Assistance of the USSR to Afghanistan during the Afghan war. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

The article tells briefly about the war in Afghanistan waged by the Soviet Union in 1979-1989. The war was a consequence of the confrontation between the USSR and the USA and was aimed at strengthening the positions of the Soviet Union in this region. This was the only use of a large contingent of Soviet troops during the Cold War.

1. Causes of the war in Afghanistan
2. The course of the war in Afghanistan
3. The results of the war in Afghanistan

Causes of the war in Afghanistan

• In the 60s. 20th century Afghanistan remained a kingdom. The country was at a very low level of development with the dominance of semi-feudal relations. At this time, in Afghanistan, with the support of the Soviet Union, a communist party arises and begins a struggle for power.
• In 1973, a coup d'etat took place, as a result of which the power of the king was overthrown. In 1978, another coup took place, during which the supporters of the socialist path of development, relying on the support of the Soviet Union, were victorious. A large number of Soviet specialists are sent to the country.
• The authorities do not enjoy the confidence of the Muslim society. Members of the Democratic People's Party of Afghanistan make up a small percentage of the population and occupy predominantly government positions. As a result, in the spring of 1979, a general uprising against the communist regime begins. The successful offensive of the rebels leads to the fact that only large urban centers remain in the hands of the authorities. H. Amin becomes prime minister, who begins to harshly suppress the uprising. However, these measures are no longer working. The very name of Amin causes hatred in the population.
• The Soviet leadership is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. The fall of the communist regime may lead to an increase in separatist sentiments in the Asian republics. The government of the USSR repeatedly turns to Amin with offers of military assistance and advises to soften the regime. As one of the measures, Amin is offered to transfer power to the former vice-president B. Karmal. However, Amin refuses to publicly ask for help. The USSR is still limited to the participation of military specialists.
• In September, Amin seizes the presidential palace and begins to pursue an even tougher policy of physical destruction of the disaffected. The last straw is the murder of the Soviet ambassador, who came to Amin for negotiations. The USSR decides to bring in the armed forces.

The course of the war in Afghanistan

• At the end of December 1979, as a result of a Soviet special operation, the presidential palace was captured and Amin was killed. Following the coup in Kabul, Soviet troops began to enter Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership announces the introduction of a limited contingent in order to protect the new government headed by B. Karmal. His actions were aimed at softening the policy: a broad amnesty, positive reforms. However, fanatical Muslims cannot accept the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the state. Karmal is considered a puppet in the hands of the Kremlin (which is generally true). The rebels (mujahideen) are now intensifying their actions against the Soviet army.
• The actions of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into two stages: before and after 1985. During the year, the troops occupy the largest centers, fortified areas are created, a general assessment and development of tactics takes place. Major military operations are then carried out jointly with the Afghan armed forces.
• In guerrilla warfare, it is almost impossible to defeat the rebels. Russia has confirmed this law many times, but for the first time it has experienced its effect on itself, as on an invader. The Afghans, despite heavy losses and lack of modern weapons, put up fierce resistance. The war took on the sacred character of the fight against the infidels. The help of the government army was insignificant. Soviet troops controlled only the main centers, which constituted a small territory. Large-scale operations did not bring significant success.
• Under such conditions, in 1985, the Soviet leadership decided to curtail hostilities and start withdrawing troops. The participation of the USSR should consist in conducting special operations and providing assistance to government troops, who themselves should bear the brunt of the war. Perestroika and a sharp turn in the policy of the Soviet Union played an important role.
• In 1989, the last units of the Soviet army were withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.

The results of the war in Afghanistan

• Politically, the war in Afghanistan did not bring success. The authorities continued to control a small territory, rural areas remained in the hands of the rebels. The war dealt a big blow to the prestige of the USSR and greatly intensified the crisis that led to the disintegration of the country.
• The Soviet army suffered heavy losses in killed (about 15 thousand people) and wounded (about 50 thousand people). The soldiers did not understand what they were fighting for in foreign territory. Under the new government, the war was called a mistake, and no one needed its participants.
• The war caused great damage to Afghanistan. The development of the country was suspended, the number of victims only killed was about 1 million people.

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. Around the causes of this event, fierce disputes are still ongoing, in which polar points of view collide.

