Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from " northern capital" In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out from the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.

Soviet- Finnish war 1939-1940 became in Russian Federation quite a popular topic. All authors who love to walk through the “totalitarian past” love to remember this war, to remember the balance of forces, the losses, the failures of the initial period of the war.

Reasonable reasons for the war are denied or hushed up. The decision about war is often blamed on Comrade Stalin personally. As a result, many of the citizens of the Russian Federation who have even heard about this war are sure that we lost it, suffered huge losses and showed the whole world the weakness of the Red Army.

Origins of Finnish statehood

The land of the Finns (in Russian chronicles - “Sum”) did not have its own statehood; in the 12th-14th centuries it was conquered by the Swedes. Three attacks were committed on the lands of the Finnish tribes (Sum, Em, Karelians). Crusades- 1157, 1249-1250 and 1293-1300. The Finnish tribes were conquered and forced to convert to Catholicism. The further invasion of the Swedes and crusaders was stopped by the Novgorodians, who inflicted several defeats on them. In 1323, the Orekhovsky Peace was concluded between the Swedes and Novgorodians.

The lands were ruled by Swedish feudal lords, the control centers were castles (Abo, Vyborg and Tavastgus). The Swedes had all administrative and judicial power. The official language was Swedish, the Finns did not even have cultural autonomy. Swedish was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated layer of the population, Finnish was the language ordinary people. The church - the Abo episcopate - had great power, but paganism retained its position among common people pretty long.

In 1577, Finland received the status of a Grand Duchy and received a coat of arms with a lion. Gradually, the Finnish nobility merged with the Swedish one.

In 1808, the Russian-Swedish war began, the reason was Sweden’s refusal to act together with Russia and France against England; Russia won. According to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty of September 1809, Finland became the property of the Russian Empire.

For a little over a hundred years Russian empire turned the Swedish province into a practically autonomous state with its own authorities, currency, post office, customs and even army. Since 1863, Finnish, along with Swedish, became the state language. All administrative posts, except for the governor-general, were occupied by local residents. All taxes collected in Finland remained there; St. Petersburg almost did not interfere in the internal affairs of the grand duchy. Migration of Russians to the principality was prohibited, the rights of Russians living there were limited, and Russification of the province was not carried out.

In 1811, the principality was given the Russian Vyborg province, which was formed from lands transferred to Russia under the treaties of 1721 and 1743. Then the administrative border with Finland approached the capital of the empire. In 1906, by decree of the Russian Emperor, Finnish women, the first in all of Europe, received the right to vote. The Finnish intelligentsia, nurtured by Russia, did not remain in debt and wanted independence.

Beginning of independence

On December 6, 1917, the Sejm (Finnish Parliament) declared independence, and on December 31, 1917, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland.

On January 15 (28), 1918, a revolution began in Finland, which developed into a civil war. The White Finns called German troops for help. The Germans did not refuse; in early April they landed a 12,000-strong division (the “Baltic Division”) under the command of General von der Goltz on the Hanko Peninsula. Another detachment of 3 thousand people was sent on April 7. With their support, the supporters of Red Finland were defeated, on the 14th the Germans occupied Helsinki, on April 29th Vyborg fell, and in early May the Reds were completely defeated. The Whites carried out massive repressions: more than 8 thousand people were killed, about 12 thousand rotted in concentration camps, approximately 90 thousand people were arrested and imprisoned in prisons and camps. Genocide was unleashed against the Russian inhabitants of Finland, they killed everyone indiscriminately: officers, students, women, old people, children.

Berlin demanded that a German prince, Frederick Charles of Hesse, be placed on the throne; on October 9, the Diet elected him King of Finland. But Germany was defeated in the First World War and therefore Finland became a republic.

The first two Soviet-Finnish wars

Independence was not enough, the Finnish elite wanted an increase in territory, deciding to take advantage of the Troubles in Russia, Finland attacked Russia. Karl Mannerheim promised to annex Eastern Karelia. On March 15, the so-called “Wallenius plan” was approved, according to which the Finns wanted to seize Russian lands along the border: White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga, in addition, the Pechenga region, the Kola Peninsula, Petrograd were supposed to go to Suomi become a “free city”. On the same day, volunteer detachments received orders to begin the conquest of Eastern Karelia.

