Illegal armed groups in Chechnya. Destroyed Chechen militants. Reference. Basics of Guerrilla Tactics

The beginning of the Chechen war is one of the most tragic pages of our history.

On December 24, 1994, troops of the Russian Armed Forces entered Grozny. Or rather, it’s difficult to call it a deployment of troops - the troops were abandoned, almost at random. Without any preliminary assessment of the situation and accurate intelligence data. Many experts gave their assessment of the unforgivable miscalculation of the General Staff in those days; many Russians and residents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CHIR) know that the start of the first company was only a consequence of complete lack of control on the part of the state authorities in the republic.

How the war in Chechnya began

In 1991, the current colonel of the Armed Forces of Russia and the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared the independence of Ichkeria, looking back at the republics of the disintegrating USSR (Transcaucasia, the Baltic states, Central Asia).

From Moscow, no one commented on this step, no official statement was made on this matter, which gave the Dudayev regime a reason to gain momentum that was terrifying in its scale. In those years, according to various sources, up to 15 large military formations were stationed on the territory of the Chechen Republic; there were large quantities of weapons (from infantry to artillery). Perhaps there was no air base with MIGs and SU (the nearest large air base of the USSR Armed Forces was located 650 km to the east, in an Azerbaijani village called Nasosny).

Having come to full and uncontrolled power in the republic from Moscow, Dzhokhar Dudayev began to arm his own army, and various alternative military units were formed (including women’s battalions). As during the Zaporozhye Sich, the army and illegal armed groups of Chechnya at that time were regularly replenished by various asocial elements: convicts released without any reason, deserters of the USSR Armed Forces, adventurers from all the republics of the USSR, the first mercenaries arrived from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the beginning of 1994, Dudayev’s “army” was a force comparable in strength and capabilities to the army corps of the fronts during the Second World War. According to various estimates, the quantitative composition of Dudayev’s army could reach 50,000 personnel.

Lawlessness of militants

During 1994, illegal groups under the command of Dzhokhar Dudayev committed a number of outright criminal acts, including: forgery of bank advice notes (the losses of Sberbank of the Russian Federation amounted to billions of rubles), the seizure of a sealed carriage with the national currency of Azerbaijan (manats, which were printed and sent from France) - they say Heydar Aliyev was forced to pay “tribute.” The precedent did not develop into an international scandal only by pure chance.

On trains passing through the territory of ChIR, conductors were regularly killed (shot), and passengers were robbed by people in uniform and with machine guns. These and many other manifestations of the criminal nature of the gangs of “independent Ichkeria” became the official reason for sending troops into the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

December 24, 1994 can be considered the day the Chechen war began. With air support, the first columns of infantry formations began to advance into Grozny; the vast majority of the fighters were recruited in the fall of 1994. These and many other ill-conceived decisions of the Ministry of Defense subsequently led to tragic consequences. Despite the fierce resistance of the illegal armed forces under the command of Dzhokhar Dudayev, during the first few days the Russian Armed Forces captured Grozny. A new milestone in the history of “hot spots” had begun...

The first Chechen war, which imperceptibly turned into the second, provided analysts with a fairly large amount of information material on the enemy opposing the Russian Armed Forces, its tactics and methods of combat, material and technical equipment, including infantry weapons. Newsreels of those years dispassionately captured the presence of the latest models of small arms in the hands of Chechen militants.

The weapons and military equipment of the armed forces of the Dudayev regime were replenished from several sources. First of all, these were weapons lost by the Russian Armed Forces in 1991–1992. According to the Ministry of Defense, the militants received 18,832 units of 5.45 mm AK/AKS-74 assault rifles, 9,307 - 7.62 mm AKM/AKMS assault rifles, 533 - 7.62 mm SVD sniper rifles, 138 - 30 mm easel automatic rifles AGS-17 “Plamya” grenade launchers, 678 tank and 319 heavy-caliber machine guns DShKM/DShKMT/NSV/NSVT, as well as 10,581 TT/PM/APS pistols. Moreover, this number did not include more than 2,000 RPK and PKM light machine guns, as well as 7 Igla-1 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), an unspecified number of Strela-2M MANPADS, 2 Konkurs anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs) , 24 sets of Fagot ATGMs, 51 Metis ATGMs and at least 740 missiles for them, 113 RPG-7 hand grenade launchers, 40 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, over 100 artillery pieces. OKNCH militants, during the defeat of the KGB of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in September 1991, captured approximately 3,000 small arms, and more than 10,000 units were taken by them during the disarmament of local internal affairs bodies. The influx of weapons and ammunition into the North Caucasus continued subsequently, and in 1992-1994. the number of weapons entering Chechnya has been constantly growing. And from the beginning of 1994, a large number of weapons, including the latest ones, began to come from federal structures to the forces of the anti-Dudaev opposition, then smoothly flowing into the hands of Dudayev’s supporters.

The supply of weapons to Chechnya took several routes. Along with direct purchases by the Dudayev regime in the CIS countries and the Baltic republics of small arms of standard models, a fairly large number of a wide variety of weapons came into this region through smuggling both from the near abroad - Georgia, Azerbaijan, and further afield - Afghanistan and Turkey. In 1991, the first batch of Soviet-style small arms (mostly produced in the GDR) was delivered from Turkey under the guise of humanitarian aid to Chechnya, and some of it was transported by militants through the territory of Azerbaijan. From Afghanistan came 7.62-mm AK-47 assault rifles made in China, AKMs made in the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Egypt, Chinese Degtyarev RPD and Kalashnikov PK/PKM machine guns, as well as English 7.71-mm sniper rifles, which are completely atypical for our country. Lee-Enfield No. 4 Mk.1(T), widely used by spooks in Afghanistan. These rifles were used by special Mujahideen sniper groups formed in Afghanistan and who arrived with their weapons in Chechnya to continue the war with the Shuravi. Chechen fighters who fought in Abkhazia brought with them a large number of domestic weapons. Including 7.62-mm Kalashnikov assault rifles made in the GDR, which were given to the Chechens as trophies. From the same source, the militants received 5.45 mm AK-74 and 7.62 mm AKM of Romanian production, as well as 7.62 mm PK/PKM and their PKT tank variants, converted by Georgians into manual ones.

Since the beginning of the Chechen war, a thorough supply of weapons to the Chechen illegal armed groups comes not only from abroad, but also from Russia itself. Thus, at the end of May 1995, during the defeat of one of the Dudayev squads, a mortar and a batch of 5.45 mm AK-74 assault rifles, manufactured by the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant in January 1995, were captured. Moreover, by that time these weapons had not even entered service with the Russian army.