By the time the troops were brought in, the USSR and Afghanistan had been in good neighborly relations for many decades in a row. The policy of Muhammad Zahir Shah was balanced and suited the USSR, which carried out many economic projects in Afghanistan, supplied weapons to the country, and trained Afghan specialists in their universities. However, avoiding sudden breakthroughs, Zahir Shah conserved the situation in the country, which caused dissatisfaction on the part of various political forces - from Islamists to progressives. As a result, at the time of his next departure abroad, he was removed from power by his cousin Mohammed Daoud.

The coup, which became the first link in the chain of further political events, did not have a noticeable impact on the relations between Afghanistan and the USSR. Nevertheless, the situation inside the country gradually began to heat up. A number of Islamist figures - Rabbani, Hekmatyar and others - are emigrating from the country to neighboring Pakistan, who will then lead the armed opposition and form the so-called "Alliance of Seven". At the same time, the United States began to establish relations with the future leaders of the Mujahideen.

In 1977, relations between the USSR and Afghanistan began to deteriorate - Mohammed Daoud began to probe the soil in order to establish ties with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and Iran. In 1978, repressions began in Afghanistan against members of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which professed Marxist ideology, the reason for which was the unrest after the assassination of Mir-Akbar Khaibar, one of the prominent figures of the PDPA, by Islamic fundamentalists. Fundamentalists counted on this assassination to achieve two goals - to provoke the actions of the PDPA and their suppression by Daoud.

However, the suppression ended in failure - just 10 days after the death of Khaibar, another coup took place in the country. Army officers, who were all trained in the USSR, supported the leaders of the PDPA. The day of April 28 went down in history as the day of the April Revolution. Muhammad Daoud was killed.

The April revolution, like Daoud's coup, came as a surprise to the USSR, which was striving to maintain stability along its southern borders. The new leadership of Afghanistan embarked on fundamental reforms in the country, while the USSR sought to extinguish the revolutionary nature of these reforms, which, given the extremely low level of development of Afghan society, had very little chance of success and a friendly reception from the population.

Meanwhile, a split began in Afghanistan between the two main factions of the PDPA - the more radical, "common" Khalq and the moderate Parcham, which was based on aristocratic intelligentsia with a European education. The leaders of Khalq were Hafizullah Amin and Nur-Muhammed Taraki, the leader of Parcham was Babrak Karmal, who after the revolution was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia in order to remove him from the political life of Afghanistan. A number of Karmal's supporters were also removed from their posts, many of them were executed. The sympathies of the USSR in this confrontation were rather on the side of the moderate "Parchamists", however, the Soviet leadership maintained relations with the Khalq, hoping to influence the leaders of Afghanistan.

The reforms of the PDPA led to the destabilization of the situation in the country. The first detachments of "mujahideen" appear, which soon begin to receive assistance from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China. This aid gradually grew in volume.

The USSR could not afford to lose control of Afghanistan, and the outbreak of civil war in the country made this threat all the more real. Beginning in the spring of 1979, Afghan leaders increasingly asked the USSR for direct military support. The Soviet leadership agreed to increase the supply of weapons and food, provide financial assistance and expand the training of specialists, but did not want to send troops to Afghanistan.

The problem was exacerbated by the uncontrollability of the Afghan leadership, convinced of their rightness - especially Amin. Contradictions also arose between him and Taraki, which gradually developed into an open conflict. Taraki was accused of opportunism and killed on September 14, 1979.

Amin actually directly blackmailed the Soviet leadership, demanding direct military intervention in the situation. Otherwise, he predicted the seizure of power by pro-American forces and the emergence of a hotbed of tension at the very borders of the USSR, threatening to destabilize the already Soviet Central Asia. Moreover, Amin himself turned to the United States (through Pakistani representatives) with a proposal to improve relations between the countries and, which was almost worse at that time, began to probe the situation in order to establish relations with China, which was looking for allies in the confrontation with the USSR.
It is believed that it was with the murder of Taraki that Amin signed his own sentence, but there is no consensus on the true role of Amin and the intentions of the Soviet leadership in relation to him. Some experts believe that the Soviet leadership expected to limit itself to the removal of Amin, and his murder was an accident.

One way or another, in the late autumn of 1979, the position of the Soviet leadership began to change. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, who had previously insisted on the undesirability of the introduction of troops, gradually inclined to the idea that this step was necessary in order to stabilize the situation. Defense Minister Ustinov was inclined to the same opinion from the very beginning, despite the fact that a number of other prominent representatives of the Soviet military elite were against this step.