On May 15, 1918, Helsinki declared war on Russia; there were no active hostilities until the fall; Germany concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Bolsheviks. But after its defeat, the situation changed; on October 15, 1918, the Finns captured the Rebolsk region, and in January 1919, the Porosozero region. In April, the Olonets Volunteer Army launched an offensive, captured Olonets, and approached Petrozavodsk. During the Vidlitsa operation (June 27-July 8), the Finns were defeated and expelled from Soviet soil. In the fall of 1919, the Finns repeated their attack on Petrozavodsk, but were repulsed at the end of September. In July 1920, the Finns suffered several more defeats, and negotiations began.

In mid-October 1920, the Yuryev (Tartu) Peace Treaty was signed, Soviet Russia ceded the Pechengi-Petsamo region, Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula.

But this was not enough for the Finns; the “Greater Finland” plan was not implemented. The second war was unleashed, it began with the formation in October 1921 on the territory of Soviet Karelia partisan detachments, on November 6, Finnish volunteer detachments invaded Russian territory. By mid-February 1922, Soviet troops liberated the occupied territories, and on March 21 an agreement on the inviolability of borders was signed.

Svinhuvud, Per Evind, 3rd President of Finland, March 2, 1931 - March 1, 1937

Helsinki did not give up hopes of profiting from Soviet territories. But after two wars, they made conclusions for themselves: they need to act not with volunteer detachments, but with an entire army (Soviet Russia has become stronger) and allies are needed. As the first Prime Minister of Finland, Svinhuvud, put it: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

With the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations, Finland began to establish contacts with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. Helsinki had a negative attitude towards the USSR's entry into the League of Nations and the mutual assistance agreement with France. Hopes for a major conflict between the USSR and Japan did not materialize.

Finland's hostility and its readiness for war against the USSR was no secret either in Warsaw or in Washington. Thus, in September 1937, the American military attache to the USSR, Colonel F. Faymonville, reported: “The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparing to repel a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany together with Finland in the West.”

There were constant provocations on the border between the USSR and Finland. For example: on October 7, 1936, a Soviet border guard making a round was killed by a shot from the Finnish side. Only after much wrangling did Helsinki pay compensation to the family of the deceased and admit guilt. Finnish planes violated both land and water borders.

Moscow was especially concerned about cooperation between Finland and Germany. The Finnish public supported Germany's actions in Spain. German designers designed submarines for the Finns. Finland supplied Berlin with nickel and copper, received 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, and planned to purchase combat aircraft. In 1939, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center was created on the territory of Finland; its main task was intelligence work against the Soviet Union. The center collected information about the Baltic Fleet, the Leningrad Military District, and Leningrad industry. Finnish intelligence worked closely with the Abwehr. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, the blue swastika became the identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force.

By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, which could accommodate 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had.

Helsinki was ready to fight against the USSR not only in alliance with Germany, but also with France and England.

The problem of defending Leningrad

By 1939, we had an absolutely hostile state on our northwestern borders. There was the problem of defending Leningrad, the border was only 32 km away, the Finns could fire at the city with heavy artillery. In addition, it was necessary to protect the city from the sea.

In the south, the problem was solved by concluding a mutual assistance agreement with Estonia in September 1939. The USSR received the right to station garrisons and naval bases on the territory of Estonia.

Helsinki did not want to resolve the most important issue for the USSR through diplomatic means. Moscow proposed an exchange of territories, a mutual assistance agreement, joint defense of the Gulf of Finland, selling part of the territory for a military base or leasing it. But Helsinki did not accept either option. Although the most far-sighted figures, for example, Karl Mannerheim, understood the strategic necessity of Moscow's demands. Mannerheim proposed moving the border away from Leningrad and receiving good compensation, and offering the island of Yussarö for a Soviet naval base. But in the end, the position of not making a compromise prevailed.

It should be noted that London did not stand aside and provoked the conflict in its own way. They hinted to Moscow that they would not interfere in a possible conflict, but the Finns were told that they needed to hold their positions and give in.

As a result, on November 30, 1939, the third Soviet-Finnish war began. The first stage of the war, until the end of December 1939, was unsuccessful; due to a lack of intelligence and insufficient forces, the Red Army suffered significant losses. The enemy was underestimated, the Finnish army mobilized in advance. She occupied the defensive fortifications of the Mannerheim Line.