Despite all the different types of small arms of illegal armed groups, their units possessed the most modern models of domestically produced weapons. As a rule, the militants were armed with 7.62 mm AK/AKM assault rifles or 5.45 mm AK/AKS-74 assault rifles, 7.62 mm SVD sniper rifles, 7.62 mm RPK/RPK-74/ light machine guns PKM or 7.62-mm PKT tank machine guns and 12.7-mm large-caliber NSV “Utes” dismantled from damaged armored vehicles. The main difference between militant formations and units of federal troops was their higher availability of such effective means of armed warfare as hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers of various models and 40-mm GP-25 under-barrel grenade launchers.

Sensitive defeats in the winter and spring of 1995 forced the Dudayevites to develop new battle tactics. The transition of fire contact with federal troops from point-blank ranges, characteristic of the battles of the initial period of the Chechen war, to a distance of 300-500 m became the main thing for the militants. In this regard, priority was given to the 7.62 mm AK-47/AKM assault rifles, which have a higher lethality of the bullet compared to the 5.45 mm AK-74 assault rifles. The importance of long-range weapons designed for the 7.62 mm rifle cartridge has increased significantly, allowing concentrated fire at point targets at a distance of 400-600 m (Dragunov SVD sniper rifles) and a distance of 600-800 m (Kalashnikov PK/PKM machine guns). Enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups repeatedly used special types of weapons available only in the special forces of the federal troops: 7.62 mm AKM with silent-flameless firing devices (silencers) PBS-1, PB and APB pistols. However, the most popular among militants were the latest models of domestic silent weapons: the 9-mm VSS sniper rifle and the 9-mm AC sniper assault rifle. Since this weapon is used in the federal troops only by special forces units (in deep reconnaissance companies of the special forces of the GRU General Staff, reconnaissance companies of motorized rifle and airborne units, special forces of internal troops, etc.), it can be assumed that some of it came to to militants as trophies or, more likely, stolen from warehouses.

Silent weapons have proven themselves positively on both sides. Thus, during a raid by one of the special forces units of the federal troops on January 2, 1995 in the area of ​​the base of Chechen saboteurs located in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt, Russian special forces, using VSS/AS complexes, destroyed a total of more than 60 militants. But the use of SVD and VSS sniper rifles by professionally trained mobile groups of militants was costly for Russian soldiers. More than 26% of the wounds of federal troops in the fighting of the first Chechen war were bullet wounds. In the battles for Grozny, only in the 8th Army Corps, as of the beginning of January 1995, in the platoon-company level, almost all officers were knocked out by sniper fire. In particular, in the 81st motorized rifle regiment in early January, only 1 officer remained in service.

In 1992, Dudayev organized small-scale production of the 9-mm small submachine gun K6-92 "Borz" (in Chechen) on the premises of the Grozny machine-building plant "Red Hammer". wolf), designed for the standard 9-mm Makarov PM pistol cartridge. Its design clearly shows many features of the Sudaev PPS submachine gun mod. 1943. However, Chechen gunsmiths competently approached the problem of creating a small-sized submachine gun and managed, using the most proven design features of the prototype, to develop a fairly successful example of a light and compact weapon.

The Borza automatic system operates on the principle of blowback. The fire type translator flag (aka safety) is located on the left side of the bolt box, above the pistol grip. The trigger mechanism allows both single and automatic fire. The magazine is box-shaped, double-row, with a capacity of 15 and 30 rounds. Shooting is carried out from the rear sear. The shoulder rest is metal, folding.

The production of these weapons, consisting almost entirely of stamped parts, did not pose any particular problems even for the underdeveloped industry of Chechnya, which has only standard industrial equipment. But the low capacity of the production base affected not only the simplicity of the design and production volumes of the Borza (the Chechens managed to produce only a few thousand weapons in two years), but also the rather low technology of its production. The barrels are characterized by low survivability due to the use of tool, rather than special grades of steel. The cleanliness of the surface treatment of the barrel bore, not reaching the required 11-12 grades of treatment, leaves much to be desired. Mistakes made during the design of the Borz resulted in incomplete combustion of the powder charge during firing and abundant release of powder gases. At the same time, this submachine gun fully justified its name as a weapon for paramilitary partisan formations. Therefore, “Borz”, along with similar Western-made weapons - submachine guns "UZI", "Mini-UZI", MP-5 - were used mainly by reconnaissance and sabotage groups of Dudayev's followers.

In 1995-1996 There have been repeated cases of the Chechen IMF using one of the newest domestic models of infantry weapons - 93-mm RPO infantry rocket flamethrowers. The portable RPO "Shmel" kit included two containers: the incendiary RPO-3 and the smoke-action RPO-D, which very effectively complemented each other in battle. In addition to them, another version of the infantry jet flamethrower, the RPO-A with combined ammunition, has proven itself to be a formidable weapon in the mountains of Chechnya. The RPO-A implements the capsule principle of flame throwing, in which a capsule with a fire mixture in a “cold” state is delivered to the target, upon impact, an ignition-explosive charge is initiated, as a result of which the fire mixture ignites and its burning pieces scatter and hit the target. A warhead filled with a thermobaric mixture forms a fuel-air mixture, which increases the destructive effect and makes it possible to fully use RPO to destroy not only enemy personnel located in shelters, firing points, buildings, and create fires at these objects and on terrain, but also for the destruction of lightly armored and motor vehicles. The RPO-A thermobaric shot (volumetric explosion) is comparable in high-explosive effectiveness to a 122-mm howitzer projectile. During the assault on Grozny in August 1996, militants, having received detailed information in advance about the defense scheme of the Ministry of Internal Affairs building complex, were able to destroy the main ammunition supply point, located in a closed room inside the building, with two targeted shots from Bumblebees, thus depriving its defenders of almost all ammunition.

