Partisan movement in 1812. Guerrilla movement - "the club of the people's war

The price of victory Victor Bezotosny The country is undoubtedly elevated by the victory won. And it educates and hardens - an exhausting path to her. It is the historian's task to analyze the consequences of the most important historical events, to trace their influence on the subsequent course of history. But

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met with fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, the ragged and frozen army of Napoleon was brutally beaten by the flying and peasant partisan detachments of the Russians.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The highly stretched Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for guerrilla attacks - the French were often far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive him of food and fodder.

In World War II, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of the commander-in-chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and a group of partisan peasants, which united spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to sabotage actions, the flying detachments were also engaged in reconnaissance. The peasant self-defense forces mainly repulsed the enemy from their villages and villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the leadership of Davydov there were over one hundred and fifty hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts near the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche. Davydov's cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the escorting detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first, the peasants took them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant's caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, let go of his beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.

Over time, the detachment of Denis Davydov increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, sometimes having a fivefold numerical superiority, and smashed them, taking the carts and freeing prisoners, it even happened that they even captured the enemy's artillery.

After the abandonment of Moscow, by order of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. Mostly these were Cossack units, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a unit, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. The united partisan groups could resist the large military formations of Napoleon's army. So, at the end of October, during a battle in the region of the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments utterly defeated more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing himself. For the French, this defeat was a terrible blow. On the contrary, the Russian troops, this success, encouraged and tuned in to further victories.

Peasant initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of French units was made by the peasants who self-organize in combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov's instructions. While willingly helping the flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the peasants, at the same time, everywhere and in every possible way did harm to the French - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a swarm of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy carts with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov's compound included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases, when peasant partisans, led by cadre soldiers, noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of the Napoleonic troops, were not isolated.

Chigvintseva S.V.

Introduction

In our time - the time of grandiose social transformations - the need for a deep understanding of the steep moments in the course of social development, the role of the masses in history, is felt as never before. In this regard, it seems relevant to us today to address the topic of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War, the 200th anniversary of which our country is celebrating this year.

The purpose of the work is to determine the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, using integrated materials from history and literature.

The tasks of the work are to consider the reasons for the emergence of a wide wave of the partisan movement and its significance in the military events of the autumn-winter of 1812.

The theme of the partisan movement of 1812 is represented by a fairly wide range of sources and research in the historical literature. The drawn range of sources allowed us to divide them into two groups. The first includes legal and government documents. The second group of sources includes the diaries of eyewitnesses to the events of the Patriotic War of 1812.

Research methods - analysis of sources, applied a problem-thematic approach to the literature, which clearly showed the importance of the actions of partisans in alliance with the troops of the people's militia during the autumn-winter of 1812.

The novelty of the research lies in an integrated approach to the use of information from literary and historical sources in the analysis of the events of the Patriotic War.

The chronological framework of the study covers the second half of 1812.

The structure of the work corresponds to the set goal and objectives and consists of: introduction, two chapters with paragraphs, conclusions, list of used sources and literature.

ChapterI... The reasons for the development of the partisan movement

Napoleon did not prepare for any of the wars as carefully as for the campaign against Russia. The plan for the upcoming campaign was developed in the most detailed way, the theater of military operations was carefully studied, huge depots of ammunition, uniforms and food were created. 1,200 thousand people were put under arms. As the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy justly notes: "Half of the army was stationed within the vast empire of Napoleon in order to keep the conquered countries in obedience, in which the national liberation movement arose against the Napoleonic yoke."

Historian A.Z. Manfred focuses on what Russia knew about Napoleon's preparation for war. The Russian ambassador to Paris, Prince A.B. Kurakin, starting in 1810, supplied the Russian War Ministry with accurate information about the number, armament and deployment of French troops. Valuable information was supplied to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Napoleon Charles Talleyrand, as well as by J. Foucher.

