Camp of Catherine's soldiers. Illustration by Alexander Benois for the publication "Pictures on Russian History". 1912 Wikimedia Commons

A recruit of the 18th century, after a long journey, ended up in his regiment, which became a home for young soldiers - after all, service in the 18th century was lifelong. Only from 1793 its term was limited to 25 years. The recruit took an oath that forever separated him from his former life; received from the treasury a hat, a caftan, an epanchu cloak, a camisole with trousers, a tie, boots, shoes, stockings, undershirts and trousers.

The 1766 Colonel's Cavalry Regiment Instruction instructed the privates to “clean and shake up trousers, gloves, a sling and a harness, tie a hat, put a casket on it and put on boots, put spurs on them, graft a braid, put on a uniform, and then stand in the required soldier figure, walk simply and march ... and when he gets used to all that, begin to teach rifle techniques, equestrian and foot exercise. " It took a lot of time to teach the peasant son to behave bravely, "so that the peasant's mean habit, evasion, antics, scratching during conversation were completely exterminated from him." The soldiers were supposed to shave, but they were allowed to let go of their mustaches; they wore their hair long, up to the shoulders, and on ceremonial days they dusted it with flour. In the 1930s, soldiers were ordered to wear brooches and braids.

It took a lot of time "for the villainous peasant habit, evasion, antics, scratching during a conversation to be completely exterminated from him."

Coming to a company or squadron, yesterday's peasants-communes were included in their usual form of organization - a soldier's artel ("so that at least eight people were in a mess"). In the absence of a developed supply system (and the shops and shops we are used to), Russian soldiers have adapted to provide themselves with everything they need. Old-timers taught newcomers, experienced and skillful people bought additional provisions for the cooperative money, they themselves repaired ammunition and sewed uniforms and shirts from state cloth and linen, the smart ones were hired to work. The money from salaries, earnings and bonuses was transferred to the artel cash desk, at the head of which the soldiers elected a dignified and authoritative "consignee", or company headman.

This arrangement of military life made the Russian army of the 18th century socially and nationally homogeneous. The feeling of connection in battle ensured mutual assistance, supported the soldier's morale. From the very first days, the recruit was taught that now "he is no longer a peasant, but a soldier, who in his name and rank prevails over all his previous ranks, differs from them undeniably in honor and glory", since he, "not sparing his life, provides his fellow citizens, defends the fatherland ... and thus deserves the gratitude and mercy of the Emperor, the gratitude of fellow countrymen and the prayers of spiritual officials. " The recruits were told the story of their regiment, mentioning the battles in which this regiment took part, and the names of the heroes and generals. In the army, yesterday's "vile man" ceased to be a serf, if he had been before. The peasant guy became a "sovereign servant" and in the era of constant wars could rise to the rank of non-commissioned officer and even - if he was lucky - to the chief officer. The "Table of Ranks" of Peter I opened the way for obtaining a noble rank - thus, about a quarter of the infantry officers of Peter's army "went public". For exemplary service, an increase in salary, awarding a medal, production of corporals, sergeants was provided. "Faithful and true servants of the fatherland" were transferred from the army to the guard, received medals for battles; for honors in service, soldiers were awarded "a ruble" with a glass of wine.

Having seen the distant lands on campaigns, the serviceman forever broke with his former life. Regiments composed of former serfs did not hesitate to suppress popular unrest, and in the 18th and 19th centuries, the soldier did not feel like a peasant. And in everyday practice, the soldier got used to living at the expense of the townsfolk. Throughout the 18th century, the Russian army did not have barracks. In peacetime, she was quartered in the houses of rural and urban residents, who were supposed to provide the military with quarters, beds and firewood. Exemption from this obligation was a rare privilege.

In everyday practice, the soldier got used to living at the expense of the townsfolk.

Fusiliers of Infantry Regiments 1700-1720 From the book "Historical description of the clothing and weapons of the Russian troops", 1842

In the short days of rest from fighting and campaigns, the soldiers walked with might and main. In 1708, during the difficult Northern War, the gallant dragoons “stood in the townships. Wine and beer were collected before the wagon train. And some gentry ranks could not drink. They carried those very seriously, and also beat them with the sovereign's name. Yet fornication did appear. Imali dragoons of the shvadron nobles in the zakuta. There were those children who were young and there were no girls and women from these whores "Gentlemen"- Served in the dragoon squadron ("squadron") nobles (gentry). These young nobles did not give the women a pass.... Our colonel and worthy cavalier Mikhail Faddeich Chulishov to frighten all those who are insolent, ordered and beat in batogs.<…>And those dra-gunas and granodirs, who were out of small battles, rested and drank kumys from the Kalmyk and the Tatars, spiced up with vodka, and then fought with the neighboring regiment on their fists. De we, reproached, fought and lost their bellies, and de you, we were hooting and sveev Svei- Swedes. were afraid. And they staggered and barked obscenely into the distant shvadron, and the colonels did not know what to do. By the sovereign's command, the most vicious ima and broadcast and fought in batogs on the box in front of all the fry. And our two from the squadron also got the dragoon Akinfiy Krask and Ivan Sofiykin. They were hanged by the neck. And Krask's tongue fell out from the strangulation, it even reached the middle of the breasts, and many marveled at this and went to look. " "Service notes (diary) of Simeon Kurosh, captain of the Dragoon Shvadron, Roslavsky"..

And in peacetime, the stationing of troops in any town was perceived by the townsfolk as a real disaster. “He profligates with his wife, dishonors his daughter ... eats his chickens, his cattle, takes money from him and beats him incessantly.<…>Every month, before leaving the quarters, the peasants must be gathered, questioned about their claims and their subscriptions taken away.<…>If the peasants are dissatisfied, then they are given wine to drink, they are given to drink, and they sign. If, in spite of all this, they refuse to sign, then they are threatened, and they end up by silence and signing, "General Langeron described the behavior of the soldiers on the bail in Catherine's time.

The soldier licks his wife, dishonors his daughter, eats his chickens, his cattle, takes his money and beats him incessantly

The officers had the possibility of more refined leisure - especially abroad. “... All other officers of our regiment, not only young but also elderly, were engaged in completely different matters and concerns. All of their almost generally zealous desire to be in Konigsberg stemmed from a completely different source than mine. They had heard enough that Konigsberg is such a city, which is filled with everything that the passions of the young and in luxury and debauchery can satisfy and satisfy the lives of those accompanying them, namely: that there was in it a great many taverns and billiards and other places of entertainment; that you can get whatever you want in it, and most of all, that the female sex in it is too prone to greed and that there is in it a great many young women who practice dishonest handicrafts and sell their honor and chastity for money.
<…>No sooner had two weeks passed, when, to my great surprise, I heard that there was not a single tavern, not a single wine cellar, not a single billiard, and not a single obscene house in the city, which our gentlemen's officers were already unknown to. but that not only all of them are on the list, but quite a few have already brought into close acquaintance, partly with their mistresses, partly with other residents there, and some have already taken to themselves and for their maintenance, and all in general are already drowning in all the luxuries and debauchery ", - recalled the former lieutenant of the Arkhangelsk infantry regiment Andrei Bolotov about his stay in Konigsberg, conquered by the Russian troops in 1758.

If in relation to the peasants "impudence" was allowed, then in the "frunt" discipline was demanded from the soldiers. Soldiers' poems from that era faithfully describe everyday drills:

You go on guard - so grief,
And you come home - and twice,
Torment is on guard for us,
And how you change - learning! ..
Suspenders are on guard
Expect stretching for training.
Stay straighter and stretch
Don't chase the pokes
Slaps and kicks
Take it like a pancake.

Violators of the "Military article" were subject to punishment, which depended on the degree of the offense and was determined by a military court. For "sorcery" was supposed to burn, for desecration of icons - beheading. The most common punishment in the army was "chasing a rod", when the offender was led with his hands tied to a gun between two ranks of soldiers who hit him on the back with thick rods. The offender was led through the entire regiment 6 times for the first time, the offender was repeated 12 times. They were severely asked for the poor maintenance of the weapon, for deliberate damage to it, or for “leaving the gun in the field”; for the sale or loss of their uniforms, sellers and buyers were punished. For a three-time repetition of this offense, the perpetrator was sentenced to death. Theft, drunkenness and fighting were common crimes for servicemen. The punishment followed for "inattention in the ranks", for "being late in the ranks". A latecomer for the first time "will be taken on guard or for two hours by three fuze Fusee- smooth-bore flintlock rifle. on the shoulder". A latecomer for the second time was supposed to be arrested for two days or "six muskets on his shoulder." Those who were late for the third time were punished with gauntlets. For a conversation in the ranks they were entitled to "deprivation of salary". For negligent guard duty in peacetime, the soldier faced "serious punishment", and in wartime - the death penalty.

For "witchcraft" was supposed to burn, for desecration of icons - beheading

Escaping was especially severely punished. Back in 1705, a decree was issued, according to which one of the three captured fugitives was executed by lot, and the other two were exiled to eternal hard labor. The execution took place in the regiment from which the soldier fled. The flight from the army took on a wide scale, and the government had to issue special appeals to deserters with a promise of forgiveness to those who voluntarily returned to duty. In the 1730s, the situation of the soldiers worsened, leading to an increase in the number of fugitives, especially among the recruits. The measures of punishment were also intensified. Either execution or hard labor awaited the fugitives. One of the decrees of the Senate of 1730 reads: “Those recruits who learn to run abroad and will be caught, then from the first breeders, for fear of others, they will be executed by death, hanged; and the rest, who are not the breeders themselves, will cause political death and exile to Siberia for government work ”.