The high combat characteristics of this powerful weapon, coupled with the massive use of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, both disposable (RPG-18, RPG-22, RPG-26, RPG-27) and reusable (RPG-7), contributed to the destruction or incapacitation of a significant number armored vehicles of federal troops and more severe damage to personnel. Tankers and motorized riflemen suffered heavy losses from the latest domestic grenade launchers: 72.5 mm RPG-26 (armor penetration up to 500 mm), 105 mm RPG-27 (armor penetration up to 750 mm), as well as shots for RPG-7 - 93/40 mm grenades PG-7VL (armor penetration up to 600 mm) and 105/40 mm PG-7VR grenades with a tandem warhead (armor penetration up to 750 mm). The widespread use by the Dudayevites during the battle for Grozny of all anti-tank defense weapons, including RPGs, ATGMs and RPO flamethrowers, allowed them to destroy and damage 225 units of armored vehicles of the federal troops, including 62 tanks, in just a month and a half. The nature of the defeats suggests that in most cases, fire from RPGs and RPOs was conducted almost point-blank from the most advantageous angles, using a multi-tiered (floor-by-floor) fire system. The hulls of almost every affected tank or infantry fighting vehicle had numerous holes (from 3 to 6), which indicates a high density of fire. Grenade-throwing snipers shot at the leading and trailing vehicles, thus blocking the advance of columns in narrow streets. Having lost maneuver, other vehicles became a good target for the militants, who fired simultaneously at the tanks with 6-7 grenade launchers from the basements of the basement floors (hitting the lower hemisphere), from the ground level (hitting the driver and rear projection) and from the upper floors of buildings (hitting the upper hemisphere). When firing at infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, grenade launchers primarily hit vehicle bodies; the militants hit the locations of stationary fuel tanks with ATGMs, grenade launchers and flamethrowers, and mounted fuel tanks with automatic fire.

In 1996, the intensity of summer fighting in Grozny increased even more. The federals gave the Dudayevites a “gift” - the militants received an unharmed railway car, stuffed to the brim with RPG-26 anti-tank hand grenades. In less than a week of fighting in the Chechen capital, the bandits managed to destroy more than 50 armored vehicles. The 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade alone lost about 200 people killed.

The success of the illegal armed formations is explained by the elementary simple, but at the same time highly effective tactics of the Chechens using maneuverable combat groups, consisting, as a rule, of 2 snipers, 2 machine gunners, 2 grenade launchers and 1 machine gunner. Their advantage was excellent knowledge of the location of hostilities and relatively light weapons, allowing them to move covertly and mobilely in difficult urban conditions.

According to competent sources, at the end of the first campaign, the Chechens had in their hands over 60,000 small arms, more than 2 million units of various ammunition, several dozen tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, as well as several hundred artillery pieces of various calibers with several ammunition for them (at least 200 shells per barrel). In 1996-1999, this arsenal was significantly expanded. Numerous reserves of weapons and military equipment, coupled with the presence in the Chechen illegal armed formations of trained, trained personnel who know how to handle their weapons competently, soon allowed the militants to once again launch large-scale military operations - the second Chechen war began.

Oleg Petrovsky

Leaders of illegal armed groups
(as a rule, “ministers” of Dudayev and Maskhadov, “brigadier and division generals”, “commanders of regiments and individual brigades”, etc.)

1. Abdul-Malik Mezhidov- Gelayev’s closest associate, former Deputy Minister of Sharia Security. Participated in Basayev's raid on Budennovsk in 1995. He led the kidnapping of General Gennady Shpigun on March 5, 1999 at Grozny airport. Took part in the invasion of Dagestan in August 1999. According to operational data, in the fall of this year he went out with his gang to the territory of Ingushetia several times.

2. Abdulkhadzhiev Aslambek, nickname "Big". Longtime friend of Basayev. He took part in the war in Abkhazia in the early 90s as part of Shamil Basayev’s “separate battalion”. He broke out of blockaded Grozny with his squad in February 2000. In spring and autumn he was in the mountains near Shatoy. According to operational data, he may be in Georgia.

3. Abu Abdullah Jafar- citizen of Pakistan, Pashtun, member of the terrorist group "Al-Badr" ("Full Month"). Known as one of Khattab’s sponsors, he sent several tens of thousands of counterfeit dollars to Chechnya. He fought under the leadership of Khattab in Dagestan, commanding a detachment of 200 Arab mercenaries. According to some reports, he is still in Chechnya.

4. Abu Dar (Darr)- citizen of Saudi Arabia. A representative of the extremist organization Al-Haramain, which sponsors militants. He is considered a close friend of Arbi Barayev. At the end of June 2000, with a detachment of Arabs, he was surrounded near the village of Serzhen-Yurt in the Shali region of Chechnya. After a week of fighting with a group of militants, he broke into the mountains. Presumably he is in one of Khattab’s detachments.

5. Abu Umar- one of the bloodiest personalities around Khattab. Instructor-miner of the highest qualification. He mined roads in Grozny back in 1995. He took part in an attack on a military unit in Buinaksk in 1998, was blown up by a mine, and was wounded. Personally instructs terrorist groups heading to Russia. According to intelligence services, this man’s people staged a terrorist attack in Volgograd on May 31, 2000, when two military construction workers were killed and 12 people were injured. Almost all the bombers who carry out sabotage in Chechnya and the North Caucasus went through this man.

6. Arsanov Vakha- former policeman, until 1991 - traffic police officer. It has been fighting since 1994. In 1996 he became "commander of the North-Western Front". Vice President of Ichkeria. Commands a small detachment of militants. The bases are located in the center of the Argun Gorge. Does not have an influential role among field commanders. According to operational data, he traveled to Afghanistan and Georgia. Until recently, he was subordinate to the Borz detachment, whose fighters joined the detachments of Basayev and other field commanders. Involved in many high-profile kidnappings in Chechnya.

7. Atgeriev Turapl-Ali(detained and placed in the FSB Lefortovo pre-trial detention center). Former traffic police officer, 31 years old. In 1996, together with Salman Raduev, he participated in the attack on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye. Former Minister of State Security of Ichkeria. During the last war he did not take an active part in hostilities. Apart from his personal guard, he had no armed supporters.

6. Akhmadov Rizvan. A gang of six Akhmadov brothers specializes exclusively in kidnappings. According to the latest information, one of the brothers was captured by the special services. Kidnappers are the Akhmadov brothers: Abu, Rizvan, Ramzan, Uvays, Ruslan, Apti. Three British citizens and a New Zealander were executed with particular cruelty - the heads of the foreigners were cut off. In 1999, near the Dagestan village of Gunib, Polish citizens Sofia Fischer-Malanovskaya and Eva Markhvinskaya-Wirval were kidnapped. They specialize in kidnapping the mothers of missing soldiers in Chechnya. Valentina Erokhina from Perm and Antonina Borschova from Rostov-on-Don were captured by the Akhmadovs. ITAR-TASS photojournalist Vladimir Yatsina was kidnapped and shot. According to the latest data, they are hiding in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.

7. Baraev Arbi Alaudinovich- native of the village of Alkhan-Kala. An ardent Wahhabi. During the first Chechen campaign he commanded the Jamaat unit. Now he is the commander of the Islamic Special Purpose Regiment. In January 1996, he took 29 Rostov power engineers hostage. Organizer of more than 70 (!) kidnappings of foreign citizens, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President Valentin Vlasov, FSB employees, NTV and ORT journalists, businessmen and clergy. Organizes attacks on military personnel and police officers. According to operational data, he is located in Grozny. Uses the documents of an employee of the Russian special services.

