldiers cross the Don River while advancing towards the Caucasus. (AP Photo)

8. German soldiers push a horse-drawn cart along a log deck in October 1941 near Salla, on the Kola Peninsula, Finland. (AP Photo)

9. A German sentry, against the backdrop of a burning bridge over the Dnieper, in recently captured Kyiv, in 1941. (Deutsches Bundesarchiv/German Federal Archive)

10. Machine gun crew of the Far Eastern Red Army of the USSR in 1941. (LOC)

11. A German bomber with a burning engine crashes in an unknown location in November 1941. (AP Photo)

12. Nazi troops in positions during the battle on the outskirts of Kyiv. (AP Photo)

13. Traces of Soviet resistance on the streets of Rostov at the end of 1941. (AP Photo)

14. Soviet prisoners and a Nazi column on July 2, 1941, at the beginning of a brutal battle between Germany and the USSR. (AP Photo)

15. Civilians save their modest belongings during the scorched earth tactics in the Leningrad region on October 21, 1941. (AP Photo)

16. Reindeer graze at an airbase in Finland on July 26, 1941, with a German plane taking off in the background. (AP Photo)

17. Heinrich Himmler (on the left in glasses), head of the Gestapo and SS troops with a prisoner of war in a camp in Russia. (National Archives)

18. Photo taken by a German photojournalist to prove great successes in the Moscow direction. 650 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who were captured in cauldrons near Bryansk and Vyazma. They were to be transported to a prison camp on November 2, 1941. (AP Photo)

19. Adolf Hitler (center) with General Field Marshal Walter von Brauchach (left) and Commander-in-Chief Franz Halder on August 7, 1941. (AP Photo)

20. German motorized infantry advances through a burning Russian village on June 26, 1941. (AP Photo)

22. In addition to regular troops, the rapidly advancing German forces encountered partisan resistance on their way. This photo shows partisans in position armed with rifles and a DP machine gun. (LOC)

25. Partisans before execution near Velizh in the Smolensk region in September 1941. (LOC)

26. A Finnish train passes along a section of the railway restored after the explosion on October 19, 1941. (AP Photo)

27. Burning houses, ruins and debris indicate the brutal nature of the fighting in front of the entrance to the industrial center of Rostov on November 22, 1941. (AP Photo)

28. General Guderian communicates with representatives of a tank formation on the Russian front on September 3, 1941. (AP Photo)

29. German soldiers remove communist symbols as they advance through the USSR on July 18, 1941. (AP Photo)

30. A man with his wife and child after the evacuation from Minsk, where German troops invaded on August 9, 1941. (AP Photo)

31. German authorities stated that this photo was a distant view of Leningrad taken from German positions on October 1, 1941. Dark silhouettes in the sky are Soviet balloons. The Germans besieged the city for two years, but were never able to conquer it. (AP Photo)

33. German Colonel General Ernst Busch inspects an anti-aircraft gun somewhere in Germany on September 3, 1941. (AP Photo)

34. Finnish soldiers storming a Soviet defensive structure on August 10, 1941. On the left is one of those who surrendered. (AP Photo)

35. German troops advance through the suburbs of Leningrad on November 24, 1941. (AP Photo)38. German motorized infantry in Staritsa on November 21, 1941 while advancing towards Kyiv. The charred buildings in the background are the result of scorched earth tactics. (AP Photo)

39. A German soldier uses his butt to knock down the front door of a house from which sniper fire was fired on September 1, 1941. (AP Photo)

40. Two Soviet soldiers, now prisoners of war, inspect a toppled and broken statue of Lenin somewhere in the USSR on August 9, 1941. Pay attention to the rope around the neck of the statue - this is a typical German method of “dismantling” Soviet monuments. (AP Photo)

41. German sources state that the officer on the right is a captured Soviet colonel being interrogated by Nazi officers on October 24, 1941. (AP Photo)

42. Advanced units of German troops entered the burning Smolensk during the advance towards Moscow in August 1941. (AP Photo)

