Origins of the Cold War. Southeast Asia during the Cold War

This article examines the history of the “northern territory problem” (hereinafter referred to as NTP) in the context of the Cold War in Asia. Particular attention is paid to the reasons why this issue has not been resolved.

The history of the problem is well known. Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered to the Allies in August 1945. The Declaration limited Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and smaller islands as designated by the Allies. The problem was to draw the state border between Japan and the Soviet Union, based on new political realities, and also to secure it in a peace treaty.

However, the coalition allies had already begun to be drawn into the Cold War, and the first clashes between the United States and the USSR took place in East Asia around Korea and Japan. Thus, the international settlement of the Japanese question turned out to be difficult and was not completed. According to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, concluded on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, but the treaty did not indicate in whose favor this renunciation was carried out. The Soviet Union took part in the Peace Conference, but refused to sign the treaty. During the conference, then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru emphasized that the Russian Empire recognized Kunashir and Iturup as Japanese territory, and the islands of Shikotan and Habomai were part of Hokkaido and, accordingly, Japan! More than 50 years have passed since heh Por, but a peace treaty between Russia and Japan has not yet been concluded. Naturally, the parties repeatedly made attempts to reach an agreement. Among other things, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro negotiated with general secretary Central Committee of the CPSU N. Khrushchev in 1955-1956. However, they were never able to come to an agreement on the issue of the Peace Treaty, limiting themselves to signing a Joint Declaration, according to which two smaller islands, the Habomai and Shikotan ridges, were to pass to Japan along with the signing of the Peace Treaty. In 1960, the Soviet Union unilaterally abandoned the Joint Declaration after Japan signed a new Security Treaty with the United States.

Since then the complex Kuril Islands became the subject of a dispute between the two capitals, with the Japanese side insisting that " northern territories"were not part of the ceded Kuril Islands. The PCT is generally perceived in Japan as the "four island problem", in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in October 1993.

PST has become the object of serious research by many scientists. However, most of them focused on the consideration of bilateral relations between Japan and the USSR (since 1991 - Russian Federation), while the positions of the United States and Great Britain, who were the main initiators of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, received, at best, very little attention. Thus, the PST is still perceived as a subject of bilateral geopolitical dialogue.

The Cold War, of course, is not discounted and continues to play an important role, but it is considered a peripheral factor, which is perceived by most analysts as an ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the center of which was Europe, while Asia occupied a secondary place. The PST did not owe its existence to the Cold War, but was largely influenced by it and was largely shaped by its events. Without understanding the essence of the Cold War in Asia and its consequences for the PST, it is impossible to understand the origin, evolution and Possible Solution the specified problem.

The Cold War in Asia is characterized by specific features. Unlike Europe, where a bipolar system emerged after the emergence of NATO in 1949 and the Warsaw bloc in 1956, Asia went through a series of dramatic transformations, within which national liberation movements, decolonization, civil wars and even revolutions took place, and their apogee was the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 and the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea in June 1950. The Korean War was the reason why Japan did not sign a Peace Treaty with all interested parties.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty left unresolved territorial disputes between China, the USSR and both Koreas. The end of the Korean War and Khrushchev's new doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” contributed to a softening of the Asian political climate. However, active hostilities were replaced by a real cold war, both within the states themselves and at the international level. In Japan, the internal Cold War was no less severe than in other countries, and the issue split the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Foreign Ministry. In Moscow, as will be shown below, opinions were also divided, although to a lesser extent. Thus, the agreement on a peace treaty with the USSR was stopped, and it has not yet been concluded.

Recently, American Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The US press noted that the main purpose of Kerry's trip was to strengthen relations with the five named states. The means of strengthening is economic partnership. However, Western analysts representing the so-called alternative press believe that Washington is developing a confrontation with Russia in the region.

Let us remind you that John Kerry’s visit to Central Asia ended two weeks ago. The US Secretary of State visited five countries: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. This visit was literally historic. The coverage is impressive: five countries in a row. This was a clear demonstration of the build-up of American influence in the region. And the demonstration was, of course, addressed to Moscow.

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The American media wrote that the main goal of D. Kerry’s visit was to strengthen relations with the states of Central Asia through economic partnership. As for Russia, our analysts treated the American press reports with distrust. What kind of “partnership” is this? Especially with Turkmenistan, where not only is there no democracy, but there is even an example of its direct opposite! However, these analysts can look towards Saudi Arabia or Qatar, where from time to time they cut off the heads of pederasts and where there is also no (and no plans for) democracy. The United States cooperates quite successfully with these monarchies, and even jointly invented the petrodollar.

One of the strongest states in the region, Kazakhstan (a member of the EAEU, SCO and CSTO), cordially received the overseas envoy. “Recently in New York I met with US President Barack Obama, we discussed issues of bilateral cooperation. Since the first days of independence of our republic, which will turn 24 in December, we have been cooperating with your country, and the Kazakh people are grateful for the constant support of our sovereignty and economic development. Today there are about 500 companies with American capital in our country. We are aimed at continuing this work,” Tengrinews.kz quotes Nursultan Nazarbayev as saying to John Kerry.

Kazakhstan is one example. The biggest. Of course, the United States will also carry out “bilateral interaction” with other countries.

Analysts of the South Front portal believe that the recent visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry to the countries of Central Asia demonstrates the importance of the states of the region for Washington, including in the context of negative trends in US foreign policy in Afghanistan, where the local government is seated in chairs by White House specialists , is weakening, while the Taliban and its allies are strengthening.

Kerry and the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the meeting in Samarkand openly discussed areas of cooperation affecting a variety of areas: economics, water security, education.

American analysts believe that this list of areas is rather formal. This is just a cover, but in reality there was a discussion of “additional issues” in “individual countries.” It is easy to predict, the authors of the article write, that the purpose of Kerry’s visit and American policy in general is issues related to Afghanistan and Russia.

Afghanistan and the activities of IS.

The borders between the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan are attracting the attention of politicians due to the increased activity of militants of all types and calibers. Here are the Taliban, who tried to seize the city of Kunduz, and ISIS, whose formations are beginning to densely concentrate there. IS militants generally consider this area a springboard for further expansion into Central Asia.

The threat is also growing in the south. Previously, the number of IS militants increased on the borders of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Along with this, analysts note “serious internal problems” in the countries of Central Asia.

All this greatly worries not only the Central Asian states themselves, but also the leadership of those countries that have influence in the region: first of all, Russia, the USA and China (the latter is conducting economic expansion here).

As for Russia, at the recent summit on collective security To the CSTO, it announced plans to create a joint border security initiative. Several Central Asian states were invited to participate in the initiative. As American analysts write, additional Russian and Kazakh armed forces have already been deployed in the region within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (since June 2015). Chinese intelligence specialists cooperate with them.

