The Battle of Moscow 1941 - battles with Nazi armies that took place from October 1941 to January 1942 around the Soviet capital, which was one of the main strategic goals of the forces Axles during their invasion of the USSR. The defense of the Red Army thwarted the attack of German troops.

The German offensive, called Operation Typhoon, was planned to be carried out in two pincer encirclements: one north of Moscow against the Kalinin Front, primarily by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, with a simultaneous interception railway Moscow-Leningrad, and the other south of the Moscow region against the Western Front south of Tula with the help of the 2nd Tank Group. The 4th German field army was supposed to attack Moscow head-on from the west.

Initially, Soviet troops conducted the defense, creating three defensive belts, deploying newly created reserve armies and transferring troops from the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts to help. After the Germans were stopped, the Red Army carried out a large counteroffensive and a series of smaller offensive operations, as a result of which the German armies were pushed back to the cities of Orel, Vyazma and Vitebsk. During this process, part of Hitler’s forces almost fell into encirclement.

Battle for Moscow. Documentary from the series “The Unknown War”

Background to the Battle of Moscow

The original German invasion plan (Plan Barbarossa) called for the capture of Moscow four months after the start of the war. On June 22, 1941, Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union, destroyed most of the enemy air force on the ground, and advanced inland, destroying entire enemy armies through blitzkrieg tactics. The German Army Group North moved towards Leningrad. Army Group South occupied Ukraine, and Army Group Center moved towards Moscow and crossed the Dnieper by July 1941.

In August 1941, German troops captured Smolensk, an important fortress on the road to Moscow. Moscow was already in great danger, but a decisive attack on it would have weakened both German flanks. Partly out of awareness of this, partly in order to quickly seize the agricultural and mineral resources of Ukraine, Hitler first ordered the main forces to be concentrated in the northern and southern directions and to defeat the Soviet troops near Leningrad and Kiev. This delayed the German attack on Moscow. When it was resumed, the German troops were weakened, and the Soviet command was able to find new forces to defend the city.

Plan for the German attack on Moscow

Hitler believed that the capture of the Soviet capital was not a priority task. He believed that the easiest way to bring the USSR to its knees was to deprive it of its economic strength, primarily the developed regions of the Ukrainian SSR east of Kyiv. German Commander-in-Chief of the Army Walter von Brauchitsch advocated a speedy advance to Moscow, but Hitler responded by saying that “such an idea could only come to ossified brains.” Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder He was also convinced that the German army had already inflicted sufficient damage on the Soviet troops, and now the capture of Moscow would mark the final victory in the war. This point of view was shared by the majority of German commanders. But Hitler ordered his generals to first surround enemy troops around Kyiv and complete the conquest of Ukraine. This operation was successful. By September 26, the Red Army had lost up to 660 thousand soldiers in the Kyiv area, and the Germans moved on.

Advancement of German troops in the USSR, 1941

Now, from the end of the summer, Hitler redirected his attention to Moscow and entrusted this task to Army Group Center. The force that would carry out the offensive Operation Typhoon consisted of three infantry armies (2nd, 4th and 9th), supported by three tank groups (2nd, 3rd and 4th) and 2 aviation -th Air Fleet (“Luftflot 2”) Luftwaffe. In total they amounted to two million soldiers, 1,700 tanks and 14,000 guns. The German air force, however, suffered considerable damage in the summer campaign. The Luftwaffe lost 1,603 aircraft completely destroyed and 1,028 damaged. Luftfleet 2 could provide only 549 serviceable aircraft for Operation Typhoon, including 158 medium and dive bombers and 172 fighters. The attack was supposed to be carried out using standard blitzkrieg tactics: throwing tank wedges deep into the Soviet rear, surrounding the Red Army units with “pincers” and destroying them.

Wehrmacht Three Soviet fronts confronted Moscow, forming a line of defense between the cities of Vyazma and Bryansk. The troops of these fronts also suffered greatly in previous battles. Nevertheless, it was a formidable concentration of forces of 1,250,000 soldiers, 1,000 tanks and 7,600 guns. The USSR Air Force suffered horrific losses in the first months of the war (according to some sources, 7,500, and according to others, even 21,200 aircraft). But in the Soviet rear, new aircraft were quickly manufactured. By the beginning of the Battle of Moscow, the Red Army Air Force had 936 aircraft (578 of them were bombers).

According to the plan of the operation, German troops were supposed to break down Soviet resistance along the Vyazma-Bryansk front, rush east and encircle Moscow, bypassing it from the north and south. However, continuous fighting weakened the power of the German armies. Their logistical difficulties were also very acute. Guderian wrote that some of his destroyed tanks were not replaced with new ones, and there was not enough fuel from the very beginning of the operation. Since almost all Soviet men were at the front, women and schoolchildren went out to dig anti-tank ditches around Moscow in 1941.

Beginning of the German offensive (September 30 – October 10). Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk

The German offensive initially went according to plan. The 3rd Panzer Army penetrated the enemy's defenses in the center, encountering almost no resistance, and rushed further to encircle Vyazma together with the 4th Panzer Group. Other units were to be supported by the 2nd Panzer Group Guderian close the ring around Bryansk. The Soviet defense was not yet fully built, and the “pincers” of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups converged east of Vyazma on October 10, 1941. Four Soviet armies (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd) found themselves in a huge ring here .

But the surrounded Soviet troops continued to fight, and the Wehrmacht had to use 28 divisions to destroy them. This constrained the forces that could have supported the attack on Moscow. The remnants of the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts retreated to new defensive lines around Mozhaisk. Although losses were high, some of the Soviet units were able to escape the encirclement in organized groups ranging in size from platoons to rifle divisions. The resistance of those surrounded near Vyazma gave the Soviet command time to reinforce the four armies that continued to defend Moscow (5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th). Three rifle and two tank divisions were transferred to them from the Far East, and others were on their way.

In the south, near Bryansk, the actions of the Soviet troops were just as unsuccessful as at Vyazma. The 2nd German tank group made a detour around the city and, together with the advancing 2nd Infantry Army, captured Orel by October 3, and Bryansk by October 6.

Operation Typhoon - German offensive on Moscow

But the weather began to change to the disadvantage of the Germans. On October 7, the first snow fell and quickly melted, turning roads and fields into swampy bogs. The “Russian thaw” has begun. The advance of the German tank groups slowed down noticeably, which gave the Soviet troops the opportunity to retreat and regroup.

The Red Army soldiers sometimes successfully counterattacked. For example, the 4th German Tank Division near Mtsensk was ambushed by Dmitry Lelyushenko's hastily formed 1st Guards Rifle Corps, which included Mikhail Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade. Newly created Russian tanks T-34 hid in the forest while the Germans rolled past them. Then the Soviet infantry held back the German advance, and soviet tanks victoriously attacked them from both flanks. For the Wehrmacht, this defeat was such a shock that a special investigation was ordered. Guderian discovered to his horror that the Soviet T-34s were almost invulnerable to the guns of German tanks. As he wrote, “our Panzer IV (PzKpfw IV) tanks with their short 75 mm cannons could only blow up a T-34 by hitting their engine from behind.” Guderian noted in his memoirs that "the Russians had already learned something."

The German advance was slowed by other counterattacks. The 2nd German Infantry Army, operating north of Guderian's forces against the Bryansk Front, came under heavy pressure from the Red Army, which had air support.

According to German data, during this first period of the battle for Moscow, 673 thousand Soviet soldiers fell into two bags - near Vyazma and Bryansk. Recent studies have given smaller, but still huge numbers - 514 thousand. The number of Soviet troops defending Moscow thereby decreased by 41%. On October 9, Otto Dietrich from the German Ministry of Propaganda, quoting Hitler himself, predicted at a press conference the imminent destruction of the Russian armies. Since Hitler had not yet lied about military events, Dietrich's words convinced foreign correspondents that the Soviet resistance near Moscow was about to collapse completely. The morale of German citizens, which had fallen greatly since the start of Operation Barbarossa, rose noticeably. There were rumors that by Christmas the soldiers would return home from the Russian front and that the “living space” captured in the east would enrich all of Germany.

But the resistance of the Red Army had already slowed down the Wehrmacht's advance. When the first German detachments approached Mozhaisk on October 10, they came across a new defensive barrier there, occupied by fresh Soviet troops. On the same day, Georgy Zhukov, recalled from the Leningrad Front on October 6, led the defense of Moscow and the united Western and Reserve Fronts. Colonel General became his deputy Konev. On October 12, Zhukov ordered to concentrate all available forces on strengthening the Mozhaisk line. This decision was supported by the actual head of the Soviet General Staff Alexander Vasilevsky. The Luftwaffe still controlled the skies wherever they went. Stuka (Junkers Ju 87) and bomber groups flew 537 sorties, destroying about 440 Vehicle and 150 pieces of artillery.

On October 15, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the leadership of the Communist Party, the General Staff and administrative institutions from Moscow to Kuibyshev (Samara), leaving only a small number of officials in the capital. This evacuation caused panic among Muscovites. On October 16-17, most of the capital's population tried to flee, crowding trains and clogging roads out of the city. To ease the panic somewhat, it was announced that Stalin himself would remain in Moscow.