8. Basaev Shamil Salmanovich- the one-legged head of Shura. Leader of irreconcilable militants. Recently I got married for the third time. A field commander who has been fighting since the early 90s. He was Deputy Minister of Defense of Abkhazia. He studied guerrilla warfare tactics in Afghanistan. Wounded eight times, shell-shocked seven times. Leader of irreconcilable militants. Located in the Vedeno district of Chechnya. Supporter of "war to the bitter end."

9. Basnukaev Akhmed- “Brigadier General”, “Commander of the Urus-Martan Front”. He “lit up” in the story with Andrei Babitsky. Participated in the battles for Grozny.

10. Gelayev Ruslan (Khamzat)- a repeat offender with three convictions. "Division General". During the fighting in the village of Komsomolskoye in March 2000, he lost about 1,200 people killed. With a small detachment he went to the mountains. Gelayev moves around the border of Georgia and Ingushetia. According to operational data, it has its base in the Pankisi Gorge of Georgia. Recruits militants among Chechen refugees in the Akhmetovsky region of Georgia. Has disagreements with Basayev and Khattab.

11. Gelikhanov Sultan- former head of the state security department of Ichkeria. Came under the complete influence of Basayev. During the first Chechen campaign he was considered an influential field commander. Participated in negotiations with federal representatives.

12. Ismailov Aslanbek Abdullaevich- “general”, “deputy commander of the armed forces of Ichkeria”. Developed a plan for the defense of the Chechen capital. Supporter of Yandarbiev. He was responsible for the defense of one of the sectors of Grozny. According to representatives of the militants, he commanded the defense of the city. As Maskhadov’s press service reported, he died while escaping from encirclement. There is no other evidence of his death.

13. Koriev Magomed- former “head of the department for combating organized crime” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ichkeria. Personally executed the hostages. In November 1999 he was wounded near Argun.

14. Maskhadov Aslan Alievich- President of caves and dugouts. Located in Chechnya. A few days ago he was wounded again and miraculously escaped capture.

15. Saikhan Zaurbekov

16. Suleymanov Ruslan

17. Udugov Movladi Saidarbievich- a failed journalist. "Vice Prime Minister" of the government of Ichkeria. Married three times. Awarded the Order of "Honor of the Nation". The main ideologist of Chechen militants. One of the richest people in Chechnya. According to some reports, he is hiding in Turkey. Sponsors the publication of the newspaper "Ichkeria" and other printed organs of Chechen militants.

18. Khambiev Magomed (Makhmad) Ilmanovich- "Minister of Defense of Ichkeria." According to some reports, in mid-November he was wounded near the village of Benoy. Does not play a significant role among field commanders. In fact, he retired. Known for his "duel" with Basayev. Accuses the latter of the invasion of Dagestan in 1999.

19. Khasuev Abubakar Yakubovich- head of the "Military-Patriotic Union of Chechnya". Had a conflict with influential field commanders.

20. Khasukhanov Islam Sheikh-Akhmedovich- "Chief of the operational headquarters under the President of Ichkeria." “Lost” with the start of the counter-terrorism campaign in Chechnya.

21. Khattab- Chechen of Jordanian origin. Nicknames “Black Arab”, “One-armed Ahmed”. Fought in Afghanistan. It is particularly cruel. Personally cut the throats of captured soldiers. Moves in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky and Vedeno regions of Chechnya.

22. Yusupov Ramzan

23. Yandarbiev Zelimkhan Abdulmuslimovich- militant poet. "Vice President of Ichkeria." In mid-1995, he commanded the defense of Grozny. Currently he is abroad, organizing financial assistance to militants. According to operational data, he visited Pakistan. Has real estate in Turkey and Azerbaijan. One of the "Ichkerian" millionaires.

Mid-level field commanders
(simply "generals", "ministers" without portfolio, "colonels" and "lieutenant colonels")

Abalaev Aidamir- “Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ichkeria”, a supporter of Maskhadov. With a detachment of about 250 people, he is located in the village of Alleroy, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district of Chechnya.

Abu Al-Walid- Arab field commander, “right hand” of Khattab. According to radio interception data, he was killed during an operation near Serzhen-Yurt in the summer of 2000. There is no other information about death.

Ampukaev Shirvani

Asludinov Magomed

Akhmadov Daud Dabaevich- field commander. Former special representative of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ichkeria. Supporter of last year's invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev Shirvani- In 1995, commandant of the village of Bamut. "Prefect" of the Vedeno district. According to the latest reports, he was wounded as a result of a special operation by the FSB Directorate in the Chechen Republic on October 27, 2000. He died from his wounds and was buried in the Vedeno region of Chechnya. The Russian Prosecutor's Office does not have evidence of death. The search for the body is underway.

Bataev Zelimkhan Murtselovitch

Beysamirov Ibrahim

Bimurzaev Saleh

Dalaev Ali

Dataev Islam

Dzhabrailov Apti

Dimaev Ali- “Brigadier General”, one of those close to Aslan Maskhadov. Moves across the Chechen-Dagestan border.

Zakaev Akhmed- field commander. During the first Chechen campaign he commanded the “front”. Former actor of the Grozny Theater, “Minister of Culture” of Ichkeria, Deputy Prime Minister. To spite Udugov, Maskhadov appointed him “Minister of Information.” In mid-August 2000, he was wounded during a special operation in the village of Gekhi, Urus-Martan region. According to operational data, it is located in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.

Ismailov Sharpudin- former director of the state television company of Ichkeria

Kilay Bibulatov

Magomedov Khalid

Madaev M.

Markaev Hussein

Movsaev Turpal- relative (brother) of the “chief counterintelligence officer” of Ichkeria, executioner Abu Movsev, who was killed last summer.

Murtazaev Akhmed

Ozniev Umar Amarbekovich

Patsayev Sultan- “general”, commander of the “special purpose regiment No. 007 “Borz” of the “Ministry of Sharia Security” of Ichkeria.

Pashayev Zhabir

Saydaev Mikhail (Mumadi, Umadi) Minkailovich- "Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria", former major of the Soviet Army. Maskhadov's right hand. Arrested on September 27 by FSB officers in Urus-Martan. He is in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center.

Suleymanov Arbi

Takaev Said-Husein Lechaevich

Khalilov Rabbani- one of the field commanders of the Jordanian Khattab. The Rabbani detachment operates in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky and Vedeno regions of Chechnya, near the border with Dagestan.

