Plato's ethics as a reflection of his inner world. Exercise "World of Eidos"

Plato(428 or 427 BC, Athens - 348 or 347 BC) - ancient Greek philosopher, student of Socrates, teacher of Aristotle. This is the first philosopher whose writings have come down to us not in short passages quoted by others, but in full

Plato solves the basic question of philosophy unequivocally - idealistically. The material world that surrounds us, and which we know with our senses, is, according to Plato, only a "shadow" and is produced from the world of ideas, that is, the material world is secondary. All phenomena and objects of the material world are transient, arise, perish and change (and therefore cannot be truly existing), ideas are immutable, immovable and eternal. For these properties, Plato recognizes them as genuine, real being and elevates them to the rank of the only subject of truly true knowledge.

Plato explains, for example, the similarity of all tables existing in the material world by the presence of the idea of ​​a table in the world of ideas. All existing tables are just a shadow, a reflection of the eternal and unchanging idea of ​​a table. In reality, the idea of ​​a table arises as an abstraction, as an expression of a certain similarity (that is, abstraction from differences) of many separate, concrete tables. Plato separates the idea from real objects (single ones), absolutizes and proclaims it a priori in relation to them. Ideas are true essences, they exist outside the material world and do not depend on it, they are objective, the material world is only subordinate to them. This is the core of Plato's objective idealism (and rational objective idealism in general).

Between the world of ideas, as a genuine, real being, and non-being (i.e., matter as such, matter in itself), according to Plato, there is an apparent being, a derivative being (i.e., a world of really real, sensually perceived phenomena and caves) which separates true being from non-being. Real, real things are a combination of an a priori idea (genuine being) with a passive, formless "accepting" matter (non-being).

The relationship between ideas (being) and real things (apparent being) is an important part of Plato's philosophical teachings. Sensually perceived objects are nothing but a likeness, a shadow, in which certain patterns are reflected - ideas. All things in the world are subject to change and development. This is especially true for the living world. Developing, everything tends to the goal of its development. Hence, another aspect of the concept of "idea" is the goal of development, the idea as an ideal.

A person also strives for some kind of ideal, for perfection. For example, when he wants to create a sculpture out of stone, he already has in his mind the idea of ​​a future sculpture, and sculpture arises as a combination of material, i.e. stone, and an idea that exists in the mind of the sculptor.

Real sculpture does not correspond to this ideal, because in addition to the idea, it also participates in matter. Matter is non-existence. Matter is non-existence and the source of everything bad, and in particular evil. And the idea, as I have already said, is the true being of the thing. This thing exists because it is involved in ideas. Everything in the world unfolds according to some purpose, and only that which has a soul/idea can have a purpose.

The idea of ​​GOOD. Among the ideas of the truly existing world, as well as among sensible things, there is a certain kind of hierarchy. At the head of all things, at its top is, according to Plato, the idea of ​​the good. Why does Plato prefer this particular idea? Plato's argument is quite rational. In any of our actions and cognition, the most important thing is why we do it or cognize it. If we do not know the benefit or good that comes from our knowledge or action, they are useless. Consequently, not a single action and not a single idea can do without the knowledge of the good, and it turns out to be the most fundamental idea that must be preceded by everything else. The question of the essence of the good, says Plato, is one of the most difficult, therefore, its understanding must be approached through the image and likeness. Plato uses the image of the sun to illustrate the essence of the good. For our visual experience, according to Plato, three things are necessary: ​​the ability of vision and its organ, the color of the object we see, and, finally, the most important thing is the light that allows our vision to see the color of the object, without this sunlight no vision could arise. He compares the sun and its light with the source of intelligible light, the idea of ​​good.

Plato pays much attention, in particular, to the question "hierarchies of ideas". This hierarchization represents a certain ordered system of objective idealism. On the top intelligible world is idea of ​​the good. The intelligible world itself is divided into two sections. Straightaway the idea of ​​the good is followed by the world of essences comprehended by pure thinking. It is truth itself, reality itself, being as such. Per it follows the world of mathematical entities, which are nothing but images of the world of truly existing . Then comes the sensible world, it is also divided into two sections. The first is themselves objects we see, second - their shadows and reflections. Over all this sensory world dominates the sun, the highest of the gods we see, the offspring and image of the highest idea of ​​​​good. It not only transcends all really existing goodness and beauty in that it is perfect, eternal and unchanging (just like other ideas), but also stands above other ideas. The cognition or achievement of this idea is the pinnacle of real cognition and evidence of the full value of life.

Question number 14. Thomas Aquinas: Evidence for the Existence of God.

Medieval philosophy teaches to think. The proofs of the existence of God have a methodological significance: they are identical in their semantic structure, since they all presuppose an answer to one and the same question (the existence of God).

Method - way of obtaining new knowledge in science.

Methodology - science of method.

The main question to which F.A. gave answers: “What in the visible world leads us to think about God”? He gave the following answers:

1. everything in the visible world has its own degree of perfection - this suggests the focus of all perfections, i.e. about God. Here F.A. based on Plato's theory of eidos.

2. everything in the visible world has its own reason - this leads us to think about the root cause, i.e. about God. This statement is based on the logic of Aristotle's reasoning.

3. the world is arranged so rationally that it leads us to think about its rational creator, i.e. about God. Based on the thoughts of ancient philosophers.

