Regional press of the Pskov region. The Old Russian Operation has begun Commander of Army Group South

The Great Patriotic War

Debrecen strategic offensive operation troops 2nd Ukrainian Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky), was carried out with the aim of liberating the eastern and southern regions of Hungary, was carried out in the fall during the period from October 6 to October 28, 1944. on the territory of Hungary and Romania. The main goal required the defeat of the German Army Group South in the area of ​​the city. Cluj – Oradea – Debrecen and assistance 4th Ukrainian Front in the defeat of the East Carpathian enemy group. The major Hungarian city of Debrecen was chosen as the main direction of attack.

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Iasi and Chisinau ( Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation 1944), troops 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky), continuing the offensive, at the end of September - beginning of October 1944 they entered the territory of Yugoslavia and the Romanian-Hungarian border, creating the preconditions for the development of an offensive against Budapest and Vienna. Hungary remained Germany's last ally in Europe. The current situation required the German military-political leadership to take urgent measures in order to increase defense efforts and prevent the loss of economically important regions of Hungary and Eastern Austria. A large number of military factories were located here and there were 2 sources of oil, for which the Wehrmacht was in dire need. Therefore, his command deployed a powerful group of forces and assets in Hungary - Army Group South.

The liberation of Hungary by the Soviet Army was carried out during the period from September 23, 1944 to April 4, 1945 Fighting on Hungarian territory continued 194 days. For more than six months of almost continuous fighting, two fronts took part in it from the Soviet side ( 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian), nine combined arms armies (of which three were guards), a guards tank army, two air armies, the Danube military flotilla, two cavalry-mechanized groups and the Budapest group of forces. In addition, two Romanian, one Bulgarian and one Yugoslav armies took part in the liberation of Hungary on the side of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The fighting to liberate the territory of Hungary resulted in three strategic offensives: ( Debrecen offensive 06 - 28 October 1944., Budapest Offensive October 29, 1944 - February 13, 1945., Vienna Offensive March 16 – April 15, 1945) and one defensive ( Balaton Defense March 6 - 15, 1945) operations of Soviet troops.

Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky

Malinovsky.In May 1944 Malinovsky was transferred by commander to 2nd Ukrainian Front , which together with 3rd Ukrainian Front(under the command of M Arshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin) continued the offensive in the southern direction, defeating the troops German Army Group "Southern Ukraine" during Iasi-Chisinau strategic offensive operation . After this, Romania left the alliance with Germany and declared war on the latter.

September 10, 1944, by submission Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Tymoshenko addressed Stalin, Malinovsky R.Ya. was awarded the military rank " Marshal of the Soviet Union ».

Continuing the offensive at the end of September, beginning of October 1944, the troops 2nd Ukrainian Front A entered the territory of Yugoslavia on the Romanian-Hungarian border at the line of Chop, Szolnok, Baja and further along the Danube to Monoštor. 1)

September 23, 1944Soviet troops reached the Romanian-Hungarian border near the village of Battonya in southern Hungary. 2)

The fighting to liberate the eastern and southern regions of Hungary took place in the fall of 1944 during Debrecen offensive operation.

Included in the troops 2nd Ukrainian Front included: 7th Guards Army, 40th, 27th, 53rd, 46th Armies, 6th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, two cavalry-mechanized groups, 18th Tank corps, 1st, 4th Romanian armies, Romanian volunteer division named after. Tudora Vladimirescu, 1st Romanian Aviation Corps. 3) General grouping 2nd Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the operation there were: 84 divisions (40 rifle, 17 infantry (Romanian), 2 fortified areas, 3 tank, 2 mechanized and 3 cavalry corps). The total number of Soviet troops was 698,200, 4) Romanians 167,000 people, a total of 825 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 10,238 guns and mortars, 1,216 aircraft). 5)

From the air, the actions of the Soviet troops were supported by aviation of the 5th Air Army, which was operationally subordinate to the 1st Romanian Aviation Corps.

By the beginning of the offensive, Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy: in men - 3 times, in guns - 1.8 times, in mortars - 4 times, in tanks - 3 times, in self-propelled guns - 1.3 times and in aircraft - 3 times.

According to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the main goal of the further offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was to first of all take Hungary out of the war. She assigned the solution to this problem to 2nd Ukrainian Front, whose troops were led R.Ya.

Commander of Army Group South

Colonel General Hans Friesner.

