Military service

The east is burning with a new dawn
Already on the plain, over the hills
Cannons rumble. Smoke crimson
It rises in circles to the heavens.
A. Pushkin, "Poltava"

It is often believed that discoveries are the result of sudden insights that occasionally visit lonely and unrecognized geniuses. But this is how only general concepts are born that are unsuitable for practical implementation. That is why geniuses sometimes remain unrecognized for many centuries until someone brings their fantasies to life. Real, important, revolutionary inventions are born long and hard, but they keep up with the deadline. This is exactly the story of the flintlock rifle with a bayonet.

LOOKING FOR A GUN

In the second half of the 17th century, the basis of the European armies was the infantry, armed with lightweight muskets, suitable for use without a support, and three-meter "Swedish" pikes. The cavalry, which was no longer threatened by the slow but unbreakable "hedgehogs" of battles, felt more confident and experienced a new heyday. The usual in the Middle Ages, but later forgotten attack in close formation, gallop, melee weapons and hooves again came into vogue. But the cavalry could no longer regain its dominant position in battle: the cavalry was no longer worth ten on foot, as it once was. The musketeer had a real chance to shoot the horse. The pikemen, although "shortened", also sacrificed their lives dearly.

But the treasury, on the contrary, was much cheaper than cuirassiers. Now it was the infantry who was to become the main striking force. But the art of offensive combat was not given to her for a long time. The musketeers had to keep a respectful distance from the enemy, in close combat they were too vulnerable. And the point was not even that the dagger was a rather weak argument in hand-to-hand combat. The shooter could not use it at all, while simultaneously holding a huge gun, a smoldering wick and a wooden ramrod. Pikemen without fire support were also worth little.

Time demanded the creation of a fundamentally new weapon - a single and universal one. Combining properties of a musket and a pike.

THE BIRTH OF A LEGEND

The flintlock rifle allowed each soldier to participate in both gunfire and close combat. It arose as a result of the combination of several inventions, each of which had a difficult history. A flint lock and a paper cartridge that increase the rate of fire, a reliable steel ramrod, and a bayonet were added to the barrel borrowed from the wick musket. By the end of the 17th century, each of these elements had existed for at least a century and a half. But they did not manage to find each other for a very long time.

The flintlock was invented in the Middle East almost simultaneously with the advent of the wheel castle in Europe. In 1500, at any rate, it was already used in Turkey. Four years later, Arabic flint became famous in Spain. Tracking the further spread of this technology in Europe is helped by a long series of the highest bans on its use.

The last time the flintlock was banned - on pain of death! - King of France Louis XIV in 1645. But this did not mean at all that anyone who was found to have it was immediately dragged to the executioner. It was not forbidden to manufacture, store, carry, and even use flintlock weapons. With him it was impossible only to catch the eye of the commander during the regimental review. A soldier with a "non-statutory" musket was not considered equipped. At a time when a warrior received funds from the treasury, but acquired equipment on his own, this was tantamount to desertion.

Why the convenient and inexpensive (in comparison with the wheel) castle did not please the rulers? In fact, the claims were weighty. The Turkish lock, extremely easy to manufacture and not prone to breakage, was extremely unreliable in operation. One misfire occurred every 3-5 shots. In practice, this meant that the regiment's salvo would be 25% "thinner" than in the case of using wick muskets.

The problem of reliability was partly solved with the advent of the German or "battery" flint lock in the thirties of the 17th century. The much more massive and complex European version was cut off only once for 7-15 shots.

But the German castle was not devoid of flaws. It consisted of many parts, each of which could fail. Even if a screw was lost during cleaning, a new one could not be made in the field forge. In addition, the flintlock needed a new type of ammunition: properly hewn pieces of stone. The flint withstood only two or three dozen shots, but it was not easy to get a new one. While flintlocks remained a rarity, marketers did not supply consumables for them.

The transition to weapons with a flintlock became possible only after the appearance of regular armies, receiving weapons from state-owned warehouses. Now, if the gun went out of order, the soldier was punished and ... he was immediately given a new one. After all, there is no benefit from an unarmed shooter. The issue with the production of flints was also easily resolved.

At the same time, an iron ramrod was introduced, which was conveniently retracted into the stock of the gun. The thick wooden ramrods adopted earlier constantly broke, and it was inconvenient to wear them, although they were cheap and did not damage the barrel. But since the Musketeers stopped spending their own money to buy weapons, these advantages have lost their meaning.