In 1810, the rearmament of the Russian army began, the strengthening of its western borders. However, the archaic recruiting system did not allow to prepare the necessary manpower reserves for the coming war. The Russian army numbered about 240 thousand people and was divided into three groups: the first army (M. B. Barclay de Tolly) covered the St. Petersburg direction, the second (P. I. Bagration) - Moscow, the third (A. P. Tormasova) - Kiev ...

The usual tactic of waging wars by Napoleon was to win 1-2 major battles and thus decide the outcome of the war. And this time Napoleon's plan was to use his numerical superiority in border battles, defeat the first and second armies one by one, and then seize Moscow and St. Petersburg. Napoleon's strategic plan was thwarted when - in June-August 1812 the Russian armies were retreating, they decided to unite in Vitebsk, and then Smolensk. In the very first days, a partisan movement began (20 thousand peasants rose). G.R. Derzhavin wrote about those days:

“At the dawn of the fiery previous battles:
Every village was boiling
Crowds of reddish warriors ...

And, a cunning warrior,
He suddenly called out his eagles
And he burst into Smolensk ...

We covered up here with ourselves
The threshold of Moscow is the door to Russia;
Here the Russians fought like animals,
Like angels "! (between 1812-1825)

In August, the army and the people demanded that MI Kutuzov be appointed commander-in-chief. The Battle of Borodino showed the courage of the Russian army, the French withdrew to their original positions, but Moscow had to be surrendered to the French.

Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov made a remarkable maneuver: creating the appearance of a retreat along the Ryazan road, with the main forces moved to the Kaluga road, where he stopped in September 1812 near the village of Tarutino (80 km from Moscow). He wrote: “Always fearing that the enemy would not seize this road with his main forces, which would deprive the army of all its communications with the grain-growing provinces, I found it necessary to detach the 6th corps with the infantry general (infantry - author) Dokhturov: on Kaluga Borovskaya road to the side of the village of Folminsky. Soon after this, the partisan Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road to Borovsk. "

The war of 1812 appears in Tolstoy's image as a people's war. The author creates many images of men, soldiers, whose judgments in the aggregate constitute the people's perception of the world.

In the Tarutino camp, the formation of a new Russian army began, the troops were given rest, and the partisan detachments tried to replenish their reserves and equipment. NA Durova wrote about those days as follows: “In the evening, our regiment was ordered to be on horseback. ... Now we have become the rearguard and will cover the retreat of the army. "

Historian V.I. Babkin believes that "partisan detachments and parts of the militia of the 1st district were an important element in the plan for the preparation and implementation of the victorious offensive of the Russian army." In our opinion, one can agree with the author in this, since M. I. Kutuzov wrote in his report to Alexander I. “When retreating ... I made it a rule for myself ... to conduct an incessant small war, and for that I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the means from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutin, my partisans instilled fear and horror at the enemy, taking away all means of food. "

However, researcher L. G. Beskrovny does not agree with our opinion, who believes that the partisans generally acted spontaneously, without coordinating "their actions with the forces of the high command."

While the Russian army was able to replenish itself with new fresh forces in a calm atmosphere, the enemy, surrounded in Moscow, was forced to conduct continuous military operations against the partisans. Thanks, among other things, to the actions of the partisans, in fact, there was no break in hostilities against Napoleon during the Tarutino period. Having occupied Moscow, the enemy received neither respite nor peace. On the contrary, during his stay in Moscow, he suffered significant damage from the blows of the popular forces. To help the militia and partisans, MI Kutuzov allocated army flying detachments of regular cavalry to strengthen the blockade of Moscow and strike at enemy communications. In our opinion, the clear interaction of the main elements of the "small war" - the militias, partisans and army flying detachments made it possible for MI Kutuzov to create a solid foundation for a victorious counteroffensive.

The campaign in Russia was not like those that Napoleon had to wage before. Armand de Caulaincourt, who was under Napoleon, wrote: “The local residents were not visible, the prisoners could not be taken, the stragglers were not found along the way, we had no spies ... The remaining inhabitants all armed; no vehicles could be found. They harassed horses on trips to get food ... ”. Such was the nature of the "little war". An internal front was formed around the main forces of the French in Moscow, consisting of militias, partisans and flying detachments.