The new Finnish fortifications (1938-1939) were not known to intelligence, and the required number of forces was not allocated (to successfully break into the fortifications, it was necessary to create a superiority in a ratio of 3: 1).

Western position

The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations, violating the rules: 7 countries out of 15 that were on the Council of the League of Nations spoke in favor of expulsion, 8 did not participate or abstained. That is, they were excluded by a minority of votes.

The Finns were supplied by England, France, Sweden and other countries. More than 11 thousand foreign volunteers arrived in Finland.

London and Paris eventually decided to start a war with the USSR. They planned to land an Anglo-French expeditionary force in Scandinavia. Allied aircraft were to carry out airstrikes against the Union's oil fields in the Caucasus. From Syria, the Allied troops planned to attack Baku.

The Red Army thwarted its large-scale plans, Finland was defeated. Despite the entreaties of the French and British to hold out, on March 12, 1940, the Finns signed peace.

The USSR lost the war?

According to the Moscow Treaty of 1940, the USSR received the Rybachy Peninsula in the north, part of Karelia with Vyborg, the northern Ladoga region, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to the USSR for a period of 30 years, and a naval base was created there. After the start of the Great Patriotic War The Finnish army was able to reach the old border only in September 1941.

We received these territories without giving up ours (they offered twice as much as they asked for), and for free - they also offered monetary compensation. When the Finns remembered compensation and cited the example of Peter the Great, who gave Sweden 2 million thalers, Molotov replied: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.” Moscow also insisted on 95 million rubles in compensation for damage to equipment and property from lands seized by the Finns. Plus, 350 sea and river transport, 76 steam locomotives, and 2 thousand carriages were also transferred to the USSR.

The Red Army gained important combat experience and saw its shortcomings.

It was a victory, albeit not a brilliant one, but a victory.

Sources:
Civil war and intervention in the USSR. M., 1987.
Diplomatic Dictionary in three volumes. M., 1986.
Winter War 1939-1940. M., 1998.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. M., 2004.
international relations (1918-2003). M., 2000.
Meinander H. History of Finland. M., 2008.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2006.

The return of Finnish prisoners to their homeland.

On March 13, 1940, the Finns signed a peace treaty, Finland decided give up and not go all the way, especially since the USSR refused to absorb this country.

USSR losses:

data on the outcome of treatment of the wounded, shell-shocked, burned, frostbitten and sick as of March 1, 1941, amounting to 248,090 people, of which:

172,203 people were returned to service. (69.4%);

46,925 people were dismissed with exclusion from military registration and were granted sick leave. (18.9%);

Killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages 65 384 ;

Among the missing, 14,043 were declared dead;

Died from wounds, concussions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921 (6.4%)

The number of wounded, shell-shocked, and patients whose treatment outcome was not determined by the specified date was 13,041 people. (5.3%)

The total number of irrecoverable losses was 95348 people

Those killed on the battlefield according to published data 48,475 people.

( RUSSIA AND THE USSR IN THE WARS OF THE XX CENTURY LOSSES OF THE ARMED FORCES Statistical research Under the general editorship of Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Sciences, Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev).

Finland's losses remain a secret: 25,904 killed, 43,557 wounded, 1,000 prisoners. According to Wiki.

But earlier the Finns admitted the loss of 48.3 thousand soldiers killed, 45 thousand wounded and 806 prisoners in the “Winter War”.

And in 1940, the Finnish government announced in the Blue and White Book that 24,912 people died in the regular army.

And in the USSR they were talking then about Finnish losses of 85 thousand people killed and 250 thousand wounded.

By the way, only 26 thousand of the country’s military personnel are counted among the official irretrievable losses of Finland, without taking into account those killed from numerous paramilitary formations, such as Shutskor, Lotta Svärd and many others; they were not included in the general loss statistics.

In general, the exact number of Finns killed is unknown, but...

We examine the enemy tank.

The death of only 23.5 - 26 thousand soldiers looks unconvincing. It turns out that with such modest losses, Finland was on the verge of defeat, and the army abandoned its fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus because of such meager losses?
It is unlikely that such small losses would have forced the Finns to retreat. Most likely, the death toll was much higher.

