After Chernenko's death in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. By that time, the USSR was already on the verge of a deep crisis, both in the economy and in the social sphere. The efficiency of social production was steadily declining, and the arms race was a heavy burden on the country's economy. In fact, all spheres of society needed to be updated. The difficult situation of the USSR was the reason for perestroika, as well as changes in the country's foreign policy. Modern historians distinguish the following stages of perestroika:

• 1985 - 1986
• 1987 - 1988
• 1989 - 1991

During the beginning of perestroika from 1985 to 1986. there were no significant changes in the organization of government of the country. In the regions, power, at least formally, belonged to the Soviets, and at the highest level, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But, during this period, statements about publicity and the fight against bureaucracy were already heard. Gradually, the process of rethinking international relations began. The tension in relations between the USSR and the USA has significantly decreased.

Large-scale changes began somewhat later - from the end of 1987. This period is characterized by unprecedented freedom of creativity, the development of art. Authorial journalistic programs are broadcast on television, magazines publish materials promoting the ideas of reforms. At the same time, the political struggle is clearly intensifying. Serious transformations in the sphere of state power begin. So, in December 1988, at the 11th extraordinary session of the Supreme Council, the law “On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution” was adopted. The law made changes to the electoral system by introducing the principle of alternativeness.

However, the most turbulent was the third period of perestroika in the USSR. In 1989, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. In fact, the USSR ceases to support socialist regimes on the territory of other states. The camp of the socialist countries is collapsing. The most important, significant, event of that period is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany.

The party is gradually losing real power and its unity. A fierce battle between the factions begins. Not only the situation in the USSR, but also the very foundations of the ideology of Marxism, as well as the October Revolution of 1917, are criticized. Many opposition parties and movements are being formed.

Against the backdrop of a tough political struggle during this period of Gorbachev's perestroika, a split begins in the sphere of the intelligentsia, among artists. If some of them were critical of the processes taking place in the country, then the other part provides comprehensive support to Gorbachev. Against the backdrop of political and social freedom unprecedented at that time, the volume of financing, both art and science, education, and many industries is significantly reduced. Talented scientists in such conditions leave to work abroad, or turn into businessmen. Many research institutes and design bureaus cease to exist. The development of knowledge-intensive industries slows down, and later stops altogether. Perhaps the most striking example of this can be the Energiya-Buran project, within the framework of which a unique reusable space shuttle Buran was created, which made a single flight.

The financial situation of the majority of citizens is gradually deteriorating. Also, there is an aggravation of interethnic relations. Many cultural and political figures are beginning to say that perestroika has become obsolete.

The consequences of perestroika are extremely ambiguous and multifaceted. Undoubtedly, the receipt by society of social and political freedoms, publicity and reform of the planned distribution economy are positive aspects. However, the processes that took place during the period of perestroika in the USSR in 1985-1991 led to the collapse of the USSR and the aggravation of interethnic conflicts that had been smoldering for a long time. The weakening of power, both in the center and in the regions, a sharp decline in the standard of living of the population, undermining the scientific base, and so on. Undoubtedly, the results of perestroika and its significance will be rethought by future generations more than once.

perestroika- the general name of the reforms and the new ideology of the Soviet party leadership, used to denote large and controversial changes in the economic and political structure of the USSR, initiated by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev in 1986-1991.

In May 1986, Gorbachev visited Leningrad, where, at a meeting with the party activists of the Leningrad city committee of the CPSU, he first used the word "perestroika" to refer to the socio-political process:

“Apparently, comrades, we all need to reorganize. Everyone".

The term was picked up by the media and became the slogan of the new era that began in the USSR.

For your information,(because in many textbooks since 1985):

"Legally" the beginning of perestroika is considered 1987, when at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU perestroika was declared the direction of development of the state.

Background.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. By that time, the USSR was already on the verge of a deep crisis, both in the economy and in the social sphere. The efficiency of social production was steadily declining, and the arms race was a heavy burden on the country's economy. In fact, all spheres of society needed to be updated.

Characteristics of the pre-perestroika administrative system: strict administrative and directive tasks, a centralized system of material and technical supply, strict regulation of the activities of enterprises and organizations. Management of the economy as a whole, and each of its branches, each enterprise, large or small, was carried out mainly by administrative methods with the help of targeted directive tasks. The command-and-order form of government alienated people both from labor itself and from its results, turning public property into a draw. This mechanism, as well as the political system, was personified in the people who reproduced it. The bureaucratic apparatus maintained a system that allowed its ideas to occupy profitable positions, to be "at the top", regardless of the actual state of affairs in the national economy.

The April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU proclaimed a new strategy - the acceleration of the socio-economic development of the country. By the mid-1980s, the imminent need for change was clear to many in the country. Therefore, proposed in those conditions by M.S. Gorbachev's "perestroika" found a lively response in all strata of Soviet society.

If we try to defineperestroika , then in my opinion,"perestroika" - this is the creation of an effective mechanism for accelerating the socio-economic development of society; comprehensive development of democracy strengthening discipline and order respect for the value and dignity of the individual; renunciation of command and administration, encouragement of innovation; a turn to science, a combination of scientific and technological achievements with the economy, etc.

Restructuring tasks.

The entry of the USSR into the era of radical transformation dates back to April 1985 and is associated with the name of the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev (elected to this post at the March Plenum of the Central Committee).

The new course proposed by Gorbachev assumed the modernization of the Soviet system, the introduction of structural and organizational changes in economic, social, political and ideological mechanisms.

In the new strategy, personnel policy acquired particular importance, which was expressed, on the one hand, in the fight against negative phenomena in the party and state apparatus (corruption, bribery, etc.), on the other hand, in the elimination of political opponents of Gorbachev and his course (in the Moscow and Leningrad party organizations, in the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics).

The ideology of reform.