Thus, the main reasons for the rise of a wide wave of the partisan movement were the application to the peasants of the demands of the French army for the delivery of food, uniforms, and fodder to them; the plunder of native villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "century of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

ChapterII... The growing wave of the partisan movement in the fall and winter of 1812

On October 10, 1812, finding himself in isolation, fearing the indignation of his multinational hungry army, Napoleon left Moscow. Moscow burned for 6 days, 2/3 of the houses were lost, the peasants went into the forests. A guerrilla war broke out. In the memory of the Russian people, there are heroes-partisans, whom L.N. Tolstoy called "the cudgel of the people's war" - D. Davydov, IS Dorokhov, AN Seslavin, AS Figner, the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the elder Vasilisa Kozhin. During the war, the partisans killed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers. G.R. Davydov dedicated his poems to D. Davydov. Derzhavin, A.N. Seslavin - FN Glinka, the patriotism of the common people was praised by VV Kapnist.

Among historians there are different points of view on the role of partisans in the liberation struggle of 1812. So, if Academician E.V. Tarle notes that G. Kurin's detachment gave successful battles to regular enemy units, exterminated them in hundreds, captured enemy guns, controlled the region while there was neither occupation nor Russian state power (that is, actually exercising control functions in it), then the historian A.S. Markin considers this opinion to be an exaggeration.

If we consider the question of the emergence of the partisan movement, here you can see various judgments of historians. E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in Poresensky, Krasinsky and Smolensk districts in July 1812, since the population of these districts first of all suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army advanced into the depths of Russia, he notes, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose to fight. Its organization was attended by the Sychevsky zemstvo police chief Boguslavsky, the leader of the Sychevsky nobility Nakhimov, Major Yemelyanov, retired captain Timashev and others. Historian Troitsky N.A. asserts otherwise - it showed itself later, in Smolensk in August 1812: “The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a tangible blow to the enemy, and also helped the Russian army a lot. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye, Nikita Minchenkov, helped the army detachment to liquidate the detachment of the French under the command of General Pino. "

The episode of the Patriotic War of 1812, associated with the activities of the peasant detachment of Gerasim Matveyevich Kurin (1777-1850), has served for many decades as a textbook illustration of the thesis about the peasant guerrilla war against the Napoleonic invaders.

On September 24, 1812, the foragers of Ney's French corps who arrived from Bogorodsk plundered and burned the Vokhon village of Stepurino. Kurin was expecting the appearance of the enemy, dividing his three-thousand-strong squad into three parts, which began to methodically beat the French. On the same day, in the evening, Ney's corps, along with other corps stationed around Moscow, received an order to return to the capital. Upon receiving news of the occupation of Bogorodsk by the French, the Vokhon volost gathering, of course, with the approval of the local head Yegor Semyonovich Stulov, decided to form a squad for self-defense, and to hide women, old people, children and movable property in the forests. The gathering also ordered the local peasant Gerasim Kurin to command the squad.

One of the large peasant partisan detachments of up to four thousand people was led in the area of ​​the city of Gzhatsk (Moscow region) by soldier Eremey Chetvertakov. In the Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of four hundred people was led by a retired soldier S. Yemelyanov. The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and took 325 French prisoners.

However, it is necessary to note a feature noted by the researcher V. I. Babkin - economic (state) peasants (unlike landowners and monasteries) have always been an island of stability and were not prone to anarchy. For example, by 1812, the Vohon volost consisted mainly of economic peasants, in comparison with their private-owned counterparts, who had long enjoyed greater personal freedom by law.

In our opinion, it is necessary to see the difference between the peasant and army partisan detachments. If the peasant detachments were organized by the peasants G. Kurin, the peasant Vasilisa Kozhina in the Smolensk province, the former private soldier Eremey Chetvertakov, then the first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintzengerode, who headed the united Kazan dragoon (equestrian), Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the town of Dukhovshchina.