The overall structure of the deployed joint armed forces in Tajikistan includes border protection units (troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, as well as Russian and Kazakh military advisers) and separate military formations from Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (the latter's contribution is small) stationed in the territory 201st Russian military base, in the vicinity of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tube. In addition, there are units of the CSTO and the regional anti-terrorism structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russian, Kazakh and Chinese intelligence forces.

However, not all countries support the CSTO's efforts. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, for example, are discussing their own joint operations to strengthen and protect their borders. These countries have previously preferred to “avoid close cooperation with the CSTO,” analysts recall.

According to experts, the reason for this attitude towards the CSTO is the ambitions of state leaders. Currently, Ashgabat and Tashkent are trying to establish a bilateral security partnership.

Of course, the United States paid attention to this.

Washington, like Moscow, is concerned about the rise in aggression in Afghanistan and is also interested in strengthening security cooperation with Central Asian states in order to challenge Moscow as the dominant military security power in the region.

Analysts say Washington's motives in Central Asia are clear. However, the devil is in the details: the details of how the United States intends to “strengthen security cooperation” in the region are obscured.

However, experts believe that something can be assumed.

Turkmenistan could grant the United States permanent rights to use the Mary-2 base (located near the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border).

Another possible plan is US support for a joint Uzbek-Turkmen border security initiative.

Another “topic” could be an increase in the US presence in Tajikistan. Tajikistan is considered one of Russia's closest allies in Central Asia, and therefore Washington would like to increase its influence here.

Of course, none of these forms of cooperation have been fully confirmed yet. Nevertheless, analysts believe that the Kremlin may pay attention to these “attempts.” The “division of efforts” will create holes in Russia’s regional security system. Recent events in Afghanistan have made it clear that US military efforts are unlikely to strengthen regional security. As a matter of fact, American forces are simply not enough for this.

Experts believe that only the joint forces of Russia and Kazakhstan will be able to “quickly and effectively” counter the IS threat. The military of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not have appropriate military equipment; the armed forces of these countries are not able to act effectively. Well, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as noted above, are trying to avoid participating in joint CSTO events.

Analysts, however, undertake to assert that, in general, Russia, China, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states assess the existing threats correctly.

However, the unstable situation on the borders of the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan leads to the fact that the confrontation between the United States and Russia is unfolding “throughout the entire former Soviet periphery.”

You can’t argue with this, let’s add from ourselves. Otherwise, it would not be a cold war, but a warm friendship of peoples. So in Syria, too, there are two coalitions against “IS”: one with the Russians, and the second - you know who.

Cold War in Asia. The arena of the Cold War was not only Europe, but also Asia.

During the war with Japan, Soviet troops occupied the territories of Manchuria and North Korea. In 1946, control of Manchuria and captured Japanese weapons were transferred to the Chinese communists, which significantly strengthened their position.

In China since the late 1920s. there were two states and two governments. The national government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, controlled 70% of the country's territory in 1946 and was recognized by the majority of countries in the world and represented on the UN Security Council. The Chinese communists, supported by the USSR, created their own system of laws in the areas they called liberated, introduced their own currency, and carried out reforms leading to the establishment of equal land use.

The war between the “two Chinas” resumed immediately after the defeat of Japan. Attempts to reconcile them, made in 1945-1947, did not lead to any results. By the end of 1949, despite US support for Chiang Kai-shek's regime, the Chinese civil war ended in communist victory. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed between the USSR and China. The remnants of the anti-communist forces under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, under the cover of the US naval forces, were evacuated to the island of Taiwan.

The transformation of the USSR into a superpower, which, as Washington believed, controlled not only Eastern Europe, but also China with its population of hundreds of millions, and the USSR’s testing of an atomic bomb in 1949, which deprived the United States of its nuclear monopoly,” caused panic in Washington. In assessing the international situation, the US ruling circles were convinced that further expansion of the borders of the socialist camp controlled by the USSR would lead to an irreversible change in the balance of forces in the world in its favor.

In the context of the emerging military confrontation between the USA and the USSR in Asia, the signing of a single peace treaty between the former allies and Japan turned out to be impossible. In September 1951, in San Francisco, the United States and its allied countries signed a peace treaty with Japan, which did not prohibit it from entering into military alliances and did not limit its armed forces. Simultaneously with the peace treaty, the United States signed a “security treaty” with Japan. According to this treaty, the United States received the right to maintain military bases in Japan, while guaranteeing the protection of its territory and the stability of democratic institutions. Japan gave up its former overseas possessions, including the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin. However, since the USSR did not sign a peace treaty as a sign of protest against the Japanese-American military alliance, it did not include a clause recognizing these territories as part of the USSR.

Thus, the outbreak of the Cold War did not make it possible to clearly record the results of the Second World War, which in subsequent decades became a source of additional friction in the international arena.

1. Features of political development

The post-war world included not only two hostile blocs, there was also a “third world”, which included the states formed as a result of the collapse of colonial empires. They differed in their level of economic development, lifestyle, and worldview. The liberated countries were faced with the question: which device should they prefer? Quite often they adopted political systems, inherited from previous imperial masters. A minority of the former colonies leaned toward the Soviet model. However, the declared affiliation with one camp or another did not correspond much to reality, since in most cases in these countries there were not enough material and political conditions to live in accordance with the proclaimed models.

The Cold War became an important factor in the formation of the post-colonial structure of the world. In most cases, its influence on the development of former colonies was negative, since in the conditions of ideological confrontation between the West and the East, politicians had a huge advantage, having the opportunity to speculate on colonialism as the main reason for the lag in development of the Third World countries. Colonialism created imbalances in the economies of dependent countries, thus making them vulnerable, but it also formed some of the preconditions for modernization in politics and economics. These preconditions could be exploited, but the Cold War atmosphere virtually eliminated continuity of development with the previous colonial administration, even where there were clearly achievements that needed to be preserved and increased.

Despite the absurdity of unification under common name"third world" countries such as Egypt and Gabon, India and New Guinea, such a union still had a certain meaning. The governments of these states did not believe that the world capitalist market and spontaneous private enterprise would succeed in their countries. In the minds of the politicians of the “third world” states, the West was the “first world” with its greedy capitalism; the “second” included socialist countries with their harsh totalitarian regimes - both of these worlds had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. The “Third World” was supposed to become a new world - free, peace-loving, independent. This concept was implemented at the First Conference of African and Asian States, held April 18-24, 1955 in Bandung, in which 28 countries took part. At the conference, the basic principles of peaceful coexistence were formulated: 1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit.