Fighting on the Mozhaisk defense line (October 13 – 30)

By October 13, 1941, the main forces of the Wehrmacht reached the Mozhaisk defense line - a hastily built double row of fortifications on the western approaches to Moscow, which went from Kalinin (Tver) towards Volokolamsk and Kaluga. Despite recent reinforcements, only about 90,000 Soviet troops defended this line - too few to stop the German advance. Given this weakness, Zhukov decided to concentrate his forces in four critical points: 16th Army General Rokossovsky defended Volokolamsk. Mozhaisk was defended by the 5th Army of General Govorov. The 43rd army of General Golubev was stationed at Maloyaroslavets, and the 49th army of General Zakharkin was at Kaluga. The entire Soviet Western Front - almost destroyed after the encirclement at Vyazma - was recreated almost from scratch.

Moscow itself was hastily strengthened. According to Zhukov, 250 thousand women and teenagers built trenches and anti-tank ditches around the capital, shoveling three million cubic meters of earth without the help of machinery. Moscow factories were hastily transferred to a war footing: an automobile plant began making machine guns, a watch factory produced detonators for mines, a chocolate factory produced food for the front, automobile repair stations repaired damaged tanks and military equipment. Moscow had already been subjected to German air raids, but the damage from them was relatively small thanks to powerful air defense and the skillful actions of civilian fire brigades.

On October 13, 1941, the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive. Initially, German troops attempted to bypass the Soviet defenses by moving northeast toward weakly defended Kalinin and south toward Kaluga. By October 14, Kalinin and Kaluga were captured. Inspired by these first successes, the Germans launched a frontal attack against the enemy fortified line, taking Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on October 18, Naro-Fominsk on October 21, and Volokolamsk on October 27, after stubborn fighting. Due to the growing danger of flank attacks, Zhukov was forced to retreat east of the Nara River.

In the south, Guderian's Second Panzer Group initially advanced to Tula easily, because the Mozhaisk defense line did not extend that far to the south and there were few Soviet troops in the area. However, bad weather, fuel problems, destroyed roads and bridges delayed the German movement, and Guderian reached the outskirts of Tula only on October 26. The German plan envisaged a quick capture of Tula in order to extend its claw east of Moscow. However, the first attack on Tula was repulsed on October 29 by the 50th Army and civilian volunteers after a desperate battle near the city itself. On October 31, the German High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations Until the painful logistics problems are resolved, the mudslide will not stop.

Break in fighting (November 1-15)

By the end of October 1941, German troops were severely exhausted. They had only a third of their means of transportation, and their infantry divisions had been reduced to half, or even a third, of their strength. Extended supply lines prevented the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler, it seemed, had already come to terms with the idea of ​​the inevitability of a long struggle for Moscow, since the prospect of a parcel in such Big city tanks without the support of heavily armed infantry looked risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.

To boost the spirit of the Red Army and the civilian population, Stalin ordered the traditional military parade on the Red Square. Soviet troops marched past the Kremlin, heading from there straight to the front. The parade was great symbolic meaning, demonstrating unwavering determination to fight the enemy. But despite this bright “show,” the position of the Red Army remained unstable. Although 100,000 new soldiers strengthened the defenses of Klin and Tula, where renewed German attacks were about to be expected, the Soviet line of defense remained comparatively weak. However, Stalin ordered several counter-offensives against German forces. They were started despite the protests of Zhukov, who pointed out the complete lack of reserves. The Wehrmacht repelled most of these counter-offensives, and they only weakened the Soviet forces. The Red Army's only notable success was southwest of Moscow, at Aleksin, where Soviet tanks inflicted serious damage on the 4th Army because the Germans still lacked anti-tank guns capable of fighting the new, heavily armored T-34 tanks. .

From October 31 to November 15, the Wehrmacht High Command prepared the second stage of the attack on Moscow. The combat capabilities of Army Group Center fell greatly due to battle fatigue. The Germans were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the east and the presence of considerable reserves among the enemy. But given the enormity of the victims suffered by the Red Army, they did not expect that the USSR would be able to organize a strong defense. Compared to October, Soviet rifle divisions took up a much stronger defensive position: a triple defensive ring around Moscow and the remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most Soviet troops now had multi-layered defense, with a second echelon behind them. Artillery and sapper teams were concentrated along the main roads. Finally, the Soviet troops - especially the officers - were now much more experienced.

By November 15, 1941, the ground was completely frozen and there was no more mud. The armored wedges of the Wehrmacht, numbering 51 divisions, were now going to move forward to encircle Moscow and connect to the east of it, in the Noginsk region. The German 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had to concentrate between the Volga Reservoir and Mozhaisk, and then move past the Soviet 30th Army to Klin and Solnechnogorsk, encircling the capital from the north. In the south, the 2nd Tank Group intended to bypass Tula, still held by the Red Army, to move to Kashira and Kolomna, and from them - towards the northern claw, to Noginsk. The German 4th Infantry Army in the center was supposed to pin down the troops of the Western Front.

Resumption of the German offensive (November 15–December 4)

On November 15, 1941, the German tank armies began an offensive towards Klin, where there were no Soviet reserves due to Stalin's order to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk. This order forced the withdrawal of all forces from Klin to the south. The first German attacks split the Soviet front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th Army. Several days of fierce fighting followed. Zhukov recalled in his memoirs that the enemy, despite the losses, attacked head-on, wanting to break through to Moscow at any cost. But the “multi-layered” defense reduced the number of Soviet casualties. The 16th Russian Army slowly retreated, constantly snapping at the German divisions that were pressing it.

The 3rd German Panzer Group captured Klin on November 24, after heavy fighting, and Solnechnogorsk on November 25. Stalin asked Zhukov whether it would be possible to defend Moscow, ordering him to “answer honestly, like a communist.” Zhukov replied that it was possible to defend, but reserves were urgently needed. By November 28, the German 7th Panzer Division had secured a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal—the last major obstacle before Moscow—and had taken up a position less than 35 km away. from the Kremlin, but a powerful counterattack by the 1st Soviet Shock Army forced the Nazis to retreat. To the northwest of Moscow, Wehrmacht forces reached Krasnaya Polyana, a little over 20 km. from the city. German officers could see some of the large buildings of the Russian capital through field binoculars. The troops of both sides were severely depleted, some regiments were left with 150-200 fighters.

On November 18, 1941, fighting resumed in the south, near Tula. The 2nd German Panzer Group tried to surround this city. And here the German troops were badly battered in previous battles - and still did not have winter clothing. As a result, their advance was only 5-10 km. in a day. German tank crews were subjected to flank attacks by the Soviet 49th and 50th armies located near Tula. Guderian, however, continued the offensive, taking Stalinogorsk (now Novomoskovsk) on November 22, 1941 and encircling the Soviet rifle division stationed there. On November 26, German tanks approached Kashira, a city that controls the main highway to Moscow. The next day, a persistent Soviet counterattack began. General Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, supported by hastily put together formations (173rd Rifle Division, 9th Tank Brigade, two separate tank battalions, militia detachments), stopped the German offensive near Kashira. In early December the Germans were driven back and the southern approaches to Moscow were secured. Tula did not give up either. In the south, Wehrmacht forces did not approach Moscow as closely as in the north.

Having encountered strong resistance in the north and south, the Wehrmacht attempted on December 1 to mount a direct attack on the Russian capital from the west along the Minsk-Moscow highway, near Naro-Fominsk. But this attack had only weak tank support against powerful Soviet defenses. Faced with staunch resistance from the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks from the Russian 33rd Army, the German offensive stalled and was repulsed four days later by a launched Soviet counteroffensive. On December 2, one German reconnaissance battalion managed to reach the city of Khimki - about 8 km from Moscow - and capture the bridge over the Moscow-Volga canal, as well as the railway station. This episode marked the furthest breakthrough of German troops to Moscow.

Meanwhile, severe frosts began. November 30th Fedor von Bock reported to Berlin that the temperature was -45° C. Although, according to the Soviet weather service, the most low temperature December reached only –28.8° C, German troops without winter clothing froze even with it. Their technical equipment was not suitable for such harsh weather conditions. More than 130 thousand cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. The oil in the engines froze; the engines had to be warmed up for several hours before use. The cold weather also harmed the Soviet troops, but they were better prepared for it.

The Axis advance on Moscow stopped. Heinz Guderian wrote in his diary: “the attack on Moscow failed... We underestimated the enemy’s strength, distances and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on December 5, otherwise disaster would have been inevitable."

Some historians believe that artificial floods played an important role in the defense of Moscow. They were organized mainly to break the ice and prevent German troops from crossing the Volga and the Moscow Sea. The first such act was the explosion of the dam of the Istra reservoir on November 24, 1941. The second was the draining of water from 6 reservoirs (Khimki, Iksha, Pyalovsk, Pestov, Pirogov, Klyazma) and the Moscow Sea in the Dubna area on November 28, 1941. Both were carried out by order Soviet General Staff 0428 dated November 17, 1941. These floods, in the midst of severe winter time, partially flooded about 30-40 villages.

Although the Wehrmacht advance was stopped, German intelligence believed that the Russians no longer had reserves left and would not be able to organize a counteroffensive. This assessment turned out to be wrong. The Soviet command transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks and more than 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to Moscow. By early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin, the Red Army had created a reserve of 58 divisions. Even with these new reserves, the Soviet troops involved in the Moscow operation numbered only 1.1 million people, only slightly larger than the Wehrmacht. However, through skillful deployment of troops, a ratio of two to one was achieved at some critical points.

On December 5, 1941, a counteroffensive with the goal of “removing the immediate threat to Moscow” began on the Kalinin Front. The Southwestern and Western Fronts began their offensive operations a day later. After several days of little progress, Soviet troops in the north recaptured Solnechnogorsk on December 12, and Klin on December 15. In the south, Guderian's army hastily retreated to Venev and then to Sukhinichi. The threat to Thule was lifted.