2nd Ukrainian Front opposed the German troops Army Group South(German 8th and 6th field armies, 2nd Panzer Army, 3rd and 2nd Hungarian armies) and three divisions of Army Group F 6) under the command Colonel General Hans Friessner. The enemy group consisted of: 31 divisions (22 infantry, 4 tank, 2 motorized and 3 cavalry divisions), 3 infantry and 2 tank brigades. At the beginning of the operation, they were armed with 293 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, about 3,500 guns and mortars, and 741 aircraft. In total there were 241,000 German troops, 190,000 Hungarians. 7)

2nd Ukrainian Front received the task: to defeat the enemy in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bCluj, Oradea, Debrecen and, developing an offensive from the south to the north of Hungary in the direction of Nyiregyháza, Chop, to assist 4th Ukrainian Front in the defeat of the East Carpathian group of enemy troops. The main blow was delivered by the 53rd Army and the 6th Guards Tank Army, the cavalry-mechanized group of Lieutenant General I.A. Pliev and the 1st Romanian Army in the direction of Debrecen. The 40th Army and the 7th Guards Army were to advance in the direction of Nyiregyhaza, the 27th Army and the 4th Romanian Army were to capture the Cluj area. Cavalry mechanized group of Lieutenant General S.I. Gorshkova received the task of capturing and liberating the cities Satu Mare and Karey. From the south, the offensive of the main forces of the front was ensured by the 46th Army, which was supposed to clear the enemy from the territory of Yugoslavia east of the Tissa River and seize bridgeheads on its right bank near the cities of Szeged, Senta and Becey.

On the eve of the Debrecen operation, back in the second half of September, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, long-range aviation carried out attacks on large railway junctions and other important objects on the territory of Hungary, including Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc and Satu Mare.

The offensive has begun October 6, 1944 The operation was carried out on a front 800 km long with an offensive zone of 120 km. As a result of intense battles, during which a counterattack by three enemy army and one tank corps in the Nyiregyházy area was repelled, the front forces inflicted a heavy defeat Army Group South».

October 20, 1944. Soviet troops captured the city of Debrnetsen. The troops who participated in the battles for the capture of Debrecen were thanked by order of the Supreme High Command of October 20, 1944, and a salute was given in Moscow with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns. 8)

Subsequently, the 1st session of the Provisional National Assembly took place in Debrecen, marking the beginning of the formation of the central bodies of the nascent “people's democratic” Hungary.

Behind 23 days continuous battles to October 28, 1944 Soviet troops advanced from 130 to 275 km, captured the river. Tisse, south of Szolnok, a large operational bridgehead and created favorable conditions for developing the offensive and defeating the enemy in the direction of Budapest. The plans of the German command to restore the situation on the line of the Transylvanian Alps were thwarted, and it was forced to withdraw troops to the Hungarian Plain.

According to Soviet data, in the period from October 6 to November 6, 1944, Soviet troops defeated 10 (out of 32) enemy divisions, more than 100,000 German-Hungarian soldiers were exterminated, 42,160 were captured, destroyed and captured 1,038 tanks and self-propelled guns. assault guns, 2,330 guns and mortars were destroyed or captured, 802 aircraft were reported destroyed or captured, and other military equipment was destroyed. 9)

Soviet troops lost: irretrievable losses amounted to 19,173 people (2.8%), medical losses 64,297 people. Total 84,010 people. Average daily losses amounted to 3,653 people, 10) about 500 tanks, 1656 guns. 11)

The successful conduct of the Debrecen offensive operation contributed to the withdrawal of troops 4th Ukrainian Front to the areas of Uzhgorod and Mukachevo.

The most important result of the Debrecen offensive operation was the liberation from the German occupiers of almost the entire left bank of the Tisza (29% of the territory and about 25% of the population of Hungary) and Northern Transylvania, which completed the liberation of the entire territory of Romania within its pre-war borders.

Not far from Novgorod, south of Lake Ilmen, is the ancient town of Staraya Russa. He also waited for his liberation from the occupation in 1944.

In August 1941, refugees were leaving Staraya Russa along a sun-scorched road; seriously wounded soldiers were walking, exhausted from continuous fighting, stern, gloomy and stubbornly repeating: “We will be back.” And they returned.