Eidos - ideas.

Plato distinguished 2 types of being:

1. being eternal, unchanging - the being of the eidos.

2. being accidental, mortal, finite - the being of things.

The being of ideas is primary, and things are only weak reflections of ideas: pale and weak (Plato is the founder of objective idealism). The existence of ideas is a true reality, and the existence of things is an imaginary one. In his dialogue “Hippias the Elder”, Plato argues as follows: a beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, a beautiful pot are brenny. They are united by the eidos of beauty. By themselves they can disappear, but the eidos of the beautiful is eternal. It can be embodied in people, horses, pots, and other objects. Not a single thing can fully embody the eidos of its class, i.e. not m.b. an ideal dog, an ideal woman or an ideal state (i.e. such a state, in which the theory of the state is fully embodied). For the theory of the state, this provision has methodological significance (ie, it serves as a model for reasoning on the topic of the state).

In a philosophical sense, a thing is something that has boundaries. The state is also a thing.

Platonic reasoning is a model of reasoning about the ideal state. With t.z. Plato. Any finite thing belongs to some class of phenomena, for which there is its own corresponding eidos, which acts as its ideal in relation to this class.

Plato even singled out 2 worlds:

1. the world of eidos (or the world of ideas) - Hyperurania. In it, the eidos are arranged hierarchically, i.e. there are eidos of a higher level (goods of beauty, justice) and a lower level (eidos of an animal, tools, i.e. specific classes of things).

2. the earthly world of concrete things.

Things according to Plato are only weak and imperfect reflections of the eidos of the corresponding class.

In the 20th century, Plato's theory of eidos is the subject of debate; in particular, the philosopher K. Popper in the book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" very emotionally criticizes Plato for his theory of the state, ranking Plato among the founders of totalitarianism. He relies in his criticism on the fact that Plato in his works "Laws", "On the State" gives priority to the interests of the state. But if we consider the theory of eidos as a methodology (that is, as a way of reasoning), then it turns out that any theory of an ideal state is a utopia.

The ideal is embodied, realized during the change of generations, which means that it is never fully realized.

Systematization and communications

In fact, eidos (ancient Greek - appearance, appearance, image), is a synonym for the modern philosophical concept of "phenomenon". Of course, you can also use ancient words in Greek, but it is not clear why, if there is a word with the same meaning in Russian.

It seemed to me that for Plato's "eidos" the most suitable modern - "essence" as that which constitutes the main idea of ​​anything.

True, such a definition suffers from a new disease (I would say - an infection), namely, the uncertainty of the concept of "idea", although in this context the idea of ​​​​this idea is used not in an ideal, but rather in an ordinary, colloquial sense, well, like: "idea this project is...

(These two §§ 73 - 74 represent the pinnacle of the phenomenological clarity and maturity of Proclus' philosophy. Three consecutive categories are put forward here - being, whole and form (the latter term sounds unimpressive in this Russian translation, because Proclus' term "eidos" indicates, in fact, , on the visually visible or represented semantic essence of the object). The existent is that which exists in itself, regardless of our point of view on its content. The whole is such an existent, which is taken together with its content and is the principle of the indivisible unity of this latter. Form However, or eidos, there is such a principle of the unification of content, which, discarding everything random and individual that is in the content and its parts, is a picture of its essential ordering.)

Thus the word "eidos" is closest to the word "form". Closer but not the same.

Is it possible to combine these different views in the concept of eidos?

Comments

Losev writes and Victor quotes:

The form, or eidos, ...

That is, according to Losev, eidos and form are one and the same. And this corresponds to the translation from the Greek "view, appearance, image", since we see only the form, it is revealed and it is also a phenomenon. However, more precisely, the phenomenon is not only an image (form), but also a concept, including an abstract one. In other words, the phenomenon is a more general philosophical concept than the form (eidos). Therefore, in my opinion, the term eidos may be of interest only to historians of philosophy.
Interestingly, the phenomenon and meaning (form and content) of the opposite, and what word does Losev call the opposite of eidos? If the eidos is existing (const. existing), then the opposite of the existing should be the essence. Which of the connoisseurs of Losev's works can answer?

Let's take a look at Victor's quote:

Here is what Losev writes in one of the comments to Proclus' "The Fundamentals of Theology":
(These two §§ 73 - 74 represent the pinnacle of the phenomenological clarity and maturity of Proclus' philosophy. Three consecutive categories are put forward here - being, whole and form (the latter term sounds unimpressive in this Russian translation, because Proclus' term "eidos" indicates, in fact, , on the visually visible or represented semantic essence of the object). Being - that which exists in itself, regardless of our point of view on its content. The whole is such a being, which is taken together with its content and is the principle of the indivisible unity of this latter. Form However, or eidos, there is such a principle of the unification of content, which, discarding everything random and individual that is in the content and its parts, is a picture of its essential ordering.)
Thus the word "eidos" is closest to the word "form". Closer but not the same.