Initially (beginning in 1985), the strategy was to improve socialism and accelerate socialist development. At the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then at the XIX All-Union Party Conference (summer 1988) M.S. Gorbachev laid out a new ideology and strategy for reform. For the first time, the presence of deformations in the political system was recognized and the task was to create a new model - socialism with a human face.

The ideology of perestroika included some liberal democratic principles (separation of powers, representative democracy (parliamentarism), protection of civil and political human rights). At the 19th Party Conference, the goal of creating a civil (legal) society in the USSR was proclaimed for the first time.

Democratization and Glasnost became the essential expressions of the new concept of socialism. Democratization touched the political system, but it was also seen as the basis for the implementation of radical economic reforms.

At this stage of perestroika, publicity and criticism of the deformations of socialism in the economy, politics, and the spiritual sphere were widely developed. The Soviet people have access to many works by both theoreticians and practitioners of Bolshevism, declared at one time enemies of the people, and figures of the Russian emigration of various generations.

Conversation with Doctor of Economics Hegumen Philip (Simonov)

April 23, 1985 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev announced plans for broad reforms aimed at the comprehensive renewal of society, the cornerstone of which was called "acceleration of the country's socio-economic development."

And exactly 30 years ago, on October 15, 1985, the next Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered and approved the draft of the main directions of the economic and social development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period up to 2000. Thus was given an official start to the new economic course, known as "perestroika".

The consequences of numerous "reforms" and "transformations", begun in those years and continued in subsequent years, affect to this day. About what kind of economy they “rebuilt”, what they wanted to come to and why it turned out “as always”, what transformations our country really needed, what the “experience” of those years can teach and what each of us Orthodox should do, we talk with the abbot Philip (Simonov), Doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation, Head of the Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.

Father Philip, they talk about two types of economic systems: command-administrative and market. What is their fundamental difference? What are the pros and cons?

First, let's say a few words about a certain commonality that unites these two concepts. This commonality consists in the fundamental economic illiteracy of those who introduced these terms for political reasons, then picked up and used them in the framework of the political struggle, and those who conveyed these concepts - perfect historical and political economic rubbish - to our time.

Any sane person, even without a higher economic education, not to mention academic degrees and titles, when talking about something, usually finds out its main characteristics. That is, trying to answer the question "what is it?", finds out, which it is what are its characteristics that make it exactly that, and not something else.

Therefore, speaking of the "market economy", one immediately wants to ask: which is it a market economy?

After all, the market existed and mediated exchange both in slave-owning antiquity, and in the stadially incomprehensible East, and in feudal Europe, and in early capitalism, and at its later stages.

Public figures who abandoned political economy as a science due to its “dark Soviet past” and threw the term “market economy” into society as the main idea of ​​a bright future, themselves acted very politically and economically: they used this meaningless term to fight for power, but no one was told what kind of "market economy" they were talking about.

Everyone thought that it was socially oriented, with the preservation of the achievements that society already had (free education and health care, full employment, an 8-hour working day with a 41-hour working week, etc.), and with the acquisition of those preferences, which the market gives (private business initiative, growth in management efficiency, quality improvement based on competition, etc.).

But this is exactly what, as it turned out, no one guaranteed. Because what happened was what happened: complete violation of the rights of workers, rampant "gangster capitalism" in the spirit of the era of primitive capital accumulation based on the unproven dogma "the market will solve everything", the emergence of a system of almost feudal "feeding" and other delights that fit perfectly into a "market economy" - provided that no one gave an exact definition of this phenomenon. What has grown has grown.

Now about the "command system". Don't you feel the economic inferiority of the term itself? It's not the language of economics, it's pure politics! By the way, no one has given a scientific definition of this term either - because it is simply impossible from the point of view of theory.

Economics does not talk about a “market” and “command” economy, but about systems of directive and indicative planning

In science, however, there was a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of systems of directive (as in the USSR) and indicative planning - the latter was the basis for the sectoral development of the countries of post-war Europe. On the basis of indicative planning, Gaullist France, for example, created its own competitive aerospace industry. Is this not an indicator of the effectiveness of the method? By the way, the intersectoral balance model, on which the Soviet planning and forecasting model was based, was developed by the American economist of Russian origin, Nobel laureate Vasily Leontiev. It’s now that we realized it, we adopted the unreadable law “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”, only the system of this strategic forecasting over 25 years has been so destroyed that there is not only no one to calculate this intersectoral balance, but there is no one to teach how to calculate it.

At the same time, the main problem was the limits of application of one or another model, which, in essence, determines the effectiveness of both. In short: is it possible to plan production to the maximum range, or are there still some boundaries beyond which the inefficient use of the resources of the economy begins?

The Western world limited itself to indicative planning, within the framework of which it was planned not to produce (in natural units), but the resources necessary for the development of this production - those sectors that are recognized as priorities for the economy at the moment. At the same time, a combination of public and private financing was envisaged: the state made initial investments in priority sectors for itself, setting a certain development vector, and private capital, having this benchmark, joined the investment process, increasing its efficiency.

The domestic economy, even in the conditions of that strange “market”, the transition to which began under Gorbachev, could not abandon the dogmas of directive planning “from above” (at the same time, enterprises did not participate in the process of preparing the plan, but received ready-made planning targets from the center), despite even to the fact that it began to very clearly demonstrate its shortcomings against the background of the growth in the well-being of the population and the corresponding increase in demand: a “deficit economy” arose, under the sign of which all the Gorbachev years passed. Let us leave aside the question of how much this deficit was the result of objective factors and how much it was man-made, consciously organized. It's not about that. The question is that the government of that time failed to ensure the effective implementation of that speculative intersectoral balance that the State Planning Committee worked on in its last years; failed to combine their own ideas about the standard of living of the population of the country with the ideas of this same population; failed to separate the economy from the ideology (as China did, for example).