The main mistake of the Soviet leadership during this period, apparently, should be considered the absence of a well-thought-out alternative to the introduction of troops, which thus became the only "calculated" step. However, the calculations went to waste. The originally planned operation to support the friendly leadership of Afghanistan turned into a long counter-guerrilla war.

The opponents of the USSR used this war to the maximum, supporting the Mujahideen detachments and destabilizing the situation in the country. Nevertheless, the USSR managed to maintain a workable government in Afghanistan, which had a chance to correct the current situation. However, a number of further events prevented the realization of these chances.

The causes of the war in Afghanistan are still controversial among historians and politicians. This war itself, what caused it, as well as its consequences, are assessed differently. The very theme of the Afghan war for many years was a painful phenomenon in the life of our society, because it led to great human losses and disappointment in the power of the USSR. After the collapse of the Union and the publication of official lists of the dead, the topic of this war became an argument in the hands of liberals who sought to denigrate the USSR and prove that our country was a real "evil empire" in those years.
Today, however, assessments of this war are changing.
Consider the main causes of this military conflict.

Historical Causes of the War in Afghanistan

The territory of Afghanistan has been a place of conflict between the interests of Russia and Britain since the 19th century.
The fact is that, pursuing a rather active expansionary policy, Britain, being the most extensive state in the world in the 19th century, sought to encircle Russia along its borders in order to weaken its influence in Eurasia. However, neither a century and a half ago, nor 40 years ago, our country did not want its interests in this region to be infringed.
Back in the 19th century, Britain organized 2 Afghan-English wars, in fact, subordinating this region to its influence. However, in the next century, when the USSR had already appeared, Soviet Russia made several successful attempts to drive the British out of the territory of this state formation.
All this laid the foundation for future confrontations between Russians and Anglo-Saxons for this region. At the same time, the Afghans themselves lived in terrible poverty and illiteracy (which reached 95% of the population). The orders in their country were similar to the feudal system.

Geopolitical Causes of the War in Afghanistan

In the middle of the 20th century, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, two major powers emerged on the planet - the United States - the heirs of the Anglo-Saxons and the USSR - the heir to the Russian Empire. As a result of different ideas about the essence of economic and ideological development, these two states entered the war, called "cold". This type of war, new in the history of mankind, assumed that military operations were conducted not on the territory of the enemy, but on the territories of other states.
Tough confrontation in all areas led to the fact that the USSR and the USA began to compete for influence in certain countries and states.
In Afghanistan, during the entire second half of the 20th century, it was very restless, proteges of the United States staged revolutions in this state, called “colored” in modern political language, which contributed to plunging this region into chaos.
The Afghan government repeatedly appealed to the leadership of the USSR with a request for military assistance, but Brezhnev and his people did not seek to introduce military force into the region. Finally, when the chaos in the country reached its limit, in 1979 the Central Committee decided to bring in Soviet troops.
Many decades later, one of the ideologists of the Cold War in the United States, Z. Brzezinski, in an interview with a French publication, admitted that his state used all its strength to bring Soviet troops into Afghanistan, as it believed that this would weaken the USSR and enable the United States to defeat its enemy .

Economic reasons for the war in Afghanistan

In addition to geopolitical, there were also economic reasons for this war. The fact is that the territory of Afghanistan is an outlet to the entire Caspian region, rich in oil reserves. Accordingly, if the USSR could create a government friendly to it in Afghanistan, then it would be able to expand its economic power in this region several times over.
In addition, one should not forget that because of the instability in the Afghan region, the threat of drug trafficking to the USSR increased. True, drug addiction as such in the Soviet Union was a rare occurrence, but in the countries of Western Europe at that time it was already claiming many human lives. The flow of drugs came just from Afghanistan.

As you know, the USSR did not succeed in this war. There were many reasons for this. The military analysts of the USSR did not properly evaluate the activities of Islamic nationalists, who received powerful support from the NATO countries, and, first of all, from the United States. All this led to a protracted war that lasted 10 years. Its result was a significant weakening of the authority of the Soviet Union on the world stage.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret decree of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan.

A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) was directly involved in the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became an active participant in it.

The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in the conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. Dushmans during the conflict were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar.

The Soviet contingent included: the 40th Army Directorate with support and maintenance units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one material support brigade and some other units and institutions.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active hostilities mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Afghan war (1979-1989)- the name of one of the stages of the civil war in Afghanistan, which has developed in the Soviet and Russian historiographic tradition, marked by the presence of a military contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of this country. The armed forces of the DRA government, on the one hand, and the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans), on the other, took part in this conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. The Soviet Army, introduced into the country by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to support the Kabul government, was directly involved in the military conflict. Dushmans during the conflict were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European countries - members of NATO, China, as well as Pakistani special services.