Seslavin Alexander Nikitich (1780-1858) was a lieutenant general, in 1812 a colonel, commander of the Sumy hussar regiment, who, on behalf of M.I.Kutuzov, became the head of the partisan detachment and was tasked with small groups to destroy enemy divisions, coordinate their actions with units active Russian army.

Denis Davydov's squad was a real thunderstorm for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyr hussar regiment. Together with his hussars (riders lightly armed with a saber and a carbine), he retreated as part of the army of P.I. Bagration to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." D. Davydov asked General PI Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "sample" M.I. Kutuzov allowed D. Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received the detachment at his disposal, D. Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near the villages of Tsarev Zaimishche, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

An Army Guerrilla Flying Detachment is a mobile unit deployed to various areas of hostilities. For example, from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S.Dorokhov operated. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the area of ​​Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol hussar regiment and 500 Cossacks.

Acting, according to the orders of the commander-in-chief, between Mozhaisk and Moscow, a detachment of retired soldiers and Colonel A.S. Figner, together with other partisans, helped the peasants who had armed themselves near Moscow in the extermination of small detachments of marauders, intercepting French couriers and carts.

In early October 1812, Napoleon, leaving Moscow, moved to Kaluga, where the food depots of the Russian army were located, hoping to spend the winter there. Russian troops pursued the enemy, inflicting sensitive blows on him. In those years, MI Kutuzov addressed the army with the following words: “... Napoleon, not seeing anything else ahead of him, as a continuation of the terrible people's war, capable of destroying his entire army in a short time, seeing in every inhabitant a warrior, a common ... a hasty retreat. "

Thus, the general offensive of the Russian army was successfully combined with the "small war". Tens of thousands of militia warriors and popular partisan detachments successfully fought the enemy together with the army. On December 25, 1812, Alexander I published a special Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy from Russia and the end of the Patriotic War. On this occasion, NA Durova noted in her notes: “The French fought with frenzy. Ah, man is terrible in his frenzy! All the properties of the wild beast are then combined in him. Not! This is not courage. I do not know what to call this wild, brutal courage, but it is unworthy to call it fearlessness. "

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people, who were waging a just, liberation struggle. The reason for the rise of the partisan movement in the fall-winter of 1812 was the following: The Napoleonic invasion caused enormous damage to the country's economy, brought innumerable troubles and suffering to the people. Hundreds of thousands of people died, no less crippled; many cities and villages were destroyed, many cultural monuments were plundered and destroyed.

The significance of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was manifested in the following: the actions of the partisans raised the spirit of patriotism in battles with the enemy, the national consciousness of the Russian people grew; helping the regular army, the partisans made it clear to Napoleon that he would not win the war overnight, and his plans for world domination were ruined.

Conclusion

The historical past of the people, historical memory, the system of universally significant patterns of behavior at such critical moments in history as the Patriotic War - this is not a complete list of those facts that affect the formation of the personality of the XXI century. Hence the relevance of our appeal to the topic of the role of the masses, the organization of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people.

In the course of our work, we came to the following conclusions:

If we consider the question of the origin of the partisan movement, E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Smolensk province; Troitsky N.A. - it showed itself later, in Smolensk; Manfred A.Z. - during the capture of Mogilev and Pskov.

Among the reasons for the emergence of the peasant and army partisan movement, historians single out such as: the application to the peasants of the requirement of the French army to hand them over food, uniforms, fodder; the robbery of villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "century of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

The role of the partisan movement in World War II was as follows:

1. replenish the reserves of the Russian army with people and equipment,
2. small detachments destroyed the forces of the French army, transmitted information about the French to the Russian army,
3. destroyed the convoys with food and ammunition that went to the French in Moscow.
4. Napoleon's plans for a lightning war against Russia collapsed.