The idea that “all of us, comrades, apparently need to rebuild” was first expressed by Gorbachev in May 1985. But even earlier, in 1983, in the leading party magazine Kommunist, the then Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yu.V. Andropov set the task of accelerated "progress of the productive forces", which was subsequently exploited by Gorbachev under the amorphous slogan of "acceleration".

In essence, it came down to three streams of situational reform measures that were little linked to each other: « publicity» (which was reduced to chewing through the media of the negative moments of Soviet history and life, without developing any significant concept of the further development of society as a result) - « cooperation» (to which one must add the epic of creating joint ventures with foreign capital, which ended, in general, ingloriously and did not make a significant contribution to economic growth; apologists for "perestroika" say that it was through cooperation and joint ventures that "elements were introduced into the socialist economy" market," - but these elements existed before them, but what cooperation really introduced into the economy was the elements of the wild market, "gray" schemes, raiding, consumer deception - all that flourished later, in 1990- years) - « new thinking» (emphasis - M.S. Gorbachev) in foreign policy (in fact, it meant the rejection of the ideological imperative in diplomacy and a certain "thaw" in relations with the West).

The reforms imposed by the IMF were designed for the economies of developing countries. They were not applicable to the developed economy of Russia

Ultimately, for the Soviet Union, all this resulted in an uncontrolled increase in borrowing on the world loan capital market, where at that time they were very willing to give "credits under Gorbachev", entering into an external debt crisis and receiving an IMF stabilization program (such a program since the 80s The twentieth century was carried out in all countries that fell into the "debt spiral"), the condition for financing under which were those "reforms" that destroyed the country's economy. And not only due to some malicious intent (although 1991 in the West was quite reasonably perceived as a brilliant victory in the Cold War, with which, however, they could not figure out what to do for a long time), but also because, according to the usual Western laziness, this program, the foundations of which were developed for developing countries, was not designed for a developed economy, and neither those who set the tasks nor those who thoughtlessly carried them out understood this.

The simplest example: "agrarian reform", according to the stabilization program, implies the elimination of large inefficient land ownership (such as pre-revolutionary landowners), the formation of small peasant (farm) farms on the basis of actually confiscated land and then their cooperation with the prospect of creating an agro-industrial complex capable of meeting the country's needs for food. This model is valid, for example, for the Upper Volta.

But in the former USSR did not have large landownership of the landowner type. But were cooperation and agro-industrial complex. Nobody noticed this.

As a result, large landed cooperative property was disbanded, and in its place was formed exactly what can be compared with inefficient landlord latifundial land ownership, which does not give a marketable product. Former arable fields and fodder territories - those that are not built up with cottages - have been overgrown with undergrowth for 25 years, farmers have failed, and now we have to restore agriculture and cooperation - this word, by the way, was banned throughout the 1990s, even articles have not been published on this topic. And now our Ministry of Agriculture is planning to start a reform already like the Upper Volta, in order to mix the consequences of the stupidity that, under the dictation of the IMF, was committed in the 1990s: to return unused agricultural land to the state land fund and find an effective way to ensure the restoration of their productive potential.

The people have always called it: "A bad head does not give rest to the legs."

On the whole, for the USSR, “perestroika” meant in fact a complete rejection of the political, economic and ideological model that the CPSU adhered to in the post-war period, in Lenin’s language (which was sharp on labels): opportunism and revisionism. With quite predictable consequences: "cooperation" (or rather, those capitals that arose on its basis and, of course, showed their political ambitions) removed Gorbachev from the domestic political arena, and "glasnost" finally buried him as a politician, along with the USSR destroyed by his hands.

What were the results of "perestroika"? Were the set goals achieved? Is it fair to say that this led to the collapse of the USSR?

“Perestroika” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator

Actually, I already answered this question. “ ” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator, who tried to sit on all chairs at once: both improve socialism and directive planning to preserve, and introduce the capitalist market into this economic system, and did not while implementing the ideas of self-financing, to be both the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the President - and all in one bottle. Actually, there were no scientifically based goals - there were some impulsive good wishes “between lafitte and clicquot”, to which the Academy of Sciences frantically tried to give a scientific appearance.

And when there is no real - not situational, but scientifically substantiated - development goal, from which the tools to achieve it follow, there can be no positive result by definition.

What changes did the Soviet Union really need? And what does the experience of the last decade of the existence of the Soviet Union teach us in terms of the organization of economic life?

I must say that the "Kremlin elders" of the last Soviet period did one big stupidity: they considered the whole people stupid.

Let me explain. I started traveling abroad on official business in the late 1980s. Yes, everything was good and beautiful there. In general, decently than we have under Gorbachev. But there, in prosperous Vienna, for the first time I saw homeless people with carriages, in which all their meager belongings were placed. People who, in no less prosperous London in the winter, settled down to sleep at night under bridges in cardboard boxes, for whom, on Christmas Eve, Bishop Anthony (Bloom) urged them to collect at least something that would make them feel the joy of the birth of Christ. People who rummaged through garbage cans in search of food.

If the "elders" did not consider the Soviet people headless idiots, they would allow them to freely travel abroad - not on tours accompanied by the KGB, but freely, simply by taking a visa. We are not idiots, we, besides jeans and street cafes, would see something else that would make us understand: tourism should not be confused with emigration. We knew full well that we were never in danger of becoming homeless or unemployed. We understood that we do not have to pay for education, and our education is such that our reports at international conferences were listened to with attention. We understood that we did not need to pay at the clinic or hospital, that we had already paid for it in the form of income tax.

And now we understand that you have to pay for everything - but where to get it? Right now, during a crisis, according to polls, people no longer have enough money for food, the share of expenses for these purposes in total expenses is growing, someone is already getting into savings, and the quality of food is deteriorating. And it is impossible to compete for wages, because, unlike in Europe, we do not have normal trade unions that would respond to the needs of the working people, and would not satisfy their own needs.