43. A train transporting Soviet prisoners of war to Germany on October 3, 1941. Several million Soviet soldiers ended up in German concentration camps. Many of them died in captivity. (AP Photo)

44. Soviet snipers emerge from their hideout in a hemp thicket somewhere in the USSR on August 27, 1941. In the foreground is a blown up Soviet tank. (AP Photo)

45. German infantry in winter uniform next to a convoy on the approaches to Moscow in November 1941. The onset of cold weather disrupted the already poor food supply and hampered the German advance, leading to Soviet counterattacks and heavy losses on both sides. (AP Photo)

The balance of power in Europe on the eve of the execution of the Barbarossa plan.

“BARBAROSSA PLAN” (“Barbarossa Fall”), on behalf of the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, is the conventional name for the plan of aggressive war of Nazi Germany against the USSR (see Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945). The fascist leaders of Germany began to develop this plan in the summer of 1940 during the 2nd World War. When planning a war against the USSR, German fascism sought to destroy the world's first socialist state, as the main obstacle in the struggle of the German imperialists for world domination. The history of the “Barbarossa Plan” reveals the inconsistency of the version of Nazi historians about the supposedly “preventive” nature of the war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The first order to prepare a plan for this war was given by Hitler to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, on July 21, 1940. At the same time, the transfer of fascist German troops to the East began. At the end of July, the entire future Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was already concentrated in Poznan, and new divisions were being formed in Germany. Formations of Nazi troops arrived in Poland, Finland and Romania. The main decisions were made at a meeting of military leadership at Berghof on July 31, 1940. On August 1, General E. Marx (chief of staff of the 18th Army, stationed at the Soviet borders) presented the first version of the war plan, the basis of which was a “lightning campaign” with the capture of Moscow and the entry of fascist German troops to the line of Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk, and then - to the Urals, with a period of implementation from 9 to 17 weeks. Due to fears of flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the North and South, this version of the plan was revised after being tested by war games. Since August 9, by order (under the name "Aufbau Ost") of the Hitlerite command, intensive preparations for the theater of war against the USSR began; railways and highways, airfields, warehouses, etc. were built and repaired. On December 5, the final version of the plan, then called “Otto’s plan”, according to the report of the scientific General Staff of General Halder, was approved by a military meeting, and on December 18, Hitler approved and signed the plan drawn up by General Warlimont Based on the decisions of the meeting, Directive No. 21 on the war plan against the USSR called “Operation Barbarossa”. This ended the 1st period of preparation of the “Barbarossa Plan”, when strategic principles of warfare were developed, forces and means for attack were determined, and the most important measures were taken to organize the concentration of fascist forces to the borders of the USSR. On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the OKH (OKH - Ober Kommando des Heeres) - the main command of the German ground forces, issued the “Troop Concentration Directive”, which formulated the main strategic idea of ​​the “Barbarossa Plan”: “to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army concentrated in the western parts of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disparate groups of enemy troops." Army Group South (Field Marshal Runstedt) was heading south of Polesie (see map), delivering the main blow to Kyiv. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was to advance north of Polesie, delivering the main blow from the area of ​​Warsaw and Suwalki in the direction of Smolensk; in the future, with tank troops, together with Army Group North, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, it was supposed to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, and then, with the Finnish army and German troops from Norway, finally eliminate the resistance of Soviet troops in the North. The implementation of subsequent tasks was planned in the interaction of Army Groups “Center” and “South”. In the central direction, the Nazi command hoped to quickly take Moscow, which, according to his plan, was supposed to bring decisive success to the entire campaign, and in the South - to capture the Donbass. The concentration directive set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the deployment of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the Air Force and Navy, the actions of the Romanian and Finnish armies, the procedure for transferring troops to the Soviet borders, camouflage measures and preparatory work. In addition to the main documents - Directive No. 21 and the Concentration Directive, the Barbarossa Plan was supplemented by a set of other instructions, orders and directives. The “Directive on disinformation of the enemy” demanded that the concentration of fascist German armed forces against the USSR be presented as a “great disinformation maneuver” to divert attention from the preparations for the invasion of England; “Special instructions” defined the system of brutal fascist terror in the occupied Soviet territories and political control there under the leadership of the Reichsführer - the head of the SS troops, Himmler. The date for the start of the attack on the USSR according to the “Barbarossa Plan” - May 1941 - in connection with the actions planned in the spring of 1941 against Yugoslavia and Greece, was postponed on April 30 by the fascist high command to June 22 (the final order about this date was given on June 17). The increased transfer of German troops to the Soviet border (tank and motorized divisions were transferred last for camouflage purposes) began in February 1941. At the last 2 meetings of the senior command staff of Nazi Germany before the attack on the USSR, on June 6 and 14, 1941, reports were heard on the readiness of troops under the “Barbarossa Plan”. Hitler called this attack “the last great campaign of the war”, in which no moral or ethical considerations should be stopped. The political foundations of the “Barbarossa Plan” were outlined by one of the fascist leaders, Rosenberg, at a secret meeting on June 20 and amounted to the complete destruction of the Soviet state, the implementation of physical extermination and eviction of indigenous people throughout the entire territory up to the Urals, replacing them with German colonists. In addition to the “Barbarossa Plan”, there were special directives on the merciless destruction of the rebellious civilian population, partisans and prisoners of war of the Soviet Army on Soviet soil, on a starvation regime for the entire population, on the seizure and merciless plunder of the Soviet economy (approved by Goering “Directive for the management of the economy again occupied eastern regions"), about forced labor of the Soviet population.