By mid-February, only the 16th Army of the Wehrmacht managed to maintain previously occupied positions. All attempts of the 2nd Baltic Front under the command of Army General M.M. Popov to break through enemy defenses in the Staraya Russa area were unsuccessful. The successful offensive of the Leningrad Front created a threat to the rear of the 16th Army. Its commander, Artillery General Hansen, began withdrawing his troops to the Panther Line. This was the most favorable moment for a decisive strike along the southeastern flank of Army Group North.

On February 18, virtually without preparation, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front went on the offensive, marking the beginning of the Starorussko-Novorzhevsk offensive operation. And on the very first day of the offensive, the city of Staraya Russa was liberated.

Under the attacks of our armies, the Germans hastily retreated further and further to the defensive line, where the key defensive outpost was the city and railway junction of Dno. Our troops left there on February 23. It was not possible to break through the defenses and liberate Dno right away. Only after a day of fierce fighting was the German defense broken through, and the city was liberated.

Building on their success, the forces of the 1st Shock Army on February 29, having cut the Pskov-Opochka railway, liberated the city of Novorzhev and went on the defensive. Thus ended two major operations: the Starorussko-Novorzhevsk and Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operations.

This campaign was later called "1st STALIN STRIKE" and became the beginning of a series of powerful offensive operations in 1944, known as "10 Stalinist blows".

The overall result of the offensive was the liberation of a vast territory of the USSR: the Leningrad and Novgorod regions, partially the Kalinin region and the eastern part of Estonia were completely liberated from the enemy. The total advance of our armies amounted to 280 kilometers. Large cities were liberated: Novgorod, Gatchina, Chudovo, Lyuban, Tosno, Luga, Kingisepp, Gdov, Porkhov, Staraya Russa, Novorzhev. Army Group North suffered a severe defeat; in total, the group lost about 30 divisions. Over 180 units of the Red Army received honorary names in honor of the cities they liberated. On the northwestern front a powerful springboard was created for the further liberation of Soviet land.

After the fall of the “Luga line,” the main forces of the 18th German Army began to retreat in the direction of Pskov. Since for this reason there was a threat of Soviet troops entering the flank and rear of the 16th Army, Colonel General Walter Model was forced to give the order to begin a general retreat to the Panther line. For an organized retreat, units of the 18th Army had to hold the defense for some time on the line “Pskov Lake - Strugi Krasnye - Shimsk” and only after the withdrawal of units of the 16th Army to the west, gradually retreat to Pskov and Ostrov.

A particularly great threat to the German troops was the ongoing offensive of the 42nd Army, whose 123rd Rifle Corps was advancing on Pskov, and the 116th on Plyussa and Strugi Krasnye.
However, the offensive of the 42nd Army in different directions and on a wide section of the front led to the dispersion of forces, which allowed the German units to contain the Soviet offensive at the Lochkina River - Lyubotezh - Gridino line.
The formations of the 67th Army, although slowly but persistently moved forward, overcoming the resistance of the fascists. On February 18, the 46th Rifle Division, together with the 9th and 6th partisan brigades, liberated Plyussa after several days of fierce fighting, and on February 23, units of the 67th Army, together with the 6th and 11th partisan brigades captured the regional center of Strugi Krasnye.
After the liberation of Struga Krasny, the last intermediate line of defense of the German 18th Army in front of the Panther Line was broken through, and the enemy troops were forced to accelerate their retreat to Pskov and Ostrov.
On February 22, the Supreme High Command Headquarters set the task for the three armies of the left wing of the Leningrad Front to cross the Velikaya River and capture the Island, and then develop an offensive against Riga.
By the end of February, formations of our 67th Army had advanced 90 kilometers, crossed the Cherekha River and cut through the Pskov-Opochka railway.
At the same time, pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the 42nd Army liberated Seredka on February 24. On the same day parts
The 54th Army, joining forces with the troops of the 1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front, after two days of fierce fighting captured the city of Dno, and on February 26 liberated the city of Porkhov.
Developing the offensive, units of the Leningrad Front over the next three days advanced another 65 kilometers and reached the main defensive line of the enemy’s Pskov-Ostrov fortified area, where they were forced to suspend the offensive until July 1944...
By mid-February, the most favorable situation had been created for the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front under the command of M.M. Popova.
Taking into account the current situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to undertake a large-scale operation with the forces of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts at the junction of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The 2nd Baltic Front was tasked with delivering the main blow in the direction of Opochka - Zilupe, and then, advancing on Karsava, together with the left wing of the Leningrad Front, defeat the enemy’s island group.
According to the offensive plan, the front's main attack was to be delivered
The 3rd shock and 10th guards armies, and the 1st shock and 22nd armies were tasked with pinning down enemy forces in secondary sectors. However, the beginning of the retreat of the 16th German Army forced the Soviet troops to go on the offensive ahead of schedule. On February 18, belatedly discovering the withdrawal of enemy troops, units of the 1st strike in the Staraya Russa area went on the offensive, and a day later - the 22nd Army in the Kholm area. The remaining armies, which had not yet completed the regrouping, joined the offensive later.
Pursuing the retreating enemy, units of the 1st Shock Army liberated Staraya Russa and, having established an elbow connection with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, continued the offensive. On February 29, Novorzhev was released.
At the same time, units of the 22nd Army liberated Kholm on February 21, and Dedovichi on February 25.
On February 26, part of the forces of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock Armies joined the offensive, which, having moved forward up to 18 kilometers, liberated Pustoshka, but could not achieve more.
Thus, by the beginning of March 1944, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front reached the Panther line. In total, in the second half of February, the 1st Shock Army advanced 180 kilometers from Staraya Russa to the Velikaya River, the 22nd Army - 125 kilometers from Kholm to Novorzhev, and units of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock - 30 kilometers from Maev to Pustoshka. The Starorussko-Novorzhevsk operation ended in complete success...
Prepared
Vadim VELKOV.

