T. N. Zagorodnikova

Zagorodnikova Tatyana Nikolaevna - Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading researcher at the Center for Indian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Priority directions research - Russian-Indian relations in the 19th and early 20th centuries, publication of archival documents, new history of India. She graduated from the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University, and has been teaching at the Department of History of South Asia at this Institute for many years.

FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN-INDIAN
MILITARY RELATIONS.
CAMPAIGN TO INDIA OF PAUL I.

When considering contacts between Russia and any colonial state, the question arises about the country in whose dependence the latter was, about the role it played in them. In our case of Russian-Indian military relations, this is Great Britain. When exploring military ties between the Russian Empire and India, third parties have, to varying degrees, always had a British component. Often these relations arose due to this component, due to the desire of both countries to eliminate it. Often the situation developing in Europe played a major role in Russian-Anglo-Indian relations. The formation and disintegration of alliances, confrontations and wars - all changes in the political situation in Europe, in particular between Great Britain and Russia - echoed in Asia, therefore only by keeping in mind the balance of power in Europe at any given moment can we consider military relations between our countries.

Russian historiography of Russian-Indian relations of the 19th century knows of two campaigns against India: 1801 by Paul I and 1878 between the conclusion of the San Stefano Peace Treaty and the Congress of Berlin. The campaign of Paul I had its own prehistory, which began 37 years before its implementation.

September 20, 1763 M.V. Lomonosov wrote a Letter of Dedication to “the President of the Admiralty Board, Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich, about the need to use the northeastern passage for merchant shipping to India and America” [i], where he talks about the benefits of using the Northern Sea Route (from M.V. Lomonosov - Northern Ocean) for sailing to these countries in order to establish trade relations with them. Having paid tribute to the merits of Peter I in the “construction of Russian fleets”, his victories on the seas and the foresight of Catherine the Great, who from an early age entrusted the leadership of the Admiralty Board to the heir to the throne, “so that under her tutelage leadership the knowledge and desire for naval affairs along with your years grew and strengthened,” he writes: “By the way, the Northern Ocean is a vast field where, under your Imperial Highness’s rule, Russian glory, combined with immeasurable benefit, can be enhanced through the invention of eastern-northern navigation to India and America.”

On September 20, 1763, the Tsarevich turned 9 years old. His position as President of the Admiralty College was, of course, nominal, but given that his studies in science began at the age of four and were preparing him for reign, he was a boy, a child, but already thinking about the future of his Fatherland. On December 22, 1763, he writes a letter to the members of the naval commission on the same topic of passage through the Northern Sea Route (for Pavel - the Siberian Ocean) to East India. America has disappeared and is not mentioned in the document. The nine-year-old statesman is trying to translate the theoretical premises of M.V. Lomonosov into a practical plane: he asks the members of the naval commission: “These arguments mentioned are not in any way contrary to nautical notes, if they are thorough in everything, then how exactly should one begin the enterprise, in Should we keep it a secret or should we start openly, what preparations should we make, where and how many ships should we build, what time and where should we go from, in a word, what is needed to successfully put into action all the intentions.” Recognizing the great difficulties that would have to be overcome along this path, Pavel Petrovich predicted new discoveries that would await the pioneers, for “countless many more remain unknown on the earth’s circle.” The Tsarevich agreed with M.V. Lomonosov that the passage along the Northern Sea Route was of great importance for the development of trade (“...convenience and growth would occur in general commerce”), but he went further: “This matter is tending to spread across seas of glory and to increase the surplus of the Russian Empire." How future Emperor The Tsarevich thought about expanding his Empire, including towards East India.

More than 30 years passed before Paul 1, the all-powerful monarch of the Russian Empire, was able to make an attempt to fulfill his childhood dream - to begin a campaign against India, although not by the Northern Sea Route, but by land, to the south. It should not be assumed that the dream of going to India was carried by Paul through all these years. But, on the other hand, the plan for the conquest of India proposed by Napoleon Bonaparte in December 1800 fell on prepared ground.

The idea of ​​​​a campaign against India came to Napoleon Bonaparte during the preparation of his expedition to Egypt in 1797. This campaign itself was considered as a blow to Great Britain, but not directly, but through its African colony. As academician A.Z. Manfred writes, in his dreams Napoleon expelled the British from India. From the beginning of 1800, the first consul of France began to look for ways of rapprochement with Russia. The very idea of ​​such a union was not the invention of Napoleon’s genius; it was in the air. This is what Hutten, a French agent in Russia, wrote: “The two powers, united, could dictate laws to all of Europe...Russia from its Asian possessions...could lend a hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting together with France, transfer the war to Bengal.” .[v]

Napoleon's plan was to assemble a 70,000-strong army, 35,000 from each of the allied powers, on the Russian side - 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 10,000 Cossacks with a reinforced set of artillery. The Russian expeditionary force was supposed to cross the Caspian Sea from Astrakhan to Astrabad (Persia) and wait there for the arrival of the French. The French corps was detached from Moreau's Army of the Rhine and headed to the mouth of the Danube, then by sea it was transported to Taganrog, then through Tsaritsyn to Astrakhan and, having crossed the Caspian Sea, united with the Russian army in Astrabad. This city was to become the main headquarters of the allied army.

The General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Batorsky, analyzing Napoleon's plan, wrote in 1886 that these were more likely sketches for the plan than the plan itself, because many of Napoleon's calculations seemed incorrect. Thus, Batorsky provides data on the number of Russian ships in the Caspian Sea in 1805 and concludes from this that “it is difficult to admit the possibility of transporting 70/t. army except for a very long period of time." The delivery of provisions and other provisions to Persia also seems extremely difficult. The timing of the entire campaign has been reduced. Bonaparte allocated 5 months for it. Batorsky called this plan “Bonaparte’s cherished aspirations” and believed that it was “made up of such fortune-telling data that it is impossible to admit that Bonaparte in 1800 was close to its implementation.”

Paul I did not wait for his ally. Without notifying Napoleon, on January 12, 1801, he issued a rescript to the ataman of the Don Army, cavalry general V.P. Orlov I, about the start of a secret expedition: “The British are preparing to launch an attack with fleet and army on me and on my allies the Swedes and Danes[x]; I am ready to accept them, but we need to attack them themselves and where their blow may be more sensitive and where they are less expected. Establishing them in India is the best thing for this. From us to India from Orenburg it takes three months, and from you there is a month, but only four months. I entrust this entire expedition to you and your army, Vasily Petrovich. Get together with him and embark on a campaign to Orenburg, from where you go along any of the three roads or all of them, and with artillery straight through Bukharia and Khiva to the Indus River and to the English establishments along it, the troops of that region are of the same kind as yours, and already having artillery, you have full avantage; get everything ready for the trip. Send your spies to prepare or inspect the roads, all the wealth of India will be our reward for this expedition. Gather an army to the rear villages and then notify me; wait for the command to go to Orenburg, where, having arrived, wait for another to go further. Such an undertaking will crown you all with glory, earn my special favor according to merit, acquire wealth and trade, and strike the enemy in his heart. Here I am attaching cards, how many of them I have. God bless you.

I am your benevolent Paul.

My maps only go as far as Khiva and the Amur Darya River, and then it’s your job to get information to English institutions and to the Indian peoples subject to them. P."

So, the plan of the expedition of Paul 1, as well as the plan of Napoleon, can be called sketches rather than a clearly developed military campaign, but this is the approach of researchers at the end of the 20th century. The emperor set a strategic goal - the conquest of India; the tactics for its implementation should have been developed by cavalry general V.P. Orlov, professional, personnel in modern terminology, military man, who began his activities in this field as a simple Cossack, participated in Russian-Turkish wars 1768–1774 and 1787–1791, distinguished himself during the storming of Izmail. The form of setting the task and ensuring its implementation were at the level of knowledge about India and other eastern countries that region. Information about what India was like was extremely scarce. This is how the emperor understood the political situation and the position of the British in India: “India, where you are appointed, is governed by one main owner and many small ones. The British have their own trading establishments, acquired either with money or weapons, and the whole goal is to ruin this and liberate the oppressed owners and kindly bring Russia into the same dependence in which they are among the British, and turn the trade to us.” Thus, the purpose of the expedition was not only the expulsion of the British from their most profitable colony, but also the very “increase in the surplus of the Russian Empire”, which the then Tsarevich Pavel wrote about in 1763.

The rescript of Paul I dated January 13, 1801 shows how the Emperor imagined the relations of the Cossack corps of the ataman of the Don army V.P. Orlov with the local Indian population and with the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, through whose territory the army was supposed to pass: “Remember that you It’s only up to the British, but peace with all those who will not help them, and so, as you pass, assure them of Russia’s friendship, and go from the Indus to the Ganges and so on to the English. Approve Bukharia in passing so that the Chinese don’t get it. In Khiva, release so many thousands of our captive subjects.”

The above rescripts set goals and defined the tasks of the expedition. Two later rescripts - from February 2 and February 7 - only confirmed the previous orders and expressed satisfaction with how preparations are underway for the campaign, and once again reminded that “... the expedition is very necessary and the sooner, the surer and better.”

The first report of the cavalry general V.P. Orlov on the progress of the preparation of the Cossacks for the campaign in India is dated February 1, received by the Emperor on February 11, 1801: “Your Imperial Majesty, on the 12th of January, deigned to order me to gather the entire army to assembly places; in pursuance of which some of the villages, having set out, have already followed them, and others, having corrected themselves, are setting out for the campaign... with the exception of the sick, those absent from their trades and few in good health, I believe there will be nineteen thousand for the campaign, then I most freely dare to present this to the highest Your Imperial Majesty's permission." By this time, lists of major generals and staff officers who were supposed to be assigned to the campaign had been compiled. On the same day, February 1, cavalry general V.P. Orlov went to the gathering places where the Cossacks were gathering for the campaign against India. In a report dated February 10, Orlov specified the number of troops assembled for the campaign: “There are five hundred and ten officials, twenty thousand four hundred and ninety-seven Cossacks, five hundred artillery officers, five hundred Kalmyks, and in addition I am replacing all those retired Cossacks who are inside the troops at posts.” There are five hundred nearby gathering places. And only twenty-two thousand five hundred and seven people.”

Report from the cavalry general V.P. Orlov dated February 15, 1801, touched upon the daily needs of the army: “... I inform you that from the gathering places of the troops, after the revision has been carried out, I will hasten to set out on a campaign from the first day of next March. I dare Your Imperial Majesty to most submissively ask whether it would be kind to you to most graciously order that knowledgeable national translations of those places be seconded to me, if such can be found. This is why, Most Gracious Sovereign, I consider it necessary to have them, so that you can rely on their loyalty, rather than someone who has been found in places and is obliged to live. And also, most submissively, Your Imperial Majesty, I ask for medical ranks, which the army will need just in case.” There is a note on this document: “To write to the Prosecutor General and send twelve doctors with one headquarters doctor to the Don Army...” It is unknown whether translators were found for this campaign.