According to Losev's quote, eidos is the principle of unity of content, which, discarding everything random and individual that is in the content and its parts, is a picture of its essential ordering. It turns out that eidos expresses (or is expressed in?) the essence (“essential ordering”) of the object rather than the manifestly individual. In the eidos there is no non-essential ("random") and individual (specific as the polarity of the generality of the essential-generic - supra-individual).
However, Losev connects the concept of eidos with form (or the opposition of content). What is the reason for this? Why, in conjunction with the concept of eidos, is essence close to the concept of form?
Maybe Losev interprets the concept of content and the concept of phenomenon in two ways?
The content includes the essential features of the subject and non-essential - individual, random. The phenomenon also includes both the essence of the object, which it manifests, and the non-essential content of signs of secondary, random, purely individual.
Then eidos as a form unites in the subject its content, which appears to us as essential, non-random, not purely individual.
Consequently, eidos coincides with the concept of form in that it unites the content of an object into a visible, figurative unity. But this is not a total unity of the sensual form of the object, which includes in the phenomenon of the object both its essential and individual content. This is a form that reveals, presents to us an object from the side of its essence, its “essential ordering”.
In this interpretation of Losev, it seems to me that the concept of eidos combines, combines the meaning of eidos as a form, the appearance of an image of an object to us, and the meaning of eidos as the essence of an object, presented in this form-appearance to the mind's eye as a visual-figurative essential-content unity of an object , cleared of layers of random-individual.
Here is a short quote from Losev's "The Most Itself":

4. a) We reveal the nature of meaning. Eidos is the meaning. Eidos is just the answer to the question: what is a given thing or what does a given thing mean?

For me, eidos is what gives us the answer to the question about the meaning, about what this thing is. It is, one might say, an individual aspect of the thing itself. We find out the answer to questions about a thing by speculatively referring to the noumenon-eidos of the thing, comparing our own answers (our understanding of the thing) with the phenomenal sensually given image of the thing in our mind. We turn to the eidos of a thing intuitively-speculatively (irrationally), compare the speculative picture with the sensual image (phenomenon) of the thing and get a “two-in-one package” at the output: a sensual image combined with a speculative logical construct in the dual unity of the sensual phenomenon (extracted from the phenomenon of the thing) and rational noumenon (extracted from the eidos of a thing).

Permian,
= For me, eidos is what gives us the answer to the question about the meaning, about what this thing is.=
Then, your understanding (like mine) is no different from that of the Greeks. After all, it is the form that expresses the content or the phenomenon expresses (shows) the meaning. For example, a word is also a phenomenon, a certain form, and it is the word that expresses the meaning that this word denotes.
But the phrase Losev quoted by you "eidos is the meaning" is very strange. I think Losev could not contradict himself, in one work he says - eidos form, and in another - eidos the meaning of this form. Most likely, this quote is out of context, since only in the Absolute (Beginning, God) the form is identical to the content or the phenomenon is identical to the meaning, only there is no opposition, but there is the identity of everything to everything, including the eidos to the meaning.

With the stubbornness of a madman, I repeat that Losev is not able to explain anything at all - he is not the right mindset. He is 100% religious. He explains the complex through more and more complex and winds this spring as long as there are enough words of the Russian language.
If you don’t feel sorry for my time, then I can rummage around and give you a quote from Losev, where he “proves” EXACTLY WITH THE SAME tenacity (i.e., produces a set of scientific proposals) that eidos in ancient philosophy is equivalent to the concept ... myth.
He has a similar situation with the concept of "idea", as well as with the concept of "single", and also - ... Whatever he undertakes to explain, he always ends up with a critical mass of heaps, and so that it does not explode in the reader's head, he stops showing off in time. Show off due to the richness of shades of the Russian language. He speculates on it.
If in life you are in search of God, and in philosophy - authority, then Losev is yours. If in life you want to expand your understanding, and for this you turn to philosophy, then Losev ... is also yours! True, as a negative character that impedes understanding, and IMPOSES faith.

The problem is that I myself understand this.
And then the disease enters its critical phase. The fact is that such an understanding of mine contradicts the diagnosis of mental illness. In short, everything is like Zeno! The Diagnosis-Achilles cannot catch up with the Mind-Turtle in any way.

Victor, September 9, 2013 - 22:00
But the phrase Losev quoted by you "eidos is the meaning" is very strange. ... Most likely this quote is out of context.

Quoted from section IV. Meaning, subsection 7. Eidos is the end of the book.
Another quote from this subsection:

3. a) The Greek word "eidos" means "view" in the broadest sense of the word. This in Greek is both a purely sensual appearance, a figure, a form, a picture, and a purely essential "view", i.e. visually, optically given entity. Why is it necessary to use just this Greek term for the category analyzed here? The point is that something visual or, rather, perceptive is actually born here, although we are here only within the limits of essence and even only within the limits of meaning. We will not talk about what is visual and contemplated not only sensual. All this work is largely devoted to proving and simply discovering that the objects of the mind, semantic, essential objects, are also visual, contemplative, contemplated, visible with the eyes of the mind. And here, in the doctrine of eidos, we only encounter this notorious and diverse "intellectual intuition" more painfully. In fact, without it, no derivation of categories is possible, since in order to proceed dialectically to any subsequent category, it is necessary to o-limit the first category, o-subject, distinguish it from everything else; and this drawing of the frontier is a wholly contemplative operation.