Staraya Russa offensive operation March 4 - 19, 1943 (offensive operation in the Staraya Russa region) - an offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the North-Western Front in the Great Patriotic War, an integral part of the larger failed Operation Polar Star to defeat the German Army Group North in March 1943.

On March 4, 1943, the implementation of the second stage of Operation Polar Star began, which received the name “offensive operation in the area of ​​​​Staraya Russa” or “Old Russian offensive operation.” The offensive was carried out in extremely unfavorable weather conditions: the early spring made dirt roads unsuitable for troop movement and opened up ice on numerous rivers and swamps. Due to the weather, 4 ski brigades formed in advance for the operation could not be used for their intended purpose and they were thrown into battle as ordinary infantry. The very concept of the operation was also unsuccessful - a repeated offensive in the same directions, without reinforcement means. Anticipating a resumption of the Soviet offensive, German troops significantly strengthened their defensive lines near Staraya Russa.
The offensive of the Soviet troops from the first day developed unsuccessfully, the advance of the troops was minimal and amounted to 10 to 15 kilometers, the troops suffered heavy losses. They only managed to break through the first line of defense along the Lovat River and occupy more than a dozen villages. Soviet troops approached the closest approaches to Staraya Russa.
Here the Soviet offensive stopped due to the need to regroup troops: the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov was urgently removed from the special group and sent to the Kharkov direction, where events became threatening for the Soviet troops. The Special Group itself was disbanded. Front commander S.K. Timoshenko was relieved of his post as front commander and Colonel General I.S. Konev was appointed in his place. The direction of the main attack was entrusted to the 68th Army, bypassing Staraya Russa from the south.
The resumption of the Soviet offensive now with infantry forces alone did not lead to success. Using powerful defenses and better training of their troops, the enemy repelled Soviet attacks. By March 19, Soviet troops had advanced only up to 5 kilometers in places, reaching the next enemy defensive line along the Redya River. The final day of the operation is March 19. However, according to other sources, the decisive attacks directly on Staraya Russa were carried out on March 19-20 and 22. And only after their final failure the front went on the defensive at the end of March. The last message from the Sovinformburo about offensive battles on the North-Western Front (“south of Lake Ilmen”) is dated March 29, 1943.

The operation plan was not carried out. For advancing to a distance of less than 20 kilometers and occupying several small villages, the Northwestern Front paid a huge price: front troops lost 31,789 people in permanent losses and 71,319 people in sanitary losses during the period from March 4 to March 19 (a total of 103,108 people). , troop losses after March 20 are unknown. The degree of brutality of the battles and the level of losses is evidenced by the fact that daily troop losses amounted to 6,444 people killed and missing. Throughout 1943, this level was exceeded only once - during the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation on the Voronezh Front, where numerous oncoming tank battles were fought, but if near Belgorod Soviet troops crushed the opposing enemy forces and opened the way to the Dnieper, then near Staraya Russa only a few tens of square kilometers of occupied forests and swamps were paid for with such losses.