Counter-offensive of the Russian army near Moscow in the winter of 1941

On December 8, Hitler signed Directive No. 9, ordering the Wehrmacht to go on the defensive along the entire front. The Germans were unable to organize strong defensive lines in the places where they were by that time, and were forced to retreat in order to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that on the same day a discussion took place with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram von Richthofen, and both of these commanders agreed that the Germans could not hold the current front line. On December 14, Halder and Kluge, without Hitler's approval, gave permission for a limited withdrawal west of the Oka River. On December 20, during a meeting with German commanders, Hitler prohibited this withdrawal and ordered his soldiers to defend every piece of land. Guderian protested, pointing out that losses from the cold exceeded combat losses and that the supply of winter equipment was hampered by the difficulties of the route through Poland. Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on defending the existing front line. Guderian was dismissed on December 25, along with Generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th Panzer and 9th Field Army. Feodor von Bock was also dismissed, formally for medical reasons. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, was removed from his post even earlier, on December 19.

Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued in the north. The Red Army liberated Kalinin. Retreating from the Kalinin Front, the Germans found themselves in a “bulge” around Klin. The front commander, General Konev, tried to envelop the enemy troops in it. Zhukov transferred additional forces to the southern end of the “bulge” so that Konev could trap the German 3rd Tank Army, but the Germans managed to withdraw in time. Although it was not possible to create an encirclement, the Nazi defenses here were destroyed. A second encirclement attempt was made against the 2nd Tank Army near Tula, but met strong resistance at Rzhev and was abandoned. The front line protrusion at Rzhev lasted until 1943. In the south important success was the encirclement and destruction of the 39th German Corps, which defended the southern flank of the 2nd Tank Army.

The Luftwaffe found itself paralyzed in the second half of December. Until January 1942, the weather remained very cold, making it difficult to start car engines. The Germans did not have enough ammunition. The Luftwaffe practically disappeared from the skies over Moscow, and the Soviet Air Force, operating from better prepared bases and supplied from close behind, strengthened. On January 4 the sky cleared. The Luftwaffe was quickly receiving reinforcements, and Hitler hoped that they would “save” the situation. Two groups of bombers arrived from Germany re-equipped (II./KG 4 and II./KG 30). Four groups of transport aircraft (102 Junkers Ju 52) were transferred near Moscow from the 4th German Air Fleet to evacuate encircled units and improve supplies for the German front. This last desperate effort by the Germans did not remain in vain. Air support helped prevent the complete defeat of Army Group Center, which the Russians were already aiming for. From December 17 to 22, Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed 299 vehicles and 23 tanks near Tula, making it difficult to pursue the retreating German army.

In the central part of the front, the Soviet advance was much slower. Only on December 26, Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk, on December 28 - Kaluga, and on January 2 - Maloyaroslavets, after 10 days of fighting. Soviet reserves were running low, and on January 7, 1942, Zhukov's counteroffensive was stopped. It threw the exhausted and freezing Nazis back 100-250 km. from Moscow. Stalin demanded new offensives to trap and destroy Army Group Center, but the Red Army was overworked and these attempts failed.

VL / Articles / Interesting

How it happened: what Hitler actually faced on June 22, 1941 (part 1)

22-06-2016, 08:44

On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, Germany treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union and, starting to bomb our cities with peacefully sleeping children, immediately declared itself as a criminal force without human face. The bloodiest war in the entire history of the Russian state began.

Our fight with Europe was deadly. On June 22, 1941, German troops launched an attack on the USSR in three directions: eastern (Army Group Center) to Moscow, southeastern (Army Group South) to Kyiv and northeastern (Army Group North) to Leningrad. In addition, the German Army “Norway” was advancing towards Murmansk.

Together with the German armies, the armies of Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and volunteer formations from Croatia, Slovakia, Spain, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and other European countries attacked the USSR.

On June 22, 1941, 5.5 million soldiers and officers of Hitler’s Germany and its satellites crossed the border of the USSR and invaded our land, but in terms of the number of troops, the armed forces of Germany alone exceeded the Armed Forces of the USSR by 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and a little more than 5 million people in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. Together with the armies of the Allies, Germany on June 22, 1941 had at least 11 million trained, armed soldiers and officers and could very quickly make up for the losses of its army and strengthen its troops.

And if the number of German troops alone exceeded the number of Soviet troops by 1.6 times, then together with the troops of the European allies it exceeded the number of Soviet troops by at least 2.2 times. Such a monstrously huge force opposed the Red Army.

The industry of the Europe it united with a population of about 400 million people worked for Germany, which was almost 2 times the population of the USSR, which had 195 million people.

At the beginning of the war, compared to the German troops and its allies that attacked the USSR, the Red Army had 19,800 more guns and mortars, 86 more warships of the main classes, and the Red Army also outnumbered the attacking enemy in the number of machine guns. Small arms, guns of all calibers and mortars were not only not inferior in combat characteristics, but in many cases were superior to German weapons.

As for armored forces and aviation, our army had them in quantities that far exceeded the number of units of this equipment available to the enemy at the beginning of the war. But the bulk of our tanks and aircraft, compared to the German ones, were “old generation” weapons, morally obsolete. Most of the tanks had only bulletproof armor. A significant percentage were also faulty aircraft and tanks subject to write-off.

At the same time, it should be noted that before the start of the war, the Red Army received 595 units of KB heavy tanks and 1225 units of T-34 medium tanks, as well as 3719 new types of aircraft: Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3 fighters, Il-3 bombers 4 (DB-ZF), Pe-8 (TB-7), Pe-2, Il-2 attack aircraft. Basically, we designed and produced the specified new, expensive and high-tech equipment in the period from the beginning of 1939 to the middle of 1941, that is for the most part during the non-aggression pact concluded in 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

It was the presence of a large number of weapons that allowed us to survive and win. For despite the huge losses of weapons in the initial period of the war, we still had a sufficient amount of weapons to resist during the retreat and for the offensive near Moscow.

It must also be said that in 1941 the German army did not have equipment similar to ours heavy tanks KB, armored attack aircraft IL-2 and rocket artillery such as BM-13 (Katyusha), which can hit targets at a distance of more than eight kilometers.

Due to the poor performance of Soviet intelligence, our army did not know the direction of the main attacks planned by the enemy. Therefore, the Germans had the opportunity to create a multiple superiority of military forces in breakthrough areas and break through our defenses.

The capabilities of Soviet intelligence are greatly exaggerated in order to belittle the military merits and technical achievements of the USSR. Our troops were retreating under the pressure of superior enemy forces. Units of the Red Army had to either quickly retreat to avoid encirclement, or fight in encirclement. And it was not so easy to withdraw the troops, because in many cases the mobility of the German mechanized formations that broke through our defenses exceeded the mobility of our troops.

Of course, not all groups of Soviet troops were capable of mobile German formations. The bulk of the German infantry advanced on foot, just as our troops mostly retreated, which allowed many units of the Red Army to retreat to new lines of defense.

The encircled covering troops held back the advance of the Nazi hordes until the last possible opportunity, and the units retreating in the battles, joining forces with the 2nd echelon troops, significantly slowed down the advance of the German armies.

In order to stop the German armies that had broken through the border, large reserves were needed, equipped with mobile formations that could quickly approach the site of the breakthrough and push the enemy back. We did not have such reserves, since the country did not have the economic capacity to maintain an army of 11 million in peacetime.

It is unfair to blame the USSR government for this development of events. Despite the desperate resistance to industrialization from certain forces within the country, our government and our people did everything they could to create and arm the army. It was impossible to do more in the time available to the Soviet Union.

Our intelligence, of course, was not up to par. But it’s only in the movies that scouts get blueprints for airplanes and atomic bombs. IN real life Such drawings will take up more than one railway car. Our intelligence did not have the opportunity to obtain the Barbarossa plan in 1941. But even knowing the direction of the main attacks, we would have to retreat before the monstrous force of the enemy. But in this case we would have fewer losses.

According to all theoretical calculations, the USSR should have lost this war, but we won it because we knew how to work and fight like no one else on earth. Hitler conquered Europe, except Poland, in an effort to unite and subordinate to the will of Germany. And he sought to exterminate us both in battles, both the civilian population and our prisoners of war. About the war against the USSR, Hitler said: “We are talking about a war of extermination.”

But everything didn’t go as planned for Hitler: the Russians left more than half of their troops far from the border, announced mobilization after the start of the war, as a result of which they had people to recruit new divisions, took military factories to the East, did not lose heart, but fought steadfastly for every inch of land. The German General Staff was horrified by Germany's losses in men and equipment.

The losses of our retreating army in 1941, of course, were greater than the German ones. The German army created a new organizational structure, including tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, engineering units and communications units, which made it possible not only to break through the enemy’s defenses, but also to develop it in depth, breaking away from the bulk of its troops by tens of kilometers. The proportions of all types of troops were carefully calculated by the Germans and tested in battles in Europe. With such a structure, tank formations became a strategic means of combat.

We needed time to create such troops from newly manufactured equipment. In the summer of 1941, we had neither the experience of creating and using such formations, nor the number of trucks needed to transport infantry. Our mechanized corps, created on the eve of the war, were significantly less advanced than the German ones.

The German General Staff assigned the name “Barbarossa” to the plan for an attack on the USSR, named after the German emperor of horrific cruelty. On June 29, 1941, Hitler declared: “In four weeks we will be in Moscow, and it will be plowed up.”

Not a single German general in his forecasts spoke about the capture of Moscow later than August. For everyone, August was the deadline for the capture of Moscow, and October - the territory of the USSR to the Urals along the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.