Losev focuses attention, emphasizes that speculation is only partly the destruction of the continuity-integrity of the picture of the world given to us in sensory perception. The reverse side of speculation is a reverse synthesis of separate categories, denoting different aspects, aspects of an integral thing, into a speculative logical categorical construct, recreating the integrity of a thing in the logical categories of the essence, meaning of a thing by means of rational-logical means. Both logical operations - methods of analysis, splitting the sensory unity of a perceived thing into separate categories, denoting different sides, signs of a thing, and the reverse process of a logical categorical synthesis of a thing into a logical holistic construct are possible with the obligatory condition of the ability of the mind to rational vision things, mind you vision. The ability to see a thing not only in a sensory-holistic image, but also in a rational-logical image-construct and allows splitting in the analysis of the sensory-whole into rational-categorially separate (into the sum of concepts-designations of individual sides, features, aspects, relationships) and in synthesis restore the integrity of the thing as already a logical-categorical construct with its "essential orderliness".

Perm
Losev's quote:

"All this work is largely devoted to proving and simply discovering that the objects of the mind, semantic, essential objects, are also visual, contemplative, contemplated, visible with the eyes of the mind."

Here Losev speaks of forms (eidos) in the being of the subject, that is, this is the same thing that Kant called the thing "in us", and more modernly the object. Losev draws attention to the fact that eidos in everyday life and eidos in being are one and the same eidos, although Kant spoke about the same before him. In my opinion, this work of Losev, so to speak, is intermediate, this is his formation as a philosopher and, in general, is of no particular interest.
What cannot be said about his work "The Dialectic of Myth", where he comes to understand the unity and otherness of the subject, that is, his philosophical knowledge becomes equal to the knowledge of Plato (Socrates), and not only the knowledge of Kant. It is a pity that Russian philosophy practically ended on Losev, with the exception of Chanyshev, whose philosophical work was first published only in the 90s and shortly before his death.

We turn to the eidos of a thing intuitively-speculatively (irrationally), compare the speculative picture with the sensual image (phenomenon) of the thing and get a “two-in-one package” at the output: a sensual image combined with a speculative logical construct in the dual unity of the sensual phenomenon (extracted from the phenomenon of the thing) and rational noumenon (extracted from the eidos of a thing).

Still, at first we see a thing, we feel it.
Then the resulting sensual image (phenomenon) of the thing is imprinted, remembered and intuitively-speculative (irrationally) "spins" in the head along the OOS ring, folding into a "convenient" form. Otherwise, it is simply discarded as "indigestible", unnecessary.
In any case, in the head are not things, but their forms.
We compare (compare) a "convenient" speculative picture from the place of its storage with a sensual image (phenomenon) of a thing, and we get "at the output" their difference in the form of a difference and a difference sign.
Based on the obtained difference, we “finish” the speculative picture (mine) until we get the minimum difference with the sensual image (phenomenon) of the thing.
As the "refinement" reveals deeper layers of the phenomenon of things, and small details, with the "increase" of which significant values ​​of specific differences are formed, requiring appropriate "refinement" at the opened (next) level. Until we get to the quantum level, where (instrumental) increase is no longer possible, but only mental increase is possible.
Since memorization occurs in a discrete form, and a thing is, in principle, continuous and dynamic, then the laying of the slices of a thing (static forms) must occur in a strict order, in a certain sequence. And the internal "reproduction" of a thing must also be in the order of its "composition".
Both the statics and dynamics of a thing in the head are the forms of this thing.
The idea of ​​a thing in the head (I will call eidos) consists of a series of static forms connected by the dynamics of "reproduction", which is a dynamic form.
How this dynamic form is formed is another question.
If the static is stored in a certain place, then the dynamics can be autonomous (asynchronous) in each subject, or it can have a synchronization type connection with external sources.

When the image of a thing in the head acquires sufficient detail in dynamics, then it is associated with the images of other things, acquiring the meaning of use.
I hope that I have not gone far from your canvas.
Thank you.

Vladimir Diletant):

The idea of ​​a thing in the head (I will call eidos) consists of a series of static forms connected by the dynamics of "reproduction", which is a dynamic form.

I liked the train of thought!
And the rest too.

Thank you Victor
The train of thought, as it was, remains so.
I can't rate it myself.
But another early phrase clings to the phrase about the dynamics of form: .
It's not about smart words. And in how, by what means, by what "hooks" they are pulled out of us. I will remember my first "hook" for the rest of my life.

In the relatively recent issue of "Questions of Philosophy 2013 No. 3" there is an article by Nikitaev V.V. "From the philosophy of technology - to the philosophy of engineering" there are interesting footnotes and texts:
On Aristotle: “Art is eidos” (MF).

Analyzing the texts, the author of the article writes:
Although the power gained by man through techne is not unlimited: "a saw cannot be made from trees; it does not depend on a moving cause" (Mt 1044-27). “To be skillful,” says Aristotle, “means to understand how something arises from things that can be and not be, and whose beginning [arche] is in the creator, and not in what is being created” (NE 1140a10). But now it turns out that only the presence of eidos in the soul (knowledge) gives a person the ability to be a creator. That is eidos has power or is itself power. (Emphasis not mine!)

Where do eidos forms come from? Plato believed that they eternally exist in their own special, hierarchically ordered world; Aristotle offers a different answer. Forms are not just in the soul (potentially or actually) - they are thought by the mind; moreover, "just as the hand is an instrument of tools, so the mind is the form of forms [eidos of eidos]" (On the Soul 432a1).