In connection with the Barbarossa Plan, ties between Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe and Japan were strengthened and formalized. On March 5, 1941, Hitler approved a special directive on cooperation with Japan, the basis of which was the active actions of the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. Italy and the puppet government of Slovakia were involved in the war against the USSR. In accordance with the Barbarossa Plan, from September 1940 in Romania, a military mission led by General Hansen and Speidel, with a large apparatus of military instructors, was engaged in the reorganization and retraining of the Romanian army along the German model. In January-February 1941, General Halder and the Chief of the General Staff of Finland, General Heinrichs, together with the Chief of Staff of the German troops in Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, developed a plan for joint operations of German and Finnish troops in Finland. In Hungary, similar work was carried out by the mission of General Paulus from the end of March 1941. By June 21, the concentration of German, Finnish and Romanian formations to the Soviet border was completed and everything was prepared for the attack in accordance with the Barbarossa Plan.

Bourgeois German military historians seek to confuse many issues related to the preparation and planning of the war against the USSR; they distort the political causes of the war, the time when the practical development of the war plan began, and the role of the German generals and senior staffs in preparing the war. The former chief of the OKH General Staff, F. Halder, claims without any basis that representatives of the high command of all branches of the armed forces, including Goering, allegedly warned Hitler against war against the USSR (see "Hitler als Feldherr. Der ehemalige Chef des Generalstabes berichtet die Wahrheit", Münch., 1949, § 21). Blumentritt (served on the General Staff), contrary to the truth, also writes that generals Brauchitsch and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia (“Fatal Decisions”, translated from English, M., 1958, p. 66). The same falsification is resorted to by K. Tippelskirch in the book “History of the Second World War” (translated from German, M., 1956), Ditmar, Butlar and others in the book. "World War 1939-1945." (collection of articles, translated from German, M., 1957), historian Görlitz (W. Görlitz, Der deutsche Generalstab, Frankf./M., 1951, S. 5). Thus, a completely false thesis is being developed about supposedly fundamental and fundamental differences between the fascist leaders of Germany and its generals on the issue of war against the USSR. The purpose of these statements is to whitewash him. the General Staff and the high command, who lost the war, and put all the blame for the failure of the Barbarossa Plan on Hitler. Documents and the entire course of development of the “Barbarossa Plan” by the General Staff of Nazi Germany and the preparation of the attack on the USSR show that this attack was not “the fruit of improvisation,” as West German historians portray it, but was prepared according to a strictly thought-out plan. The Barbarossa Plan was essentially adventuristic; it exaggerated the capabilities of Nazi Germany and underestimated the political, economic and military power of the USSR. The defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Army showed the complete inconsistency of the calculations of Hitler's strategists and the authors of the Barbarossa Plan.

Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Operations headquarters
National Defense Department
33408/40. Sov. secret

Fuhrer Headquarters 12/18/40
9 copies

The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a short-term campaign even before the war against England (Plan Barbarossa) is over.

Ground forces must use for this purpose all units at their disposal, with the exception of those necessary to protect the occupied territories from any surprises.

The task of the air force is to release such forces to support the ground forces in the Eastern Campaign so that ground operations can be counted on to be completed quickly while at the same time limiting the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft to a minimum. However, this concentration of Air Force efforts in the East must be limited by the requirement that all theaters of military operations and areas where our military industry is located are reliably protected from enemy air raids and offensive actions against England, especially against its sea communications, do not weaken at all.

The main forces of the navy should, of course, be directed against England during the Eastern Campaign.

I will give the order for the strategic deployment of armed forces against Soviet Russia, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start of operations.

Preparations that require a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should begin now and be completed by May 15, 1941.

It is critical that no one discovers the intention to carry out an attack.

Preparatory activities of the highest command authorities should be carried out based on the following basic provisions.

I. General concept

The main forces of the Russian ground forces located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations through deep, rapid extension of tank wings. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

By rapid pursuit a line must be reached from which the Russian air force will not be able to carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich. The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a barrier against the Asian part of Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining in Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.

During these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus be unable to continue the fight.

Effective actions of the Russian air force must be prevented by our powerful strikes at the very beginning of the operation.

II. Allies and their missions

1. In the war against Soviet Russia on the flanks of our front, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, agree and determine in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon their entry into the war.

2. The task of Romania will be to support with its selected forces the offensive of German troops on the southern flank, at least at the beginning of it, to pin down enemy forces where German troops are not deployed, and otherwise to carry out auxiliary service in the rear areas.

3. Finland must cover the concentration and deployment of a separate German northern group of forces (part of the 21st Army), coming from Norway, and conduct military operations together with them. In addition, Finland will be responsible for the capture of the Hanko Peninsula.

A) Ground forces (expressing agreement with the operational plans reported to me)

The theater of military operations is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern parts. The direction of the main attack should be prepared north of the Pripyat marshes. Two army groups should be concentrated here.

The southern of these groups, which is the center of the general front, has the task of attacking with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw area and north of it and splitting up enemy forces in Belarus. In this way, the prerequisites will be created for the rotation of powerful units of mobile troops to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern group of armies advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic states. Only after ensuring the completion of this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should operations begin to capture Moscow as an important center of communications and military industry.

Only the unexpectedly rapid failure of the Russian resistance could justify the formulation and implementation of these two tasks simultaneously.

The most important task of the 21st Army during the Eastern Campaign remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in addition (the mountain corps) should be used in the North primarily for the defense of the Petsamo (Pechenga) regions and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route. Then these forces must, together with Finnish troops, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to paralyze the supply of the Murmansk region via land communications.

Whether such an operation will be carried out by larger forces of German troops (two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it depends on Sweden's willingness to place its railways at our disposal for the transfer of troops.

The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked, in accordance with the advance of the German northern flank, to pin down as many Russian troops as possible, advancing to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and capture the Hanko Peninsula.

The armies operating in the south of the Pripyat marshes must further west of the Dnieper in the course of a circumferential operation and, with the help of strong flanks, completely defeat the Russian forces located in Ukraine. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate the main direction of the attack from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv, while the forces located in Romania form a protective flank separated by a large distance through the lower reaches of the Prut. The Romanian army is given the task of pinning down the Russian forces located between them.

At the end of the battles to the south and north of the Pripyat swamps, pursue the enemy and ensure the achievement of the following goals:

In the south, timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk basin,

In the north, quickly reach Moscow.