Mannerheim announced large losses in manpower in the troops...

In addition, the author of Mannerheim's memoirs underestimated the size of the Finnish army below any limit, claiming that there were only 175 thousand troops in it and only later the army increased to 200 thousand people. Sokolov writes that after the pre-war mobilization, the Finnish army included 265 thousand military personnel (of which 180 were in combat units).. (Sokolov B. “Secrets of the Finnish War.” Page 40) By the end of the wars, 340 thousand served in the army. (ibid., p. 380) And this is not counting the forces of the military personnel. Other researchers of the Soviet-Finnish war give much higher figures. Petrov: “After mobilization in October 1939, the Land Forces (in the text with a capital letter) of Finland, together with reserve formations and rear units, already numbered 286 thousand soldiers and officers (according to other sources - 295 thousand people).” (Petrov P.V. “The Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940” Volume I page 123)

In general, we are not talking about any kind of littering with corpses!

Approximately 2 - 2.5 to 1 in terms of total Soviet losses to total Finnish ones, or even a more parity ratio.

Soviet-Finnish War 1939 - 1940

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (Finnish) talvisota - Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand inhabitants lost their homes and moved into the interior of Finland, creating a number of social problems.

According to a number of foreign historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland dates back to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of the Second World War, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR was declared a military aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.

A group of Red Army soldiers with a captured Finnish flag

Background
Events of 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. December 18 (31), 1917 Council people's commissars The RSFSR turned to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Finnish Republic. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the “whites”. After the victory in Finland, the Finnish “White” troops provided support to the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty was concluded between these states. Some Finnish politicians such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded the treaty as “too good a peace,” believing that superpowers would only compromise when absolutely necessary.

Juho Kusti Paasikivi

Mannerheim, former activists and separatist leaders in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a disgrace and a betrayal of their compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Finnish: H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Nevertheless, relations between Finland and The USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, went to Finland in the North, in the Arctic, were not friendly, but also openly hostile Same. Finland was afraid of Soviet aggression, and the Soviet leadership practically ignored Finland until 1938, focusing on the largest capitalist countries, primarily Great Britain and France.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their weapons. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliament members have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, due to cost savings, military exercises have not been held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to maintain the army. The issue of spending on weapons provision was not considered in parliament. Tanks and military aircraft were completely absent.

Interesting fact:
The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Coast Guard battleship “Väinämöinen”

Finnish coastal defense battleship Väinemäinen entered service in 1932. It was built at the Creighton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku. It was a relatively large ship: its total displacement was 3900 tons, length 92.96, width 16.92 and draft 4.5 meters. The armament consisted of 2 two-gun 254 mm cannons, 4 two-gun 105 mm cannons and 14 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The ship had strong armor: the thickness of the side armor was 51, the deck - up to 19, the turrets - 102 millimeters. The crew numbered 410 people.

Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in Russia, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “The plague coming from the east could be contagious.” In a conversation with Risto Ryti, then the governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, which took place that same year, he outlined his thoughts on the need to quickly resolve the issue of creating a military program and its financing. Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the benefit of providing the military department with such large sums if no war is expected?”

Since 1919, the leader of the Socialist Party was Väinö Tanner.

Väine Alfred Tanner

During the Civil War, his company's warehouses served as a base for the Communists, and then he became the editor of an influential newspaper, a strong opponent of defense spending. Mannerheim refused to meet with him, realizing that by doing so he would only reduce his efforts to strengthen the defense capability of the state. As a result, by decision of parliament, the defense expenditure line of the budget was further cut.
In August 1931, after inspecting the defensive structures of the Enkel Line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the 1934 budget, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was crossed out.

Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of parliament:
...still believes that a prerequisite for preserving the country's independence is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that this is worth all the costs of defense.
Mannerheim describes his efforts as “a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow pipe filled with resin.” It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his position.
Negotiations of Yartsev in 1938-1939

The negotiations were started at the initiative of the USSR, initially they were conducted in secret, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain “free hands” in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view from the point of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland had a generally negative attitude towards the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side attack through Finland. That is why Finland’s attitude towards the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait on the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide it with military and economic assistance, since Finland itself is not able to repel the German landing. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner. The Finnish side's guarantees that Finland would not allow its territorial integrity to be violated and Soviet Russia to be invaded through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, first of all, in the event of a German attack, to participate in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and to receive military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Finnish: Suursaari). No territorial demands were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tyutyarsaari, and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they could not be defended or used to protect the Karelian Isthmus. Negotiations ended without result on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into a Non-Aggression Treaty. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-interference in the event of war. Germany started the Second world war attack on Poland a week later on September 1, 1939. USSR troops entered Polish territory on September 17.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the agreement between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union’s demands on Finland—the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4, and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.
At these negotiations, for the first time, the proximity of the border to Leningrad is discussed. Joseph Stalin noted: “We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it”
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side to the Finnish delegation in Moscow looked like this:

1. Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
2. Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.
3. The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya (Finnish) Russian.
4. Finland transfers to the USSR the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytyarsaari, Seiskari.
5. The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
6.Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
7.The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km?).
8.The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands with Finland’s own forces.


Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and in Porayarvi (Finnish) Russian. These were territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty The treaty remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised agreeing to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that demands for military bases should be accepted, and there was no point in hoping for German help.
The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
A similar proposal was previously made Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.
Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and starting in mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

President of Finland Risto Heikki Ryti (center) and Marshal K. Mannerheim

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions, since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issues of ensuring the security of Leningrad, in turn trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to armament of the Aland Islands, the demilitarized status of which governed by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.
The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.
Negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side followed with a statement: “We civilians have made no progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers.”
However, Stalin again made concessions the next day, offering to buy it instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will throw to hell all the games of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles on the way to the goal.” On the same day, troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to prepare military operations against Finland. On last meeting Stalin outwardly demonstrated a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases, but the Finns refused to discuss it and on November 13 left for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered as confirmation of the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article “A buffoon at the post of Prime Minister,” which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign.

K.. Mannerheim and A. Hitler

On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the settlement of Maynila, staged by the Soviet side, which is confirmed by the corresponding orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore had previously withdrawn troops from the border to a distance that would exclude the occurrence of misunderstandings. The USSR leadership blamed Finland for this incident. In Soviet information agencies, to the terms widely used to name hostile elements: White Guard, White Pole, White emigrant, a new one was added - White Finn.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were given the order to go on the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours) of the war.
It is alleged that the measures we are taking are aimed against the independence of Finland or to interfere in its internal and external affairs. This is the same malicious slander. We consider Finland, whatever regime may exist there, to be an independent and sovereign state in all its foreign and domestic policies. We firmly stand for the Finnish people to decide their internal and external affairs, as they themselves see fit.

Molotov assessed Finnish policy more harshly in a report on March 29, where he spoke of “hostility towards our country in the ruling and military circles of Finland” and praised the peaceful policy of the USSR:

The peaceful foreign policy of the USSR was demonstrated here too with complete certainty. The Soviet Union immediately declared that it stood on a position of neutrality and steadily pursued this policy throughout the entire period.

— Report by V. M. Molotov at the VI session of the Supreme USSR on March 29, 1940
Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army.
Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, doubtfully increased the security of Leningrad. There was only one constant in the demands: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland, and near its coast, to oblige Finland not to ask for help from third countries other than the USSR.
On the second day of the war, a puppet force was created on the territory of the USSR Terijoki government, led by Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen.

Otto Vilhelmovich Kuusinen

On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti.

We can assume with a great deal of confidence: if things at the front had gone in accordance with the operational plan, then this “government” would have arrived in Helsinki with a certain political purpose- unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners.” Kuusinen’s address to the soldiers of the Finnish People’s Army directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the building of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki.
However, in reality, this “government” was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow Assarsson on March 4, 1940 that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet conditions peace will be even tougher, and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the “government” of Kuusinen.