Proclus "Platonic Theology":
In fact, we assert that those objects that happen to experience the power of identity have common properties; the same, which is similar, is, of course, due to participation in a single eidos and a single nature.

The duality of the limit and the infinite So, that is why the first being was called mixed by Plato *; as an image of being, becoming also turns out to be something mixed from the limit and the boundless. And the infinite in it will be an imperfect force, and the limit - an eidos and a form of such a force.

Indeed, why does not that which arises in accordance with one eidos have the same form and nature, although a single idea must in all cases give rise to that which belongs to the same species? Despite the fact that this aporia is very difficult to resolve, based on logic, one could perhaps say the following: everything that is hypostasized in accordance with a single eidos will by no means be similar and will participate in a common cause unequally - on the contrary, one<будет причастно ей>primary, another intermediate, and a third last.

Proclus Comments on Parmenides:
However, the first outstanding representative of the doctrine of eidos, who presented it in an expanded form, was Socrates. He studied definitions and found out exactly what is defined, and from the latter, acting as an image, he moved on to eidetic causes.<Сократ>described such an entity as something in itself (???? ??? "????) existing, believing that this is how he can express all its originality. Indeed, this definition emphasizes the unmixedness, simplicity and purity of eidos, because the word "self" indicates their simplicity, and the words "by itself" describe their unblended purity.<Сократ>distinguishes eidos from what ordinary people give categorical definitions.

In what sense is unlikeness the opposite of likeness? So, on the basis of what has been said, it is necessary to come to an obvious conclusion: similarity is better than unlikeness. Indeed, if eidos, generally speaking, turn out to be paradigms, and things in our world turn out to be their images, then things, of course, will be similar and unlike them.

Meanwhile, the five kinds of beings are the cause of the hypostasis of all eidos.

This means that there are eidoses that precede the sensually perceived ones, their demiurgic causes, which are initially located in the single cause of the entire cosmos. Consequently, the creator of the cosmos, of course, is able to generate and think even more precise and perfect eidoses of visible things. So, where does he generate them and where does he contemplate? Obviously, in himself, for it is precisely himself that he contemplates. This means that while contemplating and generating himself, he simultaneously gives birth and hypostasizes in himself even more immaterial and precise eidoses of visible things.

The fact that participation in eidos should not be bodily can be considered proven.

In addition, everything that is defined in some sense turns out to be an object of knowledge, while eidos cannot be an object of knowledge.

If there are no eidos, then there will be no paradigms, because eidos are just paradigms in the most primordial sense of the word.

Losev. History of ancient aesthetics (Aristotle and the late classics):
Eidos in Plato and Aristotle is the visible essence of a thing or, so to speak, the face of a thing. And now it turns out that this face of a thing is not only something undivided, but also the very individuality of a thing, the separateness of which is already fading into the background. Here comes to the first place precisely that eidetic unity, which is not reduced either to the unity of the continuous fluidity of a given thing, or to the unification of its properties and qualities, or simply to our logical processes of generalization. Already here it becomes difficult to distinguish the concepts of Plato from Aristotle. After all, Plato introduced his One just with the aim of preserving the unity of the eidos, but Plato took all the eidos that ever existed, exist or will exist, and wanted to formulate this general principle of the unity of the world in the form of just such a general and indivisible their unity. This is also an eidos, which is also designated by Plato himself as the Idea of ​​the Good. Consequently, if Aristotle also gathered all his world eidos into a single whole and asked the question of the universal individuality arising from them, then he would also have to talk about this eidos, or an idea that is outside all its individual parts and moments. Whether to call such a One "essence" or not to call it, this is only a question of terminology. By the way, as we well know, Plato himself also considers his One to be above all essence (R. R. VI 509 b).

Plotin, ENNEADS, K.: "UCIMM-PRESS", 1995-1996; PSYLIB, 2003

If individual souls and the World Soul are essentially one and the same, then our souls are eidos, which means that their actions directed at another nature constitute unity with them and, thus, have no influence on them. And if so, then our souls are immortal, indestructible and passionless: giving something of themselves to other, lower substances, they themselves receive nothing from them and do not depend in any way, yet they have their own from a higher source, with which they are inextricably linked. .

All knowledge occurs through and thanks to likeness. And since the Mind and Soul are eidos, they can cognize eidos, and they are directed at eidos; but is it possible to imagine evil as an eidos, when it is obvious that it is the complete absence of any kind of good.
Therefore, to the question of what an eidos is, we get the following answer: an eidos is both a thought of the Mind, or even the Mind itself, and a conceivable essence, for each such essence is neither something alien to the Mind, much less something other than it, but each eidos is the Mind, and the Mind, of course, in its entirety is the totality of all eidos.

D Amassky Diadokh, On the first principles, St. Petersburg, RKHGI, 2000. - 1072 p.:
However, above this essence [soul], we see a certain isolated eidos, correlated with itself and referring to itself, the eidos of a rational hypostasis.

The most correct thing is the following: since the existence of such an eidos lies in the underlying, it should not be understood as acting independently; it must be regarded as acting only together with the foundation in which it exists, for it acts in the same way as it exists.