Khachukaev Khizir- “Brigadier General”, deputy of Ruslan Gelayev. Field commander who defended the village of Samashki back in March 1996. During the current campaign, he commanded the “southeastern sector” of defense in Grozny. He personally shot the militant truce who was negotiating surrender with Bislan Gantamirov. Demoted to private by Maskhadov for participating in negotiations with Akhmad Kadyrov and Vladimir Bokovikov in Nazran.

Husain Movladi

Tsagaraev Magomed Magomed-Salievich- one of Barayev’s deputies. His militants operate in Grozny and Urus-Martan. According to operational data, he personally shot and killed Imam Urus-Martan Idrisov. The organizer of all the latest terrorist attacks in Grozny.

Eldarov Sulima Shirvanovich- former head of the Nozhai-Yurtovsky District Department of Internal Affairs, subordinate to Maskhadov. He is located with a gang near the regional center of Nozhai-Yurt. Eldarov's militants make solo attacks. So, in December in Nozhai-Yurt they shot two military men.

Emir Adam

Commanders of groups and individual militant detachments

Abduldzhan Dolguev- “general”, Basayev’s deputy, led the actions of the militants during the invasion of the Novolaksky region of Dagestan. According to some reports, he was killed in the fall of 1999 near Argun.

Abu Al Khaled, Abushev Alkhazur, Akbulatov Lechi, Albastov Almirza

Amriev Adam- ("Emir Adam"?) - Field commander who controlled the village of Assinovskaya and Sernovodsk.

Arsabiev Umar-Khadzhi

Arsaliev Magomsoyat Montaevich- field commander who participated in terrorist attacks against the heads of local administrations. According to one version, he was killed. Posthumously awarded the Maskhadov Order.

Arsanukaev Abu- “Brigadier General”, former head of Dudayev’s security service, “Deputy Prosecutor of Chechnya”. Detained in the village of Tsa-Vedeno. “Commander” Apti Arsanukaev, a former police officer, is also wanted.

Astamirov Isa- "Brigadier General". "Vice Prime Minister of Ichkeria." According to some reports, he was killed in Grozny in early February 2000. According to others, it was destroyed by the military in May. Posthumously awarded the Maskhadov Order.

Akhmadov Apti- field commander. According to some reports, he was killed by Pskov paratroopers in a battle near the village of Ulus-Kert in March of this year.

Bazaev Akhmed "Sniper", Bakaev Aliskhan Musaevich, Baraev Suliman, Bachaev (Batchaev) Rasul, Bekmurzaev Emir Saikhan, Visangeriev Zubayir (Zubair), Daudov Zubair, Dashaev Alkhazur, Dzhumaev Emirkhan, Dombaev Curie, Eriskhanov K., Zakharov Viktor Sergeevich, Larsanov Isa, Magomadov Nuradi Daudovich, Madiev Ruslan Musaevich, Mazashev Moudi, Matuev Khamzat Alievich

Natuev Umar, 26 years. "Khattab's Deputy for Technical Affairs." Organizer of explosions in Vladikavkaz. Detained in the fall of this year by officers of the Regional Organized Crime Control Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

Ozniev Ali Edylbekovich, Saraev Adam, Smirnov Vladimir (Arabic name Abdul-Malik) Ivanovich, Suleymanov Eli, Taramov Akhmed

Balaudi Tekilov- former representative of the President of the Chechen Republic in Russia.

Temirov Isa- former deputy head of the Chechen parliament, subordinate to Basayev. He commanded a detachment of militants in Grozny who defended Minutka Square and the village of Michurina in November, December 1999 - January 2000.

Tokarzai Ahsan, Tulaev Shaa Saidovich

Tutuev Visam (Isami)- personal cameraman of Movladi Udugov, participant in the invasion of Vdagestan. Turned himself in to the FSB Directorate of the Republic of Dagestan in the city of Khasavyurt in May 2000.

Umarov Akhmed- field commander, resident of the village of Mayturup. Organizer of terrorist attacks. Ransoms militants placed in pre-trial detention centers. Prepares winter bases for extremist detachments.

Umarov Isa- brother of Movladi Udugov. "Secretary of the Security Council" of Basayev and Khattab. An ardent opponent of Russia. Ideologist of Chechen militants. Oppositionist Maskhadov.

Haldimuratov Aslanbek

Khamzatov Movladi- "Brigadier General". Involved in kidnappings. Detained at a checkpoint in the village of Goyty on April 1, 2000.

Khatuev Mogomed- former “chief of border and customs services” of Ichkeria, “brigadier general.” Friend of Basayev. Dozens of hostages were held at Khatuev’s militant bases. In January 2000, he was seriously wounded in the Vedeno region of Chechnya.

Chekhaev Zaurban Abdulkhadzhievich, Chichiev Usman, Shovkhalov Shamil Sharipovich, Elisultanov Sultan, Elmurzaev Beslan, Eliuprzaev Makhma, Emir Supyan, Ependiev Turpal.

Members of illegal armed groups

Abdulaev Lechi Said-Emievich, Azdamirov Agdan, Ayubov Salman, Baitukaev Aslanbek, Bisaev Batyr (Alaudin) Kerim-Sultanovich, Borgeshvili Omar, Kushtov Issa Salambekovich, Magomadov Dzhambulat, Magomadov Lema, Magomadov Mukhtar, Maigov Ramzan, Muradov Zendi Dzedovich, Mutaev Isa, Talkhadov (Dalkhadov) Moharbi, Ulybaev Mikhail, Khutsaev Arbi Supyanovich, Emiev Makhmad-Saleh.

Accomplices

Belkharoev Yakub, Borshchigov Rizvan, Vahabov Ruslan, Vakhidov Magomed, Visa Rasuev, Visaitov Emin, Visaragov Ruslan, Gabaev Ibragim, Makhtiev Khasan Shalautdinovich, Sabdulaev Makhala, Saidov Arbi, Takaev Khasan Vakhaevich, Umarov Khamzat, Khambiev Umar.

In daily newspaper reports and on television screens they constantly talk about
Chechen militants, show them, This term has become so common,
which in fact completely disorientated public opinion about
who is fighting on the side of D. Dudayev. In fact, in Chechen illegal
armed formations (IAF) have a fairly clear division according to
the composition of the units, the type of weapons and the nature of the tasks performed.
All Chechen illegal armed groups fighting against federal troops can be divided into
three clear groups.