In a healthy society, the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds

Here we are talking about church charity, we are working to help the poor and the homeless - but this help in itself is an indicator of the unhealthy of society, because in a healthy society there should not be socially unprotected strata, and the task of ensuring social protection (including ensuring full employment of the population) the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds received from the population as taxes. And if the Church, which does not have a tax source of income, is forced to take on the function of social protection, performing it at the expense of voluntary donations (that is, in fact, re-taxation of the population: after all, taxes have already been paid to the state, and we have the right to expect the state to fulfill its social functions, as soon as it exists in this connection), this means that the state does not fulfill its constitutional functions, and society does not control it.

As for the experience of the “decline and fall of the USSR”. Then there was a lot of talk about the Chinese model - but, unfortunately, no one really bothered to either study this model in detail or justify the possibility of using its elements in the conditions of the Soviet economy: some looked with lust at the West, others - forward "back to Lenin ”, the economy, meanwhile, was suffocating from an inefficient management model, and where, under the guise of a “socialist market”, the management model changed (initially at the micro level, then, with the folding of organized groups, already at a higher level), the processes of initial accumulation of capital began with cruelty late medieval and early modern times.

No real model was proposed based on its own economic complex, taking into account its features: the Central Committee of the CPSU, which actually ruled the country, rewrote old dogmas "from congress to congress", and the scientific world tried - through meditation - to discover "new content" in them. Some “unknown forces” also interfered: I remember well how in one of the working groups on Staraya Square they prepared a draft decree on foreign economic activity, got excited and argued, finally did it by night and went home - and the next morning they read in the newspaper “ True” text, where all our thoughts were spelled out “exactly the opposite”… By whom? And why?

There can be only one conclusion: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it.

Thus, there can be only one conclusion from this negative experience: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it, and not today or tomorrow (“and after us even a flood”; “yes, we drink pits, morning we will die" - 1 Corinthians 15:32), but for years to come. If we talk about the economy, there should be a development model consciously chosen as a goal with known characteristics, defined scientifically, and not “from the wind of our own head” (too often we are guided not by economic reality, but by our own ideas about this reality); directions, methods and tools to achieve the set goal should be determined, ensuring, among other things, the stability of the national economy to internal and external stresses that no one has canceled, no matter how much we would like to; finally, there must be the right people who would not tell pleasant tales made up of their own ideas about reality, but would work effectively for this goal, and not against it.

Otherwise, we will constantly encounter unpleasant surprises for ourselves: it suddenly turns out that we do not have self-sufficiency in food, then we suddenly realize that some industry has collapsed, and as a result, rockets are falling, then it turns out that the level of education has dropped to zero (by the way, according to polls, almost half of the respondents, in connection with the abolition of school astronomy, are now sure that the sun revolves around the earth), otherwise an insight will suddenly happen, from which it will become clear that the world community was just flirting with us like a cat with a mouse: they showed PR candy wrappers (like the notorious myth about the "G-8", which in practice never ceased to be the "G-7"), but in fact they pursued the old policy of ousting a competitor from the market. And the number of such discoveries can multiply to infinity.

What economy should be in Russia? What should we strive for? What potential for the development of the economy, if I may say so, is inherent in Orthodoxy, its ethics?

Effective, that is, ensuring the growth of the produced national income and its distribution and redistribution to achieve development goals - and not individual sectors, industries or industries, but the entire economic complex of the country.

Based on scientific and technological progress, without which we will be doomed to trail behind world development.

Socially oriented, as it should be, the economy of the “welfare state”, which is spelled out in our Constitution, that is, satisfying the basic legitimate needs of the population - not some part of it, but all citizens, since we are so fond of talking about “civil society”.

Diversified, that is, tuned to meet a wide range of national needs and various areas of national security.

Integrated into the world economy not as a raw material appendage, but as an equal partner in the emerging global division of labor.

Life will show what place Orthodoxy can take in this system. The economy is a non-confessional phenomenon. Religious ethics (and this is the only and most important thing that faith can offer to participants in the economic process) begins to work when organizational processes begin to operate: in the organization of the production process and everything connected with it (rest time, disability, pensions, etc. .), as well as in the organization of distribution, exchange and consumption of the produced product (in a general sense). How fair will these organizational processes be, how focused on the apostle indicated uniformity(see 2 Cor. 8, 14), how prepared a person will be for this justice in the process of education and upbringing - all this is not only not indifferent to religious ethics and its bearers, but is also an open field for influence.

And then everything will depend on how much we ourselves, the bearers of religious ethics, are not indifferent to all these problems, how much we ourselves are rooted in Christ's teaching, how much it is not external and temporary for us (that is, existing only when we enter from the world into church walls in order, as they say now, to “satisfy one’s religious needs”), but internally, experienced and assimilated, which has become not even a part of life, but life itself, insofar as we ourselves are “not strangers and aliens, but fellow citizens saints and their own to God” (Eph. 2:19).

Those who are God's own cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality.

See how this “own” sounds in Greek: οἰκεῖοι (ikii). Those who inhabit God's οἶκος (ikos), who - their God, οἰκεῖοι, domestici, His household, those cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality. They are like members Houses, by virtue of their rights and obligations, by all means participate, in their measure, in its creation and organization - economy.

And what other participation does the Master of the house expect from us, if not evidence, do not preach the Gospel of His beloved Son - "not the letter, but the spirit, because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life" (2 Cor. 3: 6), - "even to the ends of the earth" (Acts 1: 8).