The regiments set out on February 27 and 28 on a field march, covering 30–40 versts per day. From the very beginning, the troops began to experience great difficulties: due to crop failure in the Saratov province, the early opening of rivers and, as a consequence, frequent changes in routes, rations were not established, they often did not receive fodder and because of this they abandoned horses. V.P. Orlov reported to St. Petersburg: “Of the army, on the next campaign, some, having money, spent it on food, others, borrowing from each other, fell into debt; others, having no money and unable to borrow, allocated food to those rising from the combatants, which led some to fatigue, while others were completely lost, fallen and abandoned; the number of such is not small.” There were no casualties.

The regiments marched more than 1,500 versts when in the village of Mechetny they received news of the tragic death of Paul I and a rescript from the new Emperor Alexander I dated March 12, which read: “To Mr. General of the Cavalry Orlov 1st. Upon receipt of this, I command you with all the Cossack regiments, now following with you on the secret expedition, to return to the Don and disband them to their homes.”

Thus ended Paul I's campaign against India. The Emperor significantly changed the plan Napoleon proposed to him. Thus, the route of the corps did not pass through Persia, but through the Bukhara and Khiva khanates; the corps consisted exclusively of Cossacks; they did not take infantry.

When analyzing unfulfilled projects, campaigns, etc. It is always very tempting to analyze the possibility of their implementation from the point of view of a modern researcher and the current level of knowledge. Not being a specialist in the field of military history, it is difficult for the author to assess the purely military aspect of the Cossack expedition. Moreover, this approach seems to us unproductive, since only purely statistical data can be assessed (distance to India, number of troops, etc.), the morale of the Cossacks, their readiness for unknown and inevitable difficulties and sacrifices cannot be assessed.

The laconic lines of the rescripts of Emperor Paul I allow us to draw the main conclusion that the secret expedition of the Cossacks was intended to drive the British out of India and take their place. There was so little knowledge about India at that time that it was enough to be guided by the principle “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” and assume that the population would at least be passive towards the change of power.

[i] Russian-Indian relations in the 18th century. Collection of documents. Moscow. 1965. pp. 340-341. This dedication was preceded by the work of M.V. Lomonosov “ Short description various voyages in the Northern Seas and an indication of the possible passage of the Siberian Ocean to East India", 1764.

The cited documents of the 18th century are given with the spelling and punctuation of the original, of the 19th century - with partially corrected spelling, the punctuation is brought into line with existing norms.

Ibid page 341.

Russian state archive navy, f. 227, op. 1, d. 19, l. 70-71.

Manfred A.Z. Napoleon Bonaparte. M. 1998. P. 157.

[v] Quote. by Manfred A.Z. Decree op. P. 256.

G.Sh. Lieutenant Colonel Batorsky. "Project of expeditions to India proposed by Napoleon Bonaparte to Emperors Paul and Alexander I in 1800 and 1807-1808." – Collection of geographical, topographical and statistical materials on Asia. Issue XXIII, St. Petersburg, 1886. pp. 6-7. RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d.323, l 4, l. 5. Publ. Russian-Indian relations in the 19th century. P. 31. RGVIA, f. 26, op. 1/152, d. 104, l.546. Publ. Russian-Indian relations in the 19th century. P. 32. Napoleon Bonaparte planned to carry out his plan for a campaign against India several more times: in 1804, in preparation for the landing of troops in Great Britain, he wanted to use Admiral Gantome’s squadron to send a 30,000-strong army by sea to India; in 1807 he sent Adjutant General Gardan with an embassy to Persia, which included a group of officers to reconnoiter the route and develop a plan for a military expedition to India; soon after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, having received reports from Gardan, on February 2, 1808, he wrote a letter to Emperor Alexander I, where he outlined his plan for the conquest of India by the Russian-French corps. The answer of Alexander I contained the following lines: “... I propose one army for an expedition to India, and another with the aim of assisting in the capture of the coastal points of Asia Minor” (Quoted by Batorsky. Op. cit. pp. 8, 64–66).

The beginning of the 19th century was revolutionary for Europe, shaken by the boots of French troops led by Emperor Napoleon. For him, both Britain and Russia became the main competitors for power over the continent. But he also sought an alliance with them in order to defeat the enemy.

Friendship vs England

Not accepted into the ranks of the Russian army at one time, past the path From soldier to emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte set himself the task of first defeating the British and then taking on the Russians.

In 1801, the authorities of the Russian Empire, realizing the unreliability of such allies as the British and Austrians, signed the Treaty of Paris. According to the document, the Russians and French pledged not to help the external and internal enemies of the other side and to refuse protection to those of their subjects who would engage in hostile activities in a friendly country.

Along with the agreement, a decision was made to distinguish between influence and patronage on European countries. In particular, the status of the German and Italian states, the Greek islands, and Franco-Turkish relations was determined. But the consequences of the peace treaty also had an Asian component.

India was the pearl of the British Empire and was the most expensive and profitable colony. Its status became especially important after the independence of the North American colonies.

This forced London to switch to the Asian vector. The loss of India could deal a serious blow not only to the economic system of the empire, but also raise questions about the future imperial status of Great Britain. At the same time, Napoleon, back in 1797, declared the need to conquer India.

However, at that time his plans were not destined to come true. And now, having found a reliable ally providing a land transition to the designated goal, the Frenchman began to implement his plan.

“Russia, from her Asian possessions... could give a helping hand to the French army in Egypt and, acting in conjunction with France, transfer the war to Bengal,” wrote a French agent at the time.

Indian campaign of the Don Cossacks

The joint plan of Russian-French actions suggested sending 35 thousand soldiers each, not counting the Cossacks and artillery. At the same time, the Indian campaign was similar to the campaign of the French army in Egypt: engineers, scientists, and artists were sent along with the soldiers.

The French corps was supposed to pass through the south of Russia: through the Danube to Taganrog, Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, where it united with Russian troops. Then, together, we will cross the Caspian Sea and through Persia reach the much-cherished India.

In January 1801, Paul I gave the order for the Cossacks to march. Despite the formal leadership of the operation by Don Ataman Vasily Orlov, the commander of the troops was appointed whirlwind ataman Matvey Platov, released from behind the walls. The development of the military operation was strictly classified so that English spies could not find out about the Russian-French conspiracy.

In the imperial capital, they only knew about sending the Cossacks on the next campaign, and among the Cossacks, only five senior officers knew about the actual goals of the military operation. 22,507 people with 24 guns went on the campaign. The condition of the Cossack troops was very “shabby”: 800 sick people were marching, fire victims and poor people were marching, and those who had just returned from the Italian and Caucasian campaigns were marching.

The Russian emperor set the Cossacks the task of taking Khiva and Bukhara along the way, “so that the Chinese would not get it.” And after the conquest of India, Paul I promised the Cossacks all its riches: “In India, the British have their own trading establishments, acquired either with money or with weapons. You need to ruin all this, liberate the oppressed owners and bring the land into Russia into the same dependence as the British have it.”

However, the travel time was calculated incorrectly, and Don Cossacks Setting out from the village of Kachalinskaya, we found ourselves in snowdrifts, without provisions or heating. With the onset of spring, the roads became impassable, and many Cossacks fell ill with scurvy. Crop failure in the Volga provinces also had a negative impact on the army's advancement.

On March 23, 1801, a messenger from St. Petersburg reached the Cossack troops, changing the entire fate of the campaign: Paul I died, and the Cossacks were ordered to return back. On the way back, Ataman Vasily Orlov died of a stroke.

English trace

Many historians link the assassination of Paul I to the work of British intelligence. The death of the Russian emperor was beneficial to London, including due to the rupture of Russian-French friendship and the completion of the failed Indian campaign.

As Napoleon himself wrote about this, the British could not get into it in Paris, but got into it in St. Petersburg. Although the French emperor did not abandon his dream, and the campaign against Russia in 1812 could well be considered by him as a further campaign in India.

Could the Cossacks really reach Delhi?

Paul I thought so. Inspired by Alexander Suvorov's crossing of the Alps, he believed that the Cossacks would also cross the Pamirs.

“The operator asks: “Ataman, do you know the way to the Ganga?” This is the first time I've heard it, apparently. But who wants to sit in prison for nothing? I say: “Yes, ask any girl on the Don about the Ganges, she’ll show you the way right away...” Here I have a Maltese cross on my shirt - bam! My lice were really stunned. They were ordered to go to India and grab the English by the cheeks. We should support Massena…”, the great ataman Matvey Platov recalled about those events.

However, history decreed otherwise and the Cossacks were not destined to “wash their boots in the Indian Ocean,” and the Russian-French alliance turned out to be Patriotic War 1812. Most likely, this was the main reason why the campaign was eventually classified.

On January 12, 1801, Emperor Paul I deigned to command: to gather the entire Don army. Where and why the campaign was planned - no one knew. The military ataman Vasily Petrovich Orlov ordered all officers, non-commissioned officers and Cossacks to prepare. Everyone, down to the last one, had to be ready to set out on two horses with a month and a half of provisions in six days. Cossacks were required to carry guns and darts. And it happened before that the entire Don army rose up. The old people remembered such cases. In 1737 and 1741, the Don people rose without exception. But then there was danger from the Tatars, the Tatars were marching on the Don, there was a need to defend their native villages. Now only old people talked about Tatar raids. The Black Sea Army stood strong in the Kuban. Don was in no danger from anywhere. Where will it go the Don army - no one knew this. There were 800 sick people in the army, but they were also ordered to appear for inspection. They walked sick, swollen from wounds, crippled. Orphans and helpless poor people were preparing for the campaign; Many Cossacks did not have uniform hurkas and chekmens; they were dressed in old robes and homespun clothing. Nobody was respected. Although the house burned down, although everything was burned - go, all the same, at the expense of the village. Rich Cossacks equipped the poor. In the Cherkasy village, six Cossacks collected 2,000 rubles and gave money for uniforms and equipment for the foot Cossacks. Twenty souls of a family in one house were left without a master or food. They didn't look at the queue. The chieftain ordered to take it without a queue, and the last owner went, although his two brothers were already serving in the regiments. The regiments that had just arrived from the Caucasian line, from the Italian campaign, were again enlisted in service. Churches were left without sextons, village boards were left without clerks, they all were taken away. The militia was complete!

They also demanded Kalmyks to serve. The landowner officers were not allowed to go to their farms. Wives did not say goodbye to their husbands, children did not say goodbye to their fathers. Hastily, according to the royal decree, an army was assembled.

The following villages were designated as gathering places: Buzulutskaya, Medveditskaya, Ust-Medveditskaya and Kachalinskaya. In the winter cold, at the end of February, the Cossacks gathered to review the ataman. In total, the troops recruited 510 officers, 20,947 Cossack cavalry regiments, 500 artillerymen and 500 Kalmyks. These people made up the 41st cavalry regiment.