First of all, these are units of the regular professional army of D, Dudayev
(including mercenaries), which he nurtured, trained and armed for
time in power,

The second, most numerous group is represented by the so-called
Chechen militia. These are people from cities and villages who are wonderful
own, at a minimum, small arms and are able to competently conduct
close combat.

In addition to these detachments, which were usually on the front line, in Grozny
its own self-defense system was clearly established (the third type of armed
formations). These were residents of Grozny and its surrounding suburbs. Every
the block had special groups of residents who were responsible for round-the-clock
duty in the area of ​​your residence. These groups had their own snipers,
machine gunners and grenade launchers. Their main function is to protect their
quarters, streets, houses, however, they also participated in battles on the front line, until
which from their permanent place of deployment was at most a few
blocks. Only if these people are forced out of their neighborhood
formations that were least subordinate to the centralized
command, replenished the second group (militia). Exactly the fighters
We most often saw local armed formations on screens, much
people from the militia were less often captured by television cameramen, and
There were practically no video images of D. Dudayev’s regular units, although
it was they who were the cementing and leading link of the entire Chechen
defense systems in Grozny.

Thus, on the side of D. Dudayev, a symbiosis of regular professional units and two types of militia fought.

It should be noted that all three of the above groups with tightening
conflict received a constant influx of manpower and weapons from outside
(professionals from regions outside Chechnya due to the poor blockade of external
borders, and the militia was replenished with residents who, due to artillery shelling,
air raids, etc., with weapons in their hands, they went to avenge those killed
relatives and their destroyed houses). Moreover, the residents of Grozny poured in
into the local self-defense forces, and residents from other regions replenished
militia, It must be emphasized that it is precisely those people who lost
their loved ones, were the most cruel, distinguished by contempt for death and
in this respect they approached the mercenaries.

According to the Secretary of the Security Council O. Lobov, the city of Grozny
defended by up to 15 thousand regular army soldiers. According to the same data, under
At the beginning of the assault on the city, D. Dudayev had 2.5 thousand with a gun.
foreign mercenaries. The number of militias and self-defense militias
practically impossible to count.

According to the head of the command of the group of federal troops
in Chechnya (from 01.02.95) Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation,
commander of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation A. Kulikov, after the capture
federal troops on January 25, he has the personal archive of D. Dudayev
documents from which it is clear that the army of Chechnya as of 1
January 1994 represented the largest armed
formation in the North Caucasus region. The document contains all
surnames: Chief of the General Staff, Presidential Representative to
General Staff, National Guard Commander, BBC Commander, etc.
The characteristics of each type of troops, composition, and strength are given.

According to operational data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the number of armed forces of Chechnya is at
the beginning of the conflict there were 15 thousand people in the regular army and 30-40 thousand.
a man of the armed militia, In addition, according to captured
documents of the mobilization plan, D. Dudayev could, upon announcement
mobilization to put 300 thousand people under arms.

It should also be noted that the vast majority of personal
members of the regular army of Chechnya and the armed militia served in
ranks of the Soviet Army, many participated in the Afghan war and in combat
actions in Abkhazia.

Armed militia in Grozny

Each militia detachment was mobile, each of them had from one to
several cars. The detachments maintained clear communication with the regular
formations and with each other. For this purpose, the units had at their disposal
field stationary and individual portable radios.

Cellars for permanent residence were chosen to be spacious and
comfortable. All these rooms were carefully equipped. They were brought there and
gas (if possible), and electricity from engines. Mandatory
stoves and stoves were installed in order. The bedrooms were equipped with folding beds and
bunks, In the same basements there were canteens where food was prepared on
everyone. Separate offices for management and for the medical unit. Such
medical units provided not only first aid, but also performed operations,

Combat operations were carried out on a rotational basis. About every exit to combat
the operation was reported in detail: what, where, how many armored vehicles
etc. Before a particular detachment leaves for a specific operation
its analysis was carefully carried out, right down to the distribution of who was which
a unit of armored vehicles of the opposing federal troops will be destroyed
to avoid confusion in battle.

It should be noted that there is a clear distribution of functions in the detachment in accordance with
with professional suitability. For example, the driver in each squad
prohibited from taking part in hostilities for any reason
circumstances, Hence the mobility of the units, and their elusiveness, and
the effect of constant presence for a relatively small period of time
length of the line of contact, and relatively low efficiency
bombings and artillery shelling carried out by federal troops with
being late. There were several Russians in almost every detachment.

It must be emphasized that a centralized
supply of ammunition and weapons, but this was not enough.
A significant amount of weapons were obtained during the battle with the federal
troops, including armored vehicles, tanks and ammunition. All this
carefully stored. Heavy equipment was handed over to
regular units of Dudayev's army, armored vehicles, tanks and artillery
were used exclusively by professionals who had close
contact with the militia.

Militias of the local self-defense forces in Grozny

A characteristic portrait of a Chechen militia from local formations
(self-defense units). Weather-appropriate clothing
mandatory Kalashnikov assault rifle and other light weapons. Many
The militia also had bladed weapons (knives, daggers). Besides, in
the ranks of the Chechen militias had a large number of RPGs. In due course
time the militia visited home, ate home-cooked food, after which
often transported by car to the front line. Mostly
The militias had special training. They fought in small groups of 2
up to 20 fighters. Group control internal, by conditional signal
concentrated on a dangerous area, the Chechens claimed that during
New Year's assault, which the leadership of the illegal armed formations knew about in advance
due to a leak of information from the headquarters of the federal troops, the city was drafted
So many villagers came to D. Dudayev’s aid that many had to be sent away
back as extra.

During the assault on Grozny, the main battles took place in the city center,
which was a development of multi-storey buildings and in which
the majority of the population were Russians. At the same time, one-story
buildings of the suburb, where the Chechen population mainly lived and
from where the frontline was constantly being fed, there was practically no fire,
t.s. the material base of the average Chechen self-defense force militia is not
was affected by the almost complete destruction of multi-storey buildings in
center of the city and causing significant losses to Russian-speaking civilians
to the population. While in their city, the militia fought with the Russians
troops as if on foreign territory.

The following fact should be noted: the average militia in
In civilian life he was engaged in trade, mainly middle and
small-scale wholesale, which brought in conditions of complete collapse of the Chechen economy
quite decent income. D. Dudayev as president of independent Chechnya
the average militiaman was completely indifferent. Not indifferent to him
he had his own business, a wife, children, a house, whom he defended with arms in hand.

Regular army and mercenaries fighting on the side of D. Dudayev

Regular illegal armed groups consisted mainly of adult men (average
age about 35 years), who served in the Soviet and then Russian
Armed Forces. On average, under the command of field commanders
the regular units numbered from 100 to 200 fighters. In difficult conditions
operational situation, regular field meetings were held
commanders and ensured reliable communication between units. These
units, along with mercenaries, were the core of the entire Chechen defense system
formations.