The inspirers of the Bandung movement were the leaders of India, Indonesia, Egypt and Yugoslavia - Jawaharlal Nehru, Ahmed Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Josip Broz Tito. The principles of non-alignment, in the development of which mainly representatives of former colony countries participated, were to become the basis of a new life. In reality, however, they were often not implemented: long wars took place in Pakistan, India, Somalia, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Uganda, and Tanzania. In particular, the leaders of this movement found themselves helpless during the bloody war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

The non-aligned movement was formalized at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961.

2. The establishment of a communist regime in the largest Asian country

Even on the eve of World War I, Western competition for spheres of influence in China sparked national movements in Asia, and World War II dealt a crushing blow to Western dominance in Asia.

Determine from the map which states gained independence in Asia in 1945-1955.

The most radical changes took place in China. In 1949, the communists came to power here and, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, established the independence of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The example of China breaking free from Western control was a cautionary tale, and US and Western policy during the Cold War was dominated by the desire to stop the advance of communism in Asia.

For four thousand years, China was distinguished not only by its large and homogeneous population, but also by its political integrity. Most Chinese believed that their country was the center of the world and a model for all mankind. China rightfully considered its classical culture (painting, calligraphy, public institutions) a model for universal imitation. China and the Chinese certainly did not have a sense of cultural or intellectual backwardness. Technological weakness, which became fully apparent only in the 19th century. due to the obvious lag in the military sphere, was due not so much to the low level of technology or education, but rather to the self-sufficiency and self-confidence that distinguished Chinese civilization. Renewal became possible only after the fall of the ancient Chinese empire, the guardian traditional culture, and only through social revolution.

The communists led the massive resistance to the Japanese invaders in the occupied territory. Therefore, when the Communists won a short civil war in 1949, they were perceived as the legitimate rulers of China after 40 years of anarchic anarchy. In addition, the communists, relying on their ideology, were able to create a nationwide effective power structure. This is exactly what the Chinese expected from politicians.

For most Chinese, the communist revolution meant the restoration of peace, order, prosperity, administrative continuity, the greatness of a vast empire and an ancient civilization.

Mao Zedong

Behind the forced collectivization of agriculture in 1955-1957. followed by the “Great Leap Forward” policy in industry, which began in 1959 and led to the terrible famine of 1959-1961. Mao Zedong's new experiment - " cultural revolution", which took place in 1966-1976, was aimed at suppressing any opposition in the country. The “revolution” was accompanied by mass repressions and the instillation of an atmosphere of general fear. Its result was the pre-crisis state of the Chinese economy. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the group led by Deng Xiaoping won the power struggle. The country's new leadership carried out a number of socio-economic reforms that transformed the country. However, the previous political structures remained unchanged.

Explain why, despite social and economic changes in China, the country's political structures have remained unchanged.

3. Korean War

Korean War (1950-1953) along with the Berlin blockade in 1948-1949. became another peak of the Cold War.

Occupied by the Japanese in 1905, Korea, according to the Anglo-American-Chinese agreement of 1943, was supposed to gain independence after World War II. At the final stage of the war, the USSR and the USA decided to consider the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula as the demarcation line of allied military actions against Japan. Soviet troops accepted the Japanese surrender to the north, and American troops to the south of the 38th parallel.

Immediately after the entry of Soviet troops into Korea, a government of a unified Korea sympathetic to the Soviet Union was created. The Americans opposed this government to the provisional Korean government, which had previously been in exile. These two governments vied for power in the country, although the division of the country along the 38th parallel was expected to be temporary. Nevertheless, on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was proclaimed with its capital in Seoul, and on September 9 of the same year, the Korean People's Republic was proclaimed.

Democratic Republic (DPRK) with its capital in Pyongyang. In fact, residents of both parts of the country were never given the opportunity to decide their own fate, and Korea still remains divided: temporary military borders turned into permanent ones.

After the communist victory in China, Mao Zedong was given the opportunity to help the North Korean communists in their quest to create a unified state. It was with the support of Mao Zedong and with the knowledge of Stalin that the North Korean troops attacked the south. In 1950, the leader of the Korean communists, Kim Il Sung, informed Stalin that as soon as the communists crossed the 38th parallel, a popular uprising would begin in the south and the whole thing would be limited to a short civil war.

The corrupt regime in South Korea was not popular with the people; about 100 thousand people died during various uprisings against it. In addition, Stalin apparently believed that the United States did not attach much strategic importance to South Korea and would not interfere in the conflict. However, the American leadership, frightened by the events in Berlin, believed that communism was on the march and must be stopped at all costs.

In 1950, the USSR withdrew from the United Nations for some time. The US leadership did not fail to take advantage of this situation and was able to involve the UN in solving the Korean problem. American and UN troops were sent to Korea.

The Americans hoped for a quick resolution of the conflict, but they were faced with a three-year bloody war, which was the result of the participation of the Chinese army in it. China's victory, paid for big amount victims, but forcing the Americans to retreat, caused a state of shock in the Western world. Military successes in the fight against American and UN troops, as well as pursuing a policy independent of Moscow, have increased China's international prestige. The Korean War showed that China can no longer be ignored in international affairs.

During the Korean War

Chinese troops in Korea

It is interesting to note that during the Korean War (in which the United States officially participated, but the USSR did not), Washington knew for certain that at least 150 Chinese aircraft were actually Soviet and flown by Soviet pilots. The Americans kept this information secret because they reasonably believed that Moscow did not at all want to be drawn into the war. In other words, the main concern of both sides was to prevent actions that could be regarded as steps towards starting a war between the powers.

On July 9, 1951, the USSR proposed a truce. Negotiations proceeded extremely sluggishly, and meanwhile the front line stabilized in the same positions where hostilities began - along the 38th parallel. On July 26, 1953, a truce was concluded. 4 million Koreans, 1 million Chinese, 54,246 Americans, and 120 Soviet pilots of the 4th Fighter Aviation Corps died in the war.

Who do you think is primarily responsible for starting the Korean War?

The Korean War was a global event. It contributed to the development of the arms race. After the Korean War, the size of the army in the United States sharply increased from 1.5 million in 1948 to 3.2 million in 1951 (in the USSR, respectively, from 2.9 million to 3.1 million people). Under the influence of the Korean War, a decision was made to permanently station American troops in Europe. Since the end of 1953, the United States began to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent.

During the war, the United States was able to win over the UN, tripled military spending, created NATO, and the opportunity arose to arm Germany, which happened in 1955.

4. Beginning of the confrontation in Indochina

The main metropolis in Indochina was France. The French arrived in Southeast Asia relatively late, conquering Indochina in mid-19th V. They subjugated the Vietnamese, who had ancient culture and a highly developed sense of national unity. The French united Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia, forming their colony of Indochina. The local elite willingly cooperated with the French administration. The French education system educated the local intelligentsia, a significant part of which fell under the influence of Marxism and took the path of fighting colonialism.