Comments:

The battles near Staraya Russa in March 1943 went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the Staraya Russa offensive operation. These battles were not successful and therefore historians did not particularly remember the operation. As a rule, this operation is spoken of extremely sparingly - the operation was unsuccessful, there were large losses with little progress and small losses of the enemy.

Now, let's try to consider what actually happened.

Objectives of the operation

The initial goal of the operation was probably the second stage of Operation Polyapnaya Star - the destruction of the old Russian enemy group and a further deep offensive.

As part of this operation

The 34th Army received the order. Advance north of the city of Staraya Russa and, in cooperation with the 27th Army, acting from the north and north-west, capture the city of Staraya Russa.

The 27th Army was apparently supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses, bypass Staraya Russa from the south and, together with the 34th Army, destroy the enemy’s Staraya Russa group.

The 11th Army was supposed to break through the enemy’s front and, advancing towards the 1st UA, encircle and destroy the enemy’s Ramushev grouping.

53rd Army to pin down the enemy and subsequently destroy the enemy’s Ramushev group.

The 1st Shock Army was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and, joining with the 11th Army, encircle and destroy the enemy’s Ramushev group.

The 1st TA and 68th Army were supposed to enter the breakthrough and reach the shore of the Baltic Sea, encircle and destroy Army Group North.

On March 7, after the 1st TA received the order to withdraw the Supreme Command Headquarters to reserve, the headquarters of the North-Western Front developed a new operation plan. In all likelihood, he meant the defeat of the Ramushev and Staraya Russa enemy groups and the liberation of Staraya Russa. This plan was implemented by the front at the second stage of the operation.

Position of the parties before the start of the operation

On February 28, the Demyansk offensive operation ended. The enemy managed to withdraw his units from the Demyansk Cauldron, avoiding defeat, but the enemy still suffered certain losses. But the enemy significantly strengthened its defense. The enemy did not limit itself to passive defense, but also carried out strong counterattacks with infantry and tanks.

The front line was a large protrusion to the east – the former “Ramushevsky Corridor”, which continued to remain in enemy hands.

The defensive lines ran along the Redya River - the old enemy positions in the spring of 1942, along the Lovat River positions in the summer-autumn 1942 and a heavily fortified bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Lovat River. The enemy's defense covered both the approaches to Staraya Russa and the Staraya Russa-Kholm highway. By this time, the enemy had undergone several changes in the nature of its defense compared to the winter of 1941-1942. Instead of the “pearl necklace” - a defense system built on the basis of occupying and holding individual strong points, the enemy switched to defense with a continuous front. From the “madness on bunkers” (the formulation of the headquarters of the 16th Army), the enemy moved on to equipping open firing positions in a system of continuous trenches. The abandonment of bunkers was caused by the fact that the Red Army, during the summer offensives of 1942, had already learned during the battle to detect and destroy machine guns in bunkers; the transition to open areas allowed the enemy to widely maneuver machine guns during the battle, which greatly increased their survivability. The enemy has undergone a significant saturation of troops with automatic weapons beyond any capacity. Thus, according to documents captured by intelligence of the North-Western Front, it follows that the enemy battalion could have, instead of the standard 6 machine guns per 100 people, in fact it had 17; the situation with machine guns was similar. (100 people - this means the composition of the entire battalion - with headquarters and rear personnel, and not just the composition of the infantry companies). Not only German machine guns were actively used, but also foreign models and captured ones. The saturation of machine guns occurred both through centralized supplies of British and Soviet machine guns, and through the organization of the collection of weapons on the battlefield, which was required to be done by German orders without fail. And this situation was not in a separate battalion, but on the entire front in front of the North-Western Front. Therefore, our attacking infantry was simply met with a barrage of fire. In addition, the enemy significantly increased the training of their infantry in hand-to-hand combat. The enemy made maximum use of any opportunities to fill the depth of the defense with reserves of infantry or units that could conduct infantry combat. The very quality of the German infantry remained at a high level. Under such conditions, even small penetrations into enemy defenses were achieved with great difficulty and were immediately subject to enemy counterattacks.

