Who created the hydrogen bomb. Who invented the atomic bomb? The history of the invention and creation of the Soviet atomic bomb. Consequences of an atomic bomb explosion
7 countries that have nuclear weapons form the nuclear club. Each of these states spent millions to create their own atomic bomb. Development has been going on for years. But without the gifted physicists who were tasked with conducting research in this area, nothing would have happened. About these people in today's Diletant selection. media.
Robert Oppenheimer
The parents of the man under whose leadership the world's first atomic bomb was created had nothing to do with science. Oppenheimer's father was involved in the textile trade, his mother was an artist. Robert graduated from Harvard early, took a course in thermodynamics and became interested in experimental physics. 
After several years of work in Europe, Oppenheimer moved to California, where he lectured for two decades. When the Germans discovered uranium fission in the late 1930s, the scientist began to think about the problem of nuclear weapons. Since 1939, he actively participated in the creation of the atomic bomb as part of the Manhattan Project and directed the laboratory at Los Alamos. 
There, on July 16, 1945, Oppenheimer’s “brainchild” was tested for the first time. “I have become death, the destroyer of worlds,” said the physicist after the tests.
A few months later, atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Oppenheimer has since insisted on the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Having become a defendant in a criminal case due to his unreliability, the scientist was removed from secret developments. He died in 1967 from laryngeal cancer.
Igor Kurchatov
The USSR acquired its own atomic bomb four years later than the Americans. It could not have happened without the help of intelligence officers, but the merits of the scientists who worked in Moscow should not be underestimated. Atomic research was led by Igor Kurchatov. His childhood and youth were spent in Crimea, where he first learned to be a mechanic. Then he graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Taurida University and continued to study in Petrograd. There he entered the laboratory of the famous Abram Ioffe.
Kurchatov headed the Soviet atomic project when he was only 40 years old. Years of painstaking work involving leading specialists have brought long-awaited results. Our country's first nuclear weapon, called RDS-1, was tested at the Semipalatinsk test site on August 29, 1949. 
The experience accumulated by Kurchatov and his team allowed the Soviet Union to subsequently launch the world's first industrial nuclear power plant, as well as atomic reactor for a submarine and an icebreaker, which no one had achieved before.
Andrey Sakharov
The hydrogen bomb appeared first in the United States. But the American model was the size of a three-story house and weighed more than 50 tons. Meanwhile, the RDS-6s product, created by Andrei Sakharov, weighed only 7 tons and could fit on a bomber. 
During the war, Sakharov, while evacuated, graduated with honors from Moscow State University. He worked as an engineer-inventor at a military plant, then entered graduate school at the Lebedev Physical Institute. Under the leadership of Igor Tamm, he worked in a research group for the development of thermonuclear weapons. Sakharov came up with the basic principle of the Soviet hydrogen bomb - the puff pastry.
The first Soviet hydrogen bomb was tested in 1953
The first Soviet hydrogen bomb was tested near Semipalatinsk in 1953. To evaluate its destructive capabilities, a city of industrial and administrative buildings was built at the test site.
Since the late 1950s, Sakharov devoted a lot of time to human rights activities. Condemned the arms race, criticized the communist government, spoke out for the abolition death penalty and against forced psychiatric treatment of dissidents. He opposed the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Andrei Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and in 1980 he was exiled to Gorky for his beliefs, where he repeatedly went on hunger strikes and from where he was able to return to Moscow only in 1986.
Bertrand Goldschmidt
The ideologist of the French nuclear program was Charles de Gaulle, and the creator of the first bomb was Bertrand Goldschmidt. Before the start of the war, the future specialist studied chemistry and physics and joined Marie Curie. The German occupation and the Vichy government's attitude towards Jews forced Goldschmidt to stop his studies and emigrate to the United States, where he collaborated first with American and then with Canadian colleagues. 
In 1945, Goldschmidt became one of the founders of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The first test of the bomb created under his leadership occurred only 15 years later - in the southwest of Algeria.
Qian Sanqiang
The PRC joined the club of nuclear powers only in October 1964. Then the Chinese tested their own atomic bomb with a yield of more than 20 kilotons. Mao Zedong decided to develop this industry after his first trip to the Soviet Union. In 1949, Stalin showed the great helmsman the capabilities of nuclear weapons. 
The Chinese nuclear project was led by Qian Sanqiang. A graduate of the physics department of Tsinghua University, he went to study in France at public expense. He worked at the Radium Institute of the University of Paris. Qian communicated a lot with foreign scientists and carried out quite serious research, but he became homesick and returned to China, taking several grams of radium as a gift from Irene Curie.
Oleg Aleksandrovich Lavrentyev, the hero of our story, was born in 1926 in Pskov. Before the war, the guy managed to finish seven classes. Apparently, somewhere towards the end of this process, a book telling about the physics of the atomic nucleus and the latest discoveries in this area fell into his hands.
The 30s of the 20th century were a time of opening new horizons. The existence of neutrinos was predicted in 1930, and the neutron was discovered in 1932. In subsequent years, the first particle accelerators were built. The question arose about the possibility of the existence of transuranium elements. In 1938, Otto Hahn produced barium for the first time by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and Lise Meitner was able to explain what happened. A few months later, she predicted a chain reaction. There was only one step left before the question of an atomic bomb was raised.
It's not surprising that good description These discoveries sank into the teenager’s soul. What is somewhat atypical is that this charge remained in her throughout all subsequent troubles. And then there was a war. Oleg Lavrentyev managed to take part in its final stage, in the Baltic states. Then the vicissitudes of his service brought him to Sakhalin. The unit had a relatively good library, and with his allowance Lavrentyev, then already a sergeant, subscribed to the journal “Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk”, which apparently made a considerable impression on his colleagues. The command supported the enthusiasm of its subordinate. In 1948, he lectured on nuclear physics to unit officers, and the following year he received a matriculation certificate, having completed a three-year course in a year at a local evening school for working youth. It is not known what and how they actually taught there, but there is no doubt about the quality of junior sergeant Lavrentiev’s education - he himself needed the result.
As he himself recalled many years later, the idea of the possibility of a thermonuclear reaction and its use to produce energy first came to him in 1948, just when preparing a lecture for officers. In January 1950, President Truman, speaking before Congress, called for the rapid development of the hydrogen bomb. This was in response to the first Soviet nuclear test in August of the previous year. Well, for junior sergeant Lavrentyev this was an impetus for immediate action: after all, he knew, as he thought at that time, how to make this bomb and get ahead of a potential enemy.
The first letter describing the idea, addressed to Stalin, remained unanswered, and no traces of it were subsequently found. Most likely it just got lost. Next letter was sent more reliably: to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks through the Poronaisky City Committee.
This time the reaction was interested. From Moscow, through the Sakhalin Regional Committee, a command came to provide the persistent soldier with a guarded room and everything necessary for detailed description proposals.
Special work
At this point it is appropriate to interrupt the story about dates and events and turn to the content of the proposals made by the highest Soviet authority.
1. Main ideas.
2. Pilot installation for converting the energy of lithium-hydrogen reactions into electrical energy.
3. Pilot installation for converting the energy of uranium and transuranic reactions into electrical energy.
4. Lithium-hydrogen bomb (design).
Further, O. Lavrentyev writes that he did not have time to prepare parts 2 and 3 in detail and was forced to limit himself to a brief outline; part 1 is also damp (“written very superficially”). In fact, the proposals consider two devices: a bomb and a reactor, while the last, fourth, part - where the bomb is proposed - is extremely laconic, these are just a few phrases, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that everything has already been sorted out in the first part.
In this form, “on 12 sheets,” Larionov’s proposals in Moscow were reviewed by A.D. Sakharov, then still a candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, and most importantly, one of those people who in the USSR of those years were involved in issues of thermonuclear energy, mainly in preparation bombs.
Sakharov highlighted two main points in the proposal: the implementation of the thermonuclear reaction of lithium with hydrogen (their isotopes) and the design of the reactor. In the written, quite favorable review, the first point was briefly stated - this is not suitable.