Orlov divided them into 4 parts. The 1st, out of 13 regiments, was led by Major General Platov; 2nd, from 8 regiments, Major General Buzin; 3rd, from 10 regiments, Major General Bokov and 4th, from 10 regiments, Major General Denisov, who had just returned from Italy. Ataman Orlov and with him two companies of Don horse artillery and military engineers walked with General Platov’s detachment. The artillery was commanded by Colonel Karpov.

No one else, except the ataman and the commanders of the columns, knew anything.

What happened and why was such a terrible effort demanded from the Donskoy army?

Emperor Paul I suddenly quarreled with his allies, the British, and, in alliance with the French Emperor Napoleon, decided to declare war on England. The main wealth of the English land lay in the vast, fertile India covered with forests of rare trees. Semi-precious stones are also mined from Indian soil, and precious silk fabrics are also prepared there. England trades in the products of India, its grain and materials, and is rich in it. Emperor Paul decided to take India from England, and instructed the Don Cossacks to do this. They had to travel thousands of miles across the deserted steppe, then across the sandy desert, cross the mountains and invade Indian lands.

“India,” the Emperor wrote to Orlov, “where you are appointed, is governed by one main owner and many small ones. The British have their own trading establishments, purchased either with money or weapons. You need to ruin all this, liberate the oppressed owners and bring the land into Russia into the same dependence as the British have it. Trade her to turn to us."

Ataman was also sent a map of India. Along the way, the Don Cossacks were to occupy Bukhara and free our prisoners in Khiva. All the wealth of India was promised to the Cossacks as a reward.

If Ataman Orlov and the Don Cossacks had time to fulfill this order, they would have glorified themselves more than Ermak, the conqueror of Siberia... But the Lord did not decree that the sovereign’s great plan should be accomplished!

From the very first steps in the Trans-Don steppe, the Cossacks encountered terrible difficulties. The roads were covered with snow and the artillery was exhausted, pulling guns out of deep snowdrifts. There were no apartments for heating anywhere, and people and horses were cold and frozen in the cold wind in the steppe. There was no fuel, there was not enough food, there was no hay and oats. Unfed horses barely trudged towards the brutal cold snowstorms.

At the beginning of March there was a sudden thaw. The streams began to play, the steppe became wet, the mud became impassable. Each beam became a terrible obstacle. Military foreman Papuzin barely crossed the usually empty Talovka River. He walked forty miles in knee-deep mud, and crossed Talovka itself on a bridge he had built from brushwood, farm fences, gates and roofs.

Finally, we approached the Volga. The ice swelled and turned brown. The horses fell through it. In some places it has already started moving. Denisov and his column approached him and saw that the crossing was dangerous. He placed men with ropes across the entire river and gave them several Cossacks to provide assistance. They began to lead the horses, but they fell through and went to the bottom. However, Denisov knew that on large rivers the ice in the middle is always thicker, and so he ordered his tall and well-fed horses to be led forward. At first they failed, but then they moved on. The Cossacks followed them. Up to 700 horses failed, but the Cossacks pulled them all out. The crossing lasted five hours.

And they set off again, first along the Volga, then along the Irgiz River. The steppe became more and more deserted. Commissioner Terenin, who undertook to deliver bread and fodder, did not fulfill his obligation: this summer was a lean one on the Volga, and he could not collect food. When we arrived for the night, we didn’t find any oats, and the hay was mixed with garbage. The horses were dying from lack of food, and the path traversed by the Cossacks was marked by a long line of swollen horse corpses and black flocks of crows.

The Don people were drawn into the boundless steppes in a huge crowd and became lost in them, like a grain of sand. The distant songs fell silent. The Cossacks froze at night, and during the day they suffered in the mud and puddles into which the spring sun turned the steppe. There were already many sick Cossacks. Scurvy appeared.

And ahead was the same steppe and there was no end to it. And the sun rose there in a golden fog and the plain stretched on all day, today, as it was yesterday, as it will be tomorrow.

It was hard for the Cossacks, but silently, without grumbling, they went to fight an unknown enemy, to conquer distant India for Russia.

From the Don we walked almost seven hundred miles through the desert. On March 23, on the eve of Easter Sunday, a Cossack detachment located in the village of Mechetnoye, Volsky district, Saratov province, was caught up by a courier from St. Petersburg. On the night of March 11-12, Emperor Paul I died and Emperor Alexander I Pavlovich ascended the throne. He ordered to return home. Now the order was to assemble the shelves. Ataman Orlov came out to them and said in an inspired voice trembling with joyful excitement:

Feels sorry for you guys. God and the Sovereign are parental homes!

On the first day of Easter, the ataman and some regiments listened to mass in the Old Believer Monastery not far from Mechetny. It was fun that day in the Cossack camp. Cannons were fired, guns were fired, songs were sung.

On the day of the Annunciation we set off on the return journey. The way back was easier. Spring was coming. It was getting warmer, but in some places the mud was still impassable. Between 9 and 17 April the regiments returned home. The Khopersky, Medveditsky, Buzulutsky, Upper Don and Donetsk Cossacks were released straight from the border, the rest with the officers on the left side of the Don went to Cherkassk.

After Suvorov's crossing of the Alps, the Orenburg campaign of the Don Cossacks is the most difficult of the marching movements. 1564 versts were made by a 20,000-strong cavalry detachment in two months across the deserted steppe during the spring thaw. Done without loss of people and without stragglers. And the horses endured this trip, despite the lack of food, well. The regiment had from 62 (in the Ataman regiment) to 12 (in the Mironov regiment) fallen horses.

Many years have passed since then, none of the participants in this campaign are alive, but the old people still remember the stories of their fathers about the mysterious campaign towards Orenburg, about the time when the Cossacks were swept away on the Don - there was no one left, and the women did all the work . They remember this terrible, difficult time of eternal campaigns.

And young people, talking about this campaign against India, often ask the question - could the Cossacks reach India, could they ruin it?..

The Cossacks performed many great feats. With only peaks, on foot, they took the Izmail strongholds, crossed the Black Sea in light boats, fought on their own, took Azov at their own peril, with Suvorov they crossed the sky-high heights of the Alpine mountains, but this command - to conquer distant India - was impossible to fulfill. Those who sent them did not know how far and difficult this path was and how many obstacles the Cossacks encountered on it. It was impossible to reach India through a deserted desert, without food and fodder. But the Don army set out to carry out the will of the sovereign without reasoning - all the Cossacks would have died in it. The campaign against India is remarkable because in it the Cossacks showed how great and excellent their discipline and devotion to the sovereign were, how hardened they were in the adversities of the campaign.

In tender admiration you listen to the stories of old people about crossing the Volga. One horse and a Cossack with it are drowning in the cold water, but another and a third are walking through the same terrible place. For hours, in chest-deep water, the Cossacks save horses and each other, and then the hungry go, not knowing where, across the cold deserted steppe.

Our grandfathers, with all their valiant service, taught us to perform feats, and the campaign against India is an example of high courage, desperate determination, holy submission to the sovereign's will!..

Since ancient times, distant fabulous India has attracted merchants, travelers and conquerors. And when it became an English colony, the entire power of the British Empire rested on it. The enemies of Foggy Albion reasonably believed that victory over Britain was possible only with the capture of its Indian colonies.

Two trips to India

Alliance of France and Russia

In 1800, the Russian emperor was seriously offended by his allies: the Austrians for betraying the interests of Suvorov’s army in the Alps and the British for their contemptuous treatment in Holland. Not only the great commander, but also the talented politician and diplomat did not fail to take advantage of this. He began to flatter and show attention to the Russian emperor in every possible way. He sent him the sword of the Order of Malta, whose grandmaster Pavel was considered, and voluntarily returned all the Russian prisoners of war, with new weapons and in excellent uniform, cut and sewn by skilled Lyon weavers.
This chivalrous attitude impressed me. Russia began to move closer and closer to France. The project of a joint expedition to British India was discussed between the Russian emperor and the first consul. It was planned to use two infantry corps (Russian and French) for the campaign, each consisting of 35 thousand people, not counting artillery and Cossack cavalry. At the insistence of Paul, the French general Andre Massena was to command the combined forces, who made a great impression on the Russian emperor with his skillful defense of Genoa, besieged by the Austrians.
According to preliminary plans, French troops in May 1801 were supposed to descend on ships along the Danube to Izmail, cross, land in Taganrog, and quickly march through southern regions Russia and at the mouth of the Volga to connect with the Russian corps. The combined army was to disembark from ships in the Persian port of Astrabad. The entire movement from France to Astrabad was planned to take 80 days. Then 50 days were allotted for the passage of the combined forces through Kandahar and Herat to the coveted India, where it was planned to break into in September. This plan was proposed by Napoleon and required careful refinement.

Indian campaign of the Don Cossacks

But Emperor Paul I was an eccentric man. Instead of instructing his military to agree on joint actions with the French, he hastily launched a campaign against India in January 1801, ordering them to simultaneously, in passing, conquer the Khiva and Bukhara khanates.
Ataman Matvey Ivanovich Platov loved to talk at the bivouac, with a glass of vodka, about how he went on a campaign against India.
« So what? I'm sitting in the fortress. Petropavlovskaya, of course. For what - I don’t know... Okay. We are old people, accustomed to everything. Sitting! Suddenly the doors are wide open. They say - to the operator. And I’m wearing a shirt, like a louse. And they took us. Together with lice. They just threw on a sheepskin coat. I'm coming in. Pavel with regalia. The nose is red. He was already a healthy drinker back then. More than me! The operator asks: “Ataman, do you know the way to the Ganga?” This is the first time I've heard it, apparently. But who wants to sit in prison for nothing? I say: “Yes, ask any girl on the Don about the Ganges, she’ll show you the way right away...” Here I have a Maltese cross on my shirt - bam! My lice were stunned. They were ordered to go to India and grab the English by the cheeks. We should support Massena...".
In February, 22 thousand went on a campaign with artillery and convoys. Despite the difficulties - impassability, hunger, lack of fodder and the onset of scurvy - in March they crossed the ice of the Volga and reached the village of Mechetnaya (now the city of Pugachev, Saratov region). And here, on March 23 (April 4), a messenger from St. Petersburg caught up with the news of Paul’s death and an order to return home.

In 1797, Paul I ordered the creation of the Grand Priory of the Order of Malta in Russia. As a summer residence for the Prior of the Order of the Prince of Condé, the architect N.A. Lvov built an earthen palace in Gatchina.

The Cossacks greeted this order with unprecedented delight. We set off on the return journey immediately. We reached the Volga when the ice had already moved down the river. Luckily for the Cossacks, a large ice field passed along the river and got stuck between the banks. We walked along it. The last one had barely crossed when the ice floes split and rushed in fragments to the Caspian Sea.
Many fans of alternative history believe that they could have reached India, and then the history of the world would have taken a different course. But the White Guard general, a military specialist and current commander, considered this task impossible. Without maps, without preparation, breaking away from supply bases, walking thousands of kilometers across steppes and deserts, crossing mountains and... Moreover, to pass through territory inhabited by hostile and warlike peoples. This is an unrealistic adventure doomed to failure.