The usual joy in the soldier's life was receiving a salary. It was different and depended on the type of troops. The soldiers of the internal garrisons were paid least of all - their salary in the 60s of the 18th century was 7 rubles. 63 kopecks in year; and most of all received the cavalry - 21 rubles. 88 kopecks Considering that, for example, a horse cost 12 rubles, it was not so little, but the soldiers did not see this money. Something went to pay off debts or into the hands of resourceful store owners, something - to the artisan cash desk. It also happened that the colonel appropriated these soldier's pennies for himself, forcing the other officers of the regiment to steal, since they all had to sign expense items.

The rest of the soldiers' salary would squander in a tavern, where sometimes, in a dashing coup, he could “scold everyone swearingly and call himself tsar” or argue with whom exactly Empress Anna Ioannovna “prodigally lives” - with Duke Biron or with General Minich? Drinking companions, as expected, immediately reported, and the chatterbox had to make excuses for the usual "immense drunkenness" in such matters. In the best case, the case ended with the "chasing of the gauntlet" in the native regiment, in the worst case - with a whip and exile to distant garrisons.

The soldier could argue with whom exactly Empress Anna Ioannovna "lives prodigally" - with Duke Biron or with General Munnich?

Bored in the garrison service, the young soldier Semyon Efremov once shared with a colleague: "Pray to God that the Turk will rise, then we would get out of here." He escaped punishment only thanks to the explanation of his desire to start a war by the fact that "while he is young, he can serve as a servant." The old servicemen, who had already sniffed the gunpowder, thought not only about exploits - among the "material evidence" in the affairs of the Secret Chancellery, the conspiracies confiscated from them were preserved: false tongues and from all military weapons ... and me, your servant Michael, create as if the left by force. " Others, like private Semyon Popov, drove others to a terrible blasphemy: a soldier wrote with his own blood a "apostate letter" in which "he summoned the devil to himself and demanded wealth from him ... so that through that wealth he could leave military service."

And yet the war gave the lucky one a chance. Suvorov, who perfectly knew the psychology of a soldier, in his instruction "Science to Win" mentioned not only the speed, onslaught and bayonet attack, but also about the "holy prey" - and told how, in Ishmael, taken by a brutal assault under his command, the soldiers "divided gold and silver by handfuls ". True, not everyone was so lucky. To others "who survived - honor and glory!" - promised the same Science to Win.

However, the army suffered the greatest losses not from the enemy, but from illness and lack of doctors and medicines. “Walking around the camp when the sun went down, I saw some regimental soldiers digging holes for their dead brothers, others were already burying, and still others were completely buried. In the army, very many suffer from diarrhea and putrid fevers; when officers are settled in the realm of the dead, for whom during their illness they are very much better looked after, and doctors use their own medicines for money, then how not to die soldiers left in illness to fend for themselves and for whom medicines are either dissatisfied, or not available at all in other shelves. Diseases are born from the fact that the army stands in square, a quadrangle, that the defecated feces, although the wind blows a little, spreads a very foul smell through the air, that the water of Liman, being consumed raw, is very unhealthy, and the vinegar is not shared with the soldiers, which is The corpses of the dead are visible everywhere on the shore, drowned in the estuary in the three battles that were on it ”- this is how the army official Roman Tsebrikov described the siege of the Turkish fortress Ochakov in 1788.

For the majority, however, the usual soldier's fate fell out: endless marches across the steppe or mountains in the heat or through the mud, bivouacs and overnight stays in the open air, long evenings in "winter apartments" in peasant huts.

A. A. Svechin The evolution of the art of war. Volume II. - M.-L .: Voengiz, 1928

Chapter one. Eastern War 1853-56

<…>

Nikolaev army. The Napoleonic Wars required a total of two million recruits from the Russian peasantry — a quarter of its male labor force.

The wars that Russia then waged required from her only a partial exertion of forces. The largest of them is the fight against the Turks in 1828-29. and the fight against the Poles in 1831; the first required the deployment of 200 thousand people, the second - 170 thousand; in both cases, these figures were not achieved immediately, which caused some hesitation in the course of hostilities.

The Russian state budget had a chronic deficit. An attack in the forties to export grain to England allowed it to grow by 40% in the decade before the Eastern War, which, however, did not eliminate the deficit. The military budget continued to fluctuate around the same figure - 70 million. The lists of the same army consisted of an average of 1,230,000 people and over 100,000 horses (not counting the horses of the Cossack units). For each soldier in the army, taking into account all the costs of managing and supplying the War Ministry, there were about 57 rubles a year. {3} . The Nikolaev army outnumbered the Red Army by 2 times, and its budget was 9 times less. And with low technology, and with cheap prices for bread at that time, it was a beggarly budget. If somehow it was possible to make ends meet, it was only because the army of Nicholas I lived partly by subsistence farming; the population was charged with housing duty, underwater duty, duty for heating and lighting military apartments and buildings, duty for the removal of pastures and camp premises; conscription costs were borne by the communities supplying recruits; factories and factories of the military department used serf labor; the cavalry was content with military settlements; sometimes the townsfolk, on whom the troops were quartered, expressed a desire to give food to the soldiers, and then the state provisions were used to increase the economic sums of the unit; there were revenues from the Cossack lands and military settlements, etc. The fortifications of the Malakhov Kurgan, which formed part of the Sevastopol fortress, were built at the expense of the Sevastopol merchants ...

However, in the 19th century, these in-kind incomes of the military department gradually diminished. If earlier the transport of the military department did not cost anything, then the payment of a peasant carriage of 10 kopecks was introduced. per day, and in 1851 a countermark was introduced, at a price of 75 kopecks. for a one-horse carriage. Arakcheev's attempt, by organizing military settlements on a large scale, to transfer the army to a subsistence economy and use it as a labor force, ran counter to the development of the capitalist economy and failed radically... The military settlements went bankrupt in every way; at the time of the Polish revolutionary movement in 1831, a "cholera" revolt broke out in them, after which the idea of ​​turning a soldier into a tiller for a time of peace fell away, and the settled soldiers turned into simple peasants; the military department was their landowner, and obliged the settlers to provide food for the troops lodged in the military settlements.

Taking into account all the advantages of a subsistence economy, we must nevertheless recognize the material support of the Nikolaev army as beggarly; especially it should be borne in mind that at the expense of this miserable military budget, large barracks were erected, huge fortresses were armed, and in peacetime the bulky stocks of military supplies required for a crushing blow were already accumulating, since it was impossible to count on the mobilization of the military industry, which worked as serf labor. ...

Acquisition.The privileged estates and some nationalities exempt from conscription made up over 20% of the population. For some other nationalities (eg Bashkir) military service was replaced by a special monetary tax. During the years of peace, recruitment reached, on average, 80 thousand people. The recruit had to be between 21 and 30 years old. Of the seven peasants who reached draft age, on average, one got into military service; since the term of military service reached 25 years, one seventh of the male peasant population was irretrievably lost for peaceful labor and civilian life. The remaining 6/7 received no military training. A number of random reasons made the recruiting service very uneven. At a time when some provinces surrendered 26 recruits from 1000 souls, other provinces surrendered only 7. To rarely disturb the population with deeply worried recruitment, Russia was divided into eastern and western halves, supplying, alternately, the entire annual need for recruits. Not the personal, but the community character of the recruiting service influenced the deterioration of the quality of recruitment. The vast majority of the recruits were illiterate{4} .

Recruitment took place in a frightening environment and was accompanied by abuse. Accepted recruits, to make it difficult to escape, shaved their foreheads or the back of their heads, like convicts; for each recruit taken, another dummy was taken, that is, a deputy in case the recruit escaped or was rejected by the military authorities; recruits and dummies were sent with the same escort as the prisoners. Admission to military service freed the recruit from serfdom to the landowner; but he only changed masters and became, with all his offspring, the property of the military department. Being in military service, he could marry and the military department even encouraged soldier marriages, since the sons of these farm laborers are cantonists {5} - were the property of the military department. Only one of the sons of a soldier, killed or maimed in the war, was freed from dependence on the military department; in the era of the Eastern War, the military department had up to 378 thousand cantonists; of these, 36 thousand were in various military schools that trained qualified workers - paramedics, horsemen, musicians, gunsmiths, pyrotechnics, topographers, military court officials, foremen, clerks, telegraph operators; the bulk of the cantonists were concentrated in military settlements; up to 10% of the entire set was covered by this soldier caste.

Despite the fact that recruiting innocence encompassed only the poorest tax-paying classes of the population, due to its severity, up to 15% of the recruits were paid off from military service by issuing deputies or buying recruitment receipts; the price of such a receipt was quite significant {6} ; deputies - people out of tune or old homeless soldiers who were dismissed on indefinite leave, worsened recruitment and made it difficult to accumulate a trained reserve.