The capture of this city means not only a decisive political and economic success, but also the loss of an important railway junction.

B) Air Force

Their task will be to maximally paralyze and neutralize the opposition of the Russian air force and support the ground forces in their operations in decisive directions. This will be primarily necessary in the direction of the central army group and on the main wing of the southern army group. Russian railways and communications routes, depending on their importance for the operation, should be cut or disabled through the capture of important objects closest to the combat area (river crossings!) by bold actions of airborne troops.

In order to concentrate all forces to fight against enemy aircraft and to directly support ground forces, military industrial facilities should not be attacked during the operation. Such attacks, and primarily in the direction of the Urals, will be on the agenda only after the end of maneuver operations.

B) Navy

In the war against Soviet Russia, the navy is assigned the task of preventing the enemy's navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea, while ensuring the defense of its coast. Considering that after reaching Leningrad, the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless position, major naval operations should be avoided until this point.

After the neutralization of the Russian fleet, the task will be to ensure complete freedom of maritime communications in the Baltic Sea, in particular the supply by sea of ​​the northern flank of the ground forces (mine sweeping!).

All orders that will be given by the Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly proceed from the fact that we are talking about precautionary measures in the event that Russia changes its present position towards us. The number of officers involved in initial preparations should be as limited as possible. The remaining employees whose participation is necessary should be involved in the work as late as possible and familiarized with tasks only to the extent necessary for the performance of official duties by each of them individually. Otherwise, there is a danger of serious political and military complications arising from the disclosure of our preparations, the timing of which has not yet been determined.

I expect oral reports from the Commanders-in-Chief on their future intentions based on this directive.

Report to me through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces about the planned preparatory activities of all types of armed forces and the progress of their implementation.

A. Hitler

Translation from German: L. Bönnemann. Translation editor: L. Antipova

The Germans had a plan to quickly capture our Fatherland - the Barbarossa plan. This is the name of one of the kings of Germany, Frederick I Barbarossa. This plan is also called "Blitz Krieg". It was assumed that the eastern lands would be conquered with lightning speed, without any protracted war. The Germans expected to implement the “Barbarossa Plan” to seize the territories of the Soviet Union in 3-4 months.

Enemy troops

Nazi Germany sent a huge amount of troops and equipment to our country. According to the Barbarossa plan, after 4 months they wanted to capture the line from Arkhangelsk to the Volga. Destroying tens of millions of our soldiers and civilians. Then, according to the German plan, the industrial base that still remained in the Urals was to be paralyzed with the help of aviation.

The number of divisions with which Nazi Germany and its allies attacked our Fatherland was (only in the first strategic echelon) 157. In addition to the German ones, this number included Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian troops. One German division is 16,000 people. In the Red Army this is usually 10,000. The total German reserve consisted of 183 divisions and 13 brigades.

German troops were equipped with advanced technology. When sending such huge forces to our country, the Germans were not going to stand on ceremony. They wanted to wipe out tens of millions of people from the face of the earth. Aviation alone sent 3,470 units to our Fatherland. And it’s strange when you hear the opinion that the Germans wanted to destroy only the Bolshevik political system. Aircraft bombs from 3,470 aircraft did not know who to fall on. They flew not at the political system, but at our people (including the Slavs).

About Blitz Krieg itself

The Barbarossa plan (German command directive No. 21) was adopted on December 18, 1940, six months before the attack. It was accepted. It is clear that it was developed even earlier. This document was endorsed by Jodl and Keitel. Signed by Hitler. It is published in the book The Nuremberg Trials, Volume II, pp. 559-565. This book was published by Moscow publishing house in 1958.

A document from 1946 dated June 6 has also been preserved. This document is a transcript of a meeting of the International Military Tribunal. Interrogation of the defendant Jodl, where he answers questions from the investigative process. Thanks to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, it became possible that Jodl, who endorsed the Barbarossa plan (in 1940), became a defendant in the Nuremberg trials in 1946. Just like the hard-won liberation from the Nazis became possible with enormous sacrifices (27 million people died during the war years). Thanks to the heroism of the soldiers and civilians (who joined the partisans), Barbarossa’s plan collapsed. Just as another plan of the top of Nazi Germany collapsed - the Ost plan.