Victor, thanks for the smart quotes.
From my bell tower I saw:
Plotinus

All knowledge occurs through and thanks to likeness. And since the Mind and Soul are eidos, they can cognize eidos, and they are directed at eidos; but is it possible to imagine evil as an eidos, when it is obvious that it is the complete absence of any kind of good.

Clearly, the eidos here act as a common basis for their comparison with each other.
If I take a cow and a chair, how can I compare them? You can break your head.
But if I take the eidos of a cow as the interaction of the forms of its components - and the forms are made up of points that have coordinates (). And the specific gaps between the points are due to the size of the "grain" of a particular substrate, which makes up a particular shape. In the same way, I can imagine the eidos of a chair from its (inherent to the chair) forms - the essence is the coordinates of points that have a size (substratum).
Having the coordinates of the points of one eidos and the coordinates of the points of another eidos, I can compare with each other both the coordinates in statics and the "selections" of coordinates in dynamics (the coordinates of individual discretes of the movement of the form of a thing).
Here comes a question.
If forms are stored in statics, and the "model" of these forms is dynamic, then in what form is the dynamic form - is it moving (in the head) or static?
Here the technique ends, and we come close to the border of observing the entire "picture" of a moving "cow".

In such a consideration, evil is the result of a comparison of eidos, and not the eidos itself, as well as good.
The result of comparing eidos is a difference that has a sign (positive or negative).
Preliminarily, we can say that the sign indicates the direction of the general process - what should be done - from a cow to a chair or from a chair to a cow.
The difference in numerical comparison gives the number of directions (vectors) for further actions. For example, move a point (a cow or a chair) to a new location BY this difference value. Another number will give direction to another new location.
Again, the result is neither good nor evil. This means that it is further away, after the transformation of a cow into a chair or, conversely, a chair into a cow.
Thank you.

I look at the chair differently:

1. In order for the shaping of the chair to take place, labor (activity) (1 / A) is necessary.
2. Tool and blanks (P / A) - labor fixed in the material (P).
3. Manufacturing of parts from blanks as a process of their change ((P / A) A) - formation.
4. Assembly of parts (PP / AA) - fixing parts, structuring.
5. Operation of the chair (activation of the structure (PP / AAA).

***
The finished chair is just a thing.

But according to Losev, the thing also carries:
1. Difference (from another thing as "one")
2. Identity (with another thing as "one").
3. Formation (when changing the interior, or one's own aging, here "one" is changing in relation to "many").
4. What has become (as a structural element of the interior, furniture, in "many things").
5. Manifestation (emanation in structure - convenience, etc. in "Much")
***
I don't understand much either...

I look at the chair differently

It seems to me that Vladimir, using the example of a chair and a cow, quite clearly showed the whole inconsistency of the eidetic approach to cognition, for example, of these simple things. As Vadim Vladimirovich rightly noted a little higher, cognition always works with the form (the predicate of the proposition) and never with the content (the subject of the proposition). In this case, comparing a cow with a chair, thinking compares not their eidos, but their predicates: the chair cost me three rubles, and the cow thirty thousand; a chair for rest, and a cow for work; the chair is wooden, and the cow is alive, and so on. Your pp. 1-5 are exactly the same chair predicates, only taken without comparison with a cow and called eidos for beauty. In a word, the logic of predicates completely covers eidetic and is obviously much closer to real thinking. Don't find?

Bravo:
It seems to me that Vladimir, using the example of a chair and a cow, quite clearly showed the whole inconsistency of the eidetic approach to cognition, for example, of these simple things.

For me, this is a sore point that brings me back to Kant. Or even further - to Parmenides on the identity of being and thinking. Personally, I have already formed the opinion that we stupidly exploit eidetic thinking, as well as a cell that is higher than us in terms of development. But this exploitation is at the level of 1-3%.

In a word, the logic of predicates completely covers eidetic and is obviously much closer to real thinking. Don't find?

I find, and I wrote about this when I came to FS, that most people use predicate thinking. I also use it - thinking begins with it. The chair is dead. Cow "live". Etc.
Eidetic thinking is processual. And in life we ​​meet a person and immediately feel that he is "with a smell." Sensual Experience immediately offers us a predicate... This is not what we are talking about here... But speech is about what and how the Unity, which is embodied in us, is ensured. Therefore, I am a handyman in ancient philosophy - I stupidly collect facts, thinking along the way ...

It is not clear why eidos are opposed to the logic of predicates. After all, only eidos can predict something. We cannot relate a concept to a material thing. In Kant's non-eidos philosophy it is explicitly stated that no predicate can be attributed to the thing-in-itself.

In Kant's non-eidos philosophy it is explicitly stated that no predicate can be attributed to the thing-in-itself.

If in Russian, then apparently you wanted to say that nothing can be said about a thing "in itself" (predicate (lat.) - declared, said). Only, after all, Kant did not assert anything of the kind, he spoke of the impossibility of saying anything about a thing "in itself", and about things "in us" or about a thing "in itself" (more modernly, an object), we only do what we are talking. The subject rationally (logically) thinks exclusively in words.