In 1834, it was decided to take measures to accumulate a stock of military-trained people in the population, for which to dismiss the soldiers after 20 (later 15 and even 13) years on indefinite leave. Moreover, in order to save the money of the military department, in imitation of the Prussian freewaters of the 18th century, temporary, annual leave was established, in which the military department, depending on the availability of troops, could dismiss soldiers who had served 8 years in active service. The result of these measures, however, turned out to be negligible: by the beginning of the Eastern War, the military department had a trained reserve of only 212 thousand people, most of whom, in age and health, were hardly suitable for war. The main reason for the failure of stockpiling was the disgusting sanitary condition of the army; when hiring a recruit, the main attention was paid not to health, but to the growth of the recruit (not less than 2 yards 3¾ vershoks); in the service, the soldier received clearly insufficient food: not all lower ranks were entitled to meat (for example, the orderlies did not receive it at all), and only according to the calculation of ¼ pound twice a week; tea and sugar were not provided at all; the food sold did not always reach the soldier; with allowance - free - from local residents, it became generally arbitrary; the soldier's clothes were completely irrational {7} ; the medical unit was in a disgusting state; drill exercises were grueling, especially in the capitals, which gave the greatest mortality. As a result, the average mortality rate from 1826 to 1858 exceeded 4% per year. If we throw out the terrible cholera year of 1831, when we lost 7122 killed in battles with the Poles, and the size of our army decreased by 96 thousand, mainly from cholera, the mortality rate in 1855 was the height of the Eastern War, when 95 thousand died from diseases. , and in all other years of war, then the average mortality in peacetime will be 3.5% {8} ... Two-thirds of the recruited recruits died in the service. If we add to this 0.6% of the annual loss from desertion, and the early disability of some of the soldiers, then it turns out that the army required more than 10% of its strength to be replenished every year; in fact, the Nikolaev soldier served for 10 years, after which he went not to the reserve, but to the repayment circulation. In the Nicholas army there was neither that restraining principle that the high cost of recruiting brings to the recruited armies, nor that thrifty attitude towards the soldier, which is a natural consequence of the general conscription that extends to all classes; as a result, "here a person is protected, as in a Turkish skirmish, they will force the empty ones" ...

The absence of any impulses, heavy, boring, endless in its monotony guard duty, exhausting trampling on the site of drill exercises, with poor food and clothing, created a physically weak army. At the Kalisz maneuvers of 1839, carried out jointly with the Prussians, the backward appeared among the old servicemen of our regiments, while the Prussian youth of two years of service was still vigorous. In 1854, at the first clash of the Allies with the Russian army, the French were struck by the pale faces of the Russian soldiers. The peacetime service of a Russian soldier was hard labor, since in a remote province it did not move away from military requirements and did not come close to the normal existence of a serf. The war did not frighten the Russian soldier and seemed to him a liberation from the horrors of peaceful beggarly vegetation.

Command staff. The severity of a forced soldier's life largely depends on the qualities of the commanding staff; this dependence was especially great under the serfdom of Nicholas Russia. We can, as a confirmation of this dependence, point out the fact that in the local troops, where the worst part of the officers was, the percentage of soldier desertion was approximately 8 times higher than desertion from the field units. True, the worst elements of the recruitment were also assigned to the local troops, united under Nicholas I in the "corps of internal guards".

The enormous mortality and difficult conditions of soldier's life during the era of Nicholas I must be partly attributed to the sharply deteriorated corps of officers. At the end of the 18th century, the officer corps represented the most educated part of Russian society, the flower of the Russian nobility; relations between officers and soldiers of the Suvorov army were imbued with democracy, a caring attitude towards the soldier, and the officer's desire to attract a soldier to himself. This was possible when the landlord class was in the prime of its forces, when the Pugachev revolutionary movement had not yet introduced the slightest split in its ranks. The situation was different after the French Revolution, the ideas of which captured the best, educated part of the ruling class. The uprising of the Decembrists was the defeat of military liberalism and marked the final expulsion of the intelligentsia from the army, begun by Arakcheev. Potemkin, with his democratic reforms, represented the reaction to the Pugachevism, Arakcheev - the reaction to Robespierre; the completely different course of these reactions is explained precisely by the different position of the nobility towards these revolutionary movements; in the first case, one could fully rely on him, in the second, it was necessary to tighten up in order to preserve the existing serf system. It has been observed that an educated Russian person is extremely susceptible to the influence of radical political theories. Hence, in military service, they began to give a decisive preference to the Germans: in 1862, the second lieutenants of the Germans were only 5.84%, and generals - 27.8%; thus, the German, as a politically more reliable element, was promoted five times more successfully than the Russian; this advance, depending on belonging to a German nationality, was more successful than on receiving a military education; received military education second lieutenants were 25%, and generals 49.8%. This career, which the Germans made, relying on their reactionary firmness, was one of the main reasons that developed in the Russian people and especially in the Russian army feelings of enmity and hatred towards the Germans, though not too deep.

In the conditions of the struggle of the tsarist power with the oppositional moods of the educated stratum of the Russian bourgeoisie, in order to move up the hierarchical ladder of command, a Russian officer had to not only not boast of his education, but testify that he was completely indifferent to the issues that focus the attention of Russian society on. and is not interested in anything other than the little things of military service. Denis Davydov gives the following description of new trends in the officer corps:

“A deep study of straps, rules for stretching socks, aligning ranks, making rifle techniques, which all our front-line generals and officers flaunt, who recognize the statute as the height of infallibility, serves as a source of the highest poetic delights for them. Therefore, the ranks of the army are gradually replenished only with rude ignoramuses who happily devote their whole life to studying the little things of the military regulations; only this knowledge can give the full right to command various parts of the troops. "

Under reaction conditions; the new commanding staff could maintain discipline in the ranks of the army not by Suvorov's brotherly attitude towards the soldier, but only by constant drill, severe exactingness, external, formal measures. The officers were also subjected to the same heavy punishments for their misdeeds; they were no longer proud representatives of the noble class, as in the 18th century, but only military careerists, officials; during the reign of Nicholas I, up to 1000 officers were demoted to soldiers.

The Russian intelligentsia has finally turned its back on the army; this position, preserved in a number of generations, up to and including the Russo-Japanese War, became extremely characteristic of her. The army lost as much on this gap as the intelligentsia.

It is unpleasant for anyone to be under the command of rude, ignorant generals and regimental commanders. The Russian army began to suffer a shortage of officers, as the landlord class and the educated bourgeoisie evaded military service. The bulk - 70% of the Nikolaev officers - was formed at the expense of the poorest and received only the rudiments of education part of the sons of noblemen and commoners; they entered the army as volunteers and after a few years were promoted to officers without exams... The sons of officers, who were brought up in five-year cadet corps, whose scientific level also fell in comparison with the 18th century, constituted the best part of the officer corps and served mainly either in the guard or in special branches of the military; their number reached only 20% of the entire officer corps; up to 10% of the officer corps had to be replenished with the production of non-commissioned officers who entered military service as cantonists or recruited. With the exception of one, the cantonist sons of an officer who were born prior to his promotion to officer remained cantonist pariahs. The cantonist officer's family thus remained in a semi-serf state, which indicates an extremely modest respect for the officer's rank.

The officer corps was split into white and black bone. The incompetent officers made from the cantonists trembled for their fate and feared disaster for any trifle that did not please at the review; they were as unhappy as soldiers, were brutal with their subordinates, and often profited from them. And despite all this promiscuity in the replenishment of the command staff, the latter was not enough: at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I, there were 30 officers for every 1,000 soldiers, and by the end there were only 20 officers for the same number of soldiers. The low success of the replenishment of the command staff is also explained by the fact that the officers, on average, served, like the Nikolaev soldiers, for only ten years; the most suitable element of the command staff, finding an opportunity to get a job outside the army, resigned.

If the mass of Nikolaev officers declassified, then the very top of the army, the military ministers Chernyshev and Dolgoruky, the commanders of the armies Paskevich, Gorchakov and Menshikov, the commander in the Caucasus Vorontsov, represented the top of the titled aristocracy, who received a European education, conducted official correspondence in French, studied labor strategy Jomini. These leaders decisively broke away from the army; His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, the wittiest man, could never force himself to say a few words in front of a soldier's line; in contrast to Suvorov, the new high command had nothing to do with the soldiers' masses, was burdened by our backwardness from Western Europe and was imbued with the deepest pessimism. Skepticism towards Russia, complete disbelief in the strength of Russian statehood is characteristic of the entire senior command staff. Morally, he was already defeated before the collision with Western Europe, and therefore was unable to use the available forces and means..

General base. In 1882, according to the ideas of Jomini, the Military Academy was established, with incomparably greater tasks and a broader program than the higher military schools that existed abroad at that time. The academy had two goals: 1) training officers for service in the general staff and 2) dissemination of military knowledge in the army. However, in spite of Jomini's well-known complaisance, he was not admitted to the leadership of the Military Academy. Its first chief was General Sukhozanet, whose main slogan was the following: “You can win without science, never without discipline”; Sukhozanet established a brutal regime at the Academy. Since feudalism stubbornly defended its monopoly on high command, and in the army relying on educated generals was excluded, the second part of the task of the Military Academy - the dissemination of military education in the army - disappeared. In 1855, the year of the death of Nicholas I, at the height of the Eastern War, this situation was only recorded by the renaming of the Military Academy into the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff... The latter was not supposed to care about the level of military knowledge in the army, but only to supply learned secretaries to illiterate generals.