The French built roads, including railways, founded the University of Hanoi, schools, and hospitals. They fought illiteracy and epidemics, resulting in a reduction in the death rate among the Vietnamese. Unlike the British, they did not boast too much of their racial “superiority” and did a lot to develop the education system. Contacts with France were encouraged, resulting in the 1930s. A small Vietnamese elite visited there, including the future communist leader Ho Chi Minh, who created the party in 1929. The negative side of French domination was that the economic development of the country was dictated by the interests of the metropolis. Industrialization proceeded slowly. Overpopulation was a constant problem; the vast majority of Vietnam's 16 million peasants were poor, forced to pay high rents and taxes. Depression of the 1930s led to a fall in prices for rice and sugar; There were riots, which the French ruthlessly suppressed.

As a result of the military defeat of France by the Germans in the summer of 1940, its dominance in Indochina was greatly shaken; the colonial authorities began to cooperate with the Japanese, helping them hunt down local partisans. In the south of the country, communist units were destroyed, but in the north, communists led by Ho Chi Minh began to enjoy support. This had far-reaching consequences, since it was there that the Vietnamese Independence Struggle League (Viet Minh) arose.

During his lifetime, Ho Chi Minh became a legend, similar to the one associated with the names of Che Guevara, Castro, and Mao. After his death, Ho Chi Minh's embalmed body was placed in a glass coffin in a mausoleum in Hanoi. Despite the appeal to Marxism, the core of his worldview was nationalism. Ho Chi Minh had outstanding intellectual abilities, remaining an incorruptible and modest person in everyday life.

After the surrender of the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh, with the help of small detachments of General Nguyen Giap, who later became a famous military leader, established control over the main cities of the country and announced the creation of an independent Democratic Republic Vietnam (DRV). By the spring of 1946, French troops had established control in the south of the country. In December 1946, hostilities began, which continued sluggishly until 1950. The situation changed radically after the communist victory in China. Nguyen Giap now had heavy weapons provided by the Chinese authorities. After Mao's victory and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States provided a $3 billion loan to the French to fight the Vietnam War. But despite the initial successes, the French were never able to defeat Ho Chi Minh and were defeated. The war increasingly changed its character and became part of the confrontation between two world military blocs.

Ho Chi Minh

French troops in Indochina (war 1946-1954)

At the Geneva International Conference on April 26, 1955, an agreement was reached on the delimitation of North and South Vietnam. General elections were scheduled for the summer of 1956, the results of which were expected to unify the country. After the conference, the United States assumed responsibility for the fate of Vietnam. The Americans installed in power Ngo Dinh Diem, a tough nationalist, a representative of one of the most influential Vietnamese families, who refused to recognize the Geneva Accords. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh was preparing to resume the war for a unified communist Vietnam.

After the Communist victory in China, Vietnam began to seem to the West as a sphere of vital interest. US President Eisenhower proceeded from the “domino theory” and believed that if Vietnam fell into the hands of the Communists, the rest of Asia would follow. The United States prevented the unification of Vietnam and supported the puppet regime in the south of the country. On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh acted no less harshly, feeling the support of the USSR. After this regime was on the verge of defeat, the United States became involved in the Vietnam War in 1965, which lasted until 1975. The Americans were defeated and left the country, dropping more bombs on it than were dropped in the entire Second World War.

5. Main problems of development of Hindustan

After World War II, the anti-colonial movement began to rise in India, Britain's richest colony. To weaken it, in 1946 a decision was made to hold elections to the Central Legislative Assembly. The victory of the secular Indian National Congress (INC), which did not express the interests of certain religious groups, aroused the displeasure of Muslims, who refused to trust the Hindus and demanded their representation in power. The INC, unwilling to meet the demands of Muslims, emphasized its desire to become the only national party representing the interests of both Hindus and Muslims. This is what prompted the Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to break with the INC and embark on the path of separatism, which led to the emergence of the state of Pakistan. In August 1947, the independence law was passed, providing for the creation of two states. The former colony was divided along religious lines into India, in which the majority of the population professed Hinduism, and Pakistan, in which the Muslim population predominated. Independence Day was celebrated for the first time on August 14 in India and August 15, 1947 in Pakistan. But before the holidays ended, tragedy began. During August and September 1947, up to 500 thousand Muslims were killed who were leaving the Indian half of eastern Punjab (Pyatirechye). Militant Sikhs (representatives of a religious doctrine different from Islam and Hinduism) did not spare even women and children, stopped trains crowded with refugees, and killed everyone in cold blood. Killings of Hindus also took place in Pakistan, but on a much smaller scale. The Muslim League tried to survive the Sikhs and Hindus who found themselves in Pakistan. Millions of refugees crossed the border in both directions in search of salvation, driven mad by the horror of intercommunal war. 9-10 million Muslims fled from India; There were very few Hindus left in West Pakistan, but there were about 30 million in East Pakistan. Communal clashes and killings occurred later, but never reached the horrific proportions of 1947.

The transfer of power in India from the British to the national government turned into a catastrophic massacre. Among the victims was the founder of the Indian National Congress, M. Gandhi, who was killed in January 1948 by a Hindu extremist. A certain share of the blame for this bloodshed lies with the previous colonial administration, which did not have a clear concept of a multinational state, and the new authorities, which contributed to the tension through irresponsible statements or inaction.

J. Nehru

After gaining independence in political life India adopted a parliamentary system. The first Indian government and the INC was headed by Gandhi's ally Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), the founder of the largest political dynasty: after his death, he was Prime Minister in 1966-1977 and 1980-1984. was his daughter I. Gandhi, and then in 1984-1991. The government was headed by his grandson, R. Gandhi. Having become one of the leaders of the movement of non-aligned countries, India has gained high prestige in the international arena. Great assistance in the construction of modern industrial India was provided by the Soviet Union, under whose strong ideological influence J. Nehru was.

During the years of independence, economic reforms were carried out in India. The largest measure to modernize the country was the agrarian reform, which limited large-scale landownership. But the problem of peasant landlessness remained unresolved.

In the 1960-1980s. There is an expansion of public sector activities. 14 large banks were nationalized, the activities of monopolies were limited, and a “green revolution” was carried out, which solved the country’s food problems. The growth and strengthening of the bureaucracy, the insufficient efficiency of a number of enterprises became one of the reasons for the change in India's economic course in the 1990s, during which some public sector organizations were nationalized, a number of state-owned enterprises were corporatized, and the Indian market was opened to freer imports.