Plato and the formation of the philosophical system of objective idealism

Plato(427 - 347 BC) - a great thinker, penetrating with his subtlest spiritual threads the entire world philosophical culture; it is the subject of endless controversy in the history of philosophy, art, science and religion. Plato was in love with philosophy: all the philosophizing of this thinker is an expression of his life, and his life is an expression of his philosophy. He is not only a philosopher, but also a brilliant master of the artistic word, able to touch the finest strings of the human soul and, having touched them, tune them in a harmonious way. According to Plato, the desire to comprehend being as a whole gave us philosophy, and “a greater gift to people, like this gift of God, has never been and never will be” (G. Hegel).

The idea is the central category in Plato's philosophy. The idea of ​​a thing is something ideal. So, for example, we drink water, but we cannot drink the idea of ​​water or eat the idea of ​​bread, paying in stores with ideas of money: an idea is the meaning, the essence of a thing. All cosmic life is generalized in Platonic ideas: they have regulative energy and govern the Universe. Plato interpreted ideas as some kind of divine essence. They were conceived as target causes, charged with the energy of aspiration, while between them there are relations of coordination and subordination. The highest idea is the idea of ​​absolute goodness - it is a kind of “Sun in the realm of ideas”, the world Mind, it deserves the name of Mind and Deity.

A.F. Losev on Plato: Plato, an enthusiastic poet, in love with his realm of ideas, contradicted here Plato, a strict philosopher who understood the dependence of ideas and things, their mutual indissolubility. Plato was so clever that he understood the impossibility of completely separating the heavenly realm of ideas from the most ordinary earthly things. After all, the theory of ideas arose for him only on the paths of realizing what things are and that their cognition is possible. Greek thought about Plato did not know the concept of "ideal" in the proper sense of the word. Plato singled out this phenomenon as something self-existent. He ascribed to ideas an independent being, originally separate from the sensible world. And this, in essence, is a doubling of being, which is the essence objective idealism.

Plato's doctrine of "eidos"

The main part of Plato's philosophy, which gave its name to a whole trend of philosophy, is the doctrine of ideas (eidos), the existence of two worlds: the world of ideas (eidos) and the world of things, or forms. Ideas (eidos) are prototypes of things, their sources. Ideas (eidos) underlie the whole multitude of things formed from formless matter. Ideas are the source of everything, while matter itself cannot produce anything.

The world of ideas (eidos) exists outside of time and space. There is a certain hierarchy in this world, at the top of which stands the idea of ​​the Good, from which all the rest flow. Good is identical to absolute Beauty, but at the same time it is the Beginning of all beginnings and the Creator of the Universe. In the myth of the cave, the Good is depicted as the Sun, ideas are symbolized by those creatures and objects that pass in front of the cave, and the cave itself is an image of the material world with its illusions.

The idea (eidos) of any thing or being is the deepest, most intimate and essential in it. In man, the role of an idea is played by his immortal soul. Ideas (eidos) have the qualities of constancy, unity and purity, and things - variability, multiplicity and distortion.

The epistemology of Plato

Plato's philosophy is almost entirely permeated with ethical issues: his dialogues deal with such issues as the nature of the highest good, its implementation in the behavioral acts of people, in the life of society. The moral worldview of the thinker developed from "naive eudemonism" (Protagoras) - it is consistent with the views of Socrates: "good" as the unity of virtue and happiness, beautiful and useful, kind and pleasant. Then Plato moves on to the idea of ​​absolute morality (the dialogue "Gorgias"). It is in the name of these ideas that Plato denounces the entire moral system of Athenian society, which condemned itself in the death of Socrates. In such dialogues as "Gorgias", "Theaetetus", "Phaedo", "Republic", Plato's ethics receives an ascetic orientation: it requires purification of the soul, renunciation of worldly pleasures, secular life full of sensual joys. According to Plato, the sensual world is imperfect - it is full of disorder. The task of a person is to rise above him and strive with all the strength of the soul to become like God, who does not come into contact with anything evil (“Theaetetus”); in freeing the soul from this corporeal, focusing it on itself, on the inner world of speculation and dealing only with the true and eternal ("Phaedo").

Teaching about the soul

Interpreting the idea of ​​the soul, Plato says: the soul of a person before his birth resides in the realm of pure thought and beauty. Then she ends up on the sinful earth, where, temporarily being in a human body, like a prisoner in a dungeon. "remembers the world of ideas." Here Plato had in mind memories of what happened in a former life: the soul resolves the main questions of its life even before birth; when she comes into the world, she already knows everything there is to know. She herself chooses her lot: her own fate, destiny, is already destined for her. Thus, the Soul, according to Plato, is an immortal essence; three parts are distinguished in it: rational, turned to ideas; ardent, affective-volitional; sensual, driven by passions, or lusty. The rational part of the soul is the basis of virtue and wisdom, the ardent part is courage; the overcoming of sensibility is the virtue of prudence. In the process of thinking, the soul is active, internally contradictory, dialogical and reflexive.

Plato on the state

Plato justifies his views on the origin of society and the state by the fact that an individual person is not able to satisfy all his needs for food, housing, clothing, etc. In considering the problem of society and the state, he relied on his favorite theory of ideas and ideals. The "ideal state" is a community of farmers, artisans who produce everything necessary to maintain the life of citizens, warriors who protect security, and philosopher-rulers who carry out wise and just government of the state. Plato contrasted such an “ideal state” with ancient democracy, which allowed the people to participate in political life, to govern government. According to Plato, only aristocrats, as the best and most wise citizens, are called to govern the state. And farmers and artisans, according to Plato, must conscientiously do their work, and they have no place in government bodies. The state should be protected by law enforcement officers, who form a power structure, and the guards should not have personal property, they must live in isolation from other citizens, eat at a common table. The "ideal state", according to Plato, should in every possible way patronize religion, educate piety in citizens, and fight against all kinds of wicked people.