Leon Trotsky's plan

The Bolsheviks were also haunted by the idea of ​​crushing the main imperialist on the path of world revolution - the British Empire. He was the first of the Bolshevik leaders to talk about this. Back in the summer of 1919, he announced the plan of “one prominent military man” (M.V. Frunze). Trotsky suggested that the Central Committee consider the issue of creating a cavalry corps of 30-40 thousand soldiers and “ to form a revolutionary academy somewhere in the Urals or Turkestan, the political and military headquarters of the Asian revolution", noting that " the route to Paris and London lies through the cities of Afghanistan, Punjab and Bengal" Such a corps, in Trotsky’s opinion, having moved from Tashkent to Afghanistan, would have broken into India and made a lot of noise there.
The idea was not bad. But the timing was wrong. In the summer and autumn of 1919 he was on the Volga, Denikin’s troops took Tsaritsyn, occupied Ukraine, approached Moscow, Yudenich was at the gates of Petrograd. I had to think not about going to India, but about how to survive and survive Soviet power. So the project was shelved. However, not for long.

Roy's failed campaign

In 1919, the Indian revolutionary Manabendra Roy (real name Narendranath Bhattacharya) appeared in Moscow. A radical revolutionary, founder of the Communist Party... of Mexico (?!), according to the British intelligence services, he was “the most dangerous conspirator, ambitious, energetic and unscrupulous in his means.
Roy quickly became friends with the Bolshevik leaders, and especially with Nikolai Bukharin. Through him, the Indian contacted Lenin and proposed his plan for a campaign in India. There is no need for large armies - it is too expensive and obvious. In addition, the appearance of a large army in Afghanistan will be perceived by local tribes as a foreign invasion and will provoke armed resistance. A small mobile detachment (1.5-2 thousand people), but well equipped and trained, is enough. Moreover, the core of the detachment will be made up of revolutionary-minded Indian emigrants, mostly Muslims. The top commanders will also be Indians, and the middle command staff, instructors and specialists will be Russian. The presence of Muslims in the detachment will help to establish friendly relations with, and, as Roy hoped, some of the tribes will join the detachment. And if the expedition reaches India, the support of the local population, who dreams of throwing off English rule, is guaranteed. Ordinary soldiers of the squad will turn into rebel commanders. And Russian specialists will create a military base in India to train Indian rebels.
Roy's idea received the fundamental support of the head of the Comintern, Zinoviev. Tashkent was chosen as the base for the planned expedition. Roy formed the main backbone of the expeditionary force in Moscow. In the summer of 1920, the headquarters and basis of the expeditionary force were created. The expedition had a significant arsenal of weapons: rifles, grenades, machine guns, small-caliber artillery pieces, three disassembled aircraft, several trucks and cars. In addition, the expedition allocated a compact but superbly equipped printing house with Latin, Arabic and Persian fonts. In case of unforeseen expenses, the detachment was provided with a gold fund.
The expedition personnel consisted of military advisers, technicians, instructors, political workers and even Russian language teachers to train the natives. On September 14, 1920, the cargo and passenger train of the expedition left Moscow and arrived in Tashkent on October 1. A secret military school was created there, which was supposed to train fighters for the expeditionary force. Roy managed to successfully establish recruitment personnel among anti-British Muslim Hindus in Central Asia. In December 1920, two more trains with weapons, ten airplanes, gold coins and military instructors arrived from Moscow to Tashkent.
The campaign was planned to begin in the spring of 1921. It seemed that a little more, and the red banner of the revolution would rise above. But, despite all the secrecy and thorough checks, an English secret agent named Maulana turned out to be among the Indian cadets. He transmitted through Indian traders all the information about the upcoming expedition to the British intelligence services. He was identified and shot, but the British knew about the upcoming campaign. They put pressure on official Kabul to refuse to provide its territory for a military-revolutionary base. But the main thing is Britain's threat to abandon the just signed trade agreement and recognition Soviet Russia. The British declared that if the Indian expedition were carried out, they would not only not withdraw their troops from Persia, but would also attack Transcaucasia and Russia.
Faced with such a threat, the Bolsheviks had to abandon their plan. An order was sent to Tashkent to stop preparations for the campaign and disband the expeditionary force.
Indian campaign The Red Army ended before it began. But everything could have turned out differently. And the red banner would flutter over the waters of the Ganges, and the tired would wash their horses in the Indian Ocean.

Denis Aleksandrovich Maltsev was born in 1980 in Voronezh. Graduated from the Faculty of History of Voronezh State University.
Senior researcher at RISS, candidate of historical sciences.
Author of the books “Supplies of Entente weapons to Denikin’s troops and their influence on the defeat of parts of the Red Army in March-April 1919” (2005) and “The Entente and military operations in the south of Russia in 1918–1920” (2009).

As you know, Russian foreign policy in 1800 underwent serious changes. Paul I left the second anti-French coalition, setting a course for rapprochement with Napoleon and confrontation with Great Britain. As a result of this rapprochement, the idea of ​​a joint campaign to the British colonial possessions in India arose. She was repeatedly criticized by historians who studied the personality of Emperor Paul and his short reign. Already N. Schilder characterized this idea of ​​​​Paul as follows: “In the matter of the Franco-Russian agreement, Paul did not do without the usual fantastic hobbies: a campaign to India was conceived.” So - a “fantastic hobby”, and his possible consequences- “the obvious absurdity and harmlessness of a secret expedition to India for British power.”

This is a very valuable remark from the son of a man who in the middle of the 19th century wanted to arm the Russian imperial fleet all-metal submarines firing missiles (PLRK - in modern terminology. - D.M.), however, driven by the muscular strength of the rowers. This family undoubtedly knew a lot about fantastic projects.

It should be noted that only in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, where the so-called “society”, inspired by liberal ideas, almost openly fought against the ideas of the monarchy in conditions of minimal censorship, could such an anti-monarchist book as N. Schilder’s “Emperor Paul the First” appear, relatively one of the reigning Russian emperors, who belonged to the ruling dynasty at that moment. Even the well-known personal sympathies of the reigning Emperor and Empress for the figure of Paul I did not prevent the abundance of dubious anecdotes and direct slander as “sources”.

His other contemporaries did not lag behind Nikolai Karlovich. A. Brickner, K. Valishevsky, L. Yudin wrote in their works about the hardships and hardships that the Cossacks endured on the way to the Indus, about the futility of this campaign, about the impracticability of the tasks assigned to Ataman Orlov, as well as about the lack of maps among the Cossacks. The latter, as we will see, was an outright lie. But, according to the listed authors, the very fact of organizing this expedition was confirmation of the madness of Paul I.

However, if we are consistent, following N. Schilder, then we will have to accuse other Russian emperors of “fantastic hobbies” - Peter I and Catherine II, who in our historiography are usually called great. For Catherine’s plans to “fight the banks of the Ganges” and the very real Persian campaign of Peter I are known quite well, as well as the truly, let’s say, overly optimistic calculations of Peter I when planning the Khiva campaign of 1717. In other words, if we want to repeat the conclusion of the “court” historian Schilder, we will have to either follow the path of double standards, or come up with somewhat inadequate criticism of the foreign policy projects of our two monarchs, who, admittedly, have succeeded a lot in the foreign policy field. Probably both options are unacceptable.

What’s interesting: for some reason, French historians did not consider such plans to be madness. In the classic study " History XIX century" by French professors Lavisse and Rambaud, published in France in the 20s of the last century, one can read: "Since both rulers (Napoleon and Paul I. - D.M.) there was one and the same irreconcilable enemy, then, naturally, the thought suggested itself about a closer rapprochement between them for the sake of a joint fight against this enemy in order to finally crush the Indian power of England - the main source of its wealth and power. This is how the one came into being grand plan(emphasis mine. - D.M.), the first thought of which, without a doubt, belonged to Bonaparte, and the means for implementation were studied and proposed by the king." So, what is “obvious absurdity” for our “patriotic” historians, is “a great plan” for the French.

Another “mystery” of modern historiography is the authorship of the plan. For Lavisse and Rambaud, and after them for our modern historiography, the authorship “without a doubt” belongs to Napoleon. According to existing historiographical concepts, he is a recognized military genius, and Pavel is a “madman on the throne,” why should he develop military plans for Napoleon himself...

But the fact is that Bonaparte himself calmly accepted at least the idea of ​​going after Paul! In 1817, while imprisoned on the island of St. Helena, in a conversation with the English doctor B.E. O'Mearoy, he made the following confession: “When Paul was so irritated ( you,English. - D.M.), he asked me to draw up a plan for the invasion of India." Unfortunately, the fate of most of the correspondence between Paul and Napoleon is unknown. But in 1840 detailed plan campaign was published in Paris. The original from which it was printed, alas, has not been put into scientific circulation. Usually a reference is given to the papers of the Swedish envoy to Russia, Baron von Stedingk. The title, as we see, refers to “a land expedition to India by agreement between the first consul and Emperor Paul I at the beginning of this century.” Authorship is not announced. But seven years later, our home-grown Napoleonophiles translated it into Russian and republished it under the title “Project of a land expedition to India, proposed to Emperor Pavel Petrovich by the first consul Napoleon Bonaparte.” So easily and naturally the authorship of the plan was determined. Due to the extreme interest of this document, we present it here in full.

Project of the Russian-French expedition to India. 1800

Purpose of the expedition

Expel the British irrevocably from Hindustan; free these beautiful and rich countries from the British yoke; to open new avenues of industry and trade for the enlightened nations of Europe, especially France—such is the purpose of an expedition worthy of covering with immortal glory the first year of the nineteenth century and the heads of those governments by which this useful and glorious undertaking was conceived.

Which powers should accept
participation in it

The French Republic and the Russian Emperor - to send a united army of 70 thousand people to the banks of the Indus.

The German Emperor - for the passage of French troops through his possessions and to facilitate their means of sailing down the Danube, to its mouth in the Black Sea.

Collection in Astrakhan 35 thousand Russian. army and sending it to Astrabad. As soon as the expedition project is finally decided, Paul I will give the order to gather 35 thousand army in Astrakhan, including 25 thousand regular troops of all kinds of weapons and 10 thousand Cossacks.

This army corps will immediately sail on ships across the Caspian Sea to Astrabad to await the arrival of French troops.

In Astrabad there will be the main apartment of the allied armies; military and provisions stores will be set up here; it will become the center of communications between Hindustan, France and Russia.

French army route
as it moves from the banks of the Danube to the banks of the Indus

A 35,000-strong corps of all kinds of weapons will be separated from the Rhine army.

These troops will sail on barges along the Danube and descend on barges along this river to its mouth in the Black Sea.

Having reached the Black Sea, the troops will transfer to transport ships delivered by Russia, cross the Black and Azov Seas and land in Taganrog.

Then this army corps will follow the right bank of the Don to the Cossack city of Pyatiizbyanka, which is 321 versts from Novocherkassk.