- M.I. Semiryaga. "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945"

There is an opinion that Stalin planned, as a result of a victorious war, to include Finland into the USSR, which was part of the sphere of interests of the USSR according to the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, and negotiations with conditions that were obviously unacceptable for the then Finnish government were carried out only for the purpose of , so that after their inevitable breakdown there will be a reason to declare war. In particular, the desire to annex Finland explains the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic in December 1939. In addition, the plan for the exchange of territories provided by the Soviet Union assumed the transfer of territories beyond the Mannerheim Line to the USSR, thus opening a direct road for Soviet troops to Helsinki. The conclusion of peace could be caused by the realization of the fact that an attempt to forcefully Sovietize Finland would encounter massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the German side.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” (it should be noted that the Soviet command had practically no information about the very presence of a powerful line of defense. It is no coincidence that Mannerheim himself was surprised to learn of the existence of such a line of defense) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops by Finland’s Western allies from the Barents Sea. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on flat territory that did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the most complete way. After breaking through the fortifications, it was planned to launch an attack on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. At the same time, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned.

Red Army party meeting in the trenches

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect - “it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions.” In addition, the Soviet command did not take into account the presence of a serious line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, by the beginning of the war having only “sketchy intelligence data” about them.
Finland plan
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line”, consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Very powerful and complex fortifications were created in 1930–1939. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the state’s financial capabilities, and the people called them “millionaires” due to their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified with numerous artillery batteries on the shore and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to coordinate the fire of Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking Soviet fleet. This plan did not work - by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

Finnish soldier with a Lahti SalorantaM-26 machine gun

Finnish soldiers

Finnish sniper - “cuckoo” Simo Høihe. On his combat account there are about 700 Red Army soldiers (in the Red Army he was nicknamed -

" White death ".

FINNISH ARMY

FINNISH NAVY

Finnish Army insignia

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for guerrilla operations, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to accommodate aircraft from the Western Allies.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee rapid stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment on the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then carry out a counter-offensive in Karelia.

Armed forces of opponents
Balance of forces by November 30, 1939:

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the supplies in the warehouses lasted:
-Cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns for - 2.5 months
-Shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - 1 month
-Fuels and lubricants - for 2 months
- Aviation gasoline - for 1 month

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state-owned cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

Soviet bomber DB-3F (IL-4)

The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one engineer company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one battery of anti-tank guns, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

The Soviet division was twice as powerful as the Finnish division in terms of the total firepower of machine guns and mortars, and three times as powerful in artillery firepower. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; They had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.
Regarding the difference in the level of weapons on December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda will write:

You can’t help but admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles and shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peace-loving, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle their sabers. And the weapon, let’s be honest, is old and worn. There is not enough gunpowder for more.

Red Army soldier with an SVT-40 rifle

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the “Mannerheim Line”, difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, was stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov’s report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable “Mannerheim Line”, similar to the “Maginot Line” and “Siegfried Line”, which have not yet been crushed by any army, begins to live.
Cause of war and breakdown of relations

Nikita Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin said: “Let's start today... We will just raise our voices a little, and the Finns will only have to obey. If they persist, we will fire only one shot, and the Finns will immediately raise their hands and surrender.”
The official cause of war was the Maynila Incident: On November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which stated that as a result of artillery shelling carried out from Finnish territory, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day. The fact of the shots and the direction from which they came were recorded, and a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government proposed creating an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression.
The next day, Molotov accused Finland of “desiring to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling” and stated that the USSR “from now on considers itself free from the obligations” undertaken by virtue of the previously concluded non-aggression pact. Many years later, the former head of the Leningrad TASS bureau, Antselovich, said that he received a package with the text of a message about the “Maynila incident” and the inscription “open by special order” two weeks before the incident. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 a.m., Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin fighting. War was never officially declared.
Mannerheim, who as commander-in-chief had the most reliable information about the incident near Maynila, reports:
...And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border... ...We did not have to wait long for the implementation of Molotov’s words spoken at Moscow negotiations: “Now it will be the soldiers’ turn to talk.” On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation now known as “Shots at Maynila”... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized...
In Soviet textbooks on the history of the USSR, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was placed on Finland and Western countries: “The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939, they managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR. England and France actively helped the Finns with arms supplies and were preparing to send their troops to help them. German fascism also provided hidden assistance to the Finnish reaction. The defeat of the Finnish troops thwarted the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists. In March 1940, the war between Finland and the USSR ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow.”
In Soviet propaganda the need for a reason was not advertised and in the songs of that time the mission Soviet soldiers presented as liberating. An example would be the song “Accept us, Suomi beauty.” The task of liberating the workers of Finland from the oppression of the imperialists was an additional explanation for the outbreak of the war, suitable for propaganda within the USSR.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Aarno Yrj?-Koskinen (Finnish: AarnoYrj?-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note from the Soviet government. It stated that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls on the Finnish government, the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland.
Early in the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations from the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 o’clock in the morning on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”
War

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began evacuating the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered between November 29 and December 4.