Plato's doctrine of the state is a utopia. The classification of forms of government proposed by Plato highlights the essence of the socio-philosophical views of the brilliant thinker.

Plato pointed out:

a) "ideal state" (or approaching the ideal) - the aristocracy, including the aristocratic republic and the aristocratic monarchy;

b) the descending hierarchy of state forms, to which he ranked timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny.

According to Plato, tyranny is the worst form of government, and democracy was for him the object of sharp criticism. The worst forms of the state are the result of the “corruption” of the ideal state. Timocracy (also the worst) is a state of honor and qualifications: it is closer to the ideal, but worse, for example, than an aristocratic monarchy.

Plato is the founder of objective idealism in philosophy and the European style of thinking in general. The main achievement of Platonic philosophy is the doctrine of eidos, ideas. This doctrine contains the following main provisions:

1. The sensible world of things cannot be true being (reality), because it constantly becomes (changes) and is never what it was a moment ago. And if he is always not what he was before, and every moment he no longer becomes what he is now, then he is neither this, nor this, nor another, and has no definition at all, because he never can be equal (identical) to itself. True being can only be something unchanging, and equal (identical) to itself, about which it can always be said with certainty that it is what it is now, has always been and will always be.

2. The world of sensually perceived things is not a true reality also because any thing is in physical space, consists of parts, can decompose on them, and therefore is doomed to change and death. And that which, sooner or later, will perish, no longer exists now in the sense of all this, and, therefore, despite the fact that it physically exists, it is not authentic, since, by the final fact, it no longer exists.

3. The world of sensuously perceived things cannot be true reality also because it is multiple, and true reality can only be single, since only the single does not change and, as immutable, therefore, is always identical to itself and eternal.

4. In the world of sensible things, therefore, there is nothing of true reality, but since this world truly exists, it takes this authenticity, is saturated with this authenticity from somewhere outside itself, from some true reality, eternal, unchanging and individual. .

5. Thus, there is a certain true reality, which is the determining principle in relation to the material world and endows it with authenticity from itself, that is, makes the world a reality. But this true reality is not this world itself, or something similar in characteristics to this world. For, in order to be authentic, it must be an intangible, incorporeal phenomenon, be outside the physical space, not decompose into parts, not disintegrate, and, thus, be immortal and indestructible, which is the only authenticity.

6. Non-material true being, which is the source of the reality of material things, should be, as mentioned above, single, but the world of things and phenomena is plural. It goes without saying that something singular can determine the existence of only the singular. And how then does a single true being determine the presence of many things and phenomena in this world?

Due to the emergence of this question, it should be assumed that the singularity of true reality is a composite, assembled from a multitude of single, unchanging and truly real incorporeal formations, each of which independently determines the presence in the objective world of things or phenomena corresponding to itself.

7. Consequently, each class (group) of sensible objects and phenomena of this not true world, in the true world, in the ideal world corresponds to a certain “standard”, “type” or “idea” .

Thus, the genuine, truly real non-material world consists of incorporeal, unchanging and eternal formations, eidos, ideas through which matter receives its being, its form and its quality.

8. So matter exists because it imitates the world of ideas and joins it. Matter itself without ideas has neither form nor quality.

Therefore, sensible things owe their existence only to communion with ideas. But in this communion, things cannot take from ideas all their perfection, because, being the world of things, they are not true, but therefore they are pale, imperfect copies of these ideas.

9. The world of ideas is organized hierarchically and in such a way that at the top of its hierarchy is the most important idea of ​​the Good. The “place above the heavens” where the true non-material reality, the world of ideas, is located, is called Hyperurania.

10. The immortal soul of a person often flies into the world of ideas, remembers everything that he sees there, and then moves back into a person who, if he is looking for true knowledge, can only remember what the soul saw there.

The relationship between the world of ideas and the world of things is well clarified in Plato by the image of a cave. The philosopher compares people who believe in the reality and authenticity of the sensual picture of the material world with the prisoners of the dungeon. From an early age, they have shackles on their legs and neck, for this reason they cannot turn around to the entrance, and their eyes are turned deep into the cave. Behind these people is a shining sun, the rays of which penetrate the dungeon through a wide gap in its entire length and illuminate the wall, against which the eyes of the prisoners rest. Between the source of light and the prisoners there is a road along which people move behind the screen, holding various utensils, figurines and other objects above the screen. The prisoners of the cave are unable to see anything but the shadows cast by the "road of life" on the wall of their gloomy abode. However, they believe that these shadows are the only true reality, that apart from their cave, the weak light and pale shadows in it, there is nothing else in the world. They do not believe the one who, having managed to escape from the dungeon, and having seen real things, returns to them and tells them about the world outside the cave. So and all people - they live among the shadows, in a ghostly, unreal world. But there is another - the true world, and people can see it with the eyes of the mind. A man who escaped from the cave and tells people about the true world - this is the philosopher. To bring people the message of the true world is the true purpose of philosophy.