India is coping with food difficulties. Despite the fact that India is among the top ten countries in the world in terms of industrial production, acute domestic political problems still remain unresolved. These include national-religious strife, which resulted in clashes between Hindus and Muslims, the Sikh movement for autonomy, and the uprising of Tamil separatists (a people in South India) in the south of the country. I. Gandhi died at the hands of the Sikhs in 1984, and in 1991, during the election campaign, R. Gandhi was killed by a Tamil terrorist.

Unlike India, Pakistan declared an Islamic republic with a strong presidency. Pakistan's disagreement with the terms of territorial delimitation, which believed that a number of Muslim regions mistakenly became part of India, became the cause of repeated armed conflicts between the countries. In Pakistan, like in India, economic reforms were carried out, but less radical. It was these reforms that caused sharp contradictions between West Pakistan and East Bengal, whose opposition parties advocated secession from Pakistan. In 1971, a bloody civil war began, as a result of which a new state appeared on the world map - the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

After the surrender of Japan in August 1945, Indonesian independence was declared. Its owners, the militarily weak Dutch, refused to voluntarily leave this country. Relying on the British, they restored their power, but they were unable to establish complete control over the fifth largest country in the world. In December 1949, Holland recognized the limited sovereignty of Indonesia, and in August 1950, having evacuated its troops (85 thousand people) and the colonial administration, granted it full independence.

The victorious national liberation movement was led by Ahmed Sukarno. His ideology was a mixture of Islamic, Marxist, liberal slogans, decorated with sonorous phraseology. In 1959 he established authoritarian regime"guided democracy" and was proclaimed president for life. Majority political parties, including the Indonesian Communist Party (CPI), supported his actions. The slogan “Nationalization, religion, communism” was proclaimed in the country, which meant the cooperation of three ideological directions.

Another of Sukarno's slogans was: "A nation always needs an enemy." This is where the idea of ​​“Greater Indonesia” arose, which presupposed external expansion and the search for internal enemies. The persecution of the Chinese (“enemy within”) and their flight led to the breakdown of the internal trade system in Indonesia, since the Chinese population was mainly engaged in intermediary transactions. The country's economy was collapsing due to gross government intervention. Political tension grew, which was not least caused by the actions of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was the third largest communist party in the world (3.5 million people) after the Soviet and Chinese. KPI during agrarian reform advocated the self-seizure by peasants of land that belonged to large owners. Not knowing what to do with the opposition of the military (dissatisfied with the collapse of the country), and wanting to get rid of it, Sukarno approved the conspiracy of the communists, who on October 1, 1965 launched a putsch and began the massacre. But the commander of the reserve forces, General Suharto, seized power into his own hands. A terrible retribution followed: according to local custom, the massacre was massive - everyone involved in the conspiracy was declared guilty, and entire families had to atone for their guilt. The number of victims, according to some estimates, reached 1 million people.

The failure of the coup attempt led to the defeat of the Indonesian Communist Party, the physical destruction of its supporters and the subsequent removal of Sukarno from power, which occurred on February 22, 1967. Subsequently, he was under house arrest in his country palace. Since Sukarno was a symbol of national independence for Indonesians, his grave became a place of pilgrimage and annual mass memorial gatherings on the day of his death.

Name the reasons for the fall of the Sukarno regime. Do you agree that the failure of his policies was natural?

In 1968-1998. The country's president was General Suharto. This period was characterized by the predominant influence of the military in all spheres of society, providing ample opportunities for foreign capital. In the political life of the country, Muslim parties have come to the fore (90% of the country's population are Muslims). The growing influence of Islamic fundamentalists led to open clashes with the authorities, as a result of which the Suharto regime fell.

In modern Indonesia, many unresolved problems remain, such as the fight against separatism, corruption and terrorism. There are still religious clashes here. But the problem of extreme poverty among the poorest segments of the population remains the most acute.

7. Confrontation in the Arab world and the problem of Israel during the Cold War

After the end of the First World War Arab world had a chance to create a unified Arab state in which Arabic and Muslim culture would become the cementing foundation. However, these plans were not destined to come true, since a secret agreement in 1916 between Great Britain and France divided Turkey's Arab inheritance.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the three nations inhabiting it - the Kurds, Armenians and Palestinians - were denied their own state. Arab lands became mandate territories of Great Britain and France (Syria and Lebanon). In 1920, colonial administration of Palestine was established. The British allowed Jews to emigrate to Palestine, but did not allow them to found their own state. This was less than the Zionists wanted, but more than the Arabs were willing to concede. Another British mandate was on the opposite bank of the Jordan River. England's policy in Palestine was characterized by inconsistency and uncertainty, but on the whole the British administration tended to side with the Arabs.

After Hitler came to power, Jewish immigration increased sharply. By 1935, their number in Palestine reached 60 thousand people. Arab resistance increased accordingly, as the Arabs feared that their faith and way of life would be threatened by the increasing number of Jews. The Arabs believed that the claims of the Jews were exorbitant - according to tradition, the possessions of ancient Israel included most of modern Syria and Jordan, as well as the territory of the Egyptian Sinai and modern Israel.

Since the beginning of the 20th century. Jews, under the influence of Zionist propaganda, arrived in Palestine, bought land there, and created kibbutzim (communes with an almost complete absence of private property). The majority of the Arab population viewed the arrival of the Zionists as a blessing, since the Jews, with their tenacity and hard work, turned the barren land of Palestine into fertile plantations. This attitude towards the Zionists offended representatives of the local Arab elite, who were proud of their ancient culture and were indignant at the epithet “backward.” With the growing flow of emigrants, the Jewish community became more and more Europeanized, democratic and socialist, while the Arab community remained traditional and patriarchal.

During the period between the world wars, the leader of Arab nationalists was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, head of the largest landowning clan in Palestine. Al-Husseini took an active part in anti-Jewish pogroms in 1929. He organized the systematic extermination of moderate Arabs, of whom there were quite a few in Palestine.

For the purposes of self-defense, the Jewish Agency, with the permission of Churchill, created an independent Jewish Brigade within the British Army, which became the core of the Haganah, the defensive force of the Jewish Agency in 1920-1948. (with the formation of the Jewish state, the Haganah became the basis of the Israel Defense Forces).

In counterbalance to Arab terrorism, the most radical Zionists formed their own terrorist organization, the Irgun.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted by a majority vote for the abolition of the British Mandate regime in Palestine and the creation of two states on its territory - Arab and Jewish. On May 14, 1948, Israel's independence was declared, while the Palestinian Arabs did not follow the example of the Jews in anticipation of Israel's short life. Soon, four Arab states (Egypt, Libya, Jordan and Syria) began war against Israel.