Not an easy bomb
To introduce the reader into context, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into real situation business In modern times (and, as far as one can judge from open sources, basic principles designs have remained virtually unchanged since the late fifties) in a hydrogen bomb, the role of a thermonuclear “explosive” is performed by lithium hydride - a solid white substance that reacts violently with water to form lithium hydroxide and hydrogen. The latter property makes it possible to widely use the hydride where it is necessary to temporarily bind hydrogen. A good example is aeronautics, but the list, of course, is not exhausted.
The hydride used in hydrogen bombs differs in its isotopic composition. Instead of “ordinary” hydrogen, it contains deuterium, and instead of “ordinary” lithium, it contains a lighter isotope with three neutrons. The resulting lithium deuteride, 6 LiD, contains almost everything needed for great illumination. To initiate the process, it is enough to simply detonate a nuclear charge located nearby (for example, around or, conversely, inside). The neutrons produced during the explosion are absorbed by lithium-6, which eventually decays to form helium and tritium. The increase in pressure and temperature as a result of a nuclear explosion leads to the fact that the newly appeared tritium and deuterium, which were initially at the scene of events, find themselves in the conditions necessary for the start of a thermonuclear reaction. Well, that's it, ready.
A
B
IN
G
D In compressed and heated lithium-6 deuteride, a fusion reaction occurs; the emitted neutron flux initiates the tamper splitting reaction. The fireball expands..." alt=" A Warhead before explosion; the first step is at the top, the second step is at the bottom. Both components of a thermonuclear bomb.
B The explosive detonates the first stage, compressing the plutonium core to a supercritical state and initiating a fission chain reaction.
IN During the cleavage process in the first stage, an X-ray pulse occurs, which propagates along the inside of the shell, penetrating the polystyrene foam filler.
G The second stage contracts due to ablation (evaporation) under the influence of X-rays, and the plutonium rod inside the second stage goes into a supercritical state, initiating a chain reaction, releasing enormous amounts of heat.
D In compressed and heated lithium-6 deuteride, a fusion reaction occurs; the emitted neutron flux initiates the tamper splitting reaction. The fireball expands..." src="/sites/default/files/images_custom/2017/07/bombh_explosion-ru.svg.png">!}
A Warhead before explosion; the first step is at the top, the second step is at the bottom. Both components of a thermonuclear bomb.
B The explosive detonates the first stage, compressing the plutonium core to a supercritical state and initiating a fission chain reaction.
IN During the cleavage process in the first stage, an X-ray pulse occurs, which propagates along the inside of the shell, penetrating the polystyrene foam filler.
G The second stage contracts due to ablation (evaporation) under the influence of X-rays, and the plutonium rod inside the second stage goes into a supercritical state, initiating a chain reaction, releasing enormous amounts of heat.
D In compressed and heated lithium-6 deuteride, a fusion reaction occurs; the emitted neutron flux initiates the tamper splitting reaction. The fireball expands...
/ © Wikipedia
This path is not the only one, much less mandatory. Instead of lithium deuteride, you can use ready-made tritium mixed with deuterium. The problem is that both of them are gases that are difficult to contain and transport, let alone stuff into a bomb. The resulting design is quite suitable for explosion in tests, such were produced. The only problem is that it is impossible to deliver it to the “addressee” - the size of the structure completely excludes this possibility. Lithium deuteride, being a solid, provides an elegant way around this problem.
What is stated here is not at all difficult for us living today. In 1950, this was a top secret, to which an extremely limited circle of people had access. Of course, the soldier serving on Sakhalin was not included in this circle. At the same time, the properties of lithium hydride in themselves were not a secret; any person more or less competent, for example in matters of aeronautics, knew about them. It is no coincidence that Vitaly Ginzburg, the author of the idea of using lithium deuteride in a bomb, usually answered the question about authorship in the spirit that in general it was too trivial.
The design of the Lavrentiev bomb in general terms repeats that described above. Here we also see an initiating nuclear charge and an explosive made from lithium hydride, and its isotopic composition is the same - it is deuteride of the light lithium isotope. The fundamental difference is that instead of the reaction of deuterium with tritium, the author assumes the reaction of lithium with deuterium and/or hydrogen. Clever Lavrentyev guessed that the solid substance was more convenient to use and suggested using 6 Li, but only because its reaction with hydrogen should provide more energy. To select a different fuel for the reaction, data was required on the effective cross sections of thermonuclear reactions, which the conscript soldier, of course, did not have.
Let's say that Oleg Lavrentyev would be lucky again: he guessed the desired reaction. Alas, even this would not make him the author of the discovery. The bomb design described above had been in development for more than a year and a half by that time. Of course, since all the work was surrounded by complete secrecy, he could not know about them. In addition, the design of a bomb is not only a layout of explosives, it also involves a lot of calculations and design subtleties. The author of the proposal could not fulfill them.
It must be said that complete ignorance of the physical principles of the future bomb was then characteristic of much more competent people. Many years later, Lavrentyev recalled an episode that happened to him a little later, already in his student days. The vice-rector of Moscow State University, who taught physics to the students, for some reason decided to talk about the hydrogen bomb, which, in his opinion, was a system for watering enemy territory with liquid hydrogen. And what? Freezing enemies is a nice thing to do. The student Lavrentyev, who was listening to him, who knew a little more about the bomb, involuntarily burst out an impartial assessment of what he heard, but there was nothing to respond to the caustic remark of the neighbor who heard her. Don't tell her all the details he knows.
What has been said apparently explains why the “Lavrentiev bomb” project was forgotten almost immediately after it was written. The author demonstrated remarkable abilities, but that was all. The thermonuclear reactor project had a different fate.
The design of the future reactor in 1950 seemed to its author to be quite simple. Two concentric (one inside the other) electrodes will be placed in the working chamber. The internal one is made in the form of a mesh, its geometry is calculated in such a way as to minimize contact with the plasma as much as possible. A constant voltage of about 0.5–1 megavolt is applied to the electrodes, with the inner electrode (grid) being the negative pole and the outer one being the positive pole. The reaction itself occurs in the middle of the installation and positively charged ions (mainly reaction products) flying out through the grid, moving further, overcome resistance electric field, which ultimately turns most of them back. The energy they expended to overcome the field is our gain, which is relatively easy to “remove” from the installation.
The reaction of lithium with hydrogen is again proposed as the main process, which again is not suitable for the same reasons, but this is not noteworthy. Oleg Lavrentyev was the first person to come up with the idea of isolating plasma using some fields. Even the fact that in his proposal this role is, generally speaking, secondary - the main function of the electric field is to obtain the energy of particles flying out of the reaction zone - does not change the meaning of this fact.
As Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov subsequently repeatedly stated, it was a letter from a sergeant from Sakhalin that first gave him the idea of using a field to contain plasma in a thermonuclear reactor. True, Sakharov and his colleagues preferred to use a different field - a magnetic one. In the meantime, he wrote in the review that the proposed design is most likely unrealistic, due to the impossibility of making a mesh electrode that would withstand work under such conditions. But the author still needs to be encouraged for his scientific courage.
Soon after sending the proposals, Oleg Lavrentyev is demobilized from the army, goes to Moscow and becomes a first-year student at the physics department of Moscow State University. Available sources say (in his words) that he did this completely independently, without the patronage of any authorities.
The “authorities”, however, monitored his fate. In September, Lavrentyev meets with I.D. Serbin, an official of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the recipient of his letters from Sakhalin. On his instructions, he describes his vision of the problem again, in more detail.
At the very beginning of the next year, 1951, freshman Lavrentyev was summoned to the USSR Minister of Measuring Instrumentation Makhnev, where he met the minister himself and his reviewer A.D. Sakharov. It should be noted that the department headed by Makhnev had a rather abstract attitude towards measuring instruments; its real purpose was to support the USSR nuclear program. Makhnev himself was the secretary of the Special Committee, the chairman of which was the all-powerful at that time L.P. Beria. Our student met him a few days later. Sakharov was again present at the meeting, but almost nothing can be said about his role in it.