Thus, the general staff could not help the high command to get out of its difficulties; he was imprisoned for clerical work, was deprived of the initiative, did not have the necessary authority. The headquarters service was poorly organized. The commander-in-chief in the Crimea Menshikov basically did without a headquarters at all, secretly thinking over his intentions, and having only one colonel with him to send out orders.

Organization and mobilization. The available composition of the army reached a million lower ranks. Meanwhile, there were extremely few large organized units; the army consisted of only 29 infantry divisions, only slightly more than what European states could mobilize, which in peacetime contained 5 times fewer eaters on active service. The actual regular army numbered 690 thousand.; 220 thousand were represented by the Internal Guard Corps; local interests were served by troops with a purely serf wastefulness of human material; in terms of their training and composition, the units of the internal guard were moral and physical invalids, the scum of recruitment kits, and could not have the slightest military value. In peacetime, 90 thousand Cossacks were on active service.

Irregular units, according to wartime states, were supposed to represent 245 thousand people and 180 thousand horses; in fact, in the Eastern War, they were mobilized in a much larger composition and represented a mass of 407 thousand people and 369 thousand horses. Opportunities for their further growth were evident. With such an abundance of light irregular cavalry, we maintained over 80,000 regular cavalry. However, the number of regular cavalry was continuously decreasing, not only as a percentage of the infantry, but also absolutely: the beginning of the Nikolaev reign - 20 cavalry divisions, the era of the Eastern War - 14 cavalry. divisions; after demobilization, another 4 cavalry was reduced. divisions.

The artillery was plentiful; artillery brigades, available in terms of the number of infantry divisions, consisted of 4 batteries, 12 guns each; in accordance with the customs established under Napoleon, in each battery there were both cannons and howitzers (unicorns).

Management was characterized by the centralization of the solution of all issues in the War Ministry, which was responsible for direct control of the troops and military institutions.

The troops were divided into 8 infantry corps - 3 infantry divisions each, 3 art. brigade, 1 cav. Div., 1 cavalry artillery brigade, 1 sapper battalion; in addition, there were 2 kavas. corps and a separate Caucasian corps.

The mobilization caused by the 1848 revolution indicated the need for spare parts; due to the lack of trained reserves, it was necessary to increase the army by recruiting recruits, the training of which was to be carried out in special units when active units set out on a campaign. However, there was no sharp line between the functions of spare and reserve parts, and the spare parts were reborn into secondary divisions.

The main drawback of this military arrangement was the slow mobilization and growth of the armed forces in the event of war. With the exception of the Separate Caucasian Corps, bound by a long-term struggle in the Caucasus, and the Guards and Grenadier Corps, the expenditure of which on the battlefields was extremely undesirable for reasons of internal policy, only 6 infantry corps remained, which was obviously insufficient for the defense of the western border and the coasts of the Baltic and Black seas. We had to make new sets and start forming new battalions in the existing regiments. In the Eastern War, the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th battalions appeared, in other regiments even the 9th and 10th battalions, which were reduced to newly improvised formations; artillery grew in the same way. These new formations, formed from recruits, took a long time to establish; due to the lack of personnel, especially the command staff, their combat merits were not high.

Thus, in case of complications, it was necessary to begin mobilization long before the onset of a diplomatic crisis. Thus, Russia spent significant sums on the mobilization of 1848-49. and the mobilization of 1863; in the latter case, the matter did not go beyond the hostile tone of the French and British diplomats. In the Eastern War, we had to deal with the landing force, reaching only 200 thousand; however, in view of the general aggravation of relations and the hostile position of Austria, just in case it was necessary to resort to general mobilization; during the war, 212 thousand were called up urgently and indefinitely, there were 7 sets of recruits, which gave a total of 812 888 people, the militia was called up - over 430 thousand; by the end of the war, there were 337 squads and 6 cavalry regiments of the militia, with a total number of 370 thousand; together with the irregular troops, brought to 407 thousand, the total number of the army reached two and a half million. The peaceful organization is fragmented and mixed everywhere; some units poured into the replenishment of others, others were included in combined armies, corps, divisions, and others played the role of spare parts; near Sevastopol, the greatest organizational diversity and the entry of militia units into battle are noted. Obviously, this enormous tension did not at all correspond to the modest goal of keeping 200 thousand army in the Crimea. Russia has re-mobilized, and the depletion of the Russian economy resulting from re-mobilization was one of the main reasons that made us recognize the struggle as lost. Such an excessive advance tension of forces, however, was a direct consequence of the slowness of mobilization.

<…>

Tactics.The regulations of the Russian army were not bad. The infantry regulations of 1848 still retained, however, the outdated formation of a closed formation in 3 ranks {10} ; but while in the era of Napoleon the battalion was still a tactical unit that was not subject to fragmentation, our regulations, following the example of the Prussians, gave the form of building a battalion in capitals; the small flexible company columns could, of course, be much better applied to the terrain and did not represent such a cumbersome goal as the battalion assembled together. Fighting in rifle lines was far from ignored by the regulations: in addition to rifle lines, each company trained 48 best riflemen as "skirmishers" for actions in the rifle chain. Taking into account the weak general and tactical development of the chiefs, the charter passed them to their aid, giving 4 samples of the normal battle order of the division. These patterns varied depending on whether the artillery was in position in two or three sectors, one or two regiments were retained in the divisional reserve. In general, the formation of the division was a square of 1000 steps along the front and the same in depth. Each of the regiments of the combat unit was built by battalion, at 200 steps of intervals and distances. Part of the artillery was held in reserve. Half of the guns of 200-300 riflemen represented the normal firepower of the division.

The trouble was not in these or those shortcomings of the charter, but in the interpretation that he received in the army. The Holstein-Gotorp dynasty brought to Russia a crush on the parade: Paul I, Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II did not possess the talents and temper of military leaders, but they deeply appreciated and understood the art of the parade. After the big parade in Voznesensk, Nicholas I wrote to the Empress:

“Since there are regular troops in Russia and, I think, since there are soldiers in the world at all, nothing more beautiful, perfect, and powerful has ever been seen. The whole show passed in an amazing order and completeness ... All foreigners do not know what to say - it was really an ideal ... "

These ceremonial tendencies, mightily supported by the tsarist government, found fertile soil in the reactionary top commanding staff. Menkov tells of a German, a corps commander, who linked the success of the parades to the proper fitting of shako to the soldiers' heads; therefore, he demanded that the company commanders study anthropology, since the chief, who is not versed in the round and elongated shapes of the human skull, will not be able to properly drive the shako and will fail in the parade. Field Marshal Paskevich, "the glory and history of the tsar reigning", in his youth, under the impression of the struggle with Napoleon, showed sound views and severely criticized Barclay de Tolly for his penchant for pedantic drill:

“What to tell us the generals of the divisions, when the field marshal bends his tall figure to the ground in order to equal the socks of the grenadiers. And what kind of nonsense can you expect from an army major? "

However, the Nikolaev regime reworked Paskevich in its own way; the latter began to pay exclusive attention to the ceremonial march, and from the theater of war wrote to the sovereign how well this or that regiment marched past him.

Is it surprising that with insignificant means for training, in the absence of barracks, good shooting ranges, textbooks, attention to tactical training, illiterate command staff, all efforts were concentrated on the front side of military affairs? Some regiments that marched splendidly, only having arrived at the theater of war, a few days before the battle, first began to learn how to send rifle chains ... Nicholas I himself demanded that rifle chains be widely used on the battlefields. However, with the reactionary nature of the top commanding staff, with the distrust of each chief to his subordinates - skepticism from above and passivity from below - it was impossible to achieve dismemberment of battle formations, scattering actions. The art of command was understood by us as the art of keeping soldiers in our hands - and this was only a policy continuing into tactics.

In the army, maneuvers were arranged, but they, according to the model given by the Krasnoselsky camp gathering, turned into the same parading. Instead of considering the terrain, normal battle formations were built in line. Batteries operating in the interval between the division's regiments were required not to take positions on the continuation of the infantry formation, so as not to interfere with the alignment of the first line of the division's infantry. The rifle chains were aligned and kept in step. Teaching tactics at the Military Academy closely merged with the "experience" of the Krasnoselsky camp, and preached slender external forms that had nothing to do with combat.

The wretched tactics corresponded to the wretched notions of the top commanding staff. General Panyutin, the leader of the Russian avant-garde in 1849, when asked how he explains a number of his successes over the Hungarian revolution, answered: "By the steady application of the first normal battle order in all cases."

During the Eastern War, the commander-in-chief of the army, Prince Gorchakov, was accused of interfering with the terms of reference of his subordinates; but the latter became necessary: ​​“The lack of capable people drives me straight into madness. Without an order, none of my subordinates will move a little finger. " Indeed, there was no need to look for the initiative in the Nikolaev army. The same Gorchakov, in a letter to Menshikov dated December 5, 1854, gave the following description:

“The last time you wrote to me, General Liprandi always and everywhere on his way sees difficulties. True, he is not at all a Russian person. But what are our generals: call one of them and order him resolutely to storm the sky; he will answer "I am listening," he will pass this order on to his subordinates, he will go to bed himself, and the troops will not even take possession of the wormhole. But if you ask his opinion about the way to carry out a march of 15 miles in rainy weather, then he will present you with a thousand considerations to prove the impossibility of such a superhuman effort. There is only one way to come with them to any result: ask their opinion, listen to all the idiotic difficulties that they will report to you, explain to them how they can and must be overcome and, after explaining everything to them with great patience, give the order, not admitting contradictions. I think that if you act this way with Liprandi, it will be the person who will do the job better than others. It is clear that in this case you will tell him that the task that you set him is of the most important importance, and that only he alone, in his mind and energy, is suitable to solve it ... " {11} .