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We are waiting for changes...". These words are from the leader's song popular in the 80s. the Kino groups of V. Tsoi reflected the mood of the people in the first years of the perestroika policy. She was proclaimed the new general secretary, 54-year-old M. S. Gorbachev, who took over the baton of power after the death of K. U. Chernenko in March 1985. Dressed elegantly, speaking “without a piece of paper,” the Secretary General won popularity with his external democracy, the desire for transformations in a “stagnant” country and, of course, promises (for example, each family was promised a separate comfortable apartment by 2000), no one since Khrushchev’s he communicated with the people in this way: Gorbachev traveled around the country, easily went out to people, talked in an informal setting with workers, collective farmers, and the intelligentsia. With the advent of a new leader, inspired by the plans for a breakthrough in the economy and the restructuring of the entire life of society, people's hopes and enthusiasm revived.
A course was proclaimed to "accelerate" the socio-economic development of the country. It was assumed that in industry the core of this process would be the renewal of mechanical engineering. However, already in 1986, Gorbachev and other members of the Politburo were faced with the fact that "acceleration" was not happening. The course for the priority development of mechanical engineering failed due to financial difficulties. The budget deficit increased sharply (in 1986 it tripled compared to 1985, when it was 17-18 billion rubles). This phenomenon was caused by a number of reasons: the “deferred” demand of the population for goods (money was not returned to the treasury, and part of it was circulated on the black market), the fall in prices for exported oil (revenues to the treasury decreased by a third), loss of income as a result of anti-alcohol campaign.
In this situation, the "top" came to the conclusion that all sectors of the economy must be transferred to new methods of management. Gradually, in 1986 - 1989, in the course of economic transformations, state acceptance of products, self-financing and self-financing, and the election of directors of enterprises were introduced; The laws on the state enterprise, on individual labor activity and cooperatives, as well as the law on labor conflicts, which provided for the right of workers to strike, came into force.
However, all these measures not only did not lead to an improvement in the economic situation in the country, but, on the contrary, worsened it due to the half-heartedness, uncoordinated and ill-conceived reforms, large budget expenditures, and an increase in the money supply in the hands of the population. Production ties between enterprises for state deliveries of products were disrupted. The shortage of consumer goods increased. At the turn of the 80-90s. more and more empty store shelves. Local authorities began to introduce coupons for some products.
Glasnost and the evolution of the state system. Soviet society embraced the process of democratization. In the ideological sphere, Gorbachev put forward the slogan of glasnost. This meant that no events of the past and present should be hidden from the people. In the speeches of party ideologists and journalism, the idea of ​​a transition from “barracks socialism” to socialism “with a human face” was promoted. The attitude of the authorities towards dissidents has changed. Returned to Moscow from Gorky (as Nizhny Novgorod was called) Academician A. D. Sakharov, exiled there for critical remarks about the war in Afghanistan. Other dissidents were released from places of detention and exile, and camps for political prisoners were closed. In the course of the renewed process of rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist repressions, N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev and other political figures “returned” to our history, who were not honored with this under N. S. Khrushchev.
The processes of glasnost and de-Stalinization were clearly manifested in newspaper and magazine publications, and television programs. The weekly Moscow News (editor E. V. Yakovlev) and the magazine Ogonyok (V. A. Korotich) enjoyed great popularity. Criticism of the dark sides of Soviet reality, the desire to find a way out of the crisis for society permeated many works of literature and art, both new and those that were previously banned by the authorities, and now have become the property of a wide audience. The novels of A. N. Rybakov “Children of the Arbat”, V. S. Grossman “Life and Fate”, the works of A. I. Solzhenitsyn (“The Gulag Archipelago”, etc.) published in his homeland, films of T. E. Abuladze "Repentance", M. E. Goldovskaya "Solovki Power", S. S. Govorukhina "You can't live like that."
The emancipation of society from party tutelage, the critical assessments of the Soviet state system that were expressed in the conditions of glasnost, put the question of political transformations on the agenda. Important events in domestic political life were the approval by the participants of the XIX All-Union Party Conference (June 1998) of the main provisions of the reform of the state system, the adoption by the Supreme Council of amendments to the constitution, as well as the law on the election of people's deputies. The essence of these decisions boiled down to the transition from the nomination of one candidate for deputies to one seat in the authorities to the system of elections on an alternative basis. The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR became the supreme body of legislative power, which nominated members of the Supreme Soviet from among its members. However, only two thirds of the deputies of the congress were elected on the basis of universal suffrage, another third was nominated by public organizations, primarily the CPSU. The elections of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in two rounds were held in the spring of 1989, at the end of May it began its work. A legal opposition formed within the congress: an Interregional Deputy Group was created. It was headed by the world-famous scientist, leader of the human rights movement, academician A. D. Sakharov, former first secretary of the Moscow city party committee and candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee B. N. Yeltsin, scientist-economist G. Kh. Popov.
Under the conditions of political pluralism, simultaneously with the emergence of active opposition in the Supreme Council, various socio-political movements were born, almost all of whose representatives at first came out under the slogans of "renewal of socialism." At the same time, tendencies disturbing for the communist authorities were also outlined in their activities. They were primarily associated with the growth of social discontent and nationalist sentiments.
In the USSR, as in any other multi-ethnic state, national contradictions could not but exist, which always manifest themselves most clearly in conditions of economic and political crises and radical changes. In the Soviet Union, these contradictions were exacerbated by a number of circumstances. Firstly, while building socialism, the Soviet authorities did not take into account the historical characteristics of the peoples - the traditional economy and way of life were destroyed, Islam, Buddhism, shamanism, etc. were attacked. Secondly, in the territories that were annexed to the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and which twice (immediately after joining and after liberation from Nazi occupation) were “cleansed” from hostile elements, manifestations of nationalism were very strong, anti-Soviet and anti-socialist sentiments were widespread (the Baltic States, Western Ukraine, to some extent Moldova). Thirdly, the grievances of the peoples deported during the Great Patriotic War, returned to their native places (Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, Kalmyks), and even more so not returned (Germans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, etc.) .). Fourthly, there were long-standing historical conflicts and claims of various kinds (for example, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh sought to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR, the Abkhazians advocated the transfer of autonomy from the Georgian SSR to the RSFSR, etc.). During the years of “perestroika”, mass national and nationalist social movements arose, the most significant of which were the “popular fronts” of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Armenian committee “Karabakh”, “Rukh” in Ukraine, the Russian society “Memory”.