According to the memoirs of O.A. Lavrentiev, he was preparing to tell the dignitary about the bomb and the reactor, but Beria seemed not to be interested in this. The conversation was about the guest himself, his achievements, plans and relatives. “It was a show,” summarized Oleg Alexandrovich. - He wanted, as I understood, to look at me and, perhaps, at Sakharov, what kind of people we were. Apparently the opinion was favorable.”
The result of the “lookout” was indulgences that were unusual for a Soviet freshman. Oleg Lavrentiev was given a personal scholarship, a separate room (albeit small - 14 sq. m.), and two personal teachers in physics and mathematics. He was exempt from tuition fees. Finally, the delivery of the necessary literature was organized.
Soon they met the technical leaders of the Soviet atomic program B.L. Vannikov, N.I. Pavlov and I.V. Kurchatov. Yesterday's sergeant, who during his years of service had not seen a single general even from afar, was now talking on equal terms with two at once: Vannikov and Pavlov. True, it was mostly Kurchatov who asked the questions.
It is very likely that Lavrentyev’s proposals after his acquaintance with Beria were obediently given even too much attention. great importance. In the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation there is a proposal addressed to Beria and signed by the above three interlocutors to create a “small theoretical group” to evaluate the ideas of O. Lavrentiev. Whether such a group was created and, if so, with what result, is now unknown.
Entrance to the Kurchatov Institute. Contemporary photography. / © Wikimedia
In May, our hero received a pass to LIPAN - the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the Academy of Sciences, now the Institute. Kurchatova. The strange name at that time was also a tribute to general secrecy. Oleg was appointed as an intern in the electrical equipment department with the task of familiarizing himself with the ongoing work on the MTR (magnetic thermonuclear reactor). As at the university, the special guest was accompanied by a personal guide, “a specialist in gas discharges, Comrade. Andrianov,” says the memo addressed to Beria.
Cooperation with LIPAN was already quite tense. There they designed an installation with plasma confinement by a magnetic field, which later became a tokamak, and Lavrentyev wanted to work on a modified version of an electromagnetic trap, which went back to his Sakhalin thoughts. At the end of 1951, a detailed discussion of his project took place in LIPAN. Opponents found no errors in it and generally recognized the work as correct, but refused to implement it, deciding to “concentrate forces on the main direction.” In 1952, Lavrentiev prepared a new project with refined plasma parameters.
It should be noted that Lavrentyev at that moment thought that his proposal for the reactor was also late, and his colleagues from LIPAN were developing their own idea entirely, which had come to their minds independently and earlier. He learned much later that his colleagues themselves held a different opinion.
Your benefactor has died
On June 26, 1953, Beria was arrested and soon executed. Now one can only guess whether he had any specific plans regarding Oleg Lavrentyev, but the loss of such an influential patron had a very significant impact on his fate.
At the university they not only stopped giving me an increased scholarship, but also “reversed” the tuition fee for last year, essentially leaving him without a livelihood,” Oleg Alexandrovich said many years later. “I made my way to an appointment with the new dean and, in complete confusion, heard: “Your benefactor has died. What do you want? At the same time, my admission to LIPAN was revoked, and I lost my permanent pass to the laboratory, where, according to the previous agreement, I was supposed to undergo pre-graduation practice and subsequently work. If the scholarship was later reinstated, then I never received admission to the institute.
After university, Lavrentyev was never hired to work at LIPAN, the only place in the USSR where thermonuclear fusion was being studied at that time. Now it is impossible, and even pointless, to try to understand whether the reputation of “Beria’s man”, some personal difficulties, or something else is to blame for this.
Our hero went to Kharkov, where a plasma research department was being created at KIPT. There he focused on his favorite topic - electromagnetic plasma traps. In 1958, the C1 installation was launched, finally showing the viability of the idea. The next decade was marked by the construction of several more installations, after which Lavrentiev’s ideas began to be taken seriously in the scientific world.
Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, modern photo
In the seventies, it was planned to build and launch a large Jupiter installation, which was finally supposed to become a full-fledged competitor to tokamaks and stellarators, built on different principles. Unfortunately, while the new product was being designed, the situation around it changed. To save money, the installation was halved. A redesign of the design and calculations was required. By the time it was completed, the equipment had to be reduced by another third - and, of course, everything had to be recalculated again. The finally launched sample was quite functional, but, of course, it was far from being fully scaled up.
Oleg Aleksandrovich Lavrentyev until the end of his days (he passed away in 2011) continued active research work, published a lot and, in general, was quite successful as a scientist. But the main idea of his life has so far remained untested.
Changes in US military doctrine between 1945 and 1996 and basic concepts
//On the territory of the United States, in Los Alamos, in the desert expanses of New Mexico, an American nuclear center was created in 1942. At its base, work began on the creation of a nuclear bomb. The overall management of the project was entrusted to the talented nuclear physicist R. Oppenheimer. Under his leadership were collected the best minds of that time, not only the USA and England, but almost all of Western Europe. A huge team worked on the creation of nuclear weapons, including 12 Nobel Prize laureates. There was no shortage of financial resources.
By the summer of 1945, the Americans managed to assemble two atomic bombs, called “Baby” and “Fat Man”. The first bomb weighed 2,722 kg and was filled with enriched Uranium-235. “Fat Man” with a charge of Plutonium-239 with a power of more than 20 kt had a mass of 3175 kg. On June 16, the first test site of a nuclear device took place, timed to coincide with a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France.
By this time, relations between former comrades had changed. It should be noted that the United States, as soon as it had the atomic bomb, sought a monopoly on its possession in order to deprive other countries of the opportunity to use atomic energy at their discretion.
US President G. Truman became the first political leader to decide to use nuclear bombs. From a military point of view, there was no need for such bombing of densely populated Japanese cities. But political motives during this period prevailed over military ones. The leadership of the United States strove for supremacy throughout the post-war world, and nuclear bombing, in their opinion, should have been a significant reinforcement of these aspirations. To this end, they began to push for the adoption of the American “Baruch Plan”, which would have secured a monopoly for the United States. atomic weapons, in other words, "absolute military superiority."
The fatal hour has arrived. On August 6 and 9, the crews of the B-29 "Enola Gay" and "Bocks car" aircraft dropped their deadly payload on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The total loss of life and the scale of destruction from these bombings are characterized by the following figures: 300 thousand people died instantly from thermal radiation (temperature about 5000 degrees C) and the shock wave, another 200 thousand were injured, burned, or exposed to radiation. On an area of 12 sq. km, all buildings were completely destroyed. In Hiroshima alone, out of 90 thousand buildings, 62 thousand were destroyed. These bombings shocked the whole world. It is believed that this event marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race and the confrontation between the two political systems of that time at a new qualitative level.
The development of American strategic offensive weapons after the Second World War was carried out depending on the provisions of military doctrine. Its political side determined the main goal of the US leadership - achieving world domination. The main obstacle to these aspirations was considered Soviet Union, which in their opinion should have been liquidated. Depending on the balance of power in the world, the achievements of science and technology, its basic provisions changed, which was correspondingly reflected in the adoption of certain strategic strategies(concepts). Each subsequent strategy did not completely replace the one that preceded it, but only modernized it, mainly in determining the ways of building the Armed Forces and methods of waging war.
From mid-1945 to 1953, the American military-political leadership in matters of building strategic nuclear forces (SNF) proceeded from the fact that the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could achieve world domination by eliminating the USSR during a nuclear war. Preparations for such a war began almost immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany. This is evidenced by the directive of the Joint Military Planning Committee No. 432/d dated December 14, 1945, which set the task of preparing the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities - the main political and industrial centers of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was planned to use the entire stock of atomic bombs available at that time (196 pieces), the carriers of which were modernized B-29 bombers. The method of their use was also determined - a sudden atomic “first strike”, which should confront the Soviet leadership with the fact that further resistance was futile.
The political justification for such actions is the thesis of the “Soviet threat,” one of the main authors of which can be considered the US Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, J. Kennan. It was he who sent a “long telegram” to Washington on February 22, 1946, where in eight thousand words he outlined the “vital threat” that allegedly loomed over the United States and proposed a strategy for confrontation with the Soviet Union.