Having reached this point, the army will cross the Don and head by land to the city of Tsaritsyn, built on the right bank of the Volga.

From here the army will go down the river to Astrakhan.

Here the troops, boarding merchant ships, will sail the entire length of the Caspian Sea and land in Astrabad, a coastal city in Persia.

Then, after the French join the Russians, the allied army will march; will pass the cities of Herat, Ferah, Kandahar and will soon reach the right bank of the Indus.

Duration
French army campaign

To sail down the Danube to its mouth:

in the Black Sea - 20 days,

from the mouth of the Danube to Taganrog - 16,

from Taganrog to Pyatiizbyanka - 20,

from Pyatiizbyanka to Tsaritsyn - 4,

from Tsaritsyn to Astrakhan - 5,

from Astrakhan to Astrabad - 10,

from Astrabad to the banks of the Indus - 45.

Total - 120 days.

So, the French army will take four months to march from the banks of the Danube to the banks of the Indus, but in order to avoid any intensification of the marches, it is assumed that the campaign will last a full five months: thus, if the army sets out at the beginning of May 1801 (according to the old style), it must arrive at your destination at the end of September.

It should be noted that half the journey will be completed by water, and the other by dry route.

Execution means

When sailing along the Danube, the French army will carry field guns with charging boxes.

She will not need any camp supplies.

Cavalry, heavy and light, and artillery should not take horses with them; Load only saddles, harnesses, packs, lines, reins, reins, etc., etc. onto the barges.

This corps needs to stock up on breadcrumbs for a month. The commissars, ahead of the army, will prepare and distribute stages where there will be a need.

Having reached the mouth of the Danube, the army will transfer to transport ships sent from Russia and supplied with provisions for a period of fifteen to twenty days.

During the voyage, the commissars and officers of the main headquarters will travel by land and by mail: some to Taganrog and Tsaritsyn, others to Astrakhan.

The commissioners sent to Taganrog will enter into agreements with the Russian commissars regarding the land route of the army from Taganrog to Pyatiizbyanka, the preparation of stages and the allocation of apartments, and finally, the recruitment of horses and carts for transporting artillery and army luggage.

These same commissioners will come to an agreement with those sent to Tsaritsyn to arrange the ships necessary to cross the Don, which at this point is not much wider than the Seine in Paris.

Commissioners in Tsaritsyn must take care in advance:

1) about the connection at three or four points between the Volga and the Don of all camp supplies and provisions needed by the army during its campaign;

2) about bringing a sufficient number of ships to Tsaritsyn to transport the French army down the Volga to Astrakhan.

The commissioners sent to Astrakhan will keep ships ready to transport the army, loaded with provisions for fifteen days.

When the French army sails for Astrabad, it is to be provided with the following supplies, collected and prepared by the commissioners of both governments:

1) all kinds of ammunition, artillery shells and guns (ammunition and guns can be delivered from the arsenals of Astrakhan, Kazan and Saratov, which are abundantly supplied);

2) draft horses - for transporting artillery and ammunition of the united army;

3) wagons, carts and horses - for transporting luggage, pontoons, etc.;

4) riding horses for the French cavalry, heavy and light (horses can be purchased between the Don and Volga from the Cossacks and Kalmyks; they are found here in countless quantities; they are most suitable for service in areas that will be the theater of military operations, and the price of these horses is more moderate than anywhere else);

5) all camp supplies necessary for the French army in the campaign to the banks of the Indus and beyond;

6) warehouses of cloth, linens, uniforms, hats, shakos, helmets, gloves, stockings, boots, shoes, etc., etc. (all these items should be found in abundance in Russia, where prices for them are cheaper than in other European countries; the French government can communicate with the directors of the Sarepta colony about their production - six miles from Tsaritsyn, on the right bank of the Volga; the main administration of this the colony of evangelists, reputed to be the richest, most industrial and most efficient in all kinds of orders, is located in Saxony; from there an order should be received so that the colony of Sarepta takes up contracts);

7) a pharmacy stocked with all kinds of medicines (it can be delivered by the same colony of Sarepta, where for a long time there has been a pharmacy that competes with the imperial Moscow pharmacy in the variety and kindness of medicines);

8) supplies: rice, peas, flour, cereals, corned beef, butter, wine, vodka, etc.;

9) herds of bulls and sheep (peas, flour, cereals, corned beef and butter will be delivered, other items are in abundance in Persia);

10) warehouses of fodder, barley and oats (oats can be obtained in Astrakhan; fodder and barley - in the province).

Allied army route
from Astrabad to the banks of the Indus, measures for the sure success of the expedition

Before the Russians sail to Astrabad, commissars of the allied governments will be sent to all the khans and petty rulers of the countries through which the army will travel, to impress upon them that the army of the two nations, the most powerful in the entire universe, must pass through their possessions, marching to India; What sole purpose campaign - to expel from India the British who enslaved these beautiful countries, once so famous, powerful, rich in works - natural and industrial, so that they would attract all the peoples of the earth to participate in the deeds and all kinds of bounties that heaven was pleased to bestow on these countries; that the terrible state of oppression, misfortune and slavery in which the peoples of these countries are now groaning has inspired France and Russia to take a keen interest in them; that, as a consequence, both governments decided to join forces to free India from the tyrannical and barbaric yoke of the British; that the princes and peoples of all countries through which the allied army will pass should not be at all afraid of it; on the contrary, they are invited to contribute with all their means to the success of this useful and glorious enterprise; that this campaign is as fair in its goal as the campaign of Alexander, who wanted to conquer the whole world, was unfair; that the allied army will not collect indemnities, will purchase everything by mutual agreement and pay in clear money for all items necessary for its existence; that in this case the strictest discipline will support her; that religion, laws, customs, morals, property, women will be respected everywhere, spared, etc., etc.

With such a proclamation, with honest, frank and straightforward actions, there is no doubt that the khans and other petty princes will freely let the army pass through their possessions; however, given their discord among themselves, they are too weak to offer any significant resistance.

The French and Russian commissars will be accompanied by skilled engineers who will make a topographical survey of the countries through which the allied army will march; they will mark on their maps: resting places; rivers through which you will have to cross; cities that troops will have to pass by; points where convoys, artillery and ammunition may encounter any obstacles, and indicate the means to overcome these obstacles.

The commissioners will negotiate with khans, princes and private owners about the delivery of supplies, carts, wagons, etc., they will sign conditions, ask for and receive deposits.

Upon the arrival of the first French division in Astrabad, the first Russian division will set off on the campaign; the other divisions of the allied army will follow one after another at a distance of five to six leagues from each other; communication between them will be supported by small detachments of Cossacks.

The vanguard will consist of a corps of Cossacks from four to five thousand people, mixed with light regular cavalry; it is immediately followed by pontoons; this vanguard, building bridges across the rivers, will protect them from enemy attacks and protect the army in case of treason or other surprise.

The French government will hand over to the commander-in-chief the weapons of the Versailles factories, such as guns, carbines, pistols, sabers, etc.; vases and other porcelain products of the Sevres manufactory; pocket and wall clocks by the most skilled Parisian craftsmen, beautiful mirrors; excellent French cloth of different colors: crimson, scarlet, green and blue colors, especially loved by Asians, especially Persians; velvets; gold and silver brocades; galloons and silk Lyons fabrics; tapestry wallpaper, etc., etc.

All these items, incidentally and appropriately presented to the rulers of these countries with the affection and courtesy so characteristic of the French, will give these peoples a high understanding of the generosity, industry and power of the French people, and will subsequently become an important branch of trade.

A select society of scientists and artists must take part in this glorious expedition. The government will instruct them to take maps and plans of the areas through which the allied army will pass; it will also supply them with notes and especially respected works concerning these countries.

Aeronauts (balloonists) and pyrotechnicians (firework makers) will be very useful.

In order to instill in these peoples the highest concept of France and Russia, it will be agreed, before the army and headquarters leave Astrabad, to give in this city several brilliant holidays with military evolutions, similar to the holidays with which great events and memorable eras are honored in Paris. Having brought everything into the above order, there will be no doubt about the success of the enterprise; but mainly it will depend on the intelligence, zeal, courage and loyalty of the leaders to whom both governments will entrust the execution of the project.

Immediately upon the arrival of the allied army on the banks of the Indus, military operations should begin.

It should be noted that from European places in India and Persia the following are especially circulated and valued: Venetian sequins, Dutch chervonets, Hungarian ducats, Russian imperials and rubles.

1. Are there enough ships to transport 35 thousand army along the Danube to its mouth?

2. The Sultan will not agree to let the French army down the Danube and will oppose its departure from any port dependent on the Ottoman Empire.

3. Are there enough ships and ships on the Black Sea to cross the army and can the Russian emperor have a sufficient number of them?

4. The corps, upon leaving the Danube at sea, will not be in danger of being disturbed or dispersed by the English squadron of Admiral Keith, who, at the first news of this expedition, will march through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea to block the path of the French army and destroy it?

5. When the allied army is in in full force will gather in Astrabad, how will it penetrate into India through almost wild, barren countries, making a campaign of three hundred leagues from Astrabad to the borders of Hindustan?

If you believe the French historians and Russian researchers who accepted their concept, it turns out that Napoleon, for example, knew about the existence of the village of Pyatiizbyanka (he was the one who, according to documented evidence, believed that there were boyars in Russia!), was well versed in economic geography of Russia and knew what weapons and supplies and in what quantities were in the arsenals located deep in Russian territory. It is strange that this knowledge, to put it mildly, was not demonstrated by Napoleon in 1812! It is also striking that the project was clearly written for the French: a comparison of the Don with the Seine they are accustomed to, a mention of the “special benefit” of the expedition for France, a listing of French goods that can be traded in India. If Napoleon “carries” the hesitant Paul into one of his adventures, then logic dictates that the arguments should be made in favor of Russia.

And also - if you believe the voiced historiographical versions, then Napoleon, in addition to the noted oddities, wrote notes in the margins of his plan to himself, and then sent these notes to Paul! Because the publication also contains “Objections of Emperor Paul I,” but not to the project itself, but specifically to Bonaparte’s comments! The draft itself did not receive a response, which is natural if its author is Pavel himself. These answers are very detailed and imbued with determination - in a word, in the same spirit as the entire project.

1. I think that it will be easy to assemble the required number of ships; otherwise, the army will land at Brailov, a port on the Danube, in the Principality of Wallachia, and at Galati, another port on the same river, in the Principality of Moldavia; then the French army will cross on ships equipped and sent by Russia, and will continue on its way.

2. Paul I will force the Porte to do whatever he pleases; his enormous powers will force the Divan to respect his will.

3. The Russian emperor can easily assemble over 300 ships and vessels of all sizes in his Black Sea ports; The growth of the Russian merchant fleet on the Black Sea is known to the whole world.

4. If Mr. Keith wants to pass through the Dardanelles and the Turks do not oppose it, Paul I will oppose it; For this he has means more truly than they think.