The enemy still had all the same advantages as before - a well-developed defense in engineering, which the enemy had been improving for almost a year since May 1942. Also in his hands remained the railway and highway junction of Staraya Russa, which provided the enemy with the uninterrupted supply of material supplies in unlimited quantities practically on the battlefield. At the same time, for the Red Army the supply issue remained extremely acute; unloading stations remained hundreds of kilometers from the front line. Moreover, after the retreat, the Germans left behind scorched earth - bridges and roads were destroyed, villages were burned, the population was mostly driven away, everything possible was heavily mined. All this did not contribute to maneuver and delivery. For comparison, to deliver cargo from Staraya Russa to Cherenchitsy you need to travel only 35 km along a good highway. For the Red Army, it is necessary to travel 120 km from the Kresttsy station or 190 km from the Soblago station along roads and country roads during the period of thaws and snow melting. To understand, the winter roads from Ostashkov to Marevo are only 103 km; convoys covered this distance in February 1943 in 2-3 days.

The successful completion of the withdrawal of enemy troops from the “Demyansk Pocket” allowed the enemy not only to place a large number of infantry in the defense, but also to significantly increase its artillery group in the Staraya Russa area. Even in the fall of 1942, the artillery of 2 AK spent 3 times more shells than the Red Army. Now, in the positions of Staraya Russa, the ratio is unlikely to have changed.

Three days of pause were spent on regrouping troops, tightening up the rear, and reconnaissance.

In some areas the fighting did not stop - the 12th GSK continued to dislodge the enemy north of Staraya Russa, conducting the Zhilochernetsk operation. Units of the 11th, 34th, 53rd, 1st shock armies carried out reconnaissance in force and improved their positions. So the 53rd Army on March 3 at the turn of the river. Sutokskaya Srednyaya Robya was liberated by Mailukovy Gorki, Nizhnyaya Sosnovka.

Also, before the offensive, the army lines were changed. The 34th Army transferred the 87th, 20th SBR, 282, 245th SD to the 11th Army, 235th SD; 32 SBR subordinated to 53 A and 144, 146 SBR 91 UR in the front reserve, took under its command the units that fought north of Staraya Russa and directly east of Staraya Russa. Thus, reducing the zone of the 27th Army, which handed over a section of the front along with the units that occupied them and concentrated its efforts south of Staraya Russa.

Strengths of the parties

Red Army

It is believed that the total troops of the Northwestern Front by March 4 included 401,190 people. The front included the 11th Army of P. A. Kurochkin, the 27th Army of S. G. Trofimenko, the 34th Army of A. I. Lopatin, the 53rd Army of E. P. Zhuravlev, the 68th Army of F. I. Tolbukhin, 1st Shock Army of G.P. Korotkov, they all took part in the operation.
However, the front also included the 1st Tank Army, which did not take part in the operation, but after it was transferred to another direction, its 4 ski brigades participated in the operation.
The combined arms armies also did not all go into battle at the same time.
Thus, the 1st UA did not conduct offensive actions on the first day of the operation, and the 68th Army entered the battle only at the last stage of the operation - March 14.
On March 1, 1943, the NWF included 29 SD, 18 SBR, 10 Airborne Division, 16 Lyzbr, 1 UR

Wehrmacht
It is believed that the enemy forces were less than 150 thousand people. This is difficult to verify, but most likely there were more of them. The enemy forces were 15 divisions, 11 infantry, 2 light infantry, 1 motorized and 1 air field. In addition to the divisions, the enemy had other smaller units in the first line, for example, the 281st and 285th division security regiments, the 17th police regiment, the Latvian regiment, 8 separate battalions and other prefabricated units. They were all already either in the first echelon on well-equipped defensive lines, or in the near rear and had a good rockade at their disposal, which allowed the enemy to quickly maneuver reserves.

On March 5, all front armies went on the offensive.
In front of the front of the advancing units, the pr-k stubbornly defended its positions, holding back the advance of our troops with fire and short counterattacks. His aviation, in groups of aircraft, repeatedly bombed the battle formations of the advancing units in various sectors of the front.
On March 6, the NWF troops, continuing to carry out previously assigned tasks, during the day, units 34 A, part of forces 27 A and strike groups 11, 53, 1 Armies conducted offensive battles in the same directions. In front of the front of the advancing units, the pr-k stubbornly defended its positions, holding back the advance of our troops with fire and short counterattacks.