President G. Truman gave instructions to develop a doctrine (later called the “Truman Doctrine”) of pursuing a policy from a position of strength in relation to the USSR. To centralize planning and increase the effectiveness of the use of strategic aviation, in the spring of 1947, the Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) was created. At the same time, the task of improving strategic aviation technology is being implemented at an accelerated pace.
By mid-1948, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff had drawn up a plan for a nuclear war with the USSR, codenamed “Chariotir”. It stipulated that the war should begin "with concentrated attacks using atomic bombs against government, political and administrative centers, industrial cities and selected oil refineries from bases in the Western Hemisphere and England." In the first 30 days alone, it was planned to drop 133 nuclear bombs on 70 Soviet cities.
However, as American military analysts calculated, this was not enough to achieve a quick victory. They believed that during this time the Soviet Army would be able to capture key areas of Europe and Asia. In early 1949, a special committee of senior Army, Air Force, and Navy officials was created under the leadership of Lieutenant General H. Harmon, which was tasked with trying to assess the political and military consequences of the planned atomic attack on the Soviet Union from the air. The committee's conclusions and calculations clearly indicated that the United States was not yet ready for a nuclear war.
The committee's conclusions indicated that it was necessary to increase quantitative composition SAC, increase its combat capabilities, replenish nuclear arsenals. To ensure the delivery of a massive nuclear strike by air, the United States needs to create a network of bases along the borders of the USSR, from which bombers carrying nuclear weapons could carry out combat missions along the shortest routes to planned targets on Soviet territory. It is necessary to launch serial production of heavy strategic intercontinental bombers B-36, capable of operating from bases on American territory.
The message that the Soviet Union had mastered the secret of nuclear weapons caused the US ruling circles to want to start a preventive war as quickly as possible. The Troyan plan was developed, which envisaged starting fighting January 1, 1950. At that time, SAC had 840 strategic bombers in combat units, 1,350 in reserve, and over 300 atomic bombs.
To assess its viability, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff ordered Lieutenant General D. Hull's group to test the chances of disabling the nine most important strategic areas on the territory of the Soviet Union in staff games. Having lost the air offensive against the USSR, Hull analysts summed it up: the probability of achieving these goals is 70%, which would entail the loss of 55% of the available bomber force. It turned out that US strategic aviation in this case would very quickly lose its combat effectiveness. Therefore, the question of preventive war was dropped in 1950. Soon the American leadership was able to verify in practice the correctness of such assessments. During the Korean War that began in 1950, B-29 bombers suffered heavy losses from fighter jet attacks.
But the situation in the world was changing rapidly, which was reflected in the American strategy of “massive retaliation” adopted in 1953. It was based on the superiority of the United States over the USSR in the number of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. It was envisaged to wage a general nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp. Strategic aviation was considered the main means of achieving victory, for the development of which up to 50% of the financial resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of weapons were allocated.
In 1955, SAC had 1,565 bombers, 70% of which were B-47 jets, and 4,750 nuclear bombs with yields ranging from 50 kt to 20 mt. In the same year, the B-52 heavy strategic bomber was put into service, which gradually became the main intercontinental carrier of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the military-political leadership of the United States is beginning to realize that in the context of the rapid increase in the capabilities of Soviet air defense systems, heavy bombers will not be able to solve the problem of achieving victory in a nuclear war alone. In 1958, medium-range ballistic missiles "Thor" and "Jupiter" entered service and were deployed in Europe. A year later, the first Atlas-D intercontinental missiles were put on combat duty, and the nuclear submarine J. Washington" with Polaris-A1 missiles.
With the advent of ballistic missiles in the strategic nuclear forces, the United States' ability to launch a nuclear strike increases significantly. However, in the USSR, by the end of the 50s, intercontinental carriers of nuclear weapons were being created, capable of delivering a retaliatory strike on the territory of the United States. The Pentagon was particularly concerned about Soviet ICBMs. Under these conditions, the leaders of the United States considered that the strategy of “massive retaliation” did not fully correspond to modern realities and should be adjusted.
By the beginning of 1960, nuclear planning in the United States was becoming centralized. Before this, each branch of the Armed Forces planned the use of nuclear weapons independently. But the increase in the number of strategic delivery vehicles required the creation of a single body for planning nuclear operations. It became the Joint Strategic Objectives Planning Staff, subordinate to the commander of the SAC and the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. In December 1960, the first unified plan for waging a nuclear war was drawn up, called the “Unified Comprehensive Operational Plan” - SIOP. It envisaged, in accordance with the requirements of the “massive retaliation” strategy, waging only a general nuclear war against the USSR and China with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons (3.5 thousand nuclear warheads).
In 1961, a “flexible response” strategy was adopted, reflecting changes in official views on the possible nature of the war with the USSR. In addition to all-out nuclear war, American strategists began to accept the possibility of limited use of nuclear weapons and waging war with conventional weapons for a short period of time (no more than two weeks). The choice of methods and means of warfare had to be made taking into account the current geostrategic situation, the balance of forces and the availability of resources.
The new installations had a very significant impact on the development of American strategic weapons. Rapid quantitative growth of ICBMs and SLBMs begins. Special attention is paid to improving the latter, since they could be used as “forward-based” weapons in Europe. At the same time, the American government no longer needed to look for possible deployment areas for them and persuade the Europeans to give their consent to the use of their territory, as was the case during the deployment of medium-range missiles.
The US military-political leadership believed that it was necessary to have such a quantitative composition of strategic nuclear forces, the use of which would ensure the “guaranteed destruction” of the Soviet Union as a viable state.
In the early years of this decade, a significant force of ICBMs was deployed. So, if at the beginning of 1960 in combat strength SAC had 20 missiles of only one type - Atlas-D, but by the end of 1962 there were already 294. By this time, Atlas intercontinental ballistic missiles of modifications E and F, Titan-1 were put into service and Minuteman-1A. The latest ICBMs were several orders of magnitude higher in sophistication than their predecessors. In the same year, the tenth American SSBN went on combat patrol. The total number of Polaris-A1 and Polaris-A2 SLBMs has reached 160 units. The last of the ordered B-52H heavy bombers and B-58 medium bombers entered service. The total number of bombers in the Strategic Air Command was 1,819. Thus, the American nuclear triad of strategic offensive forces (units and formations of ICBMs, nuclear missile submarines and strategic bombers) was organizationally formed, each component of which harmoniously complemented each other. It was equipped with over 6,000 nuclear warheads.
In mid-1961, the SIOP-2 plan was approved, reflecting the “flexible response” strategy. It provided for five interrelated operations to destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal, suppress the air defense system, destroy military and government agencies and points, large groupings of troops, as well as strikes on cities. The total number of targets in the plan was 6 thousand. Among the topics, the plan's developers also took into account the possibility of the Soviet Union inflicting a retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory.
At the beginning of 1961, a commission was formed whose duties were to develop promising ways for the development of American strategic nuclear forces. Subsequently, such commissions were created regularly.
In the fall of 1962, the world again found itself on the brink of nuclear war. The outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis forced politicians around the world to look at nuclear weapons from a new angle. For the first time, it clearly played the role of a deterrent. The sudden appearance of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba for the United States and their lack of overwhelming superiority in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs over the Soviet Union made a military solution to the conflict impossible.
The American military leadership immediately announced the need for additional armament, effectively setting a course for unleashing a strategic offensive arms race (START). The wishes of the military found due support in the US Senate. Huge amounts of money were allocated for the development of strategic offensive weapons, which made it possible to qualitatively and quantitatively improve strategic nuclear forces. In 1965, the Thor and Jupiter missiles, Atlas of all modifications and Titan-1 were completely withdrawn from service. They were replaced by the Minuteman-1B and Minuteman-2 intercontinental missiles, as well as the Titan-2 heavy ICBM.
The marine component of the SNA has grown significantly quantitatively and qualitatively. Taking into account such factors as the almost undivided dominance of the US Navy and the combined NATO fleet in the vast oceans in the early 60s, the high survivability, stealth and mobility of SSBNs, the American leadership decided to significantly increase the number of deployed missile submarines that could successfully replace medium-sized missiles. range. Their main targets were to be large industrial and administrative centers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
In 1967, the strategic nuclear forces had 41 SSBNs with 656 missiles, of which more than 80% were Polaris-A3 SLBMs, 1054 ICBMs and over 800 heavy bombers. After the obsolete B-47 aircraft were removed from service, the nuclear bombs intended for them were eliminated. In connection with a change in strategic aviation tactics, the B-52 was equipped with AGM-28 Hound Dog cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead.