It was assumed that the Jews would be defeated, since the army of Egypt consisted of 10 thousand soldiers, Jordan - 4.5 thousand, Syria - 7 thousand, Iraq - 3 thousand; several thousand people were part of the Arab Liberation Army, made up of Palestinians. According to the UN decision, the Arab state was allocated 43% of the territory of Palestine with a population of about 800 thousand Arabs and 95 thousand Jews, and the Jewish state - 56% of the territory with a population of about 499 thousand Jews and about 510 thousand Arabs.

Of great importance at the time of the proclamation of the state of Israel was the position of Stalin, who wanted to undermine British positions in the Middle East by recognizing the Jewish state. To increase chaos, he ordered the sale of weapons to Israel through Czechoslovakia.

The Haganah, which numbered 21 thousand soldiers, initially did not have heavy weapons; it even lacked rifles. It was the Czechoslovak communists, on the orders of the Soviet leader, who made the defense of Israel possible by allocating an air base for the transfer of weapons to Tel Aviv. The Israelis launched a warning strike in April 1948, which was carried out using Czechoslovak weapons. By December, thanks to foreign arms supplies, Israel already had a 100,000-strong armed army and established military superiority over the Arabs.

The creation of the State of Israel caused a problem with Arab refugees (650 thousand people). In response to this, in 1947-1957. 567 thousand Jews left Arab countries. All of them, unlike the Palestinians, were well-appointed before 1960. Arab countries chose to keep refugees in camps, where they remained as hostages, to justify subsequent wars.

Israeli tanks on the approaches to the Golan Heights in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Life from war to war surrounded by hostile people Arab countries- this is a feature of the history of the Jewish people after the proclamation of the State of Israel.

Chronicle of events

1956 - a combined contingent of troops from Great Britain, France and Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, but under pressure from the USSR and the USA, the troops were withdrawn from the occupied territories.

1967 - large-scale Israeli offensive. The result of the war, which lasted six days, was the annexation by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the establishment of control over Jerusalem.

1973 - Egyptian army invades the Sinai Peninsula; The Syrian army occupied the Golan Heights. During the three-week war, Israel managed to stop the advance of Arab troops and go on the offensive.

1978 - signing of the Camp David Accords, which became the basis for the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.

In the Israeli-Arab conflict, the countries that opposed the Cold War took different sides. So, if in Germany the victory of the Jews was welcomed, then in the GDR, on the contrary, they sympathized with the Arabs who were subjected to “brazen imperialist provocation.”

During the Cold War, neither the USSR nor the USA managed to win the Middle Eastern countries to their side. The leaders of the Middle Eastern states were more concerned with their internal and regional problems and used the antagonism between the USSR and the USA to their own advantage. The Soviet Union played an important role in supplying weapons to Israel's main opponents - Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. This, in turn, gave incentive to the United States and other Western countries to support Israel in their quest to oust the USSR from the global and Middle Eastern arms market. As a result of this competition, the rival Middle Eastern nations were abundantly supplied with the most modern weapons. The natural consequence of this policy was to turn the Middle East into one of the most dangerous places in the world.

Questions and tasks

1. Why can such different countries in Asia and Africa be united under the concept of “third world”? 2. Do you agree that the Chinese model of socialism had a clearly national character? Give reasons for your position. 3. Why is the Korean War considered one of highest points"Cold War"? 4. What was common in the historical destinies of Vietnam and Korea after independence? How were they different? How did the Cold War affect the development of these countries? 5. Why did the confrontation arise in the Middle East? 6. What was Israel's problem during the Cold War? 7. Why do you think that during the Cold War, neither the USSR nor the USA managed to completely win over the Middle Eastern countries to their side?

Studying the source

From the statement of the Soviet government about armed aggression against Egypt: “Egypt has become a victim of aggression. Israeli troops invaded its territory and the threat of landing of British and French troops loomed.<...>The actions of the Israeli government constitute an act of armed aggression and are an open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The facts show that the Israeli invasion was clearly designed to be used as a pretext for the Western powers, primarily England and France, to send their troops into the territory of the Arab states, in particular the Suez Canal zone. The Western powers cover up their aggressive actions with references to the colonialist declaration of the United States of America, England and France in 1950, which was unanimously rejected by all Arab states.<...>The Soviet government believes that the UN Security Council, in the name of preserving peace and tranquility in the Near and Middle East, must take immediate measures to stop the aggressive actions of England, France and Israel against Egypt and to immediately withdraw intervention troops from Egyptian territory.”

Name the year in which this document appeared. Why did the USSR Government support Egypt in this conflict? Using the text of the document and additional sources of information, explain how the Cold War affected the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Point of view

K. Weathersby, American historian

Despite the unanswered questions about Soviet policy in Korea in 1945-1950, the evidence at our disposal indicates that North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950 was not the result of the USSR's determination to expand its territory, much less initial stage in broader plans for Soviet intervention in the American sphere of influence. In reality, Stalin's goals in Korea were limited. He sought to establish a buffer state in North Korea in order to protect the Soviet Union from a possible attack from the peninsula. Stalin also wanted to get certain things from Korea material resources and strengthen the political position Soviet Union, creating another “people's democracy” in the territory occupied by Soviet army at the end of the war.



This book is about our country's participation in the events in the Congo in 1960–1964, which went down in history as the Congo crisis. Congo became the first Cold War hotspot in sub-Saharan Africa. The battle for a vast territory in the “heart of Africa,” rich in strategic minerals, is filled with events that “shocked the world.” The unrest that engulfed the country a week after the declaration of independence, the secession of the province of Katanga and the entry of UN troops (July 1960). The assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, one of the symbols of independent Africa (1961). A dramatic three-year struggle for the return of Katanga to the Congo (1960–1963), full of unexpected turns, which cost the life of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. A powerful uprising of Lumumba's supporters (1964), which was suppressed only with the help of external military intervention, which resulted in the death of dozens of white hostages. Based on documents from the archives of Russia, Great Britain and the United States, the role of the Soviet Union in the Congolese crisis, its motives, intentions and actions in the context of the policies of other players, foreign and Congolese, is explored. The author analyzed the factors that forced the Soviet leadership to refrain from taking steps to escalate the crisis. For historians, teachers and students.

A series: Cold War

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by liters company.

Dedicated to his wife Marina

THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF WORLD HISTORY

CENTER FOR AFRICAN STUDIES

DMITRY POZHARSKY UNIVERSITY

Published by decision of the Academic Council of Dmitry Pozharsky University

Reviewers:

d.i. n Egorova N.I.

d.i. n. Shubin V. G.

Introduction

Marcus suddenly realized that no matter how big the world was, Congo would always be bigger than this world.

Albert Sanchez Piñol. Pandora in the Congo.

This book is about our country's participation in the events in the Congo in 1960–1964, which went down in history as the Congo crisis.