In continuation - plan "Ost"

The Ost plan needs to be discussed separately. But it is worth saying that even German historians recognized him. Names such as I. Heinemann, P. Wagner and W. Oberkrom. Their articles are available in Russian translation. Senior researcher at the German Federal Archives Matthias Meissner also speaks about the existence of the Ost plan. You can watch his interview in the documentary “Shadow over Russia”. You can also read works about the Ost plan by the Russian historian I. Petrov.

Plan Ost was to be implemented after Plan Barbarossa. It was assumed that after the victory, concentration camps would be built in the eastern (from Germany) lands. The population will be destroyed in these camps. According to the plan, it was decided to leave only a few, and only for heavy physical work in mines and felling timber. That is, essentially leaving slaves for whom education and personal rights were not expected. They were only supposed to provide Germany with resources. Living in conditions close to concentration camps.

Our heroes. Their feat gave us freedom. Gave us the opportunity not to be built into someone’s terrible plan, be it the “Barbarossa” plan or the “Ost” plan.

(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for Germany's invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and the military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. It provided for the lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with a subsequent exit on the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan.

The expected duration of the main hostilities, designed for 2-3 months, is the so-called “Blitzkrieg” strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).

Prerequisites

After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments sharply increased in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry of Great Britain and France into the war, the German government decided to protect itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed the former possessions of the Russian Empire from Poland: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French Campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States.

However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to make peace or defeat it. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany made attempts to attract Spain and Vichy France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.

Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions it set out were unacceptable to Germany, since they required it to renounce intervention in Finland and closed its possibility of advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans.

However, despite these events of the autumn, based on Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940, the OKH drew up rough outlines of a campaign plan against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan began, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa.” The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler soon after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.

The Axis powers are informed of Barbarossa's plan.

Plans of the parties

Germany

The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is “ defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the war against England was over" The concept was based on the idea “ split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep strikes from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groups of enemy troops" The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing them from withdrawing inland.

In development of the Barbarossa plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops on January 31, 1941.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikie Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces into defense of the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.

The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a disinformation directive, calculation of time for preparing an operation, special instructions, etc.

Directive No. 21, signed by Hitler, named May 15, 1941 as the earliest date for an attack on the USSR. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, June 22, 1941 was named as the next date for the attack on the USSR. The final order was given on June 17.

USSR

Soviet intelligence managed to obtain information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word “Barbarossa.” And the information received about the possible outbreak of war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were absolutely disinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated the approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941 and emphasized that the USSR must be defeated " more before that how the war against England will end».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic headquarters game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.

The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Bialystok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th Army occupied the most unfavorable location. This operational configuration of troops created the threat of deep envelopment and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by attacking the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suwalki and Brest directions was not deep and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough and envelopment of the Bialystok group. This erroneous deployment of troops, committed in 1940, was not corrected until the war itself...»

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, the meaning and purpose of which continue to be discussed. At the end of May and beginning of June 1941, a partial mobilization of troops was carried out under the guise of reserve training, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people who were used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began moving from the internal military districts to the border of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a hidden regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of going to the camps, more than half of the divisions constituting the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line commands to field command posts. From mid-June, vacations for personnel were cancelled.

At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the forefield. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive to switch to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters only after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were given to the commanders of the western districts from June 14 to 18.

In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were incorporated into the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population was quite hostile to Soviet power, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.

Balance of power

Germany and allies

Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.

• Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Klaipeda to Gołdap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Tank Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 1,070 combat aircraft. The task of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.

• Army Group Center (Field Marshal Feodor von Bock) occupied the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa. It included the 4th Army, 9th Army, 2nd Tank Group and 3rd Tank Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with dissecting the strategic front of the Soviet defense, encircling and destroying the Red Army troops in Belarus and developing an offensive in the Moscow direction.

• Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It included the 6th Army, 11th Army, 17th Army, 3rd Romanian Army, 4th Romanian Army, 1st Tank Group and the Hungarian Mobile Corps - a total of 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 800 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which had 500 aircraft. Army Group South had the task of destroying Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.

USSR

In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.

• The North-Western Front (commander F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic states. It included the 8th Army, the 11th Army and the 27th Army - a total of 34 divisions (of which 6 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Northwestern Front.
• The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It included the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and 13th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 20 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Western Front Air Force.
• The Southwestern Front (commander M.P. Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It included the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th Army and 26th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front.
• The Southern Front (commander I.V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and Southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
• The Baltic Fleet (commander V.F. Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 ​​torpedo boats and other ships, 656 aircraft.
• The Black Sea Fleet (commander F.S. Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It consisted of 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, and over 600 aircraft.

Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came to third place after the United States and Germany in terms of the level of development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.

First phase. Invasion. Border battles (22 June - 10 July 1941)

Beginning of the invasion

In the early morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy (Italian troops began fighting on July 20, 1941) and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia declared war on June 23, and Hungary declared war on June 27. The German invasion took the Soviet troops by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of the ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; The Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1,200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libau, Vindava, Sevastopol. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas and minefields were laid. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts, demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched against the enemy groups that had broken through in the morning of June 23. As a result of failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even further. Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for events to develop, but giving German aviation the opportunity to refuel.

The Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory on June 25. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and threatening Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The fighting soon turned into positional warfare and had no impact on the general state of affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography they are usually separated into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.

Northern direction

At first, not one, but two tank groups operated against the Soviet North-Western Front:

• Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main striking force, the 4th Tank Group, was advancing on Daugavpils.
• The 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center was advancing in the Vilnius direction.

An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the city of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the Western Dvina line.

But already on June 26, the German 4th Tank Group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (56th motorized corps of E. von Manstein), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (41st motorized corps of G. Reinhard). Following the motorized corps, infantry divisions advanced. On June 27, Red Army units left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned to the southeast and went behind the rear of the Soviet Western Front.

Central direction

A difficult situation developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno area and 4th Army in the Brest area) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23–25 ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, which contained the main forces of the Western Front.

On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; Later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the Western Front headquarters, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were led first by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.

At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the Soviet defense line on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly encountered troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the heated tank battle on July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1,600 tanks took part on the Soviet side, and up to 700 units on the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units retreated to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up their starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of ​​Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.

South direction

The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful group of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. On June 23-25, Black Sea Fleet aircraft bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, Constanta was attacked by ships of the Black Sea Fleet together with aviation. In an effort to stop the advance of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with six mechanized corps (about 2,500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area, Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lviv group (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front retreated to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. At the beginning of July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to counterattacks by Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.

At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, on July 2, German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10 they reached the Dniester.

Results of border battles

As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.

Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:

Second phase. The offensive of German troops along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)

Northern direction

On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advancing in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Ostrov, and on July 9, Pskov.

On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Tank Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th Motorized Corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, the German command on July 19 suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies arrived. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the border of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.

On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was split into two parts: the 11th Rifle Corps went to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.

On August 8, Army Group North resumed its offensive against Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk, and on August 10 - in the Luga area and in the Novgorod-Chudov direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19 the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.

On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, and on August 20, Chudovo. On August 23, fighting began for Oranienbaum; The Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).

Offensive on Leningrad

To strengthen Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th Motorized Corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.

At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Lyuban, on August 30 it reached the Neva and cut off the railway connection with the city, on September 8 it took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.

However, having decided to carry out Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release no later than September 15, 1941 of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps, which were called upon to participate in the final offensive on Moscow.

On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further military operations in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)

On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northern direction. The railways carrying food through Lake Ladoga to Leningrad were cut. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of German troops breaking through to the rear and encircling the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops who occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malovishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were thrown back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.