5. These countries are not wild, not barren; the road has been open and spacious for a long time; caravans usually travel in thirty-five to forty days from the banks of the Indus to Astrabad. The soil, like Arabia and Libya, is not covered with shifting sands; rivers irrigate it at almost every step; there is no shortage of forage grasses; rice grows in abundance and is the main food of the inhabitants; bulls, sheep, game are found in abundance; The fruits are varied and excellent.

The only reasonable remark is the length of the journey, but this should not serve as a reason to reject the project. The French and Russian armies are hungry for glory; they are brave, patient, tireless; their courage, constancy and prudence of military leaders will overcome any obstacles.

A historical event can be cited as confirmation. In 1739 and 1740, Nadir Shah, or Tahmas Quli Khan, set out from Degli with a large army on a campaign against Persia and the shores of the Caspian Sea. His path was through Kandahar, Ferah, Herat, Meshekhod - to Astrabad. All these cities were significant, although they have now lost their former splendor, but still retain most of it.

What a truly Asian army did (that says it all) in 1739–1740, can there be any doubt that the army of the French and Russians could not do it today!

The named cities will serve as the main points of communication between Hindustan, Russia and France; for this it is necessary to establish military posts, appointing Cossacks as people most capable of this type of service.

In a word, if we look at this document impartially, it is obvious that the authorship of the campaign plan belongs to Paul: his deep thought in detail is so characteristic of Paul and completely unusual for Napoleon with his famous: “First you need to get involved in battle, and then we’ll see!” » It was the inattention to supplying the army that became one of the reasons for its defeat in 1812 in Russia. His own ideas about the campaign against India were voiced by the same O’Meara: “Distance has no of great importance, the food is simply transported on camels, and the Cossacks will always get enough of it. They will find the money upon arrival; the hope of conquest would at one moment raise up many Kalmyks and Cossacks without any expense. Promise them the plunder of some rich cities as a bait, and thousands will come to join the banner.” As we can see, the contrast with Paul's carefully thought-out plan, which seriously considered issues of supply and financing, is striking. Actually, Paul’s authorship was not in doubt among the first historians who used this document. In their specialized works, not related to the assessment of the personality of Pavel Petrovich, they directly wrote about the “plan of Emperor Paul”. But later, the slender cohort of Western historians cited at the beginning of our article created another historical myth with which our history is so rich.

Now let's see how fair Paul I's description of the terrain through which the army was to march was, that is, how feasible the campaign plan was in practice. The fundamental possibility of leading an army of tens of thousands of people to India by land has not been in doubt since the time of Alexander the Great, and Paul himself prudently pointed to the most recent example in the form of Nadir Shah.

Let's see what they said about the possibility of Russian troops operating in Afghanistan and the Indus Valley modern historians, and people are much closer in time and not alien to both historical and military science. A word from a man whom hardly anyone would blame for his tendency to overly praise the Russian Empire in general and the Russian Imperial Army in particular - F. Engels. In his article for February 1857, he writes the following: “Only one route remains, namely through the Caspian Sea with bases at Astrakhan and Baku, with an observation post at Astrabad on the south-eastern shore of the Caspian - a distance of only 500 miles to Herat. This path combines all the advantages that Russia could wish for. Astrakhan on the Volga occupies the same position as New Orleans on the Mississippi. Situated at the mouth of the greatest Russian river, the upper basin of which essentially forms the center of the empire, Great Russia, Astrakhan has every opportunity to transport people and supplies for the purpose of organizing a large expedition.

Or: “Baku, located 350 miles, and Astrakhan, 750 miles from Astrabad, are two excellent points for establishing military warehouses and concentrations of reserves. With the dominance of the Russian Caspian fleet on this inland sea, the necessary supplies and reinforcements can be very easily delivered to Astrabad.”**

We know that it was Astrakhan that Peter I focused on in his Persian campaign. Paul and Napoleon were going to do the same. As for Baku, in 1800 this city was bombed by order of Paul, and the local khan was brought into submission. So, if desired, this point could also be used as an auxiliary base for the Indian campaign. Here we also see Pavel’s characteristic love for detail, which contributed to the success of the operation.

There is also an often objection that Russian and French troops would have to overcome incredible difficulties, moving through deserts and impassable mountains, where there is no water, food and fodder necessary to supply the army.

If we talk about the initial stage of the journey through Persia, Astrabad and its surroundings were described in detail by Count M. Voinovich in 1781: “A vast, deep and closed bay, from the south it is adjacent to a flowering plain - the base of high mountains, cut by light streams , shaded by dense trees; the climate is excellent: healthy, always warm and never tiresomely hot; timber, fruit trees, rich fields, many rare birds, pastures provided all the means for food. There are several villages nearby; further away are the majestic ruins of the Shah's pleasure palaces with magnificent gardens; even further - in different directions (40 and 86 versts) - the cities of Astrabad and Sari; the routes from here to the depths of Persia, to India and Central Asia are capable and short-lived: to Bassora it was supposed to be less than a month of caravan travel, to Khiva - 14 days, to Bukhara - 18, to India via Kandahar five weeks.”

“In a word, this place,” concluded squadron officer Rading, who wrote the description of the expedition, “and indeed the entire Astrabad province, due to the many natural decorations and benefits, is considered the most pleasant and prosperous of many lands praised in a similar sense.”* What is important is that since 1783 a large trading post (dozens of Russian merchants) of the Russian-Persian trading company operated here. So there were people who could meet the expedition, help make contact with local rulers and serve as guides for the further journey.

It is noteworthy that here too Pavel tried to secure the flanks.

As for the road itself from Astrabad to Herat, Engels wrote the following about it: “An attack from the Caspian Sea and the Araks would enable only one column (coming from Astrabad) to pass the desert,” “just where it departs from these mountains to To the south of the ridge separating the Persian desert from the better watered regions of Afghanistan, Herat is located, surrounded by a fairly large and extremely fertile valley, which provides it with the means of subsistence. To the north of the mountains of Khorasan there is a desert similar to that which lies at their southern foot. Large rivers, like the Murghab, are also lost in the sand here. However, the Oxus and Jaxartes are powerful enough to break through these sands and form in their lower reaches vast valleys suitable for agriculture." As we see, precisely in the place where the troops were to go, there is no question of any desert. Perhaps Engels is simply escalating the situation, frightening him with the “Russian threat,” which is typical of a journalist.

But it's clean geographical description English traveler: “The Herat province extends almost from the tributaries of the Harirud to the east, to the Persian border to the west, and from southern Russia to the northern border of Seistan. Its area extends from east to west 300 miles (450 versts) and from north to south 200 miles (300 versts). In the north, south and west there are expanses of barren land, which can only be cultivated in limited areas. To the east, the upper part of Gerirud stretches to the Kuhi Baba mountain system. It has been calculated that the Gerirud Valley is able to feed the occupying army,not exceeding 150 thousand people. These circumstances, in connection with the location of Herat at the junction of roads from the Caspian Sea from Merv, Meshed, Bukhara and India through Kandahar, gave this point the name of the Key of India. The valley of Gerirud presents clear signs of rare fertility; just under the city there are pistachio and mulberry trees, blackberries and rose hips. The surrounding area is replete with villages and hamlets. The Gerirud River, which flows in one channel from 100 to 140 feet wide and whose water noticeably decreases towards the end of summer, has transformed the surrounding desert into a smiling paradise. Hollow water remains in the river from the end of January to the end of March, when the fords are dangerously passable. In April, due to the decrease in water, the fords are easier to pass; their average depth at that time was about 4 feet. Later, when the weather becomes hotter, the river along its entire length turns into long lakes, fed by springs and subsurface currents. The lower reaches of the Gerirud, which irrigates the Tejen oasis and the Serakh station, in its main features retain the features of the upper reaches."

As we see, the Englishman (note, a man with considerable military experience) has no doubt that in the regions described it is possible to feed twice as many more people than planned in the expedition of Paul and Napoleon.

As for the significance of Herat as the “key of India,” Engels also rated it very highly: “The political significance of Herat is due to the fact that it is the strategic center of the entire region lying between the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the Jaxartes River in the west and north and the Indus River in the east; therefore, in the event of a serious clash between England and Russia in the struggle for supremacy in Asia - a clash which an English invasion of Persia might precipitate - Herat will be the main subject of dispute and the likely theater of the first major military operations. But this is in the 50s, and at the beginning of the century England not only does not have the opportunity to meet Russian troops on the approaches to India, but simply does not really know anything about these lands. No Englishman had ever been to Afghanistan. While the Russian embassy was there back in the 17th century, and in early XIX Paul had ambassadors from the Durrani state (modern Afghanistan) in St. Petersburg; an outbreak of fire broke out in their homeland in 1801. Civil War, and there was no talk of serious resistance by all the forces of the country to the Russian-French army. But about the passage of troops in exchange for support of one of the parties in civil war it was quite possible to come to an agreement. I couldn’t think of a better moment for the planned hike.

However, the campaign through Astrabad never took place. Russian treason and English gold stopped the Russian-French regiments on March 11, 1801, much more reliable than the mythical “Asian deserts.” Therefore, now, when speaking about the Indian campaign of Paul I, historians, as a rule, mean only a small part of this grand plan, which we managed to start performing. We are talking about the campaign of the Don Cossacks of Ataman Orlov at the beginning of 1801, which received the name Eastern or Orenburg on the Don. Essentially, this was to provide the left flank of the army that was supposed to go through Astrabad. By the way, the already mentioned F. Engels envisaged diversionary actions for Russia in Central Asia: “The left column, advancing from Orenburg and, very likely, counting on receiving reinforcements sent from Astrakhan to the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, will have to secure for itself the territory around the Aral Sea sea ​​and, moving to Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand, achieve either neutrality or the assistance of these states, and also, if possible, by moving up the Oxus to Balkh, create a threat to the flank and rear of the British.”* These were precisely the tasks that Orlov’s Cossacks faced.

Let’s use this part of Pavel Petrovich’s “Indian plans” as an example to see how the social, financial and organizational preparation of the campaign was carried out: what forces were allocated for this and what was done to achieve their success.

Firstly, the same question arises as with the route through Astrabad: how well was the path along which the Cossacks were supposed to go known? Are the Central Asian deserts generally passable for Cossack cavalry? In a word, everything that Ataman Orlov ordered Captain Denezhnikov to find out in his secret order.

The Sovereign Emperor deigned to order me with the Don army to go to Orenburg and further through the Urals, ordering, moreover, to prepare or inspect the roads through spies. In fulfillment of this order from His Imperial Majesty, I need to have information:

1. Starting from Orenburg, what is the most convenient road for the transition of troops, through the steppes of the Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, to the Sarazu River, the land of the Karakalpaks and Uzbeks to Khiva, and from there to Bukhara and further to India? Are there any rivers along the road, what latitudes are they and what crossings are there, are there forests and villages along these rivers, and what kind of peoples?