During the decolonization of the African continent, the Congo became an arena of rivalry between Cold War opponents and became its first hot spot in sub-Saharan Africa. The Congo attracted many people. It has an enviable geographical position – a huge territory in the center of the continent (“the heart of Africa”), bordered by 9 colonies and states. The subsoil is fabulously rich in strategic raw materials - one of the world's largest deposits of copper, cobalt, uranium, industrial diamonds, significant deposits of tantalum, tin, and zinc.

The United States and its NATO allies feared that if “communist influence” was established in the Congo, the same fate would befall the adjacent territories in a domino effect.

The fears were not unfounded. The prime minister of the Congo was Patrice Lumumba, a left-wing nationalist and admirer of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Guinean President Sekou Touré, who had established relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev was not averse to adding to the list of African friends, with the help of whom he hoped to break into the “soft underbelly of imperialism” on the growing anti-colonial wave. Will the USSR be able to operate in the Congo as successfully as in Guinea, Ghana, Mali? This question was fateful for Africa in 1960.

Following the declaration of Congolese independence on June 30, 1960, the former metropolis of Belgium used the anti-Belgian sentiments of the Congolese to destabilize the situation in its former colony. This was followed by the entry of Belgian troops into the Congo and the separation of the richest province of Katanga. Lumumba and Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu demanded the urgent dispatch of UN troops to “protect state territory Congo from the ongoing external aggression that threatens international peace."

The USSR and the USA agreed on the need for a UN operation in the Congo. The Congolese crisis has become international. US President Dwight Eisenhower, Khrushchev and Lumumba hoped to turn the internationalization of the crisis to their advantage. Eisenhower's goal was to turn UN troops into a "shield" against communist penetration, to prevent direct Soviet intervention in the Congo, to protect Western interests through the hands of the UN, saving his own funds and resources. Khrushchev believed that the UN operation would expand the USSR's ability to influence events in the Congo and support Lumumba's government. And the Congolese prime minister hoped, with the help of UN troops, to restore the territorial integrity of the country. The Soviet and Congolese leaders quickly became convinced that the American scenario was being implemented through the UN operation in the Congo. Lumumba turned to the USSR for help, bypassing the UN, to carry out military action against the breakaway Katanga. And received vehicles(trucks and civilian aircraft) to transport federal government troops to the borders of the rebel province.

The outbreak of hostilities against the Katangese separatists at the end of August 1960 led to an escalation of the crisis. With the help of UN troops and pro-Western forces inside the Congo, Lumumba was removed from power, and the Soviet embassy was expelled from the Congo. Khrushchev backed down. His Congolese policy began to be determined by the need to overcome the crisis, preserving the sovereign “face” of the USSR and his own international reputation as a consistent fighter against colonialism and imperialism. Subsequently, the Soviet leadership avoided steps that could cause an escalation of confrontation with Western powers in the Congo.

The battle for the Congo is rich in events that “shocked the world.” Unrest that engulfed the country a week after independence, the secession of Katanga and the entry of UN troops (July 1960). The assassination of Patrice Lumumba (January 17, 1961), one of the symbols of independent Africa. A dramatic struggle for the return of Katanga to the Congo (1960–1963), full of unexpected turns, which cost the life of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. The powerful Lumumbist uprising (1964), which was suppressed only with the help of external military intervention, which resulted in the death of dozens of white hostages.

To find ways out of the crisis, all UN institutions and mechanisms were involved - the General Assembly, the Security Council, the specially created Advisory Committee on Congo Affairs, the situation in the Congo was the subject of numerous negotiations and conversations. The UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo has become one of the largest and most complex for the Blue Helmets.

The documentary basis of the book is made up of archival materials. Most valuable documents The author found it in the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy (AFP RF). These are information messages, analytical reports and notes, recordings of conversations, other “products” of the Soviet embassy in the Congo and the African departments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khrushchev’s correspondence with foreign politicians about the situation in the Congo. This body of documentation unevenly covers the different stages and episodes of the Congolese crisis. Sometimes due to objective reasons: employees of the Soviet embassy in the Congo twice, in September 1960 and in November 1963, had to destroy documents when citizens of the USSR were ordered to leave the country within 48 hours. Mainly due to the fact that many information has not been declassified. The author was unable to obtain a single document from the Soviet diplomatic mission operating in Stanleyville in 1961, when the eastern part of the Congo was controlled by the government led by Lumumba's successor, Antoine Gizenga. Materials about the 1964 uprising were also unavailable.

In the Russian State Archive modern history(RGANI) there are materials about the main directions of the USSR policy in Africa. There are only a few declassified documents on the Congo. The rest are kept in the fund of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, closed to researchers.

In the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GA RF), documents on the stay of Congolese politicians who came through public organizations in the USSR turned out to be useful.

After several days of work in the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the author found important documents about the situation in the Congo. Of particular value are materials on the Congolese policy of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah.

The author did not have the opportunity to work on Congolese topics in US archives. Policy documents on US policy in Africa and analytical materials from the State Department and CIA on the activities of the Eastern Bloc countries on the continent, discovered in the National Archives while studying another topic, were a good help for the study of the Congo crisis.

Some “compensation” for the paucity of documents from American archives was a collection prepared for a conference held by staff of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War History Project in Washington on September 23–24, 2004. The collection included, in particular, the “Analytical Chronology” of events in the Congo, prepared by the CIA. Many documents published in the series “International Relations of the United States” prepared by the State Department are interesting as an “enemy’s view” of the actions of the USSR in the Congo.

A lot of useful information about the situation in the Congo and the Soviet position at different stages of the crisis is contained in UN materials - documents of the Security Council, General Assembly, reports of representatives Secretary General in Congo.

A valuable source is the oral testimony of direct participants in the events, those who literally “made history.”

The memoir genre is represented by the memoirs of diplomats, intelligence officers who worked in the Congo under diplomatic cover, politicians, UN employees, and foreign mercenaries who fought in the Congo.

The Congo crisis is a tasty dish for researchers. American journalist and historian Madeleine Kalb believes that the battle for the Congo “worthy of first-class adventure novel– an exotic setting, a dramatic plot, colorful and influential characters at a significant moment in his life against the backdrop of a collapsing empire, great power rivalry and an unexpected surge of nationalism across the continent.” The historiography of the Congolese “thriller” is extensive: hundreds of monographs, thousands of articles.

The works of Soviet historians make up a small part of it. They contain useful factual material, but were written not for the purpose of an objective analysis of the Congolese policy of the USSR, but to justify it.

The discovery, albeit very limited, of domestic archival documents has made it possible to reconsider the stereotypes that developed during the Cold War. Works have appeared that objectively examine real Soviet motives and actions at various stages of the Congolese crisis. However complete picture The participation of the Soviet Union in the battle for the “heart of Africa” has not yet been recreated.