The significance of the partisan movement was manifested in the growth of the national self-awareness of the peasantry and all strata of Russian society, a growing sense of patriotism and responsibility for the preservation of their history and culture. The close interaction of the three forces (militia, peasant partisans and army flying units) ensured a huge success in the "little war". The great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy, conveying the spirit of that time, noted: "... the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion had died."

Notes (edit)

From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. - M .: PBOYUL, 2000, From the report of M.I.Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia since ancient times to the present day // Tamzhe et al.

Zhilin P. A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974 .-- S. 93.

From M.I.Kutuzov's address to the army about the beginning of Napoleon's expulsion from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day. - M., 2000 .-- S. 271.

Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. - Kazan, 1979 .-- S. 45.

Tolstoy L.N. War and Peace: in 4 volumes - M., 1987. - Vol. 3. - S. 212.

List of sources and literature used

1. Sources

1.1 Borodino. Documents, letters, memories. - M .: Soviet Russia, 1962 .-- 302 p.

1.2. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYUL, 2000. - S. 268-269.

1.3.From the report of M.I.Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYUL, 2000. - S. 270-271.

1.4. From MI Kutuzov's address to the army about the beginning of Napoleon's expulsion from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYUL, 2000 .-- P. 271.

1.5 Davydov D.V. Diary of partisan actions // http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/Davidov1/index.html.

2. Literature

2.1. Babkin V.I.People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M .: Sotsekgiz, 1962 .-- 212 p.

2.2. Beskrovny L.G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. - 1972. - No. 1. - S. 13-17.

2.3. Bogdanov L. P. Russian army in 1812. Organization, management, armament. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1979 .-- 275 p.

2.4. Glinka F.N. Partizan Seslavin //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.5. Derzhavin G.R. 1812 //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.6. Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. Reissue. - Kazan, 1979 .-- 200 p.

2.7. Zhilin P. A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974 .-- 184 p.

2.8. V.V. Kapnist The vision of a Russian in 1812 crying over Moscow ... // lib.rtg.su / history / 284 / 17.html

A protracted military conflict. The detachments, in which people were united by the idea of ​​the liberation struggle, fought on a par with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of battles.

Partisans of 1812

When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of ​​a strategic guerrilla war emerged. Then, for the first time in world history, Russian troops used a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory. This method was based on organizing and coordinating the actions of the rebels by the regular army itself. For this purpose, trained professionals - "army partisans" - were thrown behind the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner, Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was lieutenant colonel of Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits.

This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than the others (within six weeks). The tactics of Davydov's partisan detachment was that they avoided open attacks, flew by surprise, changed the direction of attacks, and groped for the enemy's weaknesses. the local population helped: the peasants were guides, scouts, participated in the extermination of the French.

In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement was of particular importance. The local population, who knew the area well, became the basis for the formation of detachments and subunits. In addition, it was hostile to the occupiers.

The main purpose of the movement

The main task of the partisan war was the isolation of enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was directed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments disrupted communications, obstructed the approach of reinforcements and the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferry crossings and bridges across numerous rivers. Thanks to the active actions of the army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of the artillery during the retreat.

The experience of guerrilla warfare in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well-organized.

The period of the Great Patriotic War

The need to organize a partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops, who sought to make slaves and eliminate the population of the occupied regions. The main idea of ​​partisan warfare in the Great Patriotic War is to disorganize the activities of the German fascist troops, inflicting human and material losses on them. For this, fighter and sabotage groups were created, the network of underground organizations was expanded to direct all actions in the occupied territory.

The partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was two-way. On the one hand, the detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in the territories occupied by the enemy, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process proceeded in an orderly manner, under the leadership of the top. The sabotage groups were thrown behind enemy lines or organized in advance on the territory that was supposed to be left in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, they preliminarily made caches with supplies, and also worked out the issues of their further replenishment. In addition, conspiracy issues were worked out, the locations of the troops were determined in the forest after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.

Movement leadership

In order to lead the partisan war and sabotage, workers from among the local residents who were well familiar with these areas were thrown into the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of the Soviet and party bodies, who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.