1 UA acted successfully in organizing night operations.
On March 7, during the day, NWF troops with units of 34 A and strike groups of 27, 11, 53 and 1 U armies continued to conduct offensive battles in the same directions.
The pr-k stubbornly defended its positions along the entire front, holding back the advance of our troops with powerful fire. In lane 27 A ave. to units 126, 12, 290 PD from the districts of Marfino, Nagatkino, forest east. Nagatkino, Mikhalkino launched several counterattacks with a force of a company to a battalion each, trying to restore the previous position in the area of ​​the Penna farm and the forests to the east. this point.
By fire and the actions of our infantry, the pr-k was repulsed and thrown back to its original position.
On March 7, tankers of the 1st TA received an order to begin moving to holding areas for loading into trains and transferring them to another direction. 1st TA, having transferred 4 ski brigades back to the 68th Army, was leaving for Belgorod. The NWF command had to urgently change the operation plan, since it was obvious that after the departure of the tankers, an operation to great depths was impossible.

On March 8, strike group 34 A, part of forces 27, 11 A and units of 53 A and 1 UA continued to conduct offensive battles in the same directions.
The enemy along the entire front stubbornly defended their positions, holding back the advance of our troops with powerful fire.
In the 1st UA zone, the enemy had units of the 32nd Infantry Division with a strength of more than a battalion, supported by strong artillery-mines. fire, launched several counterattacks from the Kozlovo area in the direction of Verevkino and, as a result of a stubborn battle, captured Verevkino by 6.00.

On March 8, Headquarters approved the new operation plan proposed by the SZF. On the same day, the Special Group of Forces was disbanded.
On the night of March 9, the adjacent flanks of the 11th and 53rd armies continued combat operations with the aim of destroying the strongholds of the avenue to the east. bank of the river Lovat.
As a result of night fighting, our units occupied Omychkino and Kalitkino.
The enemy on all sectors of the front stubbornly defended their positions, preventing the combat operations of units 11 and 53 A with fire.

March 9 In connection with the new operation plan, there was a short pause at the front, and the regrouping of troops began. In order to hide preparations for a new offensive, the units continued to conduct attacks in separate directions and fired artillery at the enemy in the previous directions of attack in sectors 1 UA and 27 A.

In particular, part of the forces of the left flank of 11 A and the right flank of 53 A continued combat operations to destroy the strongholds of the avenue to the east. bank of the river Lovat.
In zone 27 A, our units from 6.00 to 16.00 repelled a number of strong attacks by the pr-ka, launched by him from the Nagatkino region and the forests to the east. this point in a northerly direction.
Refuge during the day by units of the 126th Infantry Division with a strength of up to a regiment and by units of the 122nd Infantry Division with a strength of up to a battalion with the support of a powerful artillery-mine. fire launched several unsuccessful attacks from the Nagatkino, Mikhalkino line in the north. direction, trying to restore the previously existing situation in the area of ​​the Penna and Mikhalkino farms.
In other sectors of the front, the enemy limited himself to fire on the battle formations of our troops and conducting reconnaissance.
On March 10–13, regrouping and preparations for the offensive continued at the front.

During this time, the 68th Army arrived and occupied the offensive zone between the 11th and 53rd armies, artillery and ammunition were brought up.

The new operation plan apparently included much smaller goals, most likely the elimination of the ledge - the former Ramushevsky corridor and the capture of Staraya Russa.

On the night of March 14, the strike groups moved to their initial positions and reconnaissance in force was carried out.

On March 14, NWF troops after a three-hour artillery battle. preparations at 10.45 -10.50 shock groups of armies launched a decisive offensive.
The enemy, in front of the front of the advancing units, stubbornly defended their positions, holding back the advance of our troops with fire and short counterattacks. his aviation, in groups of aircraft, repeatedly bombed the battle formations of the advancing units in various sectors of the front.

On March 15, the offensive continued. The pr-k, relying on previously fortified strongholds, stubbornly defended its positions. holding back the advance of our troops with powerful fire and short counterattacks. But 68 A continued its offensive in the west from 10.00. direction. As a result of the battle, the advancing units of the army broke through the front line of defense of the avenue between Ramushevo - Cherenchitsy, wedged 12 km into its defenses and advanced units reached the river. Redya.
On the night of March 16, 1968, the army continued its offensive, destroying the enemy in its strongholds - Ramushevo, Shelgunovo, Cherenchitsy and in the forests to the west of them.

On March 16, the offensive continued. The 68th army cleared the western bank of the Lovat River from the enemy and continued to clear the enemy from the forests west of the Lovat River.