The role of the USSR in the Congolese events of 1960–1964. was not the subject of special research foreign authors. In the 1960s, most Western historians described the behavior of the Soviet Union as part of a sophisticated “Kremlin plan” to conquer Africa and spread communist ideology there. Often the “Red threat” was exaggerated to make the policy of Western powers, especially the United States, seem logical and justified. An objectivist approach was rare.

In the 1970s and 80s, works were published where the actions of the Soviet Union in the Congo were analyzed not to illustrate its expansionist aspirations, but as one of the main participants in the Cold War in the “heart of Africa,” where it opposed the West, defending its national interests. We find a textbook assessment of Soviet policy in M. Kalb. Khrushchev's decision to "send planes, weapons and military advisers to assist Lumumba in suppressing Katangese separatism" was "a typical display of adventurism" by the Soviet leader. The adventure resulted in the removal of Lumumba from power, the expulsion of the Soviet embassy from the Congo, the murder of Lumumba and the “personal defeat” of Khrushchev. He was forced to “reconsider his optimistic assumptions and take a serious look at African realities.” By 1962, “after a series of disappointments and defeats in the Congo and other countries of the African continent, Khrushchev was ready to abandon adventurous dreams and pursue a more cautious, realistic policy.” And here a new disappointment awaited him: “He looked in vain for an effective radical politician who could replace Lumumba, and in the end decided to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with a moderate government led by an openly pro-American prime minister.”

Some researchers regard Khrushchev’s “realism” as not at all a healthy pragmatism. The Belgian journalist and sociologist Lude de Witte believes that the USSR imitated confrontation with the West in the Congo, “fought with one hand,” was indifferent to the fate of the left-wing Congolese nationalists and was guided solely by its own interests: “ The Kremlin lacked the political will, means and resources to create a real threat to Western hegemony in the Congo<…>It is obvious that the Kremlin did not want to support Lumumba unconditionally during the Congo crisis. He was more interested in winning the propaganda war, and Khrushchev denounced Western intervention to strengthen the Soviet Union's diplomatic position in the Afro-Asian world. The defeat of the Congolese national liberation movement was a crushing blow for all African freedom fighters, but not for the historically blind, conservative Kremlin bureaucrats who treated Lumumba and African nationalism as junk." In the Congo, the author concludes, there was no Cold War: “The Congo crisis was not really a war between East and West for hegemony in Central Africa.”

Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs George McGee, who oversaw U.S. Congolese policy from July 1962 to May 1963, considers the Congo a very dangerous front in the Cold War. In a 1990 interview, he stated that President Kennedy "had every reason to view the Soviets as the 'enemy' in the Congo." The Congolese crisis, the American politician believes, could well lead to war between the USSR and the United States.

The research on the Congo crisis by American historian Lisa Namikas has become innovative. The author managed to recreate a truly international history of the crisis, presenting it as the result of a complex interaction of five main players: USA - USSR - Belgium - UN - Congo. This became possible thanks to an extensive archival database - documents from the archives of the USA, Belgium, Russia, and the GDR. In the GDR, Namikas found materials that shed light on the Soviet position on the 1964 uprising. Documents on this topic in domestic archives have not been declassified. She thinks that Soviet politics in the Congo was the result of a situational combination of pragmatic and ideological imperatives. Khrushchev, Namikas argues, “took calculated, reasonable risks” to “establish Soviet influence in the Congo.” The Soviet leader was not “the lumbering behemoth that he was portrayed in Cold War history, but was a much more sophisticated being and well aware of his weaknesses.” It is logical that he “did not make any extra efforts to gain dominance” in Central Africa, “a region of third importance for the USSR.” Namikas considers Khrushchev’s main mistake during the crisis to be his refusal to provide massive assistance to Lumumba and attempts to save the Congolese prime minister when he was removed from power. And he immediately admits that this was impossible for a politician who really assessed his capabilities: “Khrushchev’s inaction can be explained by the fact that the USSR was already overly involved in a conflict at a distance of 12 thousand miles from its territory.” Such caution resulted in the fact that the Soviet Union in the Congo “did not have a consistent and firm policy”, “there was no loyal strong man in power or a leader who was at least internally ready to wage a cold war in Africa, as was the case in Asia and Latin America."

L. Namikas's monograph introduced the Congo crisis into the context of debates in the historiography of the Cold War between neo-orthodox and post-revisionists. The first place responsibility for the Cold War on the USSR with all the ensuing assessments of its genesis, essence and evolution. They prove that Soviet foreign policy was determined decisively by ideological imperatives, and the United States was only reacting to the propaganda and political offensive of the Eastern bloc. The latter believe that the Cold War was the product of mutual misunderstanding and recognize the presence of a powerful ideological component in American politics.

Namikas firmly takes the side of the post-revisionists: “The new evidence clearly shows that none of the Cold War adversaries adequately understood the goals of the other side or the extent to which it would (or would not) defend its positions in the Congo. Advocacy ideological principles, which defined goals more important than material and mundane ones, increased the significance of the crisis. Both superpowers wanted to avoid a direct clash, but also wanted to avoid appearing weak in front of the newly independent states.”

The work of Elizabeth Schmidt was also written from a post-revisionist position, where the events in the Congo in 1960–1965. a separate chapter is devoted.

My goal was to clarify the role of the Soviet Union in the Congolese crisis, to explore its motives, intentions and actions based on archival materials and in the context of the behavior of other players, foreign and Congolese.

The Congo crisis for the USSR is one of the lost battles of the Cold War. N.S. Khrushchev did not write a word about him in his memoirs. Today it is necessary to comprehend the reasons for the defeat and draw the right conclusions. For the future. Russian historian A.I. Fursov justified this need precisely and clearly: “We need mercilessly honest knowledge about ourselves, about the reasons for our historical defeat at the end of the 20th century. This is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition not only for victories, but also for survival in the 21st century in the trials that it brings and that are just around the corner.”

I express my deep gratitude and appreciation the following people and organizations: Directorate of the Institute general history RAS (Director Academician of the RAS A. O. Chubaryan) for the opportunity to implement this project; staff of the Center for African Studies of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (headed by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. B. Davidson) for valuable comments, suggestions and advice; American historian Lisa Namikas for fruitful cooperation in the field of studying the Congo crisis and unique information about US policy in the Congo; reviewers, Doctor of Historical Sciences N.I. Egorova and Doctor of Historical Sciences V.G Shubin, for their careful reading of the manuscript and constructive comments; A. V. Dmitriev for his work on the maps; employees of the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, the Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the National Archives of the United States for their professional assistance and favorable attitude towards the author.

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The given introductory fragment of the book Cold War in the "Heart of Africa". USSR and the Congo crisis, 1960–1964 (S. V. Mazov, 2015) provided by our book partner -