The US military believed that Germany would be busy in the war with the Russians from one to three months, and the British military - from three to six weeks. They made such predictions because they knew well the force of the blow that Germany unleashed on the USSR. The West assessed how long we would last in the war with Germany.

The German government was so confident of a quick victory that it did not even consider it necessary to spend money on warm winter uniforms for the army.

Enemy troops were advancing from the Barents to the Black Seas on a front stretching over 2,000 thousand kilometers.

Germany was counting on a blitzkrieg, that is, a lightning strike on our armed forces and their destruction as a result of this lightning strike. The location of 57% of Soviet troops in the 2nd and 3rd echelons initially contributed to the disruption of the Germans' plan for the blitzkrieg. And in combination with the tenacity of our troops in the 1st echelon of defense, the German plan for a blitzkrieg was completely disrupted.

And what kind of blitzkrieg can we talk about if the Germans in the summer of 1941 could not even destroy our aviation. From the first day of the war, the Luftwaffe paid a huge price for their desire to destroy our aircraft at airfields and in the air.

People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR from 1940 to 1946 A.I. Shakhurin wrote: “During the period from June 22 to July 5, 1941, the German Air Force lost 807 aircraft of all types, and during the period from July 6 to 19, another 477 aircraft. A third of the German air force that they had before the attack on our country was destroyed.”

Thus, only for the first month of fighting in the period from 22.06. By July 19, 1941, Germany lost 1284 aircraft, and in less than five months of fighting - 5180 aircraft. Surprisingly, only a few people in all of greater Russia know about such glorious victories of ours in the most unfortunate period of the war for us.

So who destroyed these 1,284 Luftwaffe aircraft in the first month of the war and with what weapons? These planes were destroyed by our pilots and anti-aircraft gunners in the same way as enemy tanks were destroyed by our artillerymen, because the Red Army had anti-tank guns, planes and anti-aircraft guns.

And in October 1941, the Red Army had enough weapons to hold the front. At this time, the defense of Moscow was carried out to the limit human strength. Only Soviet, Russian people could fight like that. Deserves a kind word from I.V. Stalin, who back in July 1941 organized the construction of concrete pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank barriers and other defensive military construction structures, fortified areas (Urov) on the approaches to Moscow, who managed to provide weapons, ammunition, food and uniforms fighting army.

The Germans were stopped near Moscow, first of all, because even in the fall of 1941, our men fighting the enemy had weapons to shoot down planes, burn tanks and crush enemy infantry to the ground.

On November 29, 1941, our troops liberated Rostov-on-Don in the south, and Tikhvin in the north on December 9. Having pinned down the southern and northern groups of German troops in battle, our command created favorable conditions for the Red Army’s offensive near Moscow.

It was not the Siberian divisions that provided the opportunity for our troops to go on the offensive near Moscow, but the reserve armies created by Headquarters and brought to Moscow before our troops went on the offensive. A. M. Vasilevsky recalled: “A major event was the completion of the training of regular and extraordinary reserve formations. At the line Vytegra - Rybinsk - Gorky - Saratov - Stalingrad - Astrakhan, a new strategic line was created for the Red Army. Here, on the basis of the decision of the State Defense Committee, adopted on October 5, ten reserve armies were formed. Their creation throughout the Battle of Moscow was one of the main and daily concerns of the Party Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and Headquarters. We, the leaders of the General Staff, daily reported in detail on the progress of the creation of these formations when reporting to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the situation at the fronts. It can be said without exaggeration: in the outcome of the Moscow Battle, the decisive factor was that the party and Soviet people“new armies were formed, armed, trained and deployed to the capital in a timely manner.”

The Battle of Moscow can be divided into two parts: defensive from September 30 to December 5, 1941 and offensive from December 5 to April 20, 1942.

And if in June 1941 we were suddenly attacked by German troops, then in December 1941, near Moscow, our Soviet troops suddenly attacked the Germans. Despite the deep snow and frost, our army advanced successfully. The German army began to panic. Only Hitler's intervention prevented the complete defeat of the German troops.

The monstrous power of Europe, faced with Russian power, could not defeat us and, under the blows of Soviet troops, fled back to the West. In 1941, our great-grandfathers and grandfathers defended the right to life and, celebrating the New Year of 1942, proclaimed toasts to the Victory.

In 1942, our troops continued to advance. The Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Kalinin, Smolensk, Ryazan and Oryol regions were liberated. The manpower losses of Army Group Center alone, which had recently been stationed near Moscow for the period from January 1 to March 30, 1942, amounted to over 333 thousand people.

But the enemy was still strong. Already by May 1942, the Nazi army had 6.2 million people and weapons superior to the Red Army. Our army numbered 5.1 million people. without air defense troops and the Navy.

Thus, in the summer of 1942, against our ground forces, Germany and its allies had 1.1 million more soldiers and officers. Germany and its allies maintained superiority in troop numbers from the first day of the war until 1943. In the summer of 1942, 217 enemy divisions and 20 brigades were operating on the Soviet-German front, that is, about 80% of all German ground forces.

In connection with this circumstance, the Headquarters did not transfer troops from the Western to the Southwestern direction. This decision was correct, as was the decision to place strategic reserves in the area of ​​Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad and Saratov.

Most of our forces and resources were concentrated not in the southwestern, but in the western direction. Ultimately, this distribution of forces led to the defeat of the German, or rather European army, and in this regard it is inappropriate to talk about the incorrect distribution of our troops by the summer of 1942. It was thanks to this distribution of troops that in November we were able to gather forces at Stalingrad sufficient to defeat the enemy, and were able to replenish our troops when conducting defensive battles.

In the summer of 1942, against German troops superior to us in strength and means, we could not hold the defense for long in the direction of the main attack, and were forced to retreat under the threat of encirclement.

It was still impossible to compensate for the missing numbers with artillery, aviation and other types of weapons, since the evacuated enterprises were just beginning to operate at full capacity, and the European military industry was still superior to the military industry Soviet Union.

German troops continued their offensive along the western (right) bank of the Don and sought, at all costs, to reach the large bend of the river. Soviet troops retreated to natural lines where they could gain a foothold.

By mid-July, the enemy captured Valuiki, Rossosh, Boguchar, Kantemirovka, and Millerovo. The eastern road to Stalingrad and the southern road to the Caucasus opened before him.

The Battle of Stalingrad is divided into two periods: defensive from July 17 to November 18 and offensive, which ended with the liquidation of a huge enemy group, from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943.

The defensive operation began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies offered fierce resistance to the enemy at the border of the Chir and Tsymla rivers for 6 days.

The troops of Germany and its allies were unable to take Stalingrad.

The offensive of our troops began on November 19, 1942. The troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the offensive. This day went down in our history as Artillery Day. On November 20, 1942, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On November 23, troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts united in the area of ​​Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky, closing the encirclement of German troops. The Headquarters and our General Staff calculated everything very well, tying Paulus’s army hand and foot at a great distance from our advancing troops, the 62nd Army located in Stalingrad, and the offensive of the Don Front troops.

Our courageous soldiers and officers celebrated New Year's Eve 1943, just like New Year's Eve 1942 winners.

A huge contribution to the organization of the victory at Stalingrad was made by the Headquarters and the General Staff, headed by A. M. Vasilevsky.

During Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted 200 days and nights, Germany and its allies lost ¼ of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front. “The total losses of enemy troops in the Don, Volga, Stalingrad area amounted to 1.5 million people, up to 3,500 tanks and assault guns, 12 thousand guns and mortars, up to 3 thousand aircraft and a large number of other technology. Such losses of forces and means had a catastrophic impact on the overall strategic situation and shook the entire military machine of Hitler’s Germany to the core,” wrote G. K. Zhukov.

Over the two winter months of 1942-1943, the defeated German army was thrown back to the positions from which it launched its offensive in the summer of 1942. This big victory our troops gave additional strength to both fighters and home front workers.

The troops of Germany and their allies were defeated near Leningrad. On January 18, 1943, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts united, the ring of the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

A narrow corridor 8-11 kilometers wide, adjacent to the southern coast of Lake Ladoga, was cleared of the enemy and connected Leningrad with the country. Long-distance trains began running from Leningrad to Vladivostok.

Hitler was going to take Leningrad in 4 weeks by July 21, 1941 and send the liberated troops to storm Moscow, but he could not take the city by January 1944. Hitler ordered proposals to surrender the city to German troops not to be accepted and to wipe the city off the face of the earth, but in fact, the German divisions stationed near Leningrad were wiped off the face of the earth by the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. Hitler declared that Leningrad would be the first big city, captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union and spared no effort to capture it, but did not take into account that he was fighting not in Europe, but in Soviet Russia. I did not take into account the courage of the Leningraders and the strength of our weapons.

The victorious completion of the Battle of Stalingrad and the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad became possible not only thanks to the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, the ingenuity of our soldiers and the knowledge of our military leaders, but, above all, thanks to the heroic work of the rear.