2. Between the rivers, is there water, i.e. small streams, lakes and wells, at what distance are they from each other, if in which place are there only wells, then how many of them are sufficient for water, for how many horses or camels, how deep are they and is it possible, due to their lack of them, to dig other wells in the same places to get water, moreover, are there any inhabitants at such wells, what kind of wells, or are they dug only for watering small food supplies for passing merchant caravans?

4. Separating from Orenburg, is it possible to find food to feed people among the peoples living there, in what kind and abundance do they have food products and is it possible to buy them there and with what coin? If purchases are not made, but in exchange, then for what goods?

5. Do the Kyrgyz-Kaisak hordes, Karakalpaks, Uzbeks, Khivans, Bukharans always agree with each other at what distance one is from the other and each of them is ruled by one generation of khans or is fragmented into small subordination of the Murzas; But with all this, what is their type of life and how populous are they?

To select this information that I need in advance, I consider it necessary to send you to Orenburg and, as a zealous officer, revealing to you about this expedition entrusted to me by the highest, I order, together with the cornet Dolgopyatov, who is assigned to help you, to send you to Orenburg by mail, where If it would not be possible, through the local residents who trade with Asian peoples, to find out to you most secretly about all the above-explained terms, then so as not to allow the reasons for your arrival there to be noticed and rumors could not spread and instill a contrary opinion in the Kyrgyz-Kaisaks and other peoples, like this expedition cannot touch the disturbance of their peace, I find the nearest way to appear to you in Orenburg to the local commander and tell him secretly about the power of attorney entrusted to you, ask him to take it upon himself to provide you with the clearest information about everything, and to announce to him that I, for my part, I ask him to assist you in this case to the fullest extent possible, as duty requires, and with the information you can obtain for my most submissive report to His Imperial Majesty, hurry up to return to me and meet me on the march.

As it turns out, the Russian authorities were concerned with this issue long before Pavel Petrovich. In 1753, the Samara merchant D. Rukavkin visited the Khiva Khanate. He compiled a detailed report describing the routes from Orenburg to Khiva and Bukhara, which, in particular, indicated sources of fresh water and wood along the routes. One of the roads is described in this way: “This road is more content with both waters and herbs and is the most direct and capable of veneration”*. As we see, there are no endless hot sands that appear in the minds of the average person when thinking about crossing Central Asia. Later, a sergeant of the Russian army, F. Efremov, who was captured by nomads, traveled throughout Central Asia in 1774–1782 and left a description of his travels. In 1793–1794, Major Blankennagel visited Khiva, invited to heal the sore eyes of the khan’s relative. He wrote a report of what he saw and heard. T. Burnashev and A. Beznosikov traveled to Bukhara in 1794–1795, and completed their report during the reign of Paul I.

In addition to Khiva and Bukhara, the western lands of Kazakhstan lying closer to Orenburg were described by I. Kirillov, the head of the Orenburg expedition, the founder of the city of Orenburg, as well as by the historian and ethnographer P. Rychkov and his son Captain N. Rychkov.

Based on these travels, maps were drawn up, one of which Paul I gave to Ataman Orlov. Information about routes through the states of Central Asia, about water sources, wells, about the cities along the way and their fortifications was not a secret for St. Petersburg at that time. And the envoys sent to Tashkent already during the reign of Pavel Petrovich received even more interesting assignments...

The manuscript department of the Russian National Library houses an interesting document authored by the mining official of the Kolyvan factories M.S. Pospelov. Together with his colleague T.S. Burnashev, he was in Tashkent in 1800 - strictly on the eve of the Indian campaign. The scope of his interests, reflected in the records, is very indicative. In particular, for the first time the question is raised not about the passage of Russian troops through the territory of modern Kazakhstan, but about the settlement of these territories.

A specific list of places suitable for settlement is given: “The steppes from the very tops of the Irtysh River, between the continuation of the mountains that separated from the small Altai ridge, to their intersection below the Omsk fortress, taking as a basis that between these mountains there are quite a lot of plains, and along the rivers and springs of meadow grasses, also suitable places for arable farming,” mountains Kukazlyk, Boktu, Ken-Kazlyk and Kar-Karaly and “further, even to the Nura river, at a distance of 160 versts, places can be considered the best of the entire route, because there between the mountains Frequent springs flow and meadow grasses grow on soft hems, where it is convenient to do arable farming.”

It must be said that this topic, once raised, was not forgotten. Recommendations regarding settlement, very similar to Pospelov’s recommendations, were later given by the head of the Russian embassy in 1803 to Bukhara, Ya. Gaverdovsky. He carried out a serious analysis of known places in the central regions of the Kyrgyz-Kaisak steppes, suitable for potential settlement, and concluded that the most profitable for agriculture “are those that lie near the mountains, because the spring water flowing from them in large quantities always fertilizes the land through moisture and sedimentation of silt." The inevitable process of settling these lands was greatly delayed by the Napoleonic wars (Ya. Gaverdovsky, for example, died heroically near Borodino. - D.M.) and generally little interest shown in the affairs of the East during the reign of Alexander I, but nevertheless the village of Karkaralinskaya (now the city of Karkaralinsk in Kazakhstan. - D.M.) The Siberian Cossack Army was founded in 1824 exactly where M. Pospelov advised. Even if 20 years later...

Even more interesting are the recommendations of these almost forgotten Russian diplomats and travelers regarding the possibilities of passage through the steppes and deserts of large masses of cavalry - that is, what Ataman Orlov and the Don people would inevitably face if the campaign along the Orenburg - Khiva - Bukhara route took place.

On this topic, M. Pospelov wrote about the terrain and the order of the route: “In different places there are springs, as well as small lakes and wells, and in order to follow them without suffering a lack of water, it is necessary that the team with horses be divided from 300 to 500 people , and as a line for a distance of up to 20 miles, they passed one after another.” Thus, it is necessary to follow to the Karakul lakes, “and from the lakes the already numerous team cannot be followed in total until the Tashkent possession, since all the necessary advantages are on the way.” It is written separately: “... regarding horse feed, there should never be a shortage”*.

In other words, each Cossack regiment of 500 people could easily follow standard caravan paths one after another. Regarding distances, Ya. Gaverdovsky wrote that the route first to Khiva and then to Bukhara (it was this route that was announced by Paul I in his instructions to Ataman Orlov) “may be recognized as the most convenient of all those going from the Orenburg region to Asian countries.” According to him, the transition from Orenburg to Khiva took 20 days, and the entire route took 37 days. If you follow directly from Orenburg to Bukhara, then this road “is the shortest, because with heavy packs it was completed in no more than three and a half weeks or a month”**.

At the same time, it was pointed out that even on the most difficult part of the route after crossing the sands of Kyzylkumov, “the famous Bukan well lies, surrounded from the south high mountains; it is lined with stone and contains clean water, which can be enough for a whole day for 1000 people and the same number of horses.”***.

Probably, the information given by contemporaries is enough to understand: the task of moving from Orenburg to Bukhara is purely technical and can be carried out by trained units (and the Don Cossacks clearly are) along a number of routes in a reasonable time.

Now let's look at the array of forces allocated by Emperor Paul to solve this problem. If earlier, in the 18th century, the Don put into service 10–25 regiments, which were quite enough to cover the Russian borders (primarily, of course, the Kuban, but not only - the Don regiments served up to the Finnish border inclusive), then Emperor Pavel Petrovich of the Don Much more Cossacks were needed. Already in 1799, Don fielded 47 regiments, 22 of which, under the leadership of military chieftain V. Orlov, were intended for the war with France. It is noteworthy that the entire cavalry (six regiments) of A. Suvorov’s army in his famous Italian and Swiss campaigns consisted of Cossacks. Regular cavalry regiments were not involved: it was believed that they could fight worse than the Cossacks in such extreme conditions. This fact in itself speaks of the high appreciation of the Cossack units by Emperor Paul and Generalissimo Suvorov.

Another demonstration of the high fighting qualities of the Cossack troops resulted in an increasing need for them. A kind of record was set in 1801, when the army sent 41 regiments to the famous Indian campaign, and in total they pledged to send 86 regiments to the campaign - this is exactly how much was required, according to Emperor Paul’s plan, to lead fighting against England throughout Europe, while simultaneously moving towards the “jewel of the British crown” - India.

For comparison: in the War of 1812, 67 regiments took part from the Donskoy army (including the Life Guards Cossack Regiment).

It is easy to imagine how much strain on human resources this figure required if you look at the number of Cossacks in the service. In 1800, there were 121,757 people in the military class on the Don, but of these, 53,742 (44.1%) were Cossack children under 19 years of age, 6,050 (5%) were Kalmyks, and of the remaining 61,955 people (50.9%) 22,648 (18.6%) were dismissed from service for one reason or another (usually old age, illness or disability). There were thus 39,317 in service (counting even civil clerks), including officers. It turns out that to staff the declared 86 five hundred Cossack regiments, 43,000 people were required...

It was especially difficult with officers. The regiment required a colonel, a quartermaster, five cornets, five centurions and five captains. This means, as is easy to calculate, the campaign of 1801 required 1,462 officers, but only 1,035 were available.

In order to carry out the order of Emperor Paul, a colossal effort of the entire Cossack army was required. This is how the famous Don historian Krasnov describes what was happening: “Where and why the campaign was planned - no one knew about it. The military ataman Vasily Petrovich Orlov ordered all officers, non-commissioned officers and Cossacks to prepare. Everyone, down to the last one, had to be ready for departure in six days with two horses and a month and a half of provisions. Cossacks were required to carry guns and darts. And it happened before that the entire Don army rose up. The old people remembered such cases. In 1737 and 1741, the Don people rose without exception. But then there was danger from the Tatars, the Tatars were marching on the Don, there was a need to defend their native villages. Now only old people talked about Tatar raids. The Black Sea Army stood strong in the Kuban. Don was in no danger from anywhere. Nobody knew where the Don army would go. There were 800 sick people in the army, but they were also ordered to appear for inspection. They walked sick, swollen from wounds, crippled. Orphans and helpless poor people were preparing for the campaign; Many Cossacks did not have uniform jackets and checkmen; they were dressed in old robes and homespun clothing. Nobody was respected. Although the house burned down, although everything was burned, go anyway, at the expense of the village. Rich Cossacks equipped the poor. In the Cherkasy village, six Cossacks collected 2,000 rubles and gave money for uniforms and equipment for the foot Cossacks. Twenty souls of a family in one house were left without a master or food. They didn't look at the queue. The chieftain ordered to take it without a queue, and the last owner went, although his two brothers were already serving in the regiments. The regiments that had just arrived from the Caucasian line, from the Italian campaign, were again enlisted in service. Churches were left without sextons, village boards were left without clerks, they all were taken away. The militia was complete!

They also demanded Kalmyks to serve. The landowner officers were not allowed to go to their farms. Wives did not say goodbye to their husbands, children did not say goodbye to their fathers. The army was hastily assembled according to the royal decree.”

This was the price of fulfilling the grandiose plans of Paul I. Nevertheless, the Cossacks completed the exorbitant tasks he set in 1801 without objection and in full.