On March 17, the offensive continued, but the enemy stubbornly resisted. 68 And during the day she conducted a fire battle with the enemy at the turn of the river. Redya brought up artillery, reserves and ammunition.
On March 18, the NWF troops continued to conduct offensive battles in the same directions.
The enemy, relying on previously fortified positions, stubbornly resisted the advance of our troops with powerful fire and counterattacks.

On March 19, the offensive practically stopped, only in some areas the attack forces of the 11th and 1st shock armies continued to attack.

At this point, the Starorussian operation ended and already on March 20, a directive from the Headquarters followed to withdraw the 53rd army and a number of units to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Control Headquarters - the North-Western Front was deprived of 3 Airborne Divisions (2,3 and 4 Airborne Divisions) 4 SD (55, 170 and 202 SD and 28 GSD) 6 SBR (15, 44, 47, 121, 146 and 161 SBR), 6 LBR (15, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26 LBR).

Until the end of March, the Northwestern Front also sent the 11th and 27th armies to the reserve of the Command Headquarters. The front lost another 6 rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade.

Red Army losses
Red Army losses are estimated at 103,108 total casualties. 31,789 people were irretrievably lost and 71,319 people were sanitary losses
Wehrmacht losses are not reliably known. The 13,393 total casualty figure is based on ten-day reports, but this estimate is an underestimate.

Results of the operation
It is believed that " The operation plan was not carried out. For advancing to a distance of less than 20 kilometers and occupying several small villages, the Northwestern Front paid a huge price: front troops for the period from March 4 to March 19 lost 31,789 people as irretrievable losses and 71,319 people as sanitary ones (103,108 people in total), troop losses after March 20 are unknown. The degree of brutality of the fighting and the level of losses is evidenced by the fact that daily troop losses amounted to 6,444 people killed and missing[. Throughout 1943, this level was exceeded only once - during the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation on the Voronezh Front, where numerous oncoming tank battles were fought. However, if near Belgorod the Soviet troops achieved success and opened the way to the Dnieper, then near Staraya Russa such losses paid for only a few tens of square kilometers of occupied forests and swamps.»
What are the real results of the Starorussian offensive operation in March 1943?
The maximum plan was to cut off Army Group North and fail to defeat it. But this goal had already been canceled on March 7, when the Headquarters took 1 TA from the North-Western Front.
The goal of at least defeating the enemy’s Staraya Russa group and liberating the city of Staraya Russa also failed to be achieved.
However, beyond the “several kilometers of forests and swamps” that the Red Army liberated, the ledge, the former “Ramushevsky Corridor”, which hung over the right flank of the North-Western Front, was eliminated. The enemy was pushed back to the Redya River and lost the defensive line based on the Lovat River, which was not the smallest in its lower reaches. This strengthened our defenses and allowed us to transfer some of our forces to the General Headquarters reserve.
The ledge east of Staraya Russa was shot down, which made it possible to maintain positions north of Staraya Russa. The fact is that the positions north of Staraya Russa during the flood were a continuous flood area. For this reason, the positions won in the winter of 1942 had to be abandoned in the spring by ourselves; the ski battalions covering the withdrawal of our units then retreated several kilometers, sometimes chest-deep in icy water. Thus, Vzvad and the Lovat delta, recaptured in January 1942, were lost. In 1943, these re-conquered lands were retained.
In general, the Red Army significantly reduced the front line, took positions more convenient for defense and advantageous for the subsequent attack on Staraya Russa.
As for the losses, they were indeed large - for 10 days of the offensive, the infantry of six armies stormed the enemy’s heavily fortified positions. In fact, this was the “first call” - positional battles in Belarus in the winter of 1943-1944. There is no point in comparing the Staraya Russa and Belgorod-Kharkov operations and their results - the Staraya Russa operation was carried out by infantry forces, with the neighboring fronts being passive (the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts went on the offensive only on March 19, when the offensive near Staraya Russa had already ended. The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was carried out simultaneously with the offensive all fronts from Mius to Smolensk, with the involvement of large forces including several tank armies, the enemy who suffered significant losses in combat personnel during his offensive, in addition, the weather had minimal impact on the course of the operation.
The ferocity of the battles was such that many soldiers of the Red Army, having later gone through the Battle of Kursk and many other battles, used the battles near Staraya Russa as the measure of battles for themselves.