New Thinking and the End of the Cold War."Perestroika" was closely connected with a radical change in the course of Soviet foreign policy - the rejection of confrontation with the West, the cessation of intervention in local conflicts and the revision of relations with socialist countries. The new course was dominated not by a “class approach”, but by universal values. This approach received its theoretical justification in the book by M. S. Gorbachev “Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world”. It spoke of the need to create a new international order, designed to replace post-war international relations. It should be based on maintaining a balance of national interests, the freedom of countries to choose the paths of development, the joint responsibility of the powers for solving the global problems of our time. Gorbachev advocated the concept of a "common European home" in which there would be a place for both capitalist and socialist countries.
MS Gorbachev regularly met with US Presidents: with R. Reagan (in 1985 - 1988) and George W. Bush (since 1989). At these meetings, Soviet-American relations were "thawed" and questions of disarmament were discussed. Gorbachev negotiated from the standpoint of reasonable sufficiency in matters of defense and the program he put forward for a nuclear-free world.
On 8 1987, an agreement was signed on the elimination of medium-range missiles - the Soviet SS-20 and the American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. The American and Soviet sides promised to honor the ABM treaty as it was signed in 1972. In 1990, an agreement was signed on the reduction of strategic arms.
In order to build confidence, 500 tactical nuclear warheads were unilaterally removed from the countries of Eastern Europe.
On November 9, 1989, the inhabitants of Berlin, confident that the USSR would not interfere in all-German affairs, destroyed the Berlin Wall, a symbol of divided Germany and Europe. After the unification of Germany, the USSR agreed to the entry of this, already a single state into NATO. In 1990, the participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed an agreement on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe.
The Soviet leadership realized the need to withdraw troops from Afghanistan (more than 100 thousand) and in 1988 undertook to do this within 9 months. In mid-February 1989, the last Soviet military units left Afghan soil. In addition to Afghanistan, Soviet troops were also withdrawn from Mongolia. After the "velvet revolutions" in the Eastern European countries, negotiations began on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, their withdrawal from the GDR was in progress. In 1990-1991 the dissolution of the military and political structures of the Warsaw Pact. This military bloc ceased to exist. The result of the policy of "new thinking" was a fundamental change in the international situation - the "cold war" ended. At the same time, many of the concessions to the Western states that Gorbachev made were not sufficiently thought out (mainly in their concrete implementation), and this did not correspond to the country's national interests.
Power crisis. After the publication in the summer of 1988 of a decree on meetings, rallies, processions and demonstrations against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the economic situation in the country, mass miners' strikes began. Gradually, dissatisfaction with the too slow pace of transformations grew in society; in the eyes of society, the conservative wing in the leadership of the CPSU seemed to be the culprit for the “slipping” of reforms.
After the collapse of the communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe, the hopes of the opposition for the implementation of radical changes in the Soviet Union increased. If the opposition "at the top" consisted of the Interregional Deputy Group and democratically minded intellectual circles, then the opposition movement "from below" involved the broad masses of residents of large cities, the population of a number of union republics in the Baltics, Transcaucasia, and Moldova and Ukraine. The political awakening of Russia was facilitated by the March 1990 elections of people's deputies at all levels. The opposition between the party apparatus and the opposition forces was clearly marked in the election campaign. The latter received an organizational center in the person of the electoral bloc "Democratic Russia" (later it was transformed into a social movement). February 1990 was the month of mass rallies, the participants of which demanded the elimination of the CPSU monopoly on power.
The elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR became the first truly democratic ones - after the election campaign to the Constituent Assembly of 1917. As a result, about a third of the seats in the highest legislative body of the republic were received by deputies of democratic orientation. The results of the elections in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus demonstrated the crisis of power of the party elite. Under the pressure of public opinion, the 6th article of the Constitution of the USSR, which proclaimed the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society, was canceled, the formation of a multi-party system began in the country. Supporters of the reforms B. N. Yeltsin and G. Kh. Popov occupied high posts: the first was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, the second - the mayor of Moscow.
The most important factor in the crisis of the "top" was the strengthening of national movements that led the struggle against the allied (in the terminology of their representatives - imperial) Center and the authorities of the CPSU. Back in 1988, tragic events unfolded in Nagorno-Karabakh and, as they said then, around it. There were the first demonstrations under nationalist slogans since the civil war, pogroms (Armenians in Azerbaijani Sumgait - February 1988, Meskhetian Turks in Uzbek Ferghana - June 1989) and armed clashes (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia) on ethnic grounds. The Supreme Council of Estonia proclaimed the supremacy of republican laws over all-union laws (November 1988). In both Azerbaijan and Armenia, by the end of 1989, national passions were running high. The Supreme Council of Azerbaijan declared the sovereignty of its republic, and the Armenian Social Movement was created in Armenia, which advocated independence and secession from the USSR. At the very end of 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party declared its independence in relation to the CPSU.
In 1990, national movements developed in an ascending fashion. In January, in connection with the Armenian pogroms, troops were sent to Baku. The military operation, which was accompanied by mass casualties, only temporarily removed the issue of Azerbaijan's independence from the agenda. At the same time, the Lithuanian parliament voted for the independence of the republic, and troops entered Vilnius. Following Lithuania, similar decisions were made by the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia, in the summer the declarations of sovereignty were adopted by the Supreme Soviets of Russia (June 12) and Ukraine (July 16), after which the "parade of sovereignties" covered other republics. In February-March 1991 independence referendums were held in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia.