Signal flares over the Soviet-Finnish border, the first month of the war.

The first stage of the war is usually considered to be the period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing in the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

Main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940.

The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.

Soviet tank T-28

The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksenarmeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy bunkers. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.

Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.

Scheme of military operations in December 1939 - January 1940

Scheme of the offensive of the Red Army in December 1939

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IVarmeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.
The advance of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland task force (Pohjois-SuomenRyhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy defenses at 35–45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, attacking the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists try to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to? 40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +2 to -7 °C. Then until the New Year the temperature did not drop below 23 °C. Frosts of up to 40 °C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet T-26 tank

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Molotov cocktail from the Winter War

During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line (Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name “Mannerheim Line” appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before this, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the structures.
History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, and construction itself continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.
The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
Work on the defense plan was continued by the German colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oskar Enckel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, in 1920 - 1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They reached their greatest scale in 1932, when six double-embrasure bunkers were built under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabritius.

Fortifications
The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If counting is carried out from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the node designations will follow in this order: Bunker scheme

“N” – Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] “K” – Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] “N” – Nyayukki [no existence]
“Ko” — Kolmikeeyalya [no noun] “Well” — Hyulkeyalya [no noun] “Ka” — Karkhula [now Dyatlovo]
“Sk” - Summakylä [non-creature] "La" - Lyahde [non-creature] "A" - Eyuräpää (Leipäsuo)
“Mi” – Muolaankylä [now Gribnoye] “Ma” – Sikniemi [no existential] “Ma” – Mälkelä [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [no noun] "No" - Noisniemi [now Mys] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Portovoye] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive line. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoye] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoye] "Le" - Leviainen [no existence]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulya-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
“Not” - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyyukylä [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The resistance center was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front the node occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and in depth 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine gun and artillery, which made up the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication trench with forward machine gun nests and rifle cells for one to three riflemen.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and firing loops. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The basis for the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests there are rocky ridges and numerous large boulders everywhere. The Belgian General Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world natural conditions were not as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia.”
Reinforced concrete structures of the “Mannerheim Line” are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap on a Finnish pillbox

The first generation bunkers were small, one-story, with one to three machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million-dollar” or million-dollar pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and obtained additional allocations from the country’s parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified bunkers were the Sj4 "Poppius", which had embrasures for flanking fire in the western casemate, and the Sj5 "Millionaire", with embrasures for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers swept through the entire ravine with flanking fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. Flanking fire bunkers were called casemate “Le Bourget”, named after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some bunkers in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into flanking fire casemates, while the front embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made them difficult to detect; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate with artillery from the front. “Million-dollar” pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm guns of the 1900 model on Durlyakher casemate mountings and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.
The strengths of the pillboxes lay in the large number of fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, and in the rich filling of gaps.

Destroyed bunker

Engineering barriers
The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were somewhat different from the Soviet slingshots or the Bruno spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank ones. The gouges were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with wire fences, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel obstacles at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at height 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdubolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the hole, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three or four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front edge of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and pillboxes was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of a populated area and were made of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of wire barriers along the main defense line. In practice, when in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive line and began to attempt to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using those then in service The Finnish army of several dozen outdated Renault light tanks turned out to be incompetent in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the gouges with explosive charges, thereby creating passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback, undoubtedly, was a good overview of the anti-tank lines from distant enemy artillery positions, especially in open and flat areas, such as, for example, in the area of ​​the defense center "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where it was on 11.02. 1940 The main defensive line was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the hollows were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank gouges there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Rubble of stones, barbed wire and in the distance an SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the contract neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER

Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government,” which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government.” The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen.

The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “communists” is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers there were also citizens of many other countries, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among captured Red Army soldiers. But since the work on forming such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in the hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were reinforced, replenishment inventories, reformation of parts and connections. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland. [source not specified 198 days] Fought on the side of the Finns about 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries.


Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi”

TTD “Suomi” M-31 Lahti

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used tactics guerrilla warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers, armed with machine guns, attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were equipped. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army, became widely known. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd Division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but the division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment on the battlefield of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train. More than a thousand personnel who escaped the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten; some of the wounded were captured because they were not taken out during their escape. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division line.

On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

crew of the submarine "S-2"

Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelok of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and fire from closed positions and mainly across areas, since target reconnaissance and adjustments were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.
On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since Soviet attacks on the Summa region were unsuccessful, main blow was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.


On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

England and France: plans for intervention

England provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, “we would have to fight one way or another.” The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, asking for permission to ship war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Germany (with which England was at war). The head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, the use proposed by Finland Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Snow continued to support the idea of ​​​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he had expressed before the war. Amid government disagreements, the British Army began supplying weapons, including artillery and tanks, in December 1939 (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested bombers to attack Moscow and Leningrad and to destroy the railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Northern Department: helping the Finns destroy the road would allow Britain to "avoid having to carry out the same operation later , independently and in less favorable conditions.” Maclean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with Maclean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Gerrard, plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, which were formed in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasement of the aggressors was wrong; Now the enemy, unlike his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not on ideological, but on humanitarian grounds.
Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in “circles close to the government” there was a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that at a conscious level the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to exchange one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely linked.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense because of the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany through a blockade. Soviet supplies of raw materials led to the fact that the German economy continued to grow and the realization that after some time this growth would make winning the war against Germany impossible. In this situation, although moving the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, the alternative was even worse inaction. The Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, ordered the planning of an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Great Britain did not support many French plans, including an attack on oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops(The Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also moving closer to opening a second front against the USSR. On 5 February 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was unusually present but not speaking) it was decided to seek Norwegian and Swedish consent to a British-led operation in which an expeditionary force would land in Norway and move east . As Finland's situation worsened, French plans became increasingly one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled following the end of the war, to the relief of many involved in the planning.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.
Results of the war

For starting the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.
Also, a “moral embargo” was imposed on the USSR - a ban on the supply of aviation technologies from the United States, which negatively affected the development of the Soviet aviation industry, which traditionally used American engines.
Another negative result for the USSR was the confirmation of the weakness of the Red Army. According to the Soviet history textbook of the USSR, before the Finnish War, the military superiority of the USSR even over such a small country as Finland was not obvious; and European countries could count on Finland's victory over the USSR.
Although the victory of the Soviet troops (the pushed back border) showed that the USSR was no weaker than Finland, information about the losses of the USSR, significantly exceeding the Finnish ones, strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany.
The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter time, in a forested and swampy area, experience in breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics.
All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, “The war ended in 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set for Finland turned out to be correct.”
The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build a railway on its territory connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
The peace treaty also provided for the creation of a Soviet consulate in Mariehamn (Aland Islands), and the status of these islands as a demilitarized territory was confirmed.

Finnish citizens leave for Finland after the transfer of part of the territory to the USSR

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which it made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to test out possible changes. Relations were initially cool, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Goering, the number two in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström at the end of the 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest.” Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; they also influenced Hitler's decision to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers was called the “Continuation War” in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
3.Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
6.Rent of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years.

Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. In 1944, these territories again ceded to the USSR.
Finnish losses
Military
According to an official statement published in the Finnish press on May 23, 1940, the total irretrievable losses of the Finnish army during the war amounted to 19,576 killed and 3,263 missing. Total - 22,839 people.
According to modern calculations:
Killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people)
Wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people)
Prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. out of approximately 250 thousand participants, that is, about 25%. Brief information about each of the victims on the Finnish side was published in a number of Finnish publications.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombings of Finnish cities, 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

USSR losses

The official figures for Soviet casualties in the war were announced at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

Monument to those who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy).

war memorial

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Human reserves

By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were added to the army's roster of 337 thousand people as a military force:

Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.

90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire at the advancing enemy (at different levels and from different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish war plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega Sea lake

D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.

The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Headcount ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.

The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million personnel of the Red Army and Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the killed and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor complicating the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, Active Army was removed from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Corporal Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.

Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Losses of the parties*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,
Why, I can’t imagine, -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of these, 65,384 people were killed.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.

Note:

* Between 1990 and 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons of a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She's against it great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999