Central direction

On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group attacked from Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, and three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk “cauldron” ended, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were captured.

On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for a whole month for Velikiye Luki. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central section of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.

Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, the main forces went over to the defensive and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat Soviet troops in the Velikie Luki area and capture Toropets on August 29.

On August 8-12, the 2nd Tank Group and the 2nd Field Army began advancing southward. As a result of the operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, and Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts of the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on September 6.

South direction

In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack of two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Coastal Army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa pinned down the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.

Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Belaya Tserkov direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both army commanders. But although German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.

Thus, Army Group South was unable to independently solve the tasks set for it by the Barbarossa plan. From early August to early October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.

Battle of Kyiv

In pursuance of Hitler's orders, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.

After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center advanced to join the 6th Army of Army Group South; On September 9, both German armies united in eastern Polesie. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was completely broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.

At the same time, the German 2nd Tank Group, repelling the attack of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered operational space. On September 9, the 3rd Panzer Division of V. Model broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.

Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Group launched an offensive on September 12 from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northern direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd tank groups linked up at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front found themselves in the gigantic Kiev “cauldron”; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. The administration of the Southwestern Front turned out to be destroyed; Front commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos died.

As a result, Left Bank Ukraine was in the hands of the enemy, the path to Donbass was open, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbass direction, see Donbass operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, Crimea was important as an aviation base. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the ability to raid Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and focused its efforts on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.

On October 17, Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of Army Group South gained a foothold on the Mius Front line.

Turn from Moscow

At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; Volga line - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November.

On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front, the implementation of Operation Barbarossa was discussed in time:

• Army Group North: Operations developed almost entirely according to plans.
• Army Group Center: Until the start of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed in accordance with plans, then development slowed down.
• Army Group South: Operations progressed more slowly than expected.

However, Hitler became increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: “ First, Leningrad must be captured, for this purpose the troops of the Gotha group are used. Secondly, the eastern part of Ukraine will be captured... And only as a last resort will an offensive be launched to capture Moscow».

The next day, F. Halder clarified the Fuhrer’s opinion with A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (the seizure of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Fuehrer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine, you should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.

On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: " The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and blocking the Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is to encircle Leningrad and connect with Finnish troops».

Evaluation of Hitler's decision

Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and to turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help Army Group South caused mixed opinions among the German command.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, G. Goth, wrote in his memoirs: “ There was one compelling argument of operational significance against continuing the offensive on Moscow at that time. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops located in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back the enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper to the south. An attempt to throw the Baltic group into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being attacked; in the south, this danger was already making itself felt...»

The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group, G. Guderian, wrote: “ The battle for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, whether this tactical success also had major strategic significance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw.».

Only on September 30, German troops, having brought up reserves, went on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, stubborn resistance from Soviet troops and difficult weather conditions in late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see Battle of Moscow)

Results of Operation Barbarossa

The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unachieved. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.

The main reasons can be associated with a general underestimation of the Red Army. Despite the fact that before the war the total number and composition of Soviet troops was determined quite correctly by the German command, the major miscalculations of the Abwehr included an incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces.

Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, it was expected to meet no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army. In fact, the Soviet leadership sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer alone (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games conducted by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the “Eastern Campaign” had to be won with one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of operations, “which is expanding to the east like a funnel,” German forces “will prove insufficient unless it is possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians up to the Kyiv-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line.”

Meanwhile, on the line of the Dnieper-Western Dvina rivers, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrating behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the enemy’s advance to the east.

In addition, due to the fact that the army groups launched attacks on divergent directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain cooperation between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central attacking group. These operations, although successful, resulted in wasted time and resources for the motorized troops.

In addition, already in August the question of the priority of targets arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict, a crisis of command arose.

Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.

Army Group "South" was unable to carry out deep envelopment with its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) and destroy the main enemy troops in right-bank Ukraine on time and, as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .

Subsequently, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.

In the fall of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow).

The 1941 campaign ended with the defeat of German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under