The rapid growth in the second half of the 60s in the number of Soviet OS-type ICBMs with improved characteristics and the creation of a missile defense system made the likelihood of America achieving a quick victory in a possible nuclear war scanty.
The strategic nuclear arms race posed more and more new challenges to the US military-industrial complex. It was necessary to find a new way to quickly increase nuclear power. The high scientific and production level of leading American rocket manufacturing companies made it possible to solve this problem. The designers have found a way to significantly increase the number of nuclear charges raised without increasing the number of their carriers. Multiple warheads (MIRVs) were developed and introduced, first with dispersible warheads and then with individual guidance.
The US leadership decided that it was time to somewhat adjust the military-technical side of its military doctrine. Using the tried-and-tested thesis of the “Soviet missile threat” and “US backwardness,” it easily secured the allocation of funds for new strategic weapons. Since 1970, the deployment of the Minuteman-3 ICBM and the Poseidon-S3 SLBM with MIRV-type MIRVs began. At the same time, the obsolete Minuteman-1B and Polaris were removed from combat duty.
In 1971, the strategy of “realistic deterrence” was officially adopted. It was based on the idea of nuclear superiority over the USSR. The authors of the strategy took into account the emerging equality in the number of strategic carriers between the USA and the USSR. By that time, without taking into account the nuclear forces of England and France, the following balance of strategic weapons had developed. In terms of ground-based ICBMs, the United States has 1054 versus 1,300 in the Soviet Union, in terms of the number of SLBMs - 656 versus 300, and in strategic bombers- 550 versus 145, respectively. The new strategy for the development of strategic offensive arms provided for a sharp increase in the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles while simultaneously improving their tactical and technical characteristics, which was supposed to ensure qualitative superiority over the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
The improvement of strategic offensive forces was reflected in the next plan - SIOP-4, adopted in 1971. It was developed taking into account the interaction of all components of the nuclear triad and provided for the destruction of 16 thousand targets.
But under pressure from the world community, the US leadership was forced to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. The methods of conducting such negotiations were regulated by the concept of “negotiating from a position of strength” - component“realistic deterrence” strategies. In 1972, the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1) were concluded. However, the build-up of the strategic nuclear potential of opposing political systems continued.
By the mid-70s, the deployment of the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missile systems was completed. All Lafayette-class SSBNs equipped with new missiles have been modernized. Heavy bombers were armed with SRAM nuclear guided missiles. All this led to a sharp increase in the nuclear arsenal assigned to strategic delivery vehicles. So, in five years from 1970 to 1975, the number of warheads increased from 5102 to 8500 units. The improvement of the combat control system for strategic weapons was in full swing, which made it possible to implement the principle of quickly retargeting warheads to new targets. To completely recalculate and replace the flight mission for one missile now required only a few tens of minutes, and the entire group of SNS ICBMs could be retargeted in 10 hours. By the end of 1979, this system was implemented at all intercontinental missile launchers and launch control posts. At the same time, the security of silo launchers of Minuteman ICBMs was increased.
The qualitative improvement of the US strategic offensive forces made it possible to move from the concept of “assured destruction” to the concept of “target selection,” which provided for multi-variant actions - from a limited nuclear strike with a few missiles to a massive strike against the entire complex of targeted targets. The SIOP-5 plan was drawn up and approved in 1975, which provided for attacks on military, administrative and economic targets of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries with a total number of up to 25 thousand.
The main form of use of American strategic offensive weapons was considered to be a sudden massive nuclear strike by all combat-ready ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as a certain number of heavy bombers. By this time, SLBMs had become the leading ones in the US nuclear triad. If before 1970 most of the nuclear warheads were assigned to strategic aviation, then in 1975 4,536 warheads were installed on 656 sea-based missiles (2,154 warheads on 1,054 ICBMs, and 1,800 on heavy bombers). Views on their use have also changed. In addition to striking cities, given the short flight time (12 - 18 minutes), submarine missiles could be used to destroy launching Soviet ICBMs on the active part of the trajectory or directly in launchers, preventing their launch before the approach of American ICBMs. The latter were entrusted with the task of destroying highly protected targets and, above all, silos and command posts of missile units of the Strategic Missile Forces. In this way, a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory could have been thwarted or significantly weakened. Heavy bombers were planned to be used to destroy surviving or newly identified targets.
Since the second half of the 70s, a transformation of the views of the American political leadership on the prospects of nuclear war began. Considering the opinion of most scientists that even a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike would be disastrous for the United States, it decided to accept the theory of limited nuclear war for one theater of war, specifically the European one. To implement it, new nuclear weapons were needed.
The administration of President J. Carter allocated funds for the development and production of the highly effective strategic sea-based Trident system. The implementation of this project was planned to be carried out in two stages. At the first it was planned to re-equip 12 SSBNs of the J. type. Madison" with Trident-C4 missiles, as well as to build and commission 8 new-generation Ohio-class SSBNs with 24 of the same missiles. At the second stage, it was planned to build 14 more SSBNs and arm all boats of this project with the new Trident-D5 SLBM with higher tactical and technical characteristics.
In 1979, President J. Carter decides on the full-scale production of the Peacekeeper (MX) intercontinental ballistic missile, which in its characteristics was supposed to surpass all existing Soviet ICBMs. Its development has been carried out since the mid-70s, along with the Pershing-2 MRBM and a new type of strategic weapons - long-range ground- and air-launched cruise missiles.
With the coming to power of the administration of President R. Reagan, the “doctrine of neo-globalism” was born, reflecting the new views of the US military-political leadership on the path to achieving world domination. It provided for a wide range of measures (political, economic, ideological, military) to “throw back communism”, the direct use military force against those countries where the United States perceives a threat to its “vital interests.” Naturally, the military-technical side of the doctrine was also adjusted. Its basis for the 80s was the strategy of “direct confrontation” with the USSR on a global and regional scale, aimed at achieving “complete and undeniable military superiority of the United States.”
Soon, the Pentagon developed “Guidelines for the Construction of the US Armed Forces” on coming years. They, in particular, determined that in a nuclear war “the United States must prevail and be able to force the USSR to quickly cease hostilities on US terms.” Military plans provided for the conduct of both general and limited nuclear war within the framework of one theater of operations. In addition, the task was to be ready to wage an effective war from space.
Based on these provisions, concepts for the development of the SNA were developed. The concept of “strategic sufficiency” required having such a combat composition of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads for them in order to ensure the “deterrence” of the Soviet Union.” The concept of “active counteraction” provided for ways to ensure flexibility in the use of strategic offensive forces in any situation - from a single use of nuclear weapons to the use of the entire nuclear arsenal.
In March 1980, the president approved the SIOP-5D plan. The plan provided for three options for nuclear strikes: preventive, retaliatory, and retaliatory. The number of targets was 40 thousand, which included 900 cities with a population of over 250 thousand each, 15 thousand industrial and economic facilities, 3,500 military targets on the territory of the USSR, Warsaw Pact countries, China, Vietnam and Cuba.
In early October 1981, President Reagan announced his “strategic program” for the 1980s, which contained guidelines for further building up strategic nuclear capabilities. The last hearings on this program took place at six meetings of the US Congress Committee on Military Affairs. Representatives of the President, the Ministry of Defense, and leading scientists in the field of weapons were invited to them. As a result of comprehensive discussions of all structural elements, the program for building up strategic weapons was approved. In accordance with it, starting in 1983, 108 Pershing-2 MRBM launchers and 464 BGM-109G ground-based cruise missiles were deployed in Europe as forward-based nuclear weapons.
In the second half of the 80s, another concept was developed - “substantial equivalence”. It determined how, in the context of the reduction and elimination of some types of strategic offensive arms, by improving the combat characteristics of others, to ensure qualitative superiority over the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.