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, J.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the order " Patriotic War", this name was officially assigned. And the name “Great Patriotic War” appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are already talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
The question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at the beginning and for the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad are still being debated. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not do what they were obliged to do because they took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation; ordinary people were wary of rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world,” which was constantly repeated in newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, and on his own territory, who had encroached on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev, decisions of the 20th Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who was “afraid” of Hitler, and at the same time “believed” him, forbade the generals to bring troops western districts into combat readiness before June 22, thanks to which, in the end, the Red Army soldiers met the war sleeping in their barracks”;
“The main thing, of course, that weighed on him, on all his activities, which also affected us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces" (From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military Historical Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the Ogonyok magazine No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities.....” (G.K. Zhukov, “Memories and Reflections.” M. Olma -Press. 2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and importance of the General Staff.... took little interest in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to comprehensively report to I. Stalin on the state of the country’s defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy...” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

It still sounds in different interpretations that the “main culprit,” of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot,” “everyone was afraid of him,” and “nothing happened without his will,” “he did not allow the troops to be brought into combat.” readiness in advance,” and “forced” the generals to leave soldiers in “sleeping” barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation that took place in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I’m gone, more than one bucket of dirt will be poured on my head, a heap of garbage will be placed on my grave. But I’m sure that the winds of history will blow all this away!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, written in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this evidence, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall on him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me.”
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed at one time, is characteristic, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to abstract ourselves from everything personal and follow only the truth; it is unacceptable to try to place all the blame for the surprise attack of Nazi Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless complaints of our military leaders about “suddenness,” one can see an attempt to absolve themselves of all responsibility for failures in the combat training of troops and in their command and control during the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all levels - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep their troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and explaining failure to fulfill it with references to I.V. Stalin does not suit the soldiers.”
Stalin, by the way, just like them, took a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that it was precisely those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, the rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, is what former People's Commissar of the USSR Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister must also be responsible for something... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I certainly bear responsibility for this. Otherwise it’s all about Stalin...”
The same were great commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from his post as Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and assigned him to the 2nd Belorussian Front.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Polyak to take Berlin, and G.K. became Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov gave almost all of his Front Headquarters officers, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky was always distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
The troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. E. Golovanov was proud that he had the honor of serving the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military leaders and historians talk about the same thing.

This is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia” Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise of the attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s formulation was invented at one time in order to blame Stalin for the defeat at the beginning of the war and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period... "

According to the long-term head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Army General P. I. Ivashutin, “neither in strategic nor in tactical terms was Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union sudden” (VIZH 1990, No. 5).

In the pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in mobilization and training.
Hitler announced universal conscription on March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only on September 1, 1939.
As we see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to dress and how to arm the conscripts, and only then, if calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as many as, according to calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the “Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940,” developed by its leader since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army had only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and rearm it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

J.V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that it would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than the middle of 1942-43. That is why he tried to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but he continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to delay time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and feared Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish war, in personal diary A recording appeared from the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, which recorded the following words of Stalin that she personally heard during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for resistance, for war with Hitler.”

As to whether Stalin “trusted” Hitler, his speech at a Politburo meeting on November 18, 1940, summing up the results of Molotov’s visit to Berlin, is very clear:

“….As we know, Hitler, immediately after our delegation left Berlin, loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we know the value of these statements well! It was clear to us even before meeting Hitler that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the security requirements of our country...
We viewed the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to test the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his persistent reluctance to take into account the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to end the actual occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about the non-infringement of the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, he is at the same time trying to gain time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the issue of further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations...
It was at this time that we managed to prevent an attack by Nazi Germany. And in this matter, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite; the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but has not been completely eliminated.

But by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot consider the Soviet-German Pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
Issues of state security are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been pushed to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops brought into combat readiness in the near, but... not in the immediate rear.”
(Final words I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops of the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“….Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with Nazi Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink to the war, to the offensive in the war, to our victory in this war...."

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshall S.K. Tymoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present, so that they would think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which newspapers around the world are trumpeting.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the district troops:

“War creeps up unnoticed and will begin with a sudden attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. In the mid-1970s, Molotov recalled the beginning of the war as follows:

“We knew that war was just around the corner, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was where we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on equal terms. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, no one could be prepared for the hour of attack, not even the Lord God!
We were expecting an attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would have said: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!”
The TASS message of June 14, 1941 was sent to not give the Germans any reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort... It turned out that Hitler became the aggressor on June 22 in front of the whole world. And we had allies.... Already in 1939, he was determined to start a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or several months. Of course, we knew that we had to be prepared for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It’s very difficult...” (F. Chuev. “One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov.”

They say and write a lot about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on Germany’s preparation for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the heads of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A., recalled. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated by intelligence materials (why will be shown below - sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was entrusted with bringing it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability of a long war with Russia for Germany, emphasizing the fact that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals that is invulnerable to German attack.”

For example, I. Stalin ordered that the German military attache in Moscow be acquainted with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
At the beginning of April 1941, he was allowed to tour new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attaché in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate possible aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on the instructions of Stalin, specifically provided the Harbin station of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to “intercept and decipher” a certain “circular from Moscow”, which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union had prepared to defend its interests.” (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

Foreign intelligence received the most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR through its agents (the "magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, Maclean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations conducted with Hitler by the British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and by Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed with Hitler’s demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany’s expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of senior representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data were received on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion (“Seekckt’s testament”) that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if fighting will drag on for more than two months and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of military industry and raw materials production in the European part of the USSR.”
The conclusion, as we see, was completely justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German intelligence department, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude the 1939 non-aggression pact.
In 1935, data was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a flight range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged description of Germany’s intentions towards the USSR, specific goals, timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained unclear.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler’s proposals for delimiting the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We must also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not escape intelligence. Our residency in Germany and other countries was greatly weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov said that he “purged 14 thousand security officers”

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to begin aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to begin military operations no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - to be very happy for himself and then set June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at Wehrmacht headquarters, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa.

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 “Plan Barbarossa”.

In January 1941, it was obtained by the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, Sam Edison Woods, through his connections in government and military circles in Germany.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, K. Umansky, be familiarized with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Semner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, indicating the source.

The information from the Americans was a very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information from the intelligence department of the NKGB and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it.” (Sudoplatov P.A. “Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941.” M., 2001).

But the date - June 22nd - is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-time head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSH), Army General Ivashutin, said:
“The texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning Germany’s military preparations and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People’s Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff.”

Therefore, G.K.’s statement looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan... Let me declare with full responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People’s Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections” M. APN 1975 pp. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. have at his disposal then? Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and also was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (from February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - “Options for military operations of the German army against the USSR,” compiled on the basis of all the intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country’s leadership.

This document outlined options for possible directions of attacks by German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the “Barbarossa Plan” and the direction of the main attacks of German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question asked to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(It is characteristic that in his most “truthful book about the war” G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov insisted that on the eve of the war he knew nothing about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. testified. Zhukov received copies of these German documents, which bore the signatures of Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the report dated March 20, 1941 and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing for an attack on the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 the head of the RU General Staff F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Tymoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, presented a report “On plans for a German attack on the USSR,” which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and the number of concentrated German divisions;
-On May 15, 1941, the RU message “On the distribution of the German armed forces across theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on Romania’s military preparations. Until June 22, a number of more messages were submitted.

As stated above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about potential opportunities enemy.
What capabilities of a potential enemy could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity to make a detailed report to I. Stalin, this is also a complete lie in “the most truthful book about the war.”
For example, only in June 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment of his appointment to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office.
This is evidenced by the entries in the log of visits to I. Stalin’s office.
(“At a reception with Stalin. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)” Moscow. New chronograph, 2008. The records of the duty secretaries of the reception of I.V., stored in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, are published. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day the time of stay of all his visitors in Stalin’s Kremlin office was recorded down to the minute).

During the same period, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of Staff, they visited Stalin's office several times. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilova, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, Army General Meretskov, Aviation Lieutenant Generals Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement Plan Barbarossa.

The directive defined “Day B” - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of senior military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Halder “On setting a date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"1. The D-Day of Operation Barbarossa is proposed to be June 22, 1941.
2. If this deadline is postponed, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main attack will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned and that open execution of the order can begin.
b) Alton signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aviation, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.”

Unfortunately, our foreign, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determining the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht’s rate of blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the reliance on blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.”

Foreign intelligence reports about Germany's military preparations came from various stations: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin station “Corsican” (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. Began collaborating with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 arrested and executed) conveyed information that “at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union." There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin station that on December 18, Hitler, speaking on the occasion of the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, sharply spoke out against “the injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one-sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice."

“In those pre-war years, there was a procedure for reporting to the country’s leadership each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without an analytical assessment. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose these or other measures were being carried out, whether a political decision had been made to attack, etc.
No summary materials were prepared, with an in-depth analysis of all information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country’s leadership.” (“Hitler’s secrets on Stalin’s table”, published by Moscow City Archives, 1995).

In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “inundated” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, in the development of which the highest ranks of the Third Reich took part.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, document No. 44142/41 “Guidelines of the Supreme High Command for camouflaging the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, signed by Keitel, which provided for concealing from the enemy preparations for the operation under the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed, at the first stage, “until April to maintain uncertainty about one’s intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.”

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 “Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces dated May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union.”
This document provided:

“...from May 22, with the introduction of a maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue preparations for an attack on England with particular energy...
Among the formations located in the East, rumors about rear cover against Russia and a “distractive concentration of forces in the East” should circulate, and troops located on the English Channel should believe in real preparations for the invasion of England...
To spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England...”
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted more than 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to the island of Crete. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin station was exposed to the agent provocateur “Lyceumist” (O. Berlinks, 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, testified during interrogation in May 1947 that in August 1940, Amayak Kobulov (resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was set up by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceist”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr long time supplied him with disinformation materials.).
The results of the meeting between the Lyceum Student and Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from “Lyceumist” about the low probability of war between Germany and the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of USSR troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of “Lyceumist”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that quickly determining the true identity of the “Lyceumist” left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin Kobulov supplied the “Lyceumist” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation campaigns, information began to appear that German preparations at our borders are aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept demands of an economic and territorial nature, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin allegedly intends to put forward.

Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, it would not be able to defeat England.
All this disinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin station, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence received it through its agents in these countries.
Thus, there was multiple overlap of the obtained information, which seemed to confirm its “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in supplies of raw materials.
On May 5, the same “Corsican” provides information that the concentration of German troops is a “war of nerves” so that the USSR accepts Germany’s conditions: the USSR must give guarantees of entering the war on the side of the Axis powers.
Similar information comes from the English station.
On May 8, 1941, a message from the “Starshina” (Harro Schulze-Boysen) said that an attack on the USSR was not off the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum demanding increased exports to Germany.

And so all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting a generalized analysis and conclusions, onto the table of Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation towards intelligence materials, but not towards all materials.
This is what V.M. recalled. Molotov:
“When I was Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, I spent half a day every day reading intelligence reports. What was there, what deadlines were mentioned! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The intelligence officer’s task is not to be late, to have time to report...”

Many researchers, speaking about I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov No. 2279/M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Sergeant Major” (Schulze-Boysen) and “The Corsican” (Arvid Harnak):
“Comrade Merkulov. Your source from the German headquarters may send it. aviation to your fucking mother. This is not a source, but a disinformer. I.St."

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin’s distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only based on I. Stalin’s resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates of a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported through military intelligence alone, Stalin apparently developed it.

Hitler, for example, during the war on the Western Front, issued an order for an offensive, and on the planned day of the offensive he canceled it. Hitler issued an order for an offensive on the Western Front 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the message of the “Starshina” itself, then I. Stalin’s irritation and resolution will become understandable.
Here is the text of the Chief's message:
"1. All military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any significance.
3.The targets of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories that produce individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops...”
(The following is a message from The Corsican on issues of economics and industry in Germany).
.
“Foreman” (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. Studied at Faculty of Law Berlin University. was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Reich Air Ministry. Before the outbreak of World War II, Schulze-Boysen established contact with Dr. Arvid Harnack (“The Corsican”). On August 31, 1942, Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed. Posthumously in 1969 awarded the order“Red Banner”) has always been an honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks quite frivolous simply because the date of the TASS report is mixed up (not June 14, but June 6), and the priority targets of German air raids are the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories “producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as auto repair shops.”

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that I. Stalin’s resolution applies only to “Starshina” - an agent working at the headquarters of German aviation, but not to “Corsican”.
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why intelligence trusted “Starshina,” Stalin said: “Go double-check everything and report to me.”

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by military attache Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1,638 sheets of telegraph messages were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR.
A telegram from Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, became widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, “Red Star” published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The “resolution” of L. Beria dated June 21, 1941 is the same fake:
“Many workers are sowing panic... The secret employees of “Yastreb”, “Carmen”, “Almaz”, “Verny” will be erased into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to embroil us with Germany.”
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

After all, since February 3, 1941, Beria had no foreign intelligence subordinate to him, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence came completely under the subordination of Merkulov.

Here are a few actual reports from R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2: “I talked with the German Ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler, either in May or after the war with England.”
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that war will start.”
- June 1: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 for Bangkok. In Bangkok he will take up the post of military attaché.”
- June 20 “The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable.”

According to military intelligence alone, there have been more than 10 messages about the start date of the war with Germany since 1940.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin in the spring of next year;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will advance in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack was scheduled for 3 - 4 o'clock in the morning on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source at the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Agency - "HVC" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who early in the morning of June 21. “KhVC” itself summoned its curator, RU Colonel K.B. Leontva, to an urgent meeting.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again had a meeting with an HVC agent.
The information from "HVC" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive the intelligence network of Soviet intelligence was is also evidenced by the fact that such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk were agents of our military intelligence.

An illegal intelligence officer, operating under the pseudonym "Merlin", aka Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, volumes and especially the level and quality of information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that the connection between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow were supported by three radio operators in Berlin and its environs.
Hitler awarded Olga Chekhova the specially established title of State Artist of the Third Reich, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he demonstratively showed her signs of the highest attention, and invariably seated her next to him. (A.B. Martirosyan “Tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or Treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to an intelligence group of Soviet military intelligence, code-named “Krona”. Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Jan Chernyak.
The group was created back in the mid-20s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but not one of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important Wehrmacht officers and major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers from captured German
movie "The Girl of My Dreams")

But G.K. Zhukov still did not miss the opportunity to spoil our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Department of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our intelligence agency, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitlerite high command. Our human intelligence was unable to refute Hitler’s false version of his lack of intention to fight with the Soviet Union.”

Hitler continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay I. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the off-flight Yu-52 aircraft (Junkers-52 aircraft were used by Hitler as personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynskoye field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means Air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very “serious troubles.”
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to I. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion force away from the eyes and aircraft of the enemy, and also in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, about 88 divisions, which may have given rise to rumors currently circulating about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you with the honor of the head of state that this is not so.
For my part, I also understand that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, in conditions of such a concentration of troops, could take on very large proportions, when it would be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be completely frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and thwart my plans.
We are talking about just one month. Around June 15-20, I plan to begin a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I earnestly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may occur on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, of course, try not to give them any reason.
If provocation from one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report what happened through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, as it seems to me, you and I have clearly agreed upon. I thank you for meeting me halfway on a matter known to you, and I ask you to forgive me for the method I chose to deliver this letter to you as quickly as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941."

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself “names” the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But J. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler’s intentions and trust in him.
The question of whether he believed or not believed simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler’s “sincerity” and continued to take measures to “bring into combat readiness operational groupings of troops in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear,” which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, General Staff directives No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 were sent (for the Western, Kyiv, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline indicated in them for submitting plans by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, these plans were not approved by either the General Staff or the People's Commissar of Defense.
This is the direct fault of the district commanders, as well as the General Staff, who did not demand the submission of plans by the specified deadline.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers responded with their lives at the start of the war;

- “...In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kyiv special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border, the allocation of the necessary forces and forms of their use for this purpose were outlined...” (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life.” M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally conscript about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the enrollment of reserve command personnel, called up upon mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who were detained in the army after the end of this war until special tension;

On May 24, 1941, at an extended meeting of the Politburo, J. Stalin openly warned all senior Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subject to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of “hidden mobilization”, about a million “assignees” from the internal districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions to their normal wartime strength (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and reinforcement of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This hidden mobilization could not be carried out without the instructions of I. Stalin, but it was carried out secretly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II declared Russian Empire mobilization, which was regarded as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859/SS/OV was sent to ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, all deep rifle divisions ... be withdrawn to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual bringing troops to increased combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to immediately bring the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO to proper condition and full combat readiness, primarily to strengthen their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report the execution by June 15, 1941. But there was no report on the implementation of this directive.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg.” M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question is, where were the General Staff and its chief, who should have demanded its implementation, or should J. Stalin control these issues for them?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent on the implementation of Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a General Staff directive was issued on the deployment of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life”).
In three out of four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (District Commander, Army General D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kyiv OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sk (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sk (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sk (141,80,139 sd); 55 sk (169,130,189 sd); 49 sk (190,197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (rk), comprising 14 rifle divisions (rf), which is about 200 thousand people.”
In total, 28 divisions were moved closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov we also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Already in June 1941, Timoshenko recommended that district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to pull troops closer to deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was implemented by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
...The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kiev OVO-Kirponos), without coordination with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to the firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if such events are carried out without their knowledge by the district commanders when war with Germany is on the threshold?
As a result, some corps and divisions of covering troops during the attack of Nazi Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order was issued from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the training grounds located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large caliber artillery, impact force troops were practically absent from battle formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command provided this “invaluable service” to the invading German troops.
This is what German General Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army of Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd Tank Group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest area against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - army commander, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all of our artillery opened fire... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not respond... A few hours later, the first echelon divisions were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy... There was no doubt that the Russians were taken by surprise... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed east along the flat terrain" ("Fatal Decisions" Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this we must add that the bridges in the Brest area were not blown up, along which German tanks were moving. Guderian was even surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire Air Force airfield network within a 500-km strip from the border with completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is that of the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the Red Army General Staff for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, Order No. 0042 of the People's Commissar of Defense was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has yet been done to camouflage airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft with “the complete absence of their camouflage” are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show similar carelessness towards camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks provides not only excellent observation objects, but also targets advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military facilities...”
What was the result of this carelessness of the district command, primarily the Western OVO, was shown on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame for this? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, who failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of their orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, upon learning of these losses, shot himself on the same day, June 22.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was... He believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm signal, they could reliably repel the enemy... Knowing absolutely exactly the number of aircraft stationed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm, they could fly into the air and reliably repel the enemy. And I was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.”
Naturally, I. Stalin’s idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly listened to in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. Southern, Northwestern, Northern.
By this time, the front command posts were already equipped, because Back on June 13, a decision was made to separate the command structures in the military districts and transform the military district directorates into front-line ones.
Command post of the Western Front (The front commander, Army General D.G. Pavlov, was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But Pavlov never appeared there before the start of the war).
The front command post of the Southwestern Front was located in the city of Ternopil (the front commander, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, died on September 20, 1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People’s Commissar of the Navy N.G. wrote. Kuznetsov, “the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it actually turned out to be...”.
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the approaching war from the foreign intelligence stations of Merkulov from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also intelligence of the border troops, subordinate to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by the constant observation of border guards, a large number of informants in the border areas who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these were residents of the border areas, train drivers , switchmen, oilers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot be unreliable. This information, generalized and collected together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B on April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko were given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sent note No. 1798/B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868/B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from border troops intelligence were presented.