This is despite the fact that military service was not only burdensome, but also very expensive. According to M. Platov’s calculations, just entering the service at the beginning of the 19th century “at reasonable prices” cost a Cossack 208 rubles 70 kopecks. Nevertheless, everyone appointed took part in the Indian campaign, and those who could not get together on their own were helped by wealthier neighbors.

This attitude was facilitated by the policy consistently pursued by Paul I in relation to the Don Cossacks.

The period from the end of the 18th to the end of the 19th century was characterized on the Don by the completion of the process of social stratification of the Cossacks into ordinary villagers and Cossack elders.

Representatives of the elders carved out vast estates for themselves from the stanitsa lands and even started farmsteads there with peasants whom they sought to secure for themselves. In those years, remembering the ancient Don will, many peasants, “leaving their homes, came to the army, as before, with the intention of joining the Cossacks.” “But the Don officials, under various pretexts, spontaneously planted them on public military lands, registered them and called them peasants.”

A significant part of the Don officers - regiment commanders - in war time in fact, it was made up of large landowners. The Don elders have long wanted to equalize their rights with the Russian nobility, so that they would be “allowed by law... to buy and maintain peasants and courtyard people.” And what about Emperor Paul? In the very first month of his reign (!), by decree of December 12, 1796, he prohibited “willful movements of villagers from place to place” on the Don. The Don elders perceived the mentioned decree precisely as the final assignment of the peasants to them.

The only aspiration of the Cossack elite was the formal recognition of their rights as nobility. Which is what followed! By a decree of September 22, 1798, for the “jealousy and service” of the troops, as well as “as a sign of gratitude and goodwill” to him, all Cossack ranks were equated to army headquarters and chief officer ranks. Moreover, Cossack chief officers were promoted faster than army officers. A centurion, equivalent to a lieutenant, at the next promotion to esaul (corresponding to an army captain) “jumped” the rank of staff captain, making a faster career. Thus, the Don elders received all the rights of the nobility associated with army ranks. Now the Don elders began to be called officials, as those who had army ranks, and those of them who had serfs or assigned peasants - Don landowners. These reforms guaranteed Emperor Paul the loyalty of the Don elite.

To put it simply modern language, Emperor Paul steadily strengthened the “vertical of power,” leaving little of Cossack autonomy, but at the same time maintaining its visibility in the form of military and village circles, where the tone was set by the “new nobles” of the Don, who owed him their economic well-being. From here it becomes clear the unquestioning obedience that the Don army demonstrated in 1801, setting off on a difficult campaign against India. It also becomes obvious that the transformations were carried out precisely with the expectation of maximizing the mobilization capabilities of the Cossacks within the framework of the goals pursued by the foreign policy of the Russian Empire.

The high fighting qualities of the Cossack cavalry are quite widely known, but Paul I also took into account the fact that during the campaign, Ataman Orlov’s army would have to solve problems that were not typical of irregular cavalry. Thus, the assault on Khiva and Bukhara was clearly envisaged. In the rescripts from Paul I to Orlov it was written, in particular, “to establish Bukharia so that the Chinese do not get it, and in Khiva free so many thousands of our captive subjects,” which was, of course, impossible without the military defeat of these robber nests. For this purpose, the army was given artillery led by Colonel Karpov. The artillery consisted of 12 unicorns with 960 grenades, 120 cannonballs and 360 grapeshots and 12 cannons with 1080 cannonballs and 360 grapeshots - this outfit was more than enough for the modest fortifications of the Central Asian khanates. The sending of reinforcements was not excluded: “If infantry was needed, then it would be possible to follow you, and not otherwise. But it’s better if you do it by yourself.”

The “Campaign to the Indus River” of 1801, organized by the forces of the Donskoy army on the orders of Emperor Paul, as already said, was considered only as a meaningless adventure that had no hope of success and was useless for Russia. At the same time, it did not arouse interest as a bright page of the original Cossack and Russian military art in general. The march of the 41st Cossack regiment with reinforcement units (22 thousand people in total) without roads for thousands of kilometers across the spring steppe, crossing the most difficult water barrier on the East European Plain - the Volga River - had no analogues in the then European armies. And yet it was successfully carried out without sanitary losses! The Cossacks were stopped only by the murder of Pavel Petrovich and the order of the new sovereign to cancel the campaign.

Note that, in addition to the Don Cossacks, the Ural Cossacks were also supposed to take part in the campaign, among whom Paul I enjoyed great sympathy, because he consigned to oblivion Pugachev riot and expressed a desire to have with him a guard hundred of the Urals. And this strengthened the expedition with units accustomed to the conditions of Central Asia. Unfortunately, it was not possible to identify documents on the involvement Orenburg Cossacks, but it is known that on June 12, 1798, Emperor Paul issued a decree on dividing the Ufa Cossack regiment into two parts and forming new regiments on their basis. Moreover, in order to quickly complete the formation of these regiments, by decree of October 27, 1799, it was allowed to enroll yasak peasants, including from among the Mordvins, Chuvash and Tatars, into the Orenburg Cossack Army. This is a rather unusual measure, and the reasons for such a rush require more detailed consideration.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to pay attention to such an important aspect as the material support of such a complex event, which is the Eastern Campaign of the Don Cossacks.

Derzhavin, who was then the state treasurer, by order of the sovereign, gave Orlova “on loan” 1,670,285 rubles for this expedition, “which should be returned from the spoils of that expedition.”

Accordingly, moving across the territory of the Russian Empire, the troops calmly paid both the German colonists mentioned in the first draft of the campaign, and other rural workers.

Measures to supply the troops were also taken further along the route. The Governor General of Orenburg, Major General N. Bakhmetyev, obeying the orders of the sovereign, stocked food and fodder. The need to communicate with the local population after the Cossacks left the borders of the empire was taken into account. For this purpose, translators were sought who could speak “in the dialects of Khiva, Bukhara, Indian and Persian.” Those who knew the last two had to be specially discharged from Astrakhan! The governor also sent Orlov a map of the Kyrgyz steppe and the possessions of Khiva and Bukharia. Camels were purchased to transport heavy loads and provisions while moving. Also, 12 doctors arrived in Orenburg and were supposed to accompany the army. It must be said that the doctors to Orlov’s regiments were seconded to this expedition by personal order of the emperor: “To write to the prosecutor general and send twelve doctors with one staff doctor to the Don army”*.

Contrary to popular belief, the campaign was accompanied by serious diplomatic preparation. Moreover, it began long before 1800. Understanding the hostility of Khiva and Bukhara and the need to have guides from the local population, the emperor tried to enlist the support of the nomads of Central Asia. In 1797, a Khan's Council controlled by Russian proteges was established in the Junior Zhuz, which elected Aichuvak, who was absolutely loyal to Russia, as khan, and the daughter of the “Kyrgyz-Kaisak mufti” M. Huseynov (part-time Russian officer, spy in Bukhara and Kabul and diplomat) was married to the latter Khan of the Bukey Horde Dzhangir. Thus, the steppes of Kazakhstan in 1801 were completely loyal to Russia, and their owners were ready to provide guides and pack animals for the army of the “white king”.

But the local forces on which Russian troops could rely were not limited to the Kazakh steppes. Thanks to the active policy of Paul I in Central Asia, back in 1797, the Tashkent ruler Yunus-haji humbly asked the emperor to “accept him for patronage and protection” in order to protect him from the Chinese Empire. The following year, 1798, Paul I informed him of his readiness “to most graciously accept you and your well-intentioned subjects under his high patronage and deigns, hoping that you, on your part, will feel the full value of a little bit of E.I.V. mercy." Thus, Orlov’s Cossacks in 1801 had a base in the very center of Central Asia, very close to Bukhara. At the same time, an attentive researcher understands what the emperor’s phrase in one of his letters to Orlov means: “To establish Bukhara so that the Chinese do not get it.”

The initiative of Emperor Paul literally shook up the Central Asian region, and its consequences were felt long after his death. At the end of 1803, an envoy of the Bukhara emir Haydar Khan brought a message from his master to St. Petersburg, asking not to send troops to India, but, if necessary, to entrust the campaign to the emir. In 1804, Orenburg Governor-General G. Volkonsky proposed a plan for a large steppe campaign to Khiva with the goal of stopping further trade in Russian slaves, which were abundantly supplied to Central Asian markets by the Kyrgyz-Kaisaks.

Thus, we see that in 1801, potential guides, supply bases and auxiliary troops of the Allies awaited the Russians in both the Asian and Persian directions. Of course, it is extremely doubtful that all these grandiose events would have been completed in 1801, but there are no serious grounds for doubting the ability of the Don Army to reach Tashkent this year and then take Khiva and Bukhara. 64 years later, General Chernyaev took Tashkent, having a thousand bayonets and sabers, and three years later, General Kaufman with 3.5 thousand people brought the entire Bukhara Emirate into submission to Russia. Having 22 thousand people of the best cavalry of his time, Ataman Orlov would undoubtedly have done the same. The consequences of the subjugation of the Central Asian khanates to Russia 60–70 years earlier than what happened in real history are colossal in themselves. This is a presence on the northern borders of India, when the British are far from conquering it, and a colossal impetus for the Russian economy (development and strengthening of trade with India, Persia, China and the growth of the textile industry based on Central Asian cotton), etc. It is not without reason that many English researchers consider the Eastern Campaign of the Don Cossacks in 1801 to be the beginning of the Great Game - the name given to the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian empires for dominance in Central Asia, which lasted throughout the 19th century.

Well, if the main campaign of the Russian-French army through Persia had taken place - at least in 1801, at least in the next few years - then this would have led to the end of that very Great Game in the form in which we know it. The entry of the united armies onto the Indus in the Punjab region almost inevitably led them to an anti-British alliance with Ranjit Singh, who had just, on April 12, 1801, been crowned Maharaja of the united Punjab and subsequently held back the expansion of the British Empire in this part of India for almost 40 years. Note that the troops of the British East India Company were significantly inferior in number to the 70,000-strong corps that Russia and France were supposed to send. In 1798, the number of European troops in all of British India was 22,160, and until 1805 this number increased slightly to 24,891. The rest were native troops, in no way superior to the Sikhs and unconquered Marathas.

Review of the Kirghiz-Kaisak steppe (part 1), or Day notes in the Kirghiz-Kaisak steppe in 1803 and 1804 // History of Kazakhstan in Russian sources of the 16th–20th centuries. T. 5: The first historical and ethnographic descriptions of the Kazakh lands: The first half of the 19th century. Almaty, 2007. P. 360.

The trip of Pospelov and Burnashev to Tashkent in 1800 // Bulletin of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1851. Part 1. Book. 1: Historical geography. VI. 1851. P. 17.

Statistical description of the land of the Don Army // RGVIA. F. 846. Op. 16. D. 18719. L. 149–150.

Under the banner of Russia: Sat. archival documents / Comp., note. A.A. Sazonova, S.N. Kistereva. M.: Russian Book, 1992. P. 341.