Two presidents. In the fall of 1990, M. S. Gorbachev, elected President of the USSR by the Congress of People's Deputies, was forced to reorganize the state authorities. The executive bodies now began to report directly to the president. A new advisory body was established - the Federation Council, whose members were the heads of the union republics. The development and, with great difficulty, the coordination of the draft of a new Union Treaty between the republics of the USSR began.
In March 1991, the first referendum in the history of the country was held - the citizens of the USSR were to express their opinion on the issue of preserving the Soviet Union as a renewed federation of equal and sovereign republics. It is indicative that 6 (Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova) out of 15 union republics did not take part in the referendum. No less significant is the fact that 76% of those who participated in the vote were in favor of preserving the Union. In parallel, the All-Russian referendum was also held - the majority of its participants voted for the introduction of the post of president of the republic.
On June 12, 1991, exactly one year after the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, the nationwide elections of the first president in the history of Russia were held. It was Boris N. Yeltsin, who was supported by more than 57% of those who took part in the vote. After these elections, Moscow turned into the capital of two presidents - the All-Union and the Russian. It was difficult to reconcile the positions of the two leaders, and personal relations between them did not differ in mutual disposition.
Both presidents advocated reforms, but at the same time they looked differently at the goals and ways of reforms. One of them, MS Gorbachev, relied on the Communist Party, which was in the process of splitting into conservative and reformist parts. In addition, the party ranks began to melt - about a third of its members left the CPSU. Another president, B. N. Yeltsin, was supported by forces in opposition to the CPSU. It is natural that in July 1991 Yeltsin signed a decree prohibiting the activities of party organizations at state enterprises and institutions. The events unfolding in the country testified that the process of weakening the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union was becoming irreversible.
August 1991: a revolutionary turn in history. By August 1991, drafts of two important documents had been developed - the new Union Treaty and the program of the CPSU. It was assumed that the ruling party would take a social democratic position. The draft Union Treaty provided for the creation on a new basis of the Union of Sovereign States. It was approved by the heads of 9 republics and Soviet President Gorbachev. It was planned that the program would be approved at the upcoming Congress of the CPSU, and the signing of the Union Treaty would take place on August 20. However, the draft treaty could not satisfy either the supporters of a federation closed to the center, or the supporters of further sovereignization of the republics, primarily the Russian radical democrats.
Representatives of the party and state leaders, who believed that only decisive action would help preserve the political positions of the CPSU and stop the collapse of the Soviet Union, resorted to forceful methods. They decided to take advantage of the absence of the President of the USSR in Moscow, who was on vacation in the Crimea.
Early in the morning of August 19, television and radio informed the citizens that in connection with the illness of M. S. Gorbachev, the duties of the President of the USSR were temporarily entrusted to Vice-President G. I. Yanaev and that "to govern the country and effectively implement the state of emergency" the State State of Emergency Committee (GKChP). This committee included 8 people, including Vice President, Prime Minister V. S. Pavlov, and power ministers. Gorbachev found himself isolated in a state dacha. Military units and tanks were brought into Moscow, and a curfew was announced.
The House of Soviets of the RSFSR, the so-called White House, became the center of resistance to the GKChP. In the appeal “To the Citizens of Russia”, President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR R.I. Khasbulatov called on the population not to obey the illegal decisions of the State Emergency Committee, qualifying the actions of its members as an unconstitutional coup. The support of Muscovites gave the leadership of Russia steadfastness and determination. Tens of thousands of residents of the capital and a considerable number of visiting citizens came to the White House, expressing their support for Yeltsin and their readiness to defend the seat of Russian state power with arms in hand.
The confrontation between the State Emergency Committee and the White House lasted three days. Fearing the unleashing of a civil war, Yanaev and his associates did not dare to storm the House of Soviets. On the third day, the demoralized representatives of the State Emergency Committee began to withdraw troops from Moscow and flew to the Crimea, hoping to negotiate with Gorbachev. However, the President of the USSR managed to return to Moscow together with the Vice-President of the RSFSR A. V. Rutskoi, who had flown in “to the rescue”. Members of the GKChP were arrested.
Yeltsin signed decrees on the suspension of the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR and the publication of communist-oriented newspapers. Gorbachev announced the resignation of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then issued decrees that effectively stopped the activities of the party and transferred its property to state ownership.
The collapse of the USSR and the creation of the CIS. The last months of 1991 became the time of the final disintegration of the USSR. The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was dissolved, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was radically reformed, most of the allied ministries were liquidated, and a powerless inter-republican economic committee was created instead of the cabinet of ministers. The State Council of the USSR, which included the President of the USSR and the heads of the union republics, became the supreme body that directed the domestic and foreign policy of the state. The first decision of the State Council was the recognition of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Meanwhile, in the localities, the republican authorities began to resubordinate to themselves the branches of the national economy and state structures that were previously under the jurisdiction of the federal Center.
It was supposed to sign a new Union Treaty and create not a federation, but a confederation of sovereign republics. But these plans were not destined to come true. On December 1, a referendum was held in Ukraine, and the majority of those who took part in it (more than 80%) spoke in favor of the independence of the republic. Under these conditions, the leadership of Ukraine decided not to sign a new Union Treaty.
On December 7-8, 1991, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine B.N. Yeltsin and L.M. Kravchuk and the chairman of the Supreme Council of Belarus S.S. Shushkevich, having met in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, not far from the border Brest, announced the termination of the USSR and the formation as part of the three republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Subsequently, the CIS included all the former Soviet union republics, with the exception of the Baltic ones.