But this is what Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding the separate 212th Long-Range Aviation Bomber Regiment, subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk to Minsk to present to the Air Force Commander of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I’ll check it again, but I think it’s just a provocation...”
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Boss is not in a good mood. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...” Apparently, by this “bastard” he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to insist that Stalin allegedly did not believe “Pavlov’s warnings” about the concentration of German troops....
The situation was heating up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS message, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about the “proximity of war between the USSR and Germany.”
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It apparently became clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no “withdrawal” or “transfer” of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter dated May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, “towards England,” did not happen.
On the contrary, an increased accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR naval attache, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that a German attack on the USSR would occur on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on the evening of June 21, he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with an “inspection” of German units near our border.
This is what Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov writes in his book “I am a fighter.” Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or eighteenth of June forty-one - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and we had to fly from south to north – to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were filled with troops. In villages, farmsteads, and groves there were poorly camouflaged, or even completely uncamouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles and passenger cars, apparently staff cars, were darting along the roads. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory a movement was emerging, which here, right at our border, was slowing down, resting against it... and ready to overflow across it.
We flew then for a little over three hours. I often landed the plane at any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently took his visor (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information would soon land -sad39) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, landed again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. In the evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok.
After landing, the district air force commander, General Kopec, took me after the report to the district commander.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he was seeing me for the first time. I felt dissatisfied when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The commander’s intonation openly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything I said... And with that we left.”
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either...

Continuation, beginning of posts under the tag “1941 through the eyes of the Germans”

I continue to put a selection of quotes from a very interesting, in my opinion, book by the British historian Robert Kershaw “1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of Iron”, in which the author collected and analyzed a lot of documentary evidence of participants in the events on both sides of the Eastern Front

As I already said, in my opinion, the book is especially interesting because it is also a look at the events of 1941 in the east from the outside

Headings in bold and selection of illustrations are mine, everything else is quotes from Kershaw's book

The beginning of the general offensive against Moscow

“That evening Richter will write in his diary: “Most likely, we will go on the attack tomorrow, and, apparently, this will be the last major operation this year.”
<…>
Non-commissioned officer Helmut Pabst, who fought with the 9th Army, said: “We still don’t know when all this will start,” but no one doubted that it would happen soon.

“They told me about the tanks,” continues Pabst, “and they were yellow, the color of sand, they were transferred here from the African desert.” Almost all types of weapons were present here - self-propelled artillery, six-barreled mortars, and heavy guns. “The technicians have piled up an awful lot,” Helmut Pabst once again confirms.

German assault guns before the offensive, September 1941

<…>
“All these films about the war are a pitiful imitation of what we had to see and experience,” continues Non-Commissioned Officer Pabst. On a front 2 kilometers wide, 1,200 tanks were advancing, not counting self-propelled guns. Immediately after the artillery barrage, “the infantry went on the offensive.” Paths stretch across deserted and flat fields. According to Pabst, “this offensive was much more powerful than then, in June, in the border areas.”

“It wouldn’t be long before I saw something like that again.” The Russian defenses were breached quite quickly. Georg Richter monitored the progress of the offensive through binoculars. “White rockets marked the front line, red ones served as a signal for the artillerymen to move their fire into the depths.” Red rockets fell continuously behind the front line. Operation Typhoon, the final offensive against Moscow, began.

<…>
The Russians were still desperately defending the approaches to the pillboxes. Shooting at point-blank range from heavy guns did not help either. They tried to throw grenades at the embrasures, as a result one stubborn Red Army sergeant was wounded. The smoke from the explosions had barely cleared when pistol shots were heard from the concrete bunker.

It was decided to send one prisoner to the pillbox to negotiate with the defenders. Soon a single pistol shot came from the pillbox. “This prisoner remained in that pillbox forever,” Richter stated. The artillery continued its furious shelling of the bunker, the pillbox was again thrown with grenades, after which the Germans tried to take the pillbox by storm. It didn't work out. Then the desperate sappers of the assault group doused the approaches to the embrasures with gasoline and set them on fire.

Some time later, three Red Army soldiers staggered out of the bunker. “Our people became so furious that they could have committed lynching,” says Richter. “But we cooled their ardor, - in the end, the task was completed - the bunker was taken, but at what cost?” Fierce fighting continued throughout the night.

“Shooting was heard from everywhere. Soon the village was on fire. Russian tanks sent shell after shell into the fire, ours fired back. A Russian shell landed near us. The roar of volleys from all types of weapons did not stop until dawn... The sky glowed pink from the burning village of Zubrovo.”

The crew of the anti-tank rifle digs in, the beginning of Operation Typhoon, 1941

<…>
“The pace of the offensive forced us to rush forward headlong,” a tank officer wrote in his diary, describing the first three days of the operation. Already on the second day of the offensive, Guderian’s 2nd Tank Army managed to advance 130 kilometers deep into enemy territory, reaching the Bryansk-Orel road. From here the tank wedges turned north.
<…>
Thus, a huge ring of encirclement was formed south of Bryansk, which, according to preliminary estimates, included about three Soviet armies - the 3rd, 13th and 50th. Meanwhile, the 4th Panzer Group completed the encirclement of Soviet troops from the south from Vyazma.
<…>
Motorcyclists of the 10th Panzer Division entered Vyazma on October 7. As a result, another cauldron was formed, where the 16th, 19th, 20th and 32nd armies found themselves. From now on, the troops of the Eastern Front were able to neutralize the last of the well-armed armies that stood on their way to Moscow.

Fighting in early October 1941 in the Moscow direction

“Surely you have already heard a special message on the radio about our successes. In general, it’s not difficult to find us on the map, we are already close to Moscow! The Russians didn’t want to believe that we would launch an offensive at this time of year—it’s getting cold here.”

Another officer from the same division recalls that “there has not been such a high spirit in the troops, probably since Suwałki. Everyone is terribly happy that they finally moved away.” The commander of the 6th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment gave the order to “go at full speed”, as a result his column “caught up” with a Russian convoy along the road. In the terrible dust, the Russians did not really understand what had happened, and their columns were quickly shot. And those who remained fled in panic.

The 6th Motorized Regiment became the first to reach the “main road” - the Vyazemsky section of the Minsk highway. One private commented enthusiastically: “Everything on wheels is in motion, just like in the old days.” good times, and the order is still the same - forward and only forward!

Entry of the 11th German Panzer Division into the city of Spas-Demensk on October 4, 1941. Photo from the division archive

The same private continues:

“We are the kings of the offensive again! This inspires us so much! If the enemy thinks that he has erected an insurmountable barrier for us, then we have slipped through it without even noticing it. Kilometer by kilometer we are moving deeper into his territory to the east, so that we will soon find ourselves in his rear.”

The chronicle of the 7th Tank Division describes the closing of the encirclement near Vyazma with access to the Moscow-Minsk highway as “a race between the 25th tank regiment and the reinforced 6th motorized regiment.” Describing the “fantastic achievements” of the advanced units, the commander says:

“We saw columns of thousands of Russian prisoners heading to our rear.” The commander also recalls Soviet pillboxes on both sides of the roads and anti-tank ditches. “They tried to delay our advance - but they never took advantage of either.”

Red Army prisoners of war captured near Vyazma and Bryansk, photographed in November 1941

Lieutenant Wolfgang Koch, who advanced on Oryol as part of the 52nd Infantry Regiment (18th Panzer Division), recalled how his soldiers played Tchaikovsky chorales on the gramophone. For some reason all this reminded him so much of France. The Luftwaffe incinerated and bombarded all the villages ahead, and they regularly followed the tanks. In the end, the polyphony of chorales tired the Wehrmacht soldiers. Unlike France, in this country there was absolutely nothing to take except gramophones. But “The Nutcracker” will be remembered forever.
<…>
"Long Live the Victory! - one lieutenant from the 123rd Infantry Division screams like a man possessed. “The Red Front is completely defeated!” And then he triumphantly adds: “We were all overcome with a feeling of joy from the victory that awaits everyone ahead!” An artillery corporal whose unit provided fire support to the 23rd Infantry Division said: “Finally, after two months of defending this accursed front, we are again moving forward indomitably.”
<…>
“During all these weeks before October 2, we saw enough of Soviet bombers, but now it’s as if they were blown away by the wind. They are either afraid, or the Russians have thrown all their aviation into the defense of the Kremlin. My gut instinct is that the enemy's resistance is about to collapse. All we have to do is finish off the rest, and we’ll deal with them in no time.”

The German propaganda company, reporting the successes of the “2nd Panzer Division, which closed the encirclement ring near Vyazma,” choked with delight:

“We don’t know how many divisions, armies there are, how many guns and tanks they have in these dense forests, on the edges of which we are standing now. We know one thing - they won’t get out of there.”
<…>
When the advanced units of the tank division burst into Kalinin, trams plied the streets in the city as if nothing had happened. Fierce fighting broke out between armed groups of factory workers, who did not even have time to dress in military uniform, so sudden was the appearance of the Germans on the streets of Kalinin.

<…>
When the smoke cleared, the outlines of the structures of a 250-meter bridge across the Volga appeared. He was guarded by a single sentry who stood with his back turned to the advancing Germans. This was an example of that incredible situation that occurs in war even during the most fierce battles. The soldier in an ordinary gray overcoat and khaki cap remained at his post, although there was no trace of his comrades. Unable to simply shoot this unfortunate man, the officer shouted to him: “Hey, you! Get out of here!»