Economic considerations also contributed to the adoption of the well-known paper muzzle cartridge since 1530. The essence of the invention was that instead of a wooden charge, the amount of gunpowder required for a shot was poured into a paper tube - a "sleeve". A bullet was also glued into it. The use of casings made it possible to abandon the horn with the seed gunpowder and a pair of wads. Now the shooter simply took the cartridge out of the bag, bit it, poured some gunpowder on the shelf, the rest into the barrel, and then drove the bullet along with the cartridge case with a ramrod. The convenience of this charging technique was not in doubt. But in the era of mercenary armies, musketeers, with no less valor than the onslaught of enemy cavalry, reflected the attempts of the command to force them, in addition to gunpowder and lead, to buy paper, which was also expensive for those times.

The bayonet completed the transformation. Musketeers have long found that they need a stronger weapon than a sword. Attempts to attach a point to the support ceased, since the support itself was no longer used. It seemed logical to equip the musket with a blade. Already in the 16th century, bayonets appeared - knives inserted into the barrel. But they constantly broke or fell out. In the middle of the 17th century, the Dutch invented the screw-in bayonet. But he did not satisfy the military either, since when the muzzle heated by the firing cooled down, the thread jammed tightly. Distribution could only get a bayonet, welded outside the barrel.

Field artillery

From the moment the coulevrin was replaced by rapid-fire short cannons in the 17th century and until the advent of rifled guns at the end of the 19th century, the firepower of artillery remained unchanged. And the development of this kind of troops was forced to be limited to a gradual increase in maneuverability. Instead of hired horses and oxen, artillery horses, strong, fast and not afraid of shots, were increasingly used. First of all - at the turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries - field artillery was completely transferred to the "state" thrust in Russia. Mainly because Russian peasant horses were smaller and weaker than their Western counterparts and could not pull guns. But by the middle of the century, other sovereigns followed Peter's example. Field guns from different countries differed in design, but not in characteristics. They almost always weighed about one and a half tons and had a caliber of 122 millimeters (12 pounds). The gun fired one shot per minute and "reached" 400 meters with buckshot and twice as far as ricochets. The core could fly two or three kilometers, but at a great distance it no longer bounced off the ground and posed no danger.

FROM FUSEY TO SEMILINEAR GUN

In the 80s of the 17th century, the "weapon of the future" took on a finished form. The designers had to do a lot of work: after all, the musket itself weighed more than six kilograms, but now a heavy German lock, a one and a half meter steel ramrod and a half meter bayonet were added to it, which in total weighed two more kilograms. Only at the cost of the most severe economy (even sights were sacrificed) it was possible to keep the total weight of the gun within 5.7 kilograms.

It was not so easy to decide on the choice of caliber. At the beginning of the 17th century, "double" 20-23 mm muskets began to be replaced by much more comfortable 16-18 mm. But the creators of the fusée still settled on an impressive caliber of 20.3-21.6 mm.

Oddly enough, the length of the barrel played a decisive role in this. He was now simultaneously a "shaft" for a bayonet: the ability to strike a little earlier seemed a great advantage. At that time, they could not mass produce barrels with a ratio of caliber to length of more than 1:70.

Of course, the 142-centimeter-barrel fuze looks like a huge gun. But in order to fully assess its dimensions, some additional information is required. For example, the fact that even in 1836 (and this is already the 19th century) only every hundredth of the recruits drafted into the French army was over 172 centimeters. The average height of the recruits was only 158 centimeters. However, the French were then considered an undersized nation. The Russians and the British were slightly higher.

The Fusée's caliber was not only great "from birth", but also gradually increased over time. Indeed, after every twenty shots, the gun had to be cleaned with brick powder, otherwise carbon deposits (a mixture of lead, soot and scale) clogged the barrel to such an extent that the bullet no longer entered it. And since near the treasury and the muzzle, the barrel was rubbed faster than in the middle, from time to time the gun was sent to the workshop and reamed.

The bullets fired from the fusei inflicted terrible wounds, but rarely hit the target. Moreover, the result practically did not depend on the efforts of the shooter - the legendary accuracy of Hawkeye (as, incidentally, his predecessor Robin Hood) is a myth. Even in the ideal case, the dispersion of bullets emitted from the smooth barrels of that era was very large. The best sporting rifle with a barrel length of 120 calibers ensured the correct shot at a growth target from 60 meters. Military 70-caliber - from 35 meters. A short and light hunting or cavalry rifle - only from 20 meters. That is, a bad shooter, of course, could have missed from such a distance. But from a greater distance, even a sniper hit the enemy only by accident.