It should be noted that they fought on the side of D. Dudayev (according to
according to the FSK and GRU General Staff at the end of February) more than 5,000 Muslim mercenaries and
non-Muslims from 14 countries of the near and far abroad (including
Türkiye, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Baltic countries and Russian mercenaries).

According to the same data, almost half of the mercenaries are from Georgia,
Abkhazia and Dagestan, 700 people from Afghanistan, about 200 from countries
Baltic, 150 from Ukraine. Two Abkhaz Chechens fought in Grozny
battalions are the most combat-ready units of the Chechen armed forces. Abkhazov in
these battalions did not exist, since they included former
Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia Chechen fans are experienced and very dangerous
opponents, practically suicide bombers. The main military successes of the Abkhazian
sides against Georgia were achieved precisely with the help of the Chechen
battalion, named in honor of the Abkhazian victories. In 1994, this battalion
and formed the basis of the military group used by D. Dudayev
first to fight the internal opposition, and then the federal
Russian troops.

Mobile professional groups were formed from mercenaries,
adhered to the tactics of sabotage and reconnaissance groups
special forces: strike - retreat. Some experts believe that wages
mercenaries' pay, depending on qualifications, ranged from 200 to 800
dollars per day, but according to the GRU - about 1000 dollars per day with additional
payment for each damaged unit of armored vehicles. However, these amounts
seem overestimated.

The conduct of hostilities by illegal armed groups was supported not only by money, but also
blackmail. There are known cases when Chechens took away children from Russian women.
as hostages with the requirement to find out certain information in
location of Russian units. This, by the way, was one of the reasons
highly effective mortar shelling of federal troops positions
Chechen formations.

Among the mercenaries there were a large number of highly qualified snipers,
who had combat experience. According to the military, only in the 8th Army
corps as of the beginning of January 1995 at the platoon and company level
the officers were practically knocked out by sniper fire. In particular, in 1981
regiment from Chernorechensk, Volga Military District in one of
battalions after the battles in early January there were only one officer left and
10 soldiers.

It was the professionals who waged an effective on-air war. They're great
knew the frequencies used by the federal troops, listened to many
radio conversations and often entered into them. In addition to the usual threats,
the transmission of false radio orders was also organized in order to
misinformation. So, according to the order, one of the units was sent
vehicles with ammunition without the corresponding order of the commander of the given
parts. Immediately after the vehicles arrive, the deployment zone of this military
The unit was subjected to precise mortar fire. New and
old ammunition, which the Dudayevites knew very well.

The problem of combating radio espionage could be perfectly solved by units
electronic warfare. However, the electronic warfare regiment was stationed in Mozdok.

In addition to radio communications, for communication between individual units
Chechen formations used different types of playing cards. Cards
served as a password and at the same time for transmitting orders in writing
form. For communication between departments, they were mostly used
children, which provided the Chechens with almost quick and complete transfer
information in conditions of disunity of illegal armed formation units during the conduct
street fighting.

The main drawback in the actions of the Chechen formations was that
that they did not know how to dig in. This opinion was expressed by the chief of staff
armed forces of Chechnya A. Maskhadov. Only after great losses
losses, the field commanders managed to force the Chechens to dig in
fighters, although they did it extremely reluctantly.

Tactics of illegal armed groups in Grozny

The tactics of the illegal armed groups were simply simple, but effective. Main
the advantage of the Chechens was their excellent knowledge of the city, relatively
light weapons (machine gun, grenade launcher with a supply of grenades, anti-tank
grenades). This allowed them to maneuver easily and quickly.

Among the Chechen fighters there were undoubtedly well-trained
snipers-grenade throwers, who, to stop the movement of the column and
blocking armored vehicles of federal troops on narrow streets set fire
the lead and trailing vehicles with cumulative grenades. Lost to maneuver
other vehicles became good targets for militants.
Meanwhile, the grenade launcher snipers moved to other positions, and
tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were shot in an intensive multi-level (floor-by-floor) manner
grenade fire from nearby houses. The militants knew very well that
additional fuel tanks for infantry fighting vehicles are located in the doors of the landing
compartment, and the armor of the infantry fighting vehicle could not withstand the impact of a cumulative grenade.
The surviving landing party either left the burning car, falling under the aim
small arms fire or remained inside it.

With an insufficient number of Chechen fighters in some areas
so-called traps were used. Specially equipped fire
a point in the building suddenly opened fire on the lead vehicle of the convoy.
The tank or infantry fighting vehicle stopped (the crews were not prepared to conduct
firing on the move) to aim the cannon and destroy it. At that time
militants dispersed in houses began firing RPGs at the entire
a stopped column of armored vehicles.

It was very difficult for the artillerymen to detect the Chechen firing positions,
Mortar crews did not remain in firing positions and acted as
nomadic units. Installed on Niva, KamAZ, tram and
on railway platforms, mortars occupied pre-selected positions with
anchored on the ground and, having fired 3-4 shots, went into cover.
Mobile groups of grenade launchers acted in a similar way,
located on specially equipped passenger cars with
roofs and rear seats removed. Availability of such mobile groups
made it possible to quickly organize anti-tank barriers on
the most threatened directions and provided maneuver
grenade launcher snipers.

Mortar attacks, as well as accurate sniper fire, were the main
cause of large losses of federal troops. The actions of the artillerymen and
The mortarmen of the Chechen illegal armed formations were personally supervised by the Chief of Staff of the Chechen Armed Forces A.
Maskhadov. At one time he served in the Southern Group of Forces, repeatedly
won artillery competitions.

Using existing tanks, the Chechens tried to conduct a fleeting
shooting from them in the city center, being under the cover of multi-story buildings
houses. After several shots, the tank quickly changed its firing position, and
Federal troops returned fire, as a rule, at a residential building,
was ineffective and led to casualties among civilians. Chechens
learned to cleverly disorient fire spotters, often
creating situations where ours hit ours. So, on the night before the capture
presidential palace, the Russian Grad installation covered its own
reconnaissance company in the airport area.

Chechen snipers tried to hit the legs when firing
selected target. When other Russian soldiers ran up to the wounded man,
in order to pick him up, they also tried to hit his feet. So
They shot three people, and then methodically finished them off. Only after
heavy losses, an order was received to remove wounded Russian
military personnel in the dark. According to the Chechens, there is a lack of
They did not test weapons and ammunition during December - January.
Arms and ammunition came to them from the southwest in amounts not
less than what the federal army received. According to some reports,
supplies came through Ingushetia from Russia itself.