R Robert Kershaw 1941 through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of Iron crosses
http://detectivebooks.ru/book/20480016/?page=1

To be continued

The Battle of Moscow (1941-1942) is one of the most major battles The Second World War, both in terms of the number of participants and the territory on which it took place. The significance of the battle is enormous, it was on the verge of actual defeat, but thanks to the valor of the soldiers and the leadership talents of the generals, the battle for Moscow was won, and the myth of the invincibility of the German troops was destroyed. Where were the Germans stopped near Moscow? The course of the battle, the strength of the parties, as well as its results and consequences will be discussed further in the article.

Background of the battle

According to master plan German command under code name"Barbarossa", Moscow was supposed to be captured three to four months after the start of the war. However, Soviet troops offered heroic resistance. The battle for Smolensk alone delayed German troops for two months.

Hitler’s soldiers approached Moscow only at the end of September, that is, in the fourth month of the war. The operation to capture the capital of the USSR received the code name “Typhoon”, according to it, German troops were supposed to cover Moscow from the north and south, then encircle and capture. The Moscow battle took place over a vast territory that stretched for a thousand kilometers.

Strengths of the parties. Germany

The German command deployed enormous forces. 77 divisions with a total number of more than 2 million people took part in the battles. In addition, the Wehrmacht had at its disposal more than 1,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 14 thousand guns and mortars and about 800 aircraft. The commander of this huge army was Field Marshal F. von Bock.

USSR

The VKG Headquarters had at its disposal the forces of five fronts with a total number of more than 1.25 million people. Also, Soviet troops had more than 1000 tanks, 10 thousand guns and mortars and more than 500 aircraft. The defense of Moscow was led in turn by several outstanding strategists: A. M. Vasilevsky, I. S. Konev, G. K. Zhukov.

Course of events

Before finding out where the Germans were stopped near Moscow, it is worth talking a little about the course of military operations in this battle. It is usually divided into two stages: defensive (which lasted from September 30 to December 4, 1941) and offensive (from December 5, 1941 to April 20, 1942).

Defensive stage

The start date of the Battle of Moscow is considered to be September 30, 1941. On this day, the Nazis attacked the troops of the Bryansk Front.

On October 2, the Germans went on the offensive in the Vyazma direction. Despite stubborn resistance, German units managed to cut through the Soviet troops between the cities of Rzhev and Vyazma, as a result of which the troops of actually two fronts found themselves in a cauldron. In total, more than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers were surrounded.

After the defeat at Bryansk, the Soviet command organized a line of defense in the Mozhaisk direction. Residents of the city hastily prepared defensive structures: they dug trenches and trenches, and installed anti-tank hedgehogs.

During the rapid offensive, German troops managed to capture cities such as Kaluga, Maloyaroslavets, Kalinin, Mozhaisk from October 13 to 18 and came close to the Soviet capital. On October 20, a state of siege was introduced in Moscow.

Moscow is surrounded

Even before the actual imposition of a state of siege in Moscow, on October 15, the Civil Defense Command was evacuated from the capital to Kuibyshev (modern Samara); the next day the evacuation of all government agencies, the general staff, etc. began.

J.V. Stalin decided to stay in the city. On the same day, panic gripped the residents of the capital, rumors spread about leaving Moscow, and several dozen city residents tried to urgently leave the capital. Only by October 20 was it possible to establish order. On this day the city went into a state of siege.

By the end of October 1941, battles were already taking place near Moscow in Naro-Fominsk, Kubinka, and Volokolamsk. German air raids were regularly carried out on Moscow, which did not cause much damage, since the most valuable buildings in the capital were carefully camouflaged, and Soviet anti-aircraft gunners worked well. At the cost of huge losses, the October offensive of the German troops was stopped. But they almost reached Moscow.

Where were the Germans able to get? This sad list includes the suburbs of Tula, Serpukhov, Naro-Fominsk, Kaluga, Kalinin, Mozhaisk.

Parade on Red Square

Taking advantage of the relative silence at the front, the Soviet command decided to hold a military parade on Red Square. The purpose of the parade was to raise the morale of Soviet soldiers. The date was set for November 7, 1941, the parade was hosted by S. M. Budyonny, the parade was commanded by General P. A. Artemyev. Rifle and motorized rifle units, Red Navy men, cavalrymen, as well as artillery and tank regiments took part in the parade. The soldiers left the parade almost immediately to the front line, leaving unconquered Moscow behind...

Where did the Germans go? What cities were they able to reach? How did the Red Army soldiers manage to stop the enemy’s orderly battle formations? It's time to find out about it.

November Nazi offensive on the capital

On November 15, after a powerful artillery barrage, a new round of German offensive began near Moscow. Stubborn battles unfolded in the Volokolamsk and Klin directions. So, during the 20 days of the offensive, the Nazis managed to advance 100 km and capture cities such as Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Yakhroma. The closest settlement to Moscow, where the Germans reached during the offensive, turned out to be Yasnaya Polyana - the estate of the writer L. N. Tolstoy.

The Germans had about 17 km to the borders of Moscow itself, and 29 km to the walls of the Kremlin. By the beginning of December, as a result of a counterattack, Soviet units were able to drive the Germans out of previously occupied territories in the vicinity of the capital, including from Yasnaya Polyana.

Today we know where the Germans reached near Moscow - to the very walls of the capital! But they failed to take the city.

The onset of cold weather

As stated above, the Barbarossa plan provided for the capture of Moscow by German troops no later than October 1941. In this regard, the German command did not provide winter uniforms for the soldiers. The first night frosts began at the end of October, and the temperature dropped below zero for the first time on November 4. On this day the thermometer showed -8 degrees. Subsequently, the temperature very rarely dropped below 0 °C.

Not only were the German soldiers, dressed in light uniforms, unprepared for the first cold weather, but also the equipment, which was not designed to work in subzero temperatures.

The cold caught the soldiers when they were actually several tens of kilometers from Belokamennaya, but their equipment did not start in the cold, and the frozen Germans near Moscow did not want to fight. “General Frost” once again rushed to the rescue of the Russians...

Where were the Germans stopped near Moscow? The last German attempt to capture Moscow was made during the attack on Naro-Fominsk on December 1. During several massive attacks, German units managed to penetrate for a short time into the areas of Zvenigorod by 5 km, and Naro-Fominsk by up to 10 km.

After transferring the reserve, Soviet troops managed to push the enemy back to their original positions. The Naro-Fominsk operation is considered the last one carried out by the Soviet command at the defensive stage of the battle for Moscow.

Results of the defensive stage of the battle for Moscow

The Soviet Union defended its capital at great cost. The irretrievable losses of Red Army personnel during the defensive phase amounted to more than 500 thousand people. The German army at this stage lost about 145 thousand people. But during its attack on Moscow, the German command used virtually all available reserves, which by December 1941 were virtually depleted, which allowed the Red Army to go on the offensive.

At the end of November, after it became known from intelligence sources that Japan did not transfer about 10 divisions and hundreds of tanks to Moscow from the Far East. The troops of the Western, Kalinin and Southwestern fronts were equipped with new divisions, as a result of which, by the beginning of the offensive, the Soviet group in the Moscow direction consisted of more than 1.1 million soldiers, 7,700 guns and mortars, 750 tanks, and about 1 thousand aircraft.

However, she was opposed by a group of German troops, not inferior, and even superior in numbers. The number of personnel reached 1.7 million people, tanks and aircraft were 1200 and 650, respectively.

On December 5 and 6, troops on three fronts launched a large-scale offensive, and already on December 8, Hitler gave the order for German troops to go on the defensive. On December 12, 1941, Istra and Solnechnogorsk were liberated by Soviet troops. On December 15 and 16, the cities of Klin and Kalinin were liberated.

During the ten days of the Red Army's offensive, they managed to push back the enemy on different sections of the front by 80-100 km, and also create a threat of collapse to the German front of Army Group Center.

Hitler, not wanting to retreat, dismissed Generals Brauchitsch and Bock and appointed General G. von Kluge as the new army commander. However, the Soviet offensive developed rapidly, and the German command was unable to stop it. In just December 1941, German troops in different sectors of the front were pushed back 100-250 km, which meant the virtual elimination of the threat to the capital and the complete defeat of the Germans near Moscow.

In 1942, Soviet troops slowed down the pace of their offensive and failed to actually destroy the front of Army Group Center, although they inflicted an extremely heavy defeat on the German troops.

The result of the battle for Moscow

The historical significance of the defeat of the Germans near Moscow is invaluable for the entire Second World War. More than 3 million people, over two thousand aircraft and three thousand tanks took part in this battle on both sides, and the front stretched over more than 1000 km. Over the 7 months of the battle, Soviet troops lost more than 900 thousand people killed and missing, while German troops lost more than 400 thousand people over the same period. Important results of the Battle of Moscow (1941-1942) include:

• The German plan for “blitzkrieg” - a quick lightning-fast victory - was destroyed, Germany had to prepare for a long, exhausting war.
• The threat of the capture of Moscow ceased to exist.
• The myth about the indestructibility of the German army was dispelled.
• suffered serious losses of its advanced and most combat-ready units, which had to be replenished with inexperienced recruits.
• The Soviet command gained enormous experience in successfully waging war against the German army.
• After the victory in the Moscow battle, the anti-Hitler coalition began to take shape.

This is how the defense of Moscow took place, and such significant results were brought about by its positive outcome.