Notes.

{3} According to calculations by Bobrikov-Obruchev, based on extensive archival statistical material, the expenses of the War Ministry per soldier in the forties were even less and ranged from 48 rubles. 38 k. To 53 p. 72 k. Per year.

{4} Recruit literacy statistics provide data only since 1862, when there were 8.68% literate; in the Ukrainian provinces - only 3%.

{5} The word cantonist comes from the Prussian canton regulation of the 18th century; its meaning is liable for military service.

{6} In 1869, a recruitment receipt was valued at 570 rubles. In most cases, the supply of recruits was bought off by the bourgeois or serf society as a whole. In the prosperous Moscow province, the number of deputies reached 40% of the recruitment.

{7} Clothing and equipment met only the requirements of the parade. A pocket on a uniform and trousers was not allowed, as differently stuffed could spoil the appearance of the soldier's system. The soldier stuffed his pipe, makhorka, soap, brush and so on into the shako and put it all on his head; the weight of the shako with a load reached 3.5 kilograms. In 1831, during the winter campaign, officers and soldiers were strictly prohibited from wearing sheepskin coats.

{8} For comparison, let us point out the mortality rate of the German army before the World War - 0.2% or a maximum of 0.3% per year. In the middle of the 19th century, the death rate of the Prussian army no longer reached 1%.

{10} From which we partially abandoned even under Potemkin.

{11} General Liprandi was an educated and capable man. Gorchakov's skepticism in relation to his assistants ruled out for him the possibility of gaining any success in the war.

Manning the Russian army

XVIII - early XX century

The Russian army began to be created from the "amusing" regiments of the young Tsar Peter I in 1683. It was not yet an army, it was the forerunner of the army. They were recruited into the amusing ones both on a voluntary basis (people without specific occupations, runaway serfs, free peasants) and on a compulsory basis (young people from the palace servants). However, by 1689, two full-blooded infantry regiments were formed (Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky). The officers in them were mainly foreigners invited to the Russian service. The term of service was not determined for either the soldiers or the officers.

In parallel, there was an old Russian army, recruited on a voluntary basis for money (archers, foreign soldiers' regiments), which gradually dissolved and disappeared during the campaigns on Azov, rifle riots, etc.

By the decree of Peter I of November 17, 1699. the creation of a regular Russian Army began. The army was recruited with soldiers on a mixed basis. "Volnitsa" - admission to the army of personally free people. "Datochnye" - the compulsory assignment of serfs belonging to landowners and monasteries to the army. It was established - 2 recruits for every 500 people "datochnye". It was possible to replace one recruit with a cash contribution of 11 rubles. The soldiers were accepted at the age of 15 to 35 years. However, the first recruitment showed that "freemen" are clearly not enough, and the landowners prefer to pay money instead of supplying recruits.

XVIII century

Since 1703, a unified principle of manning the army with soldiers has been introduced. recruitment, which will exist in the Russian Army until 1874. Recruitment kits were announced irregularly by decree of the tsar, depending on the needs of the army.

The initial training of recruits was carried out directly in the regiments, but from 1706 training was introduced at recruit stations. The term of the soldier's service was not determined (for life). Those subject to conscription could put up a replacement for themselves. Only those who were completely unfit for service were fired. Quite a significant number of soldiers were enrolled in the army from among the soldiers' children, all of whom were sent to "cantonist" schools from an early age. Of these, barbers, healers, musicians, clerks, shoemakers, saddlers, tailors, blacksmiths, forged and other specialists entered the divisions.

The army was staffed with non-commissioned officers through the production of the most capable and efficient soldiers into non-commissioned officer ranks. Later, many non-commissioned officers were given cantonist schools.

The army was initially recruited for money (a voluntary principle) from among foreign mercenaries, but after the defeat at Narva on November 19, 1700, Peter I introduced the compulsory recruitment of all young noblemen into the guard by soldiers, who, after completing training, were released into the army as officers. Thus, the guards regiments also played the role of officer training centers. The service life of the officers was also not determined. Refusal to serve as an officer entailed deprivation of the nobility. 90% of the officers were literate.

From 1736, the service of officers was limited to 25 years. In 1731, the first educational institution for the training of officers was opened - the Cadet Corps (however, for the training of officers of artillery and engineering troops, the "School of the Pushkar Order" was opened back in 1701). Since 1737, it has been forbidden to produce illiterate officers as officers.

In 1761, Peter III issued a decree "On the freedom of the nobility". Nobles are exempt from compulsory military service. They can choose military or civilian service at their discretion. From this moment on, the recruitment of officers to the army becomes purely voluntary.

In 1766, a document was published that streamlined the system of manning the army. It was "The General Institution on the collection of recruits in the state and on the procedures which should be performed when recruiting." In addition to serfs and state peasants, recruitment was extended to merchants, courtyards, yasak, black-haired, clergy, foreigners, persons assigned to state-owned factories. A monetary contribution instead of a recruit was allowed only to artisans and merchants. The age of the recruits was set from 17 to 35 years old, height not less than 159cm.

The nobles entered the regiments as privates and after 1-3 years received the rank of non-commissioned officer, and then, upon the opening of vacancies (free officer positions), received the rank of officer. Under Catherine II, abuses in this area flourished. The nobles, immediately after birth, enrolled their sons in the regiments as privates, received leave for them "for education" and by the age of 14-16 the underage received officer ranks. The quality of the officer corps has dropped dramatically. For example, for 3.5 thousand privates in the Preobrazhensky regiment there were 6 thousand non-commissioned officers, of which no more than 100 were actually in the ranks.From 1770, cadet classes were created under the guards regiments to train officers from among the young nobles who actually served.

After his accession to the throne, Paul I decisively and cruelly broke the vicious practice of the fake service of noble children.

From 1797, only graduates of cadet classes and schools, and non-commissioned officers from the nobility who had served for at least three years, could be promoted to officers. Non-commissioned officers from non-nobility could receive an officer's rank after 12 years of service.

19th century

In the first half of the 19th century, the army manning system did not undergo significant changes. In 1802, the 73rd recruitment was made at the rate of two recruits from 500 people. Depending on the needs of the army, recruitment may not be made at all per year, or maybe two sets per year. For example, in 1804 there was a set of one person with 500, and in 1806 there were five people with 500.

In the face of the danger of a large-scale war with Napoleon, the government resorted to a previously unused method of forced recruitment (now called mobilization). On November 30, 1806, the manifesto "On the Compilation of the Militia" was published. With this manifesto, the landlords exhibited the maximum possible number of their serfs capable of carrying weapons. But these people remained in the possession of the landowners, and after the dissolution of the militia in 1807, the warriors returned to the landowners. More than 612 thousand people were gathered in the militia. This was the first successful mobilization experience in Russia.

Since 1806, reserve recruitment depots have been created, in which the recruits were trained. They were sent to the regiments as needed for replenishment of the regiments. Thus, it was possible to ensure the constant combat capability of the regiments. Earlier, after battles and losses incurred, the regiment left the active army for a long time (until it received and trained new recruits).

Planned recruits were held in November each year.

1812 required three recruits, with a total of 20 recruits out of 500.

In July 1812, the government carried out the second mobilization in this century - the manifesto "On the collection of the zemstvo militia." The number of militia warriors was about 300 thousand people. The warriors were commanded either by the landowners themselves, or by retired officers. A number of large aristocrats from their serfs at their own expense formed and transferred several regiments to the army. Some of these regiments were later assigned to the army. The most famous are the cavalry squadron of V.P. Skarzhinsky, the Cossack regiment of Count M.A.Dmitriev-Mamonov, the hussar regiment of Count P.I. Saltykov (later the Irkutsk hussar regiment), the battalion of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna.

In addition, there were special units that were not included in the army in the first half of the 19th century, but participated in all the wars waged by Russia. They were Cossacks - Cossack units. The Cossacks were a special way of the compulsory principle of manning the armed forces. The Cossacks were not serfs or state peasants. They were free people, but in exchange for their freedom they supplied the country with a certain number of ready-made, armed cavalry units. The order and methods of recruiting soldiers and officers were determined by the Cossack lands themselves. They armed and trained these units at their own expense. The Cossack units were distinguished by high training and combat effectiveness. In peacetime, the Cossacks carried out border service in their places of residence. They closed the border very efficiently. The Cossack system will continue until 1917.

Recruitment by officers. By 1801, there were three cadet corps for the training of officers, the Page Corps, the Imperial Military Orphan House, and the Gapaniem Topographic Corps. (The fleet, artillery, engineering troops had their own educational institutions since the beginning of the 18th century).

Since 1807, nobles 16 years and older were allowed to enter the regiments as non-commissioned officers for training as officers (called cadets), or to graduate from the senior classes of cadet corps. In 1810, the Noble Training Regiment was created to train young nobles for officers.

After the end of the war and the overseas campaign, recruiting was carried out only in 1818. There was no recruitment in 1821-23. During this period, up to several thousand people were put into the army at the expense of trapping vagabonds, fugitive serfs, and criminals.