In the mid 80s. in the USSR there were radical changes in ideology, public consciousness, political and state organization, profound changes began in property relations and social structure. The collapse of the communist regime and the CPSU, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation in its place of new independent states, including Russia itself, the emergence of ideological and political pluralism, the emergence of civil society, new classes (among them capitalist) - these are just some of the new realities modern Russian history, the beginning of which can be dated to March-April 1985.

Strategy of "acceleration"

IN April 1985, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev

outlined a strategic course for reform. It was about the need for a qualitative transformation of Soviet society, its "renewal", about profound changes in all spheres of life.

The key word of the reform strategy was “ acceleration". It was supposed to accelerate the development of the means of production, scientific and technological progress, the social sphere and even the activities of party organs.

Terms “ perestroika" And " glasnost b” appeared later. Gradually, the emphasis was shifted from “acceleration” to “perestroika” and it was this word that became symbol course produced by M.S. Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s.

Publicity meant the identification of all the shortcomings that impede acceleration, criticism and self-criticism of performers “from top to bottom”. BUT perestroika assumed the introduction of structural and organizational changes in economic, social, political mechanisms, as well as in ideology in order to achieve acceleration of social development.

To ensure the implementation of new tasks, a change was made in some of the party and Soviet leaders. N. I. Ryzhkov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and E. A. Shevardnadze, who had previously been First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In December 1985, B. N. Yeltsin became secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. A. N. Yakovlev, A. I. Lukyanov advanced to the highest party hierarchy.

In 1985, the task of technical re-equipment and modernization of enterprises was set at the center of economic transformations. For this it was necessary accelerated development of mechanical engineering. This was the main goal in the national economy. The program of "acceleration" assumed the advancing (1.7 times) development of mechanical engineering in relation to the entire industry and its achievement of a world level by the beginning of the 90s. The success of acceleration was associated with the active use of the achievements of science and technology, the expansion of the rights of enterprises, the improvement of personnel work, and the strengthening of discipline in enterprises.

The course proclaimed in 1985 at the April plenum was reinforced in February 1986. on the XXVII Congress of the CPSU.

There were few innovations at the congress, but the main thing was support Law on labor collectives. The law proclaimed the creation of councils of labor collectives at all enterprises with broad powers, including the selection of executive workers, the regulation of wages in order to eliminate equalization and observe social justice in wages, and even determine the price of products.

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, promises were made to the Soviet people: to double the economic potential of the USSR by 2000, to increase labor productivity by 2.5 times and to provide each Soviet family with a separate apartment.

Most of the Soviet people believed the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev and enthusiastically supported him.

Course towards democratization

IN 1987. began serious adjustments to the reformist course.

There have been changes in the political vocabulary of the country's leadership. The word "acceleration" gradually fell out of use. New concepts have emerged, such as democratization”, “command and control system”, “braking mechanism”, “deformation of socialism". If before it was assumed that Soviet socialism was fundamentally sound, and it was only necessary to “accelerate” its development, now the “presumption of innocence” was removed from the Soviet socialist model, and serious internal shortcomings were discovered that needed to be eliminated and a new model created. socialism.

IN January 1987. Gorbachev recognized the failure of the reform efforts of previous years, and saw the reason for these failures in the deformations that had occurred in the USSR by the 1930s.

Since it was concluded that deformations of socialism”, it was supposed to eliminate these deformations and return to the socialism that was conceived by V.I. Lenin. This is how the slogan " Back to Lenin”.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in his speeches argued that in the "deformation of socialism" there were deviations from the ideas of Leninism. The Leninist concept of the NEP gained particular popularity. Publicists started talking about the NEP as a "golden age" of Soviet history, drawing analogies with the modern period of history. Economic articles on the problems of commodity-money relations, rent, and cooperation were published by P. Bunich, G. Popov, N. Shmelev, L. Abalkin. According to their concept, administrative socialism was to be replaced by economic socialism, which would be based on self-financing, self-financing, self-sufficiency, self-management of enterprises.

But main, the central theme of the perestroika time in the media was criticism of Stalin And command and control system generally.

This criticism was conducted much more fully and more ruthlessly than in the second half of the 1950s. On the pages of newspapers, magazines, on television, revelations of Stalin's policy began, Stalin's direct personal participation in mass repressions was revealed, a picture of the crimes of Beria, Yezhov, Yagoda was recreated. The revelations of Stalinism were accompanied by the identification and rehabilitation of more and more tens of thousands of innocent victims of the regime.

The most famous at this time were such works as “White Clothes” by V. Dudintsev, “Bison” by D. Granin, “Children of the Arbat” by A. Rybakov. The whole country read the magazines “New World”, “Znamya”, “October”, “Friendship of Peoples”, “Ogonyok”, which published previously banned works by M. Bulgakov, B. Pasternak, V. Nabokov, V. Grossman, A. Solzhenitsyn , L. Zamyatina.

XIX All-Union Party Conference (June 1988)

At the end of the 80s. transformations affected the structure of state power. The new doctrine of political democracy has received practical implementation in decisions XIX All-Union Party Conference, which for the first time proclaimed the goal of creating a civil society in the USSR and excluding party bodies from economic management, depriving them of state functions and transferring these functions to the Soviets.

At the conference, a sharp struggle developed between supporters and opponents of perestroika on the question of the tasks of the country's development. The majority of deputies supported the point of view of M.S. Gorbachev on the need for economic reform and transformation of the country's political system.

The conference approved the course for the creation in the country rule of law. Specific reforms of the political system to be implemented in the near future were also approved. It was supposed to elect Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the country's highest legislative body of 2,250 members. At the same time, two thirds of the Congress were to be elected by the population on an alternative basis, i.e. not less than two candidates, and one third of the deputies, also on an alternative basis, were elected by public organizations. The congress, convened periodically to determine legislative policy and adopt higher laws, formed from its midst The Supreme Council, which was supposed to work on a permanent basis and represent the Soviet parliament.

The alignment of political forces in the country began to change dramatically from the autumn of 1988. The main political change was that the previously united camp of supporters of perestroika began to split: radical wing, which quickly gained strength, turned into a powerful movement in 1989, and in 1990 began to decisively challenge Gorbachev's power. The struggle between Gorbachev and the radicals for leadership in the reform process formed the main pivot of the next stage of perestroika, which lasted from autumn 1988 to July 1990.