Since 1985, the deployment of 50 silo-based MX ICBMs began (another 50 missiles of this type in a mobile version were planned to be put on combat duty in the early 90s) and 100 B-1B heavy bombers. Production of the BGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles to equip 180 B-52 bombers was in full swing. A new MIRV with more powerful warheads was installed on the 350 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, while the control system was modernized.
An interesting situation arose after the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles on the territory of West Germany. Formally, this group was not part of the US National Security Council and was the nuclear weapon of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe (this position has always been occupied by US representatives). The official version for the world community was that its deployment in Europe was a reaction to the appearance of RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles in the Soviet Union and the need to rearm NATO in the face of a missile threat from the East. In fact, the reason was, of course, different, which was confirmed by the Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe, General B. Rogers. He said in one of his speeches in 1983: “Most people believe that we are modernizing our weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would have carried out modernization even if there were no SS-20 missiles.”
The main purpose of the Pershings (taken into account in the SIOP plan) was to deliver a “decapitation strike” on the command posts of strategic formations of the USSR Armed Forces and Strategic Missile Forces in Eastern Europe, which was supposed to disrupt the Soviet retaliatory strike. To achieve this, they had all the necessary tactical and technical characteristics: short approach time (8-10 minutes), high shooting accuracy and a nuclear charge capable of hitting highly protected targets. Thus, it became clear that they were intended to solve strategic offensive tasks.
Ground-launched cruise missiles, also considered NATO nuclear weapons, became dangerous weapons. But their use was envisaged in accordance with the SIOP plan. Their main advantage was high shooting accuracy (up to 30 m) and stealth flight, which took place at an altitude of several tens of meters, which, combined with a small effective dispersion area, made interception of such missiles by an air defense system extremely difficult. The targets of destruction for the Kyrgyz Republic could be any highly protected pinpoint targets such as command posts, silos, etc.
However, by the end of the 80s, the USA and the USSR had accumulated such a huge nuclear potential that it had long outgrown reasonable limits. A situation arose where it was necessary to make a decision on what to do next. The situation was aggravated by the fact that half of the ICBMs (Minuteman-2 and part of Minuteman-3) had been in operation for 20 years or more. Keeping them in combat-ready condition became more and more expensive every year. Under these conditions, the country's leadership decided on the possibility of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms, subject to a reciprocal step on the part of the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was concluded at the end of July 1991. Its provisions largely determined the path of development of strategic weapons in the 90s. An instruction was given for the development of such strategic offensive weapons, so that in order to fend off the threat from them, the USSR would need to spend large financial and material resources.
The situation changed radically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States achieved world dominance and remained the only “superpower” in the world. Finally, the political part of the American military doctrine was fulfilled. But with the end of the Cold War, according to the Clinton administration, threats to US interests remained. In 1995, the report “National military strategy", presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and sent to Congress. It became the last of the official documents outlining the provisions of the new military doctrine. It is based on a “strategy of flexible and selective engagement.” Certain adjustments in the new strategy have been made to the content of the main strategic concepts.
The military-political leadership continues to rely on force, and the Armed Forces are preparing to wage war and achieve “victory in any wars, wherever and whenever they arise.” Naturally, the military structure is being improved, including strategic nuclear forces. They are entrusted with the task of deterring and intimidating a possible enemy, both in a period of peace and during a general or limited war using conventional weapons.
A significant place in theoretical developments is devoted to the place and methods of action of the SNS in a nuclear war. Taking into account the existing balance of forces between the United States and Russia in the field of strategic weapons, the American military-political leadership believes that goals in a nuclear war can be achieved as a result of multiple and spaced-out nuclear strikes against military and economic potential, administrative and political control. In time, these can be either proactive or reactive actions.
The following types of nuclear strikes are envisaged: selective - to hit various command and control organs, limited or regional (for example, against groupings of enemy troops during a conventional war if the situation develops unsuccessfully) and massive. In this regard, a certain reorganization of the US strategic offensive forces was carried out. Further changes in American views on possible development and the use of strategic nuclear weapons can be expected at the beginning of the next millennium.
The development of Soviet nuclear weapons began with the mining of radium samples in the early 1930s. In 1939, Soviet physicists Yuliy Khariton and Yakov Zeldovich calculated the chain reaction of fission of the nuclei of heavy atoms. The following year, scientists from the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology submitted applications for the creation of an atomic bomb, as well as methods for producing uranium-235. For the first time, researchers have proposed using conventional explosives as a means to ignite the charge, which would create a critical mass and start a chain reaction.
However, the invention of the Kharkov physicists had its shortcomings, and therefore their application, having visited a variety of authorities, was ultimately rejected. The final word remained with the director of the Radium Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Vitaly Khlopin: “... the application has no real basis. Besides this, there is essentially a lot of fantastic stuff in it... Even if it were possible to implement a chain reaction, the energy that will be released would be better used to power engines, for example, airplanes.”
The appeals of scientists on the eve of the Great Patriotic War to the People's Commissar of Defense Sergei Timoshenko were also unsuccessful. As a result, the invention project was buried on a shelf labeled “top secret.”
- Vladimir Semyonovich Spinel
- Wikimedia Commons
In 1990, journalists asked one of the authors of the bomb project, Vladimir Spinel: “If your proposals in 1939-1940 were appreciated at the government level and you were given support, when would the USSR be able to have atomic weapons?”
“I think that with the capabilities that Igor Kurchatov later had, we would have received it in 1945,” Spinel replied.
However, it was Kurchatov who managed to use in his developments successful American schemes for creating a plutonium bomb, obtained by Soviet intelligence.
Atomic race
With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, nuclear research was temporarily stopped. The main scientific institutes of the two capitals were evacuated to remote regions.
The head of strategic intelligence, Lavrentiy Beria, was aware of the developments of Western physicists in the field of nuclear weapons. For the first time, the Soviet leadership learned about the possibility of creating a superweapon from the “father” of the American atomic bomb, Robert Oppenheimer, who visited the Soviet Union in September 1939. In the early 1940s, both politicians and scientists realized the reality of obtaining a nuclear bomb, and also that its appearance in the enemy's arsenal would jeopardize the security of other powers.
In 1941, the Soviet government received the first intelligence data from the USA and Great Britain, where active work on creating superweapons had already begun. The main informant was the Soviet “atomic spy” Klaus Fuchs, a physicist from Germany involved in work on the nuclear programs of the United States and Great Britain.
- Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, physicist Pyotr Kapitsa
- RIA News
- V. Noskov
Academician Pyotr Kapitsa, speaking on October 12, 1941 at an anti-fascist meeting of scientists, said: “One of the important means of modern warfare is explosives. Science indicates the fundamental possibilities of increasing explosive force by 1.5-2 times... Theoretical calculations show that if a modern powerful bomb can, for example, destroy an entire block, then an atomic bomb of even a small size, if feasible, could easily destroy a large metropolitan city with several million people. My personal opinion is that the technical difficulties standing in the way of using intra-atomic energy are still very great. This matter is still doubtful, but it is very likely that there are great opportunities here.”
In September 1942, the Soviet government adopted a decree “On the organization of work on uranium.” In the spring of the following year, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created to produce the first Soviet bomb. Finally, on February 11, 1943, Stalin signed the GKO decision on the program of work to create an atomic bomb. At first, the deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee, Vyacheslav Molotov, was entrusted with leading the important task. It was he who had to find scientific supervisor new laboratory.
Molotov himself, in an entry dated July 9, 1971, recalls his decision as follows: “We have been working on this topic since 1943. I was instructed to answer for them, to find a person who could create the atomic bomb. The security officers gave me a list of reliable physicists that I could rely on, and I chose. He called Kapitsa, the academician, to his place. He said that we are not ready for this and that the atomic bomb is not a weapon of this war, but a matter of the future. They asked Joffe - he also had a somewhat unclear attitude towards this. In short, I had the youngest and still unknown Kurchatov, he was not allowed to move. I called him, we talked, he made a good impression on me. But he said he still has a lot of uncertainty. Then I decided to give him our intelligence materials - the intelligence officers had done a very important job. Kurchatov sat in the Kremlin for several days, with me, over these materials.”