In 1817, the network of military educational institutions for the training of officers expanded. The Tula Alexandrovskoe Noble School began to train officers, the Smolensk Cadet Corps was opened. In 1823, the School of Guards ensigns was opened at the Guards Corps. Then similar schools were opened at the headquarters of the armies.

From 1827 Jews were taken into the army as soldiers. At the same time, a new recruitment charter was issued.

Since 1831, the recruitment duty was extended to the children of priests who did not follow the spiritual line (that is, did not study in theological seminaries).

The new Recruiting Charter has significantly streamlined the recruitment system. According to this charter, all taxable estates (categories of the population obliged to pay taxes) were rewritten and divided into thousands of plots (the territory in which a thousand people of the taxable class live). Recruits were now taken in an orderly manner from the sites. Some wealthy estates were exempted from nominating a recruit, but paid a thousand rubles instead of a recruit. A number of regions of the country were exempted from conscription. For example, the area of ​​the Cossack troops, the Arkhangelsk province, a strip of one hundred versts along the borders with Austria and Prussia. The recruitment deadlines were set from November 1 to December 31. The requirements for height (2 arshins 3 vershoks), age (from 20 to 35 years old), and state of health were especially stipulated.

In 1833, instead of general recruitment, private recruitment began to be practiced, i.e. recruitment of recruits not evenly from the entire territory, but from individual provinces. In 1834, a system of indefinite leave for soldiers was introduced. After 20 years of service, a soldier could be dismissed on an indefinite leave, but if necessary (usually in case of war) he could be taken into the army again. In 1851, the compulsory period of service for soldiers was set at 15 years. The officers were also allowed indefinite leave after 8 years of service in the chief officer's ranks or 3 years in the staff officer's ranks. In 1854, the recruitment was divided into three types: ordinary (age 22-35, height not less than 2 arshins 4 vershoks), reinforced (age not determined, height not less than 2 arshins 3.5 vershoks), extraordinary (height not less than 2 arshins 3 vershok). Quite a significant influx of quality soldiers into the army was provided by the so-called "cantonists", ie. children of soldiers who were sent from an early age to study in cantonist schools. In 1827, the cantonist schools were reorganized into half companies, companies and cantonist battalions. In them, the cantonists learned to read and write, military affairs, and upon reaching draft age they were sent to the army as musicians, shoemakers, paramedics, tailors, clerks, gun masters, barbers, treasurers. A significant part of the cantonists were sent to training carabinier regiments and after graduation they became excellent non-commissioned officers. The authority of the schools of military cantonists became so high that the children of poor nobles and chief officers often enrolled in them.

After 1827, the bulk of the non-commissioned officers was recruited from training carabinieri regiments, i.e. the quality of the non-commissioned officers was steadily improving. It got to the point that the best of the non-commissioned officers were sent to officer schools, the Noble Regiment, cadet corps as instructors of drill and physical training, and shooting. In 1830, 6 more cadet corps were opened to train officers. In 1832, the Military Academy was opened to receive higher education for officers (officers of artillery and engineering troops received higher military education in their two academies, which were opened much earlier). In 1854, it was allowed to admit young nobles to the regiments as volunteers (on the rights of cadets), who, after training directly in the regiment, received officer ranks. This order was established only for wartime.

In 1859, it was allowed to release soldiers on indefinite leave (what is now called "retirement") after 12 years of service.

In 1856, the military cantonist system was abolished. The children of the soldiers were freed from the previously obligatory military future for them. Since 1863, the age of recruits has been limited to 30 years. From 1871, a system of extra-conscripts was introduced. Those. A non-commissioned officer, after the end of the obligatory term of service of 15 years, could remain in service beyond this period, for which he received a number of benefits, an increased salary.

In 1874, the recruiting duty, which had existed for almost two centuries, was canceled. A new way of recruiting an army is being introduced - universal conscription.

All young men who turned 20 years old by January 1 were subject to conscription. The call began in November every year. Priests and doctors were exempted from military service, and a deferral of up to 28 years was given to persons undergoing training in educational institutions. The number of conscripts in those years far exceeded the needs of the army, and therefore everyone who did not qualify for exemption from service drew lots. Those to whom the lot fell (approximately one out of five) went to serve. The rest were enlisted in the militia and were subject to conscription in time of war or when necessary. They were in the militia for up to 40 years.

The term of soldier's service was set at 6 years plus 9 years in reserve (they could be drafted if necessary or in wartime). In Turkestan, Transbaikalia and the Far East, the service life was 7 years, plus three years in reserve. By 1881, the term of active soldier's service was reduced to 5 years. As a volunteer, it was possible to enter the regiment from the age of 17.

Since 1868, a network of cadet schools has been deployed. Cadet corps are transformed into military gymnasiums and progymnasiums. They lose the right to promote their graduates to officers and become preparatory educational institutions that prepare young people for admission to cadet schools. Later they were renamed cadet corps again, but the status was not changed. By 1881, all new officers entering the army have a military education.

XX century (until 1918)

In 1906, the term of active soldier's service was reduced to 3 years. The social composition of the soldiers: 62% peasants, 15% artisans, 11% laborers, 4% factory workers. This system of manning the Russian Army survived until the First World War. In August-December 1914, a general mobilization took place. 5,115,000 people were drafted into the army. In 1915, six sets of recruits and older militias were made. In 1916 the same thing. In 1917, two recruits were conducted. The country's human resources were depleted by mid-1917.

By the beginning of the war, there were 80 thousand officers in the army. The reserve of officers and military schools could not provide officer personnel for the instantly grown army, and from October 1, 1914, the schools switched to accelerated training of warrant officers (3-4 months). Until that time, the cadets were released into the army as second lieutenants. A number of ensign schools were opened (by 1917 there were 41 of them). In 1914-1917, 220 thousand officers entered the army in this way.

Huge losses of officers during the war years led to the fact that by 1917 there were officers in the army who received a normal military education before 1914, only 4%. Of the officers by 1917, 80% were peasants, half of the officers did not have a secondary education.

It is not surprising that the army reacted positively to the fall of the autocracy in February 1917, it is not surprising that more than three-quarters of the army consisted of peasants so easily succumbed to agitation from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks and did not defend the democratic Provisional Government, did not oppose the Bolsheviks' dispersal of the Constituent Assembly ...

However, the army was a product of the former state, and with the death of the state itself perished.

During the civil war, a new army was born in the country, new systems of manning the army were created, but this was already a different state and a different army.

More about this in the following articles.

Literature

1. L.E.Shepelev. Titles, uniforms, orders

2. M.M. Khrenov. Military clothing of the Russian army

3. O. Leonov and I. Ulyanov. Regular infantry 1698-1801, 1801-1855, 1855-1918

4. VM Glinka. Russian military suit of the VIII-early XX century.

5.S. Okhlyabinin. Esprit de corps.

6. A.I.Begunova. From chain mail to uniform

7.L.V. Belovinsky. With a Russian warrior through the centuries.

8. Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 250 of 03/04/1988.

9. OV Kharitonov. Illustrated description of uniforms and insignia of the Red and Soviet Army (1918-1945)

10. S. Drobyako and A. Kraschuk. Russian Liberation Army.

11. S. Drobyako and A. Kraschuk. Russian Civil War 1917-1922 Red Army.

12. S. Drobyako and A. Kraschuk. Russian Civil War 1917-1922 White armies.

13. S. Drobyako and A. Kraschuk. Russian Civil War 1917-1922 Army of the interventionists.

14. S. Drobyako and A. Kraschuk. Russian Civil War 1917-1922 National armies.

15. Collection of orders of the VM of the USSR "Allowance for the employee of the military registration and enlistment office" -M. 1955

16. Handbook of the officer of the Soviet Army and the Navy. -M: Military publishing house, 1964.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian army was considered the best in Europe (and, accordingly, in the world). The Russian infantry was armed with the best examples of small arms and artillery in Europe, and in combination with the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier and the "Suvorov school", this made the Russian army the strongest military force on the continent. The experience of the Italian and Swiss companies of Suvorov, Ushakov's Mediterranean campaign showed that the Russian military art is at the highest level and is not inferior to the French, and in some moments even surpasses. It was at this time that A.V.Suvorov developed the principles of strategic interaction between theaters of war. In his opinion, the main method of war was a strategic offensive. It should be noted that Suvorov's ideas and actions were carefully studied in France. We can say that Napoleon Bonaparte was to a certain extent a "student" of Suvorov, adopting his offensive manner of combat, maneuver warfare.

Suvorov applied the basic tactical ideas that the Russian army would then use: an offensive with a wide front (battle on the Adda River on April 15-17, 1799), a counter battle (the battle of Trebbia on June 6-8, 1799), actions in loose formation and columns (battle at Novi on August 1, 1799). In almost every battle, Suvorov acted as an innovator. Determination, speed, onslaught, precise calculation and the highest fighting spirit of Suvorov's "miracle heroes" brought Russia one victory after another.