The militias acted mainly by guerrilla methods, as a rule,
small mobile groups. Interesting detail: militia butts
their machine guns and light machine guns were wrapped with a rubber band so that
If necessary, use it to stop bleeding. Among
According to eyewitnesses, the militia were not drunk or stoned.
Most militias not only do not drink, but also do not smoke. According to
Chief of Staff of the Chechen Armed Forces A. Maskhadov, the main shortcoming in the actions
militias was that at night they left their positions and left
home and returned in the morning. The command of the illegal armed formations fought against this, but
mostly unsuccessful.

In residential buildings, Chechens installed grenades on trip wires in doorways, attaching TNT blocks to them. Notice

a thin thread when storming a building was not easy, and at night
almost impossible. Mining and bodies of the dead were used
Russian soldiers. The most dangerous areas were also mined
possible breakthrough of federal troops,

The Chechens were armed with tanks T-72, T-62, BTR-70, self-propelled guns 2C1, 2SZ,
anti-tank guns MT-12, MLRS Grad. In the city, the Dudayevites used
a large number of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. In big
there were anti-tank cumulative missiles and mortars in quantity. On
The Chechens also had man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems in their weapons
such as Strela-2 and Stinger, which were obviously purchased after the withdrawal
Russian troops from Chechnya. According to some reports, the stingers were in
in the hands of Arab and Afghan mercenaries who fought on the side of D.
Dudaeva.

By the beginning of February, the tactics of combat operations in the city were somewhat
changed: Chechen formations tried to break up units
federal troops into small groups and destroy them one by one.

N.N. Novichkov, V.Ya. Snegovsky, A.G. Sokolov, V.Yu. Shvarev.
Russian armed forces in the Chechen conflict. Paris-Moscow, 1995.
pp. 36-42

The experience of suppressing the gangster activities of Islamic extremists during the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus region indicates that the tactics of the gangs opposing the federal troops have undergone significant changes. Currently, along with traditional forms, it also includes large-scale offensive and defensive actions to capture and retain important strategic objects, and is characterized by a wide range of bandit manifestations: from terrorist actions to open armed actions by small (15-20 people) and large (up to 500 people or more) in groups. At the same time, the fundamental principles of the tactics of gangs are still surprise, decisiveness, audacity and short duration of raids.

The most important factor determining the specifics of the actions of gangs is the conduct of systematic “harassing” actions that force troops to resort to defensive tactics, as was the case for almost two months in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. Moreover, they create the impression of the gangs’ ability to strike in any place, sometimes completely unexpected. “Harassing” and “Exhausting” operations form the basis of the tactics of the gangs, who, as a rule, sought to avoid a direct clash with large forces of federal troops. The basis of their actions in this case is anticipation in opening fire, which is carried out accurately and mainly from short distances.

At the same time, as the experience of the Chechen company and especially the events in Dagestan have shown, bandit formations in some cases, when achieving a tactical advantage, make attempts to capture and long-term hold an object that is important in tactical terms or in terms of life support for the population. This indicates a new stage in the development of the tactics of armed confrontation between the separatists and federal troops and the commitment of the leaders of the gangs to long-term and fierce resistance.

An armed formation is a large paramilitary unit, led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to forcefully protect the interests of a certain financial, economic and political (religious) group. An armed formation, as a rule, includes representatives of one or more related teips (jamaats).

The armed formation organizationally consists of commander (commander) headquarters and two groups (for the period of hostilities up to 500 people each).

Groups, in turn, are divided into combat groups, designed to directly carry out an operation in a specified area, and reserve groups, designed to build up efforts and planned (usually within a week) replacement of warring militants.

Grouping is divided into five or six detachments (100 people or more), led by amirs (field commanders).

Squad, as a rule, consists of three groups.

First- a central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly in combat mode with the amir and does not have a permanent location.

Second the group (the number depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in a populated area. This group is subordinate, controlled and has contact only with the Amir. Members of the group were trained at a special training center and specialize in mining, sniper shooting and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply secretive and engaged in legal social activities.

Third group - a group of “helpers”. These are like-minded people and supporters of the emir living at home. In order to save financial resources, this group is not constantly with the detachment. If the emir orders them, they come to him and carry out the task, then return home again and do their usual business or act independently with the consent of the emir.

Thus, central the group is the main formation of the detachment and consists of three platoons By three branches in everyone. The group is armed only with weapons that are easy to carry, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and leaving. The time, place and target of the attack are appointed by the Amir.

Radio stations - 2 pcs., binoculars - 2 pcs., terrain map - 2 pcs., 7.62 mm cartridges for PC-1000-1300 pcs., 5.45 mm - 500–600 pcs., 4 pcs. RPG-18 "FLY"; Each fighter has a flask for water, spare clothes, a cape, a sleeping bag, medicine, and dry rations for 7 days

The tactics of armed extremists and Dagestan separatists in the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan included mainly two stages:

The first is preparation for the operation;

The second is the direct conduct of military operations and terrorist acts.

The leadership of the extremists had previously identified three areas for carrying out an armed action in the Republic of Dagestan: to the west of BOTLIKH, near the settlement. ANDI and GIGATLI district. Accordingly, three armed formations were created: the main and central one under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the northern one - Shervani Basayev and the southern one - Bagautdin. In total, the formations were estimated to number up to 3,000 militants. The formations were structurally divided into battalions (50–70 people each), companies (15–20 people each) and platoons (5–7 people each).

The preparation stage for the operation involved conducting detailed reconnaissance and direct preparation of the militants and the combat area.

Detailed reconnaissance of the operation area included:

Studying the terrain, approach routes, difficult areas and roads in gorges, dominant heights, natural shelters, water sources.

Reconnaissance of the locations of federal troops, their security and defense systems, storage areas for weapons and ammunition, military equipment, the nature of the troops' activities, advance routes for subsequent ambushes and road mining.

During reconnaissance, detailed video recording was carried out.

Direct preparation of the operation:

Development of the plan (distribution of forces and means to objects, time and sequence of the operation.).

Creation of warehouses and caches of weapons, ammunition, food and water supplies.

Recruiting local residents on the basis of religious, national and related principles, indoctrinating identified supporters and carrying out propaganda activities with their help to attract as many residents as possible to their side.

Negotiating with the administration and local residents by persuasion, bribery or threat in order to ensure their support and carry out joint actions with the militants or not interfere with their actions against the Federal forces;

Creation of units and recruitment of mercenaries from among local residents.

Combat training of units in base camps and training centers.