Over the next couple of weeks, Kurchatov thoroughly studied the data received by intelligence and drew up an expert opinion: “The materials are of enormous, invaluable importance for our state and science... The totality of information indicates the technical possibility of solving the entire uranium problem in a much shorter time than our scientists think who are not familiar with the progress of work on this problem abroad.”
In mid-March, Igor Kurchatov took over as scientific director of Laboratory No. 2. In April 1946, it was decided to create the KB-11 design bureau for the needs of this laboratory. The top-secret facility was located on the territory of the former Sarov Monastery, several tens of kilometers from Arzamas.
- Igor Kurchatov (right) with a group of employees of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology
- RIA News
KB-11 specialists were supposed to create an atomic bomb using plutonium as a working substance. At the same time, in the process of creating the first nuclear weapon in the USSR, domestic scientists relied on the designs of the US plutonium bomb, which was successfully tested in 1945. However, since the production of plutonium in the Soviet Union had not yet been carried out, physicists at the initial stage used uranium mined in Czechoslovakian mines, as well as in the territories of East Germany, Kazakhstan and Kolyma.
The first Soviet atomic bomb was named RDS-1 ("Special Jet Engine"). A group of specialists led by Kurchatov managed to load a sufficient amount of uranium into it and start a chain reaction in the reactor on June 10, 1948. The next step was to use plutonium.
“This is atomic lightning”
In the plutonium "Fat Man", dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, American scientists placed 10 kilograms of radioactive metal. The USSR managed to accumulate this amount of substance by June 1949. The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, informed the curator of the atomic project, Lavrenty Beria, about his readiness to test the RDS-1 on August 29.
A part of the Kazakh steppe with an area of about 20 kilometers was chosen as a testing ground. In its central part, specialists built a metal tower almost 40 meters high. It was on it that the RDS-1 was installed, the mass of which was 4.7 tons.
Soviet physicist Igor Golovin describes the situation at the test site a few minutes before the start of the tests: “Everything is fine. And suddenly, amid general silence, ten minutes before the “hour”, Beria’s voice is heard: “But nothing will work out for you, Igor Vasilyevich!” - “What are you talking about, Lavrenty Pavlovich! It will definitely work!” - Kurchatov exclaims and continues to watch, only his neck turned purple and his face became gloomily concentrated.
To a prominent scientist in the field of atomic law, Abram Ioyrysh, Kurchatov’s condition seems similar to a religious experience: “Kurchatov rushed out of the casemate, ran up the earthen rampart and shouting “She!” waved his arms widely, repeating: “She, she!” - and enlightenment spread across his face. The explosion column swirled and went into the stratosphere. A shock wave was approaching the command post, clearly visible on the grass. Kurchatov rushed towards her. Flerov rushed after him, grabbed him by the hand, forcibly dragged him into the casemate and closed the door.” The author of Kurchatov’s biography, Pyotr Astashenkov, gives his hero the following words: “This is atomic lightning. Now she is in our hands..."
Immediately after the explosion, the metal tower collapsed to the ground, and in its place only a crater remained. A powerful shock wave threw highway bridges a couple of tens of meters away, and nearby cars scattered across the open spaces almost 70 meters from the explosion site.
- Nuclear mushroom of the RDS-1 ground explosion on August 29, 1949
- Archive of RFNC-VNIIEF
One day, after another test, Kurchatov was asked: “Aren’t you worried about the moral side of this invention?”
“You asked a legitimate question,” he replied. “But I think it’s addressed incorrectly.” It is better to address it not to us, but to those who unleashed these forces... What is scary is not physics, but the adventurous game, not science, but its use by scoundrels... When science makes a breakthrough and opens up the possibility of actions affecting millions of people, the need arises rethink moral norms to bring these actions under control. But nothing like that happened. Quite the opposite. Just think about it - Churchill's speech in Fulton, military bases, bombers along our borders. The intentions are very clear. Science has been turned into a tool of blackmail and the main decisive factor in politics. Do you really think that morality will stop them? And if this is the case, and this is the case, you have to talk to them in their language. Yes, I know: the weapons we created are instruments of violence, but we were forced to create them in order to avoid more disgusting violence! — the answer of the scientist is described in the book “A-bomb” by Abram Ioyrysh and nuclear physicist Igor Morokhov.
A total of five RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. All of them were stored in the closed city of Arzamas-16. Now you can see a model of the bomb in the nuclear weapons museum in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16).
The hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb became cornerstone arms race between the USA and the USSR. The two superpowers argued for several years about who would become the first owner of a new type of destructive weapon.
Thermonuclear weapon project
At the beginning of the Cold War, the test of a hydrogen bomb was the most important argument for the leadership of the USSR in the fight against the United States. Moscow wanted to achieve nuclear parity with Washington and invested huge amounts of money in the arms race. However, work on creating a hydrogen bomb began not thanks to generous funding, but because of reports from secret agents in America. In 1945, the Kremlin learned that the United States was preparing to create a new weapon. It was a superbomb, the project of which was called Super.
The source of valuable information was Klaus Fuchs, an employee of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the USA. He provided the Soviet Union with specific information regarding the secret American development of a superbomb. By 1950, the Super project was thrown into the trash, as it became clear to Western scientists that such a new weapon scheme could not be implemented. The director of this program was Edward Teller.
In 1946, Klaus Fuchs and John developed the ideas for the Super project and patented own system. The principle of radioactive implosion was fundamentally new in it. In the USSR, this scheme began to be considered a little later - in 1948. In general, we can say that at the starting stage it was completely based on American information received by intelligence. But by continuing research based on these materials, Soviet scientists were noticeably ahead of their Western colleagues, which allowed the USSR to obtain first the first, and then the most powerful thermonuclear bomb.
On December 17, 1945, at a meeting of a special committee created under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, nuclear physicists Yakov Zeldovich, Isaac Pomeranchuk and Julius Hartion made a report “Use of nuclear energy of light elements.” This paper examined the possibility of using a deuterium bomb. This speech marked the beginning of the Soviet nuclear program.
In 1946, theoretical research was carried out at the Institute of Chemical Physics. The first results of this work were discussed at one of the meetings of the Scientific and Technical Council in the First Main Directorate. Two years later, Lavrentiy Beria instructed Kurchatov and Khariton to analyze materials about the von Neumann system, which were delivered to the Soviet Union thanks to secret agents in the West. Data from these documents gave additional impetus to the research that led to the birth of the RDS-6 project.
"Evie Mike" and "Castle Bravo"
On November 1, 1952, the Americans tested the world's first thermonuclear device. It was not yet a bomb, but already its most important component. The explosion occurred on Enivotek Atoll, in the Pacific Ocean. and Stanislav Ulam (each of them actually the creator of the hydrogen bomb) had recently developed a two-stage design, which the Americans tested. The device could not be used as a weapon, as it was produced using deuterium. In addition, it was distinguished by its enormous weight and dimensions. Such a projectile simply could not be dropped from an airplane.
The first hydrogen bomb was tested by Soviet scientists. After the United States learned about the successful use of the RDS-6s, it became clear that it was necessary to close the gap with the Russians in the arms race as quickly as possible. The American test took place on March 1, 1954. The Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands was chosen as the test site. The Pacific archipelagos were not chosen by chance. There was almost no population here (and the few people who lived on the nearby islands were evicted on the eve of the experiment).
The Americans' most destructive hydrogen bomb explosion became known as Castle Bravo. The charge power turned out to be 2.5 times higher than expected. The explosion led to radiation contamination of a large area (many islands and Pacific Ocean), which led to a scandal and a revision of the nuclear program.
Development of RDS-6s
The project of the first Soviet thermonuclear bomb was called RDS-6s. The plan was written by the outstanding physicist Andrei Sakharov. In 1950, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to concentrate work on the creation of new weapons in KB-11. According to this decision, a group of scientists led by Igor Tamm went to the closed Arzamas-16.
The Semipalatinsk test site was prepared especially for this grandiose project. Before the hydrogen bomb test began, numerous measuring, filming and recording instruments were installed there. In addition, on behalf of scientists, almost two thousand indicators appeared there. The area affected by the hydrogen bomb test included 190 structures.