Subsequently, the foundations laid by P.A.Rumyantsev and A.V. Suvorov were used by other Russian commanders. So, the student of these two great Russian commanders can be called Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, the general of the "Suvorov school" was Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration and a number of other heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. It must be said that the defeat at Austerlitz, as well as the unsuccessful results of the anti-French campaigns of 1805, 1806-1807, were associated primarily not with the shortcomings of the Russian army, the training of its command staff and soldiers, but with geopolitical reasons. Russia and the Emperor Alexander followed the lead of their allies (Austria, England, Prussia), played someone else's game. Alexander obeyed the Austrian allies and dragged the army into the battle of Austerlitz, although Kutuzov was against this battle. Even earlier, the Austrians did not wait for Russian troops and invaded Bavaria, as a result they suffered a heavy defeat. Kutuzov, keeping the army, was forced to make an amazing 425 km march from Braunau to Olmutz, during which he inflicted a number of defeats on individual units of Napoleon's army. In 1806, Prussian warriors made a similar mistake. Fully confident in their invincibility, they did not wait for the Russian troops and suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Jena and Auerstedt. The Russian army quite successfully held back the onslaught of the enemy, a number of battles ended in a draw. This is despite the fact that the French army was led by Napoleon (after the death of Suvorov, the best commander in Europe), and there was no leader of this level in the Russian army. Russia did not suffer a crushing military defeat, both armies were exhausted. And this is taking into account the fact that Russia could not concentrate all its main forces against the enemy - there was the Russian-Persian war (1804-1813) and the Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812).

The Russian army and navy for the war of 1812 were not inferior to the armed forces of France in the field of weapons, combat training, organization and application of advanced methods of war.

Organization, organization of the army

Infantry. In the organization of the Russian infantry in 1800-1812. several stages can be distinguished. In 1800-1805 - this is the recovery time of an organization that was consistent with the principles of linear tactics. Emperor Paul transformed the infantry by reducing the number of jaeger units and increasing the number of musketeer regiments. In general, the infantry was reduced from almost 280 thousand people to 203 thousand. The military commission in 1801 worked to establish uniformity of the infantry in order to improve management in peace and wartime. For this, a three-battalion composition was established in all regiments (ranger, grenadier and musketeer), in each battalion there were four companies. At the same time, the grenadier and jaeger regiments had a homogeneous composition. The musketeer regiments were reinforced with grenadier battalions to enhance their striking power.

The grenadiers were heavy infantry and were considered the striking force of the infantry. Therefore, the taller and physically strongest recruits were traditionally taken to the grenadier units. In general, the total number of grenadiers was relatively small. The line (middle) infantry were musketeers. Musketeer regiments were the main type of Russian infantry. The light infantry was represented by the huntsmen. Jaegers often operated in loose formation and fought at maximum distance. That is why some of the gamekeepers were armed with rifled weapons (fittings), which were rare and expensive for that period. People of small stature, very mobile, good shooters were usually selected for the jaeger units. One of the main tasks of light infantry in battles was the destruction of enemy officers and non-commissioned officers by well-aimed fire. In addition, it was welcomed if the soldiers were familiar with life in the forest, were hunters, since the rangers often had to perform reconnaissance functions, be in forward patrols, and attack the enemy's guard pickets.

According to the peacetime state, the musketeer and grenadier regiments had 1,928 combatant and 232 non-combatant soldiers, according to the wartime state - 2,156 combatant and 235 non-combatant soldiers. Jaeger regiments had a single staff - 1385 combatants and 199 non-combatants. According to the states of 1803, the army had 3 guards regiments, 1 guards battalion, 13 grenadier regiments, 70 musketeer regiments, 1 musketeer battalion, 19 jaeger regiments. The Guard numbered 7.9 thousand soldiers, 223 officers, in the field troops - 209 thousand soldiers and 5.8 thousand officers. Then some transformations took place, as a result, by January 1, 1805, the infantry had 3 guards regiments, 1 guards battalion, 13 grenadier regiments, 77 infantry (musketeer) regiments and 2 battalions, 20 jaeger regiments and 7 naval regiments. The number of guards (excluding the marines) is set at 8 thousand people, field troops - 227 thousand people.

The second period of transformation covers the years 1806-1809. At this time, the number of the infantry was increased, in particular the jaeger units. In 1808, the infantry included 4 guards regiments, 13 grenadier regiments, 96 infantry (musketeer) and 2 battalions, 32 jaeger regiments. According to the states, there were 11 thousand people in the guard, 341 thousand in the field troops with 25 thousand lifting horses. True, the shortage totaled 38 thousand people.

In the third period of transformations - 1810-1812, the restructuring of the infantry was completed. The quantitative and qualitative composition of the infantry was significantly changed and began to meet modern requirements. The grenadier regiments now had 3 fusilier (infantry) battalions, each battalion had 4 companies (3 fusilier and 1 grenadier). Musketeer (infantry) regiments had 3 infantry battalions, each battalion had 3 musketeer companies and 1 grenadier company. Only the Life Grenadier Regiment had 3 grenadier battalions from grenadier companies. A three-battalion structure was also introduced in the Jaeger regiments: each battalion consisted of 3 Jaeger companies and 1 Grenadier company. This established the unity of the line infantry.

By the middle of 1812, the Russian infantry had: 6 guards regiments and 1 battalion, 14 grenadier regiments, 98 infantry, 50 chasseurs, 4 naval regiments and 1 battalion. The total number of the guard increased to 15 thousand people, and the field infantry to 390 thousand.

The main tactical infantry unit was the battalion. The highest tactical formation of the infantry was a division, made up of two line (medium) and one jaeger brigades. The brigades were of two regiments. Later, there were corps of two-division composition with attached parts.

Cavalry. Similar processes (reforming) were going on in the cavalry. Emperor Paul disbanded the carabinier, horse-grenadier and light-window regiments. The total number of cavalry was reduced from 66.8 thousand people to 41.7 thousand people. The transformations practically did not affect the tactical cavalry, which provided direct support to the infantry, but the strategic cavalry suffered greatly. In 1801, the Military Commission concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the strategic cavalry, which ensures dominance in the theater of operations. It was decided to increase the number of dragoon regiments and strengthen the light cavalry.

The composition of the regiments has not changed. Cuirassier and dragoon regiments had 5 squadrons, two companies per squadron. The hussar regiments had 10 squadrons, 5 squadrons per battalion. They only added one spare squadron to the cuirassier and dragoon regiments (it will soon be reduced to half), and two spare squadrons to the hussar regiments (reduced to one). According to the state of 1802, the cuirassier regiments had 787 combatants and 138 non-combatants; dragoons - 827 combatants and 142 non-combatants; hussars - 1528 combatants and 211 non-combatants.

In subsequent years, the total number of cavalry grew, the number of dragoon, hussar and uhlan units increased due to the formation of new regiments and the transformation of cuirassiers. The predominant type of cavalry was dragoons, who could make deep marches and solve tactical tasks on the battlefield. The number of light cavalry was increased, which made it possible to conduct reconnaissance to a considerable depth. The number of cavalry regiments increased from 39 in 1800 to 65 in 1812. The number of guards regiments increased in the same years, from 3 to 5, dragoon regiments from 15 to 36, hussars from 8 to 11. Uhlan regiments began to form, in 1812 there were 5. The number of cuirassier regiments from 1800 to 1812. decreased from 13 to 8. The staffing of the cavalry in 1812 was 5.6 thousand people in the guards, in the field troops 70.5 thousand.

The measures taken did not completely solve the problem of matching the cavalry with combat tactics with the help of columns and loose formation. The ratio of cavalry regiments to infantry regiments was about 1: 3, it would be more correct to have 1: 2, so that 1 cavalry regiment fell to two infantry regiments. True, they wanted to cover this gap at the expense of the Cossack cavalry. The Cossacks could conduct both tactical and deep (strategic) reconnaissance, operate as part of infantry formations. The total number of Cossack troops in 1812 was 117 thousand people. The Cossack regiments were 500-strong, only two regiments had 1,000 horsemen. With the help of the forces of the Cossacks, the number of cavalry could be increased to 150-170 thousand people.

The Don army put up 64 regiments and 2 horse artillery companies by the beginning of the war. In addition, already during the war, the Don army gave 26 regiments. The Black Sea army gave 10 regiments, but in fact only one hundred fought (as part of the Life Guards Cossack regiment), the rest of the units carried the border service. The Ukrainian, Ural, Orenburg Cossack troops were allocated 4 regiments each. The Astrakhan and Siberian troops carried the border service. The Bug and Kalmyk troops each gave 3 regiments, etc.

In many ways, the combat effectiveness of the cavalry depended on its equestrian composition. In 1798, it was decided to purchase 120 horses annually for each dragoon and cuirassier regiment, and 194 for the hussar regiment. The horse's service life was 7 years. For the annual replenishment of 4 guards and 52 army regiments, 7 thousand horses were required. The further growth of the cavalry was hampered by the lack of horses. Therefore, non-combat horses were often used in reserve squadrons. To solve this problem, the government even allowed the supply of horses, not recruits, to the army, and increased purchase prices. At the beginning of 1812, a cuirassier horse cost 171 rubles 7 kopecks (in 1798 it was 120 rubles), a dragoon horse - 109 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 90 rubles), a hussar horse - 99 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 60 rubles ). By the beginning of 1813, the cost of horses increased even more - up to 240 - 300 rubles. Some help was provided by donations - in 1812, 4.1 thousand horses were received in this way.

The horse structure of the Russian army was better than the French. Horses were distinguished by greater endurance, better adaptation to local conditions. Therefore, in the Russian army, there were no cases of mass deaths of horses, despite serious difficulties in supplying fodder, especially during the period of retreat.