Causes

One of the reasons for the war was the desire to support the supporters of the concept of socialism in Afghanistan, who came to power as a result of the April Revolution, faced with powerful opposition to their social, economic and political strategy.

In part, the introduction of Soviet troops was aimed at preventing the possible strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, caused by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.

In itself, the fall of the pro-Soviet government would mean a strong blow to the very theory of Marxism-Leninism, which asserted that social formations always change from simple to perfect and from feudalism to communism, and at the same time to the foreign policy positions of the USSR, since, if this happened, it would it would be the first case in post-war history of the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government. Theoretically, in addition to direct consequences, the spread of fundamentalism through the Afghan Tajiks could significantly destabilize Soviet Central Asia. At the international level, it was stated that the USSR was guided by the principles of "proletarian internationalism". As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan and personally Hafizullah Amin to provide military assistance to the country to fight anti-government forces.

Solution

The final decision on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 "To the position in" A "".

Course of the war - chronology

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979

December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.

March - the first major offensive operation of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar Offensive.

April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jets.

April - The US Congress authorizes $15 million in "direct and open aid" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.
June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; the death of Major General Khakhalov

October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 Special Forces) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").

December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from moving north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).

November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the advisability of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.

February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.

March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.

April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."

July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.

August - the hard work of the mission of D. Cordoves to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of the Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".

Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - during a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, he was ambushed and suffered heavy losses by the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment.
October - dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft from the Strela MANPADS over Kabul.

1985

June - army operation in Panjshir.

Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".

Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.

March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahiddins with the Stinger ground-to-air MANPADS, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to ground attack.

April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans.
Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.

May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service of Khad, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.

July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.

August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.

October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.

November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.

December - an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates the speediest end to the fratricidal war.

January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.

February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.

February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.

March - Operation "Thunderstorm" in the province of Ghazni.
- Operation "Circle" in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.
- Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.

Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan
January 8 - battle at height 3234.

April 14 - With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting on May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).

The humanitarian aspect of hostilities The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the massive migration of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a considerable percentage of which remain there to this day. The bitterness of the belligerents reached extreme limits. It is known that dushmans subjected prisoners to torture, among which the one called “red tulip” is widely known. There are known cases of the destruction of villages that gave shelter to the rebels to intimidate dushmans, mine fields and nodes of the water supply network, and destroy crops in territories controlled by dushmans [source?]. However, the rumors about the use of chemical weapons by the 40th Army were never confirmed.

results

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) existed for another three years and, having lost the support of Russia, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of Mujahideen field commanders.

During the war years, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared in Afghanistan and the groups of Islamic radicals became stronger, who were active participants in the conflicts in Algeria, Egypt and Chechnya.

Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent” expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan: “I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for asserting that that the 40th Army was defeated, as well as the fact that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.

Before the Limited Contingent, no one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either preemptive or retaliatory. Together with government troops, we carried out military operations only in order to exclude attacks on our garrisons, airfields, automobile convoys and communications that were used to transport goods.

At the same time, more than 70% of the forces and means of the 40th Army were constantly involved in the transportation of humanitarian cargo through the territory of Afghanistan. This hard work did not stop until the last day of the stay of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan. Thanks to Soviet supplies and the activities of our specialists, the country's economy has strengthened and, figuratively speaking, has risen to its feet.

One can agree with Gromov's opinion on the outcome of the war, since the Mujahideen have never managed to carry out a single major operation, not to mention measures of the caliber of the Tet offensive in Vietnam, and have not been able to occupy a single large city.

Afghanistan casualties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” .

USSR losses

1979 - 86 people
1980 - 1,484 people
1981 - 1,298 people
1982 - 1,948 people
1983 - 1,446 people
1984 - 2,346 people
1985 - 1,868 people
1986 - 1,333 people
1987 - 1,215 people
1988 - 759 people
1989 - 53 people

Total - 13,836 people, on average - 1,537 people per year. According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14,427, the KGB - 576, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing.

Losses in equipment, according to official figures, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft and 333 helicopters. At the same time, as in the case of human losses, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were annually spent from the USSR budget to support the Kabul regime.
The maintenance of the 40th Army and the conduct of hostilities from the budget of the USSR annually spent about 3 billion US dollars.