The Semipalatinsk experiment was unique not only because of the new type of weapon. Unique intakes designed for chemical and radioactive samples were used. Only a powerful shock wave could open them. Recording and filming instruments were installed in specially prepared fortified structures on the surface and in underground bunkers.
Alarm Clock
Back in 1946, Edward Teller, who worked in the USA, developed a prototype of the RDS-6s. It's called Alarm Clock. The project for this device was originally proposed as an alternative to the Super. In April 1947, a series of experiments began at the Los Alamos laboratory designed to study the nature of thermonuclear principles.
Scientists expected the greatest energy release from Alarm Clock. In the fall, Teller decided to use lithium deuteride as fuel for the device. The researchers had not yet used this substance, but expected that it would improve efficiency. Interestingly, Teller already noted in his memos the dependence of the nuclear program on the further development of computers. This technique was necessary for scientists to make more accurate and complex calculations.
Alarm Clock and RDS-6s had much in common, but they also differed in many ways. The American version was not as practical as the Soviet one due to its size. It inherited its large size from the Super project. In the end, the Americans had to abandon this development. The last studies took place in 1954, after which it became clear that the project was unprofitable.
Explosion of the first thermonuclear bomb
First in human history The hydrogen bomb test took place on August 12, 1953. In the morning, a bright flash appeared on the horizon, which was blinding even through protective glasses. The RDS-6s explosion turned out to be 20 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. The experiment was considered successful. Scientists were able to achieve an important technological breakthrough. For the first time, lithium hydride was used as a fuel. Within a radius of 4 kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion, the wave destroyed all buildings.
Subsequent tests of the hydrogen bomb in the USSR were based on the experience gained using the RDS-6s. This destructive weapon was not only the most powerful. An important advantage of the bomb was its compactness. The projectile was placed in a Tu-16 bomber. Success allowed Soviet scientists to get ahead of the Americans. In the United States at that time there was a thermonuclear device the size of a house. It was not transportable.
When Moscow announced that the USSR's hydrogen bomb was ready, Washington disputed this information. The main argument of the Americans was the fact that the thermonuclear bomb should be made according to the Teller-Ulam scheme. It was based on the principle of radiation implosion. This project will be implemented in the USSR two years later, in 1955.
In the creation of RDS-6s greatest contribution contributed by physicist Andrei Sakharov. The hydrogen bomb was his brainchild - it was he who proposed the revolutionary technical solutions that made it possible to successfully complete tests at the Semipalatinsk test site. Young Sakharov immediately became an academician at the USSR Academy of Sciences, a Hero of Socialist Labor and a laureate of the Stalin Prize. Other scientists also received awards and medals: Yuli Khariton, Kirill Shchelkin, Yakov Zeldovich, Nikolai Dukhov, etc. In 1953, the test of a hydrogen bomb showed that Soviet science can overcome what until recently seemed like fiction and fantasy. Therefore, immediately after the successful explosion of the RDS-6s, the development of even more powerful projectiles began.
RDS-37
On November 20, 1955, the next tests of a hydrogen bomb took place in the USSR. This time it was two-stage and corresponded to the Teller-Ulam scheme. The RDS-37 bomb was about to be dropped from an airplane. However, when it took off, it became clear that the tests would have to be carried out in an emergency situation. Contrary to weather forecasters, the weather deteriorated noticeably, causing dense clouds to cover the training ground.
For the first time, experts were forced to land a plane with a thermonuclear bomb on board. For some time there was a discussion at the Central Command Post about what to do next. A proposal to drop a bomb in the mountains nearby was considered, but this option was rejected as too risky. Meanwhile, the plane continued to circle near the test site, running out of fuel.
Zeldovich and Sakharov received the final word. A hydrogen bomb that exploded outside of the test site would have led to disaster. The scientists understood the full extent of the risk and their own responsibility, and yet they gave written confirmation that the plane would be safe to land. Finally, the commander of the Tu-16 crew, Fyodor Golovashko, received the command to land. The landing was very smooth. The pilots showed all their skills and did not panic in a critical situation. The maneuver was perfect. The Central Command Post breathed a sigh of relief.
The creator of the hydrogen bomb, Sakharov, and his team survived the tests. The second attempt was scheduled for November 22. On this day everything went without any emergency situations. The bomb was dropped from a height of 12 kilometers. While the shell was falling, the plane managed to move to a safe distance from the epicenter of the explosion. A few minutes later, the nuclear mushroom reached a height of 14 kilometers, and its diameter was 30 kilometers.
The explosion was not without tragic incidents. The shock wave shattered glass at a distance of 200 kilometers, causing several injuries. A girl who lived in a neighboring village also died when the ceiling collapsed on her. Another victim was a soldier who was in a special holding area. The soldier fell asleep in the dugout and died of suffocation before his comrades could pull him out.
Development of the Tsar Bomba
In 1954, the country's best nuclear physicists, under the leadership, began developing the most powerful thermonuclear bomb in the history of mankind. Andrei Sakharov, Viktor Adamsky, Yuri Babaev, Yuri Smirnov, Yuri Trutnev, etc. also took part in this project. Due to its power and size, the bomb became known as the “Tsar Bomba”. Project participants later recalled that this phrase appeared after famous saying Khrushchev about “Kuzka’s Mother” at the UN. Officially, the project was called AN602.
Over seven years of development, the bomb went through several reincarnations. At first, scientists planned to use components from uranium and the Jekyll-Hyde reaction, but later this idea had to be abandoned due to the danger of radioactive contamination.
Test on Novaya Zemlya
For some time, the Tsar Bomba project was frozen, since Khrushchev was going to the USA, and in cold war there was a short pause. In 1961, the conflict between the countries flared up again and in Moscow they again remembered thermonuclear weapons. Khrushchev announced the upcoming tests in October 1961 during the XXII Congress of the CPSU.
On the 30th, a Tu-95B with a bomb on board took off from Olenya and headed for Novaya Zemlya. The plane took two hours to reach its destination. Another Soviet hydrogen bomb was dropped at an altitude of 10.5 thousand meters above the Sukhoi Nos nuclear test site. The shell exploded while still in the air. A fireball appeared, which reached a diameter of three kilometers and almost touched the ground. According to scientists' calculations, the seismic wave from the explosion crossed the planet three times. The impact was felt a thousand kilometers away, and everything living at a distance of a hundred kilometers could receive third-degree burns (this did not happen, since the area was uninhabited).
At that time, the most powerful US thermonuclear bomb was four times less powerful than the Tsar Bomba. The Soviet leadership was pleased with the result of the experiment. Moscow got what it wanted from the next hydrogen bomb. The test demonstrated that the USSR had weapons much more powerful than the United States. Subsequently, the destructive record of the “Tsar Bomba” was never broken. The most powerful hydrogen bomb explosion ever major milestone in the history of science and the Cold War.
Thermonuclear weapons of other countries
British development of the hydrogen bomb began in 1954. The project manager was William Penney, who had previously been a participant in the Manhattan Project in the USA. The British had crumbs of information about the structure of thermonuclear weapons. American allies did not share this information. In Washington, they referred to the atomic energy law passed in 1946. The only exception for the British was permission to observe the tests. They also used aircraft to collect samples left behind by American shell explosions.
At first, London decided to limit itself to creating a very powerful atomic bomb. Thus began the Orange Messenger trials. During them, the most powerful non-thermonuclear bomb in human history was dropped. Its disadvantage was its excessive cost. On November 8, 1957, a hydrogen bomb was tested. The history of the creation of the British two-stage device is an example of successful progress in conditions of lagging behind two superpowers that were arguing among themselves.
The hydrogen bomb appeared in China in 1967, in France in 1968. Thus, today there are five states in the club of countries possessing thermonuclear weapons. Information about the hydrogen bomb in North Korea. The head of the DPRK stated that his scientists were able to develop such a projectile. During the tests, seismologists different countries recorded seismic activity caused by a nuclear explosion. But there is still no concrete information about the hydrogen bomb in the DPRK.
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