The cavalry regiments were united in the highest tactical formations: divisions and corps. The cavalry division had three brigades, two regiments in each brigade. The cavalry corps had two cavalry divisions. In 1812, 16 cavalry divisions were formed: 3 cuirassier (two brigades in each), 4 dragoons, 2 horse-jaegers, 3 hussars and 4 lancers (three brigades each).

Artillery. According to the state of 1803, the artillery consisted of 15 battalions: 1 guards, 10 light, 1 cavalry and 3 siege battalions. The number is 24.8 thousand soldiers and officers. Artillery has also undergone a number of transformations. By 1805, the artillery had: 1 guards battalion (4 foot and 1 horse artillery companies), 9 artillery regiments with two battalions in each (the battalion had 2 battery companies with field guns and 2 light companies with regimental guns), 2 horse battalions (each 5 mouths in each). The war of 1805 showed that the number of the artillery park must be increased. Therefore, this year, 2 artillery regiments and 6 companies were formed, and in 1806, 8 more regiments and 4 cavalry companies were formed.

The lowest tactical unit was the artillery company, and the highest was the brigade attached to the division. In 1806, the regimental and field artillery was brought together into 18 brigades, in 1812 there were already 28 of them (according to the number of infantry and cavalry divisions). In addition, they formed 10 reserve and 4 reserve brigades, and 25 companies. The guards brigade included 2 foot battery, 2 light and 2 horse companies, field brigades - 1 battery and 2 light companies. The reserve brigades did not have the same composition. The reserve brigades had 1 battery and 1 horse company, plus 4 pontoon companies.

The battery (heavy) companies had 12 guns: 4 half-pound unicorns, 4 12-pounder guns of medium proportion and 4 12-pounders of small proportions. In addition, each brigade was given 2 three-pound unicorns. The light company had 12 guns: 4 twelve-pound unicorns and eight six-pound cannons. The mounted companies also had 12 cannons: 6 twelve-pound unicorns and 6 six-pound cannons.

To achieve greater maneuverability and independence, each company had its own wagon train for transporting ammunition and a field forge. For each gun, 120 ammunition was carried: 80 cannonballs or grenades, 30 buckshot and 10 brandskugels (incendiary round). The number of gun servants was 10 people for a light weapon and 13 for a heavy one. There was an officer for every two guns.

By 1812, field artillery had 1,620 guns: 60 guards artillery guns, 648 battery guns, 648 light guns, and 264 horse guns. In addition, there were 180 siege artillery pieces. The personnel of the artillery consisted of about 40 thousand people.

Half-pound "unicorn" sample 1805. The mass of the gun is 1.5 tons. The barrel length is 10.5 caliber.

Engineering troops. By the beginning of the 19th century, the engineering troops consisted of: 1 pioneer (sapper) regiment and 2 pontoon companies. According to the state of 1801, the sapper regiment had 2 miners and 10 pioneer companies of 150 people each. The regiment had 2.4 thousand men and more than 400 lifting horses. Two pontoon companies had 2 thousand combatants and non-combatants, more than 300 combatants and lifting horses. Each company served 8 depots with 50 pontoons each.

The military commission of 1801, having examined the state of the engineering troops, came to the conclusion that the number of engineering companies was insufficient. In 1803, the second pioneer regiment was formed. Taking into account the fact that the need to link artillery units and engineering formations was soon realized, in 1806, when the artillery brigades were formed, they began to include a pioneer company in them. Pioneer regiments were made up of three battalions. In 1812, the regiments had 3 battalions of four companies, the number of pioneer companies was increased to 24. The staff of the regiment consisted of 2.3 thousand people.

In 1804, a pontoon regiment of 2 thousand people was created. The regiment consisted of two battalions of four companies, had 16 depots with 50 pontoons each. Usually pontoon companies were stationed in fortresses. In 1809, there were 62 fortresses in the Russian Empire: 19 - first class, 18 - second, 25 - third. They were serviced by an engineering staff of 2.9 thousand people. Each fortress had one artillery company (or half company) and an engineering team.

By the beginning of 1812, the Russian army numbered 597 thousand people: 20 thousand guardsmen, 460 thousand field and garrison troops, 117 thousand irregular troops.

To be continued…

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The Russian army of the 19th century is the army that conquered all of Europe, defeated Napoleon. The army, the first to guard the Holy Union and the European world order. An army that in the most unfavorable conditions opposed the strongest European armies in the Crimean War - and defeated, but not broken by them. An army that begins to rapidly catch up with other armies in Europe, in order to once again become a worthy army of one of the largest European powers.
The Russian army of the described period is an army that entered a period of major reforms, but is still in their very early stages.
The military reforms of the reign of Alexander II are associated primarily with the name of D.A. Milyutin, who assumed the post of Minister of War in 1861 and remained there for the rest of the reign of Alexander II. The main goal of these reforms was to unify the structure of the army, solve problems with its staffing, which were identified during the Crimean War, and increase the overall combat capability of the state.

One of these transformations was the introduction of a system of military districts. The state was divided into military districts. In the hands of the chief of the district, the command of the troops, the management of local military institutions, supervision over the maintenance of peace and order, and, in general, military administration were concentrated. The first military districts were Varshavsky, Vilensky and Kievsky, created in 1862 - exactly one year before the events of interest to us.

The next changes affected the structure of the army. In 1856, the entire infantry received a uniform organization. All regiments were transferred to the 3rd battalion. Since a gradual transition of the army to rifled armament was carried out in parallel, the 5th rifle companies were formed in all regiments.
From 1858 to 1861, changes in the organization of troops were made only in cavalry and artillery, and the composition of the active infantry and engineering troops remained almost unchanged.

In 1862, the active forces had the following organization:
1st army from I, II, III army corps
Caucasian army
IV, V, VI army corps
Separate corps: Guards Infantry, Guards Cavalry, Grenadier, Orenburg and Siberian.

The guards corps included all the guards units. The grenadier and army corps consisted of 3 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions with attached artillery.

Manning the army

The rank and file of the army was replenished on the basis of the recruitment. The term of active service was 15 years from 1856, and from 1859 - 12 years. Recruits were gathered from all tax-paying population (peasants and bourgeois).

In addition to recruits, volunteers entered the army - volunteers from estates not obliged to military service. However, their number was small (about 5%). There was also the practice of conscription into soldiers as a measure of criminal punishment, but, of course, the proportion of those in the total number of soldiers was negligible.

There were three ways to replenish the army with non-commissioned officers: 1) the production of volunteers who entered the service; 2) production from privates, enrolled; 3) the production of cantonists (children of lower ranks subject to compulsory military service; the institution of cantonists was abolished in 1856). For the production of non-commissioned officers in the infantry, no special knowledge and skills were required - only compulsory service for 3 years was required.

All troops were replenished with officers from three sources: 1) graduates of military educational institutions; 2) the production of those who entered the service voluntarily by lower ranks; 3) the production of those who entered the recruitment service.
The military educational institutions admitted mainly children of noblemen and military men. The best students, upon graduation, were enlisted in the guards infantry as warrant officers or in the army as lieutenants, who graduated from the course with less success - in the army as second lieutenants or warrant officers. The annual graduation of higher educational institutions was extremely small (in 1861 - 667 people), therefore the main source of replenishment of the army with officers was the production of persons who entered volunteers.

Volunteers were promoted to officers upon reaching seniority in the lower ranks for a certain period (depending on class and education).
The production of recruited officers as officers gave an insignificant percentage of officers - because of the too long term of obligatory service (10 years in the guards and 12 years in the army) and because of the illiteracy of a significant number of lower ranks. Most of those recruited, suitable for the term of service, did not take the exam for officer rank, but continued to serve as non-commissioned officers.

Tactics and weapons

The company in combat was divided into 2 platoons, and the platoon - into 2 half-platoons. The main battle formations of the company and battalion were a deployed three-legged formation, columns, squares and loose formation.

The deployed formation was used mainly for firing in volleys. The columns were used when moving around the terrain, maneuvering and attacking. The square served to protect against cavalry attacks. The loose formation was used exclusively for shooting and consisted of skirmishers, who were usually sent ahead of the battle formations with the aim of disrupting the enemy's ranks with fire.
At the turn of the first and second half of the 19th century, training in the infantry was little focused on the actual battle - attention was paid almost only to ceremonial formations, marching on the parade ground, etc. The Crimean War forced to draw from this bitter lessons - in the training of a soldier, they began to pay more attention to directly conducting combat, primarily shooting. Although this practice was enshrined in the statutes after the Polish uprising, it was widespread “locally”.

The main weapon of the soldier was a gun. The Russian army met the Crimean War with smooth-bore primer 7-yp. rifles with a range of 300 steps - weapons that were completely outdated at that time. As a result of the war, an understanding of the need for a hasty transition to rifled weapons came. As a result, in 1856, a 6-liter capsule was adopted for service. a rifle with the so-called Minier expansion bullet (the oblong bullet had a recess in the bottom, where a conical cup was inserted; when fired, the cup entered the recess and expanded the bullet walls, due to which the latter entered the grooves). The firing range of such a gun was already 1200 steps.

The rearmament to rifled weapons proceeded at a fairly rapid pace, but was fully completed only by 1865.

The infantry's edged weapons consisted of a bayonet and a cleaver or saber; the latter were most often in service with non-commissioned officers and the best soldiers of the company. The officers were armed with sabers.