Guerrilla warfare played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

Essay on the history of a student of grade 11, 505 of the school of Afitova Elena

Guerrilla movement in the war of 1812

A guerrilla movement, an armed struggle of the masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformations, waged on territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Regular troops operating behind enemy lines can also take part in the Partisan Movement.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and the detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with fodder and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the pr-ka into Smolensk, and then into the Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement took on an especially wide scale. At the end of July-August in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other districts, the peasants united in foot and mounted partisan detachments, armed with pikes, sabers and rifles, attacked individual groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and carts, disrupted the communications of the French army. The guerrillas were a formidable fighting force. The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. The partisan detachments of G.M. Kurin, S. Emelyanov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina and others became widely known. Tsarist law reacted with distrust to the Partisan movement. But in an atmosphere of patriotic enthusiasm, some landowners and progressive-minded generals (P.I.Bagration, MB Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Ermolov and others). The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov. He saw in her a huge force, capable of inflicting significant damage on the pr-ku, in every possible way contributed to the organization of new detachments, gave instructions on their armament and instructions on the tactics of partisan warfare. After the abandonment of Moscow, the front of the Partisan movement was significantly expanded, and Kutuzov, plans, gave it an organized character. This was largely facilitated by the formation of special detachments from regular troops, operating in partisan methods. The first such detachment, numbering 130 people, was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions acted as part of the army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S.Dorokhov, M.A.Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments, which arose spontaneously, subsequently joined the army or worked closely with them. Individual detachments of the formation of narcotics were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its broadest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, seized carts, informed the Russian command of valuable information about the pr-ke. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set before the Partisan Movement broader tasks of interacting with the army and striking individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. So, on September 28 (October 10), by order of Kutuzov, a detachment of General Dorokhov, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino in 1812, the avenue lost over 30 thousand people as a result of partisan strikes. Along the entire route of the retreat of the French army, partisan detachments assisted the Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking his carts and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating the Napoleonic troops and expelling them from the borders of Russia.

The reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops in Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by the performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be formed, thousands of national heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle emerged.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, ruthlessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think of any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases about the liberation of the serfs were uttered and even talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, this was only a tactical move, with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. And this did not correspond to his political goals when joining Russia. In the opinion of Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was important for him to consolidate monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution in Russia.

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the feudal landlords. The provisional Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to obey the landlords unquestioningly, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving military force if circumstances so require.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, residents, when the French approached, went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be plundered and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of freeing them from serfdom.

Peasant war

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of the mass abandonment of villages and villages and the withdrawal of the population to forests and areas far from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. French troops, with a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This did not take long to affect the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers were starving, and looting intensified. More than 10 thousand horses died before Vilna.

French foragers sent to villages for food were not confronted with passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only feed on what the marauders organized in whole detachments were getting; Cossacks and peasants killed many of our people every day who dared to go in search." In the villages, there were clashes, including shooting, between the French soldiers sent for food and the peasants. Skirmishes like this happened quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance arose - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced to remind chief of staff Berthier more and more often about the large losses in people and strictly ordered to allocate an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.

The peasants' partisan struggle became widest in August in the Smolensk province; it began in the Krasnensky and Porechsky districts, and then in the Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be brought to justice.

In the city of White and Belsk Uyezd, partisan detachments attacked the French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police chief Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with rifles taken from the French, and established proper order and discipline. The Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

The inhabitants of the Roslavl district created several cavalry and foot partisan detachments, armed with lances, sabers and rifles. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders who made their way into the neighboring Yelnensky district. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment of Denis Davydov.

The largest Gzhatsky partisan detachment operated successfully. It was organized by Fedor Potopov (Samus), a soldier of the Elizavetgrad regiment. Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself in the rear of the enemy and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2,000 (according to other sources, 3,000). Its striking force consisted of an equestrian group of 200 people, armed and dressed in the armor of French cuirassiers. The Samusia detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system of warning the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were emptied, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes informed when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, to go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture the cannon. Samusia's detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.