Alas, only new rifles, loaded with great accuracy, had such a fight. The barrel of the old fusée, having seen and experienced a lot, as a rule, was bent more than once during bayonet strikes. And a bullet crumpled with a ramrod and covered with paper could only be considered “round”. Added to the above is the crushing impact.

Despite the convenience of the new lock and the use of a paper cartridge, the rate of fire also remained very low: it took from one to one and a half minutes to load, the weapon was monstrously long, and the bayonet interfered with the work of the ramrod.

Only in the middle of the 18th century, King Frederick II of Prussia decided that the advantages in bayonet combat could be partly sacrificed in favor of increasing the rate of fire. This is how a new seven-line (17.8 mm) gun appeared with a barrel shortened to 60 calibers.

The effectiveness of shots at the horse decreased slightly, but now the infantry could already fire one and a half volley per minute. Through a systematic, avid and intensified flogging of the musketeers, the Prussians even managed to bring the rate of fire to four volleys. But ... the experience was deemed unsuccessful. That is, the musketeers, of course, were flogged further, but the infantry was no longer taught to make more volleys per minute until the middle of the 19th century. All the same, the bullets flew away from no one knows where, and frequent fire had no other consequences, except for smoke and ammunition consumption. The real effect was given only by point-blank shots and bayonet strikes.

Nevertheless, by the end of the century, the convenience and practicality of the short shotgun was recognized throughout Europe, and the seven-bar caliber became standard.

However, there was no need to talk about real standardization yet. A feature of the armament of the armies of the 18th century (like many previous centuries) was the lack of uniformity. For each type of infantry - musketeers, rangers, grenadiers - and for each type of cavalry, a special model of the gun was developed and approved at the highest level. But only the guards regiments were supplied with it. Most of the soldiers carried weapons of the most diverse, and often mysterious origins. After all, the bulk of it consisted of trophies taken during countless wars, the results of alterations and modernizations, as well as relics of bygone eras. For example, the fusées made under Peter I continued to be used until the Patriotic War of 1812. And after it, the situation only got worse: having collected the most impossible weapon trash from all over Europe, the French brought it to Russia and threw it near Moscow.

The trophies captured in 1812-1815 did not lend themselves to any classification. But even before that, in the Russian army, guns were divided by caliber (from 13 to 22 millimeters), and each caliber by type: infantry (longest), jaeger (shorter), dragoon (even shorter), cuirassier and hussar (with the shortest barrel ). In total, there were 85 "combinations". Some kind of standardization existed only within the regiments. Each of them received guns - albeit issued at very different times in different countries, but with barrels of approximately the same caliber and length.

Naturally, this rule was not observed in practice. Some of them handed over faulty guns to warehouses, and in return received not the ones that were needed, but those that were available. In addition, even among the guns of "equal proportions" there were both new and old ones with repeatedly reamed and thinned barrels. Each of them had individual ballistics. As a result, the accuracy of the salvo firing did not stand up to criticism. The soldiers who got the ancient 22-mm squeak were regularly injured by the heroic recoil. The same shooters who were given 13-millimeter rifles (probably taken from the Janissaries or Polish partisans) began to chatter when they met enemy cavalry.

Siege artillery

The fight against enemy fortifications in the 17th-19th centuries was assigned to guns with a four-meter barrel with a caliber of 152 millimeters (24 pounds). Deviations from this standard were rare and generally not viable. A cannon heavier than five tons would be very difficult to transport with horse-drawn traction. A large team of teams did not solve the problem of gun mobility. The "Achilles' heel" of the 18th century artillery was narrow wooden wheels - the cannons got stuck in a rut. And if a regimental 6-pounder weighing four hundredweight was used to carry it across the moat and threw it into the gap in the wall, then in order to pass the siege parks it was often necessary to strengthen bridges and roads. The core's energy fell rapidly with distance. Therefore, the siege cannon fired from a distance of only 150-300 meters. It was not so easy for the sappers to build a reliable shelter from the wooden log cabins stuffed with earth at such a distance from the enemy walls.

Horse artillery

If in the 16th century the battery in battle could not change its position at all, then in the 18th century the cannon was already worn so dashingly on level ground that the gunners could not keep up with it on foot. They tried to find a way out in the equipment of the gun carriage, front end and charging box with several seats. This is how “riding artillery” appeared. But this method of movement turned out to be very uncomfortable and dangerous: when the horses switched to a trot, the carts deprived of springs literally shook the soul out of the passengers. People often fell from them and died under the wheels of guns. Much better results were achieved by placing the gunners on horses. Suddenly appearing where the guns, it seemed, could not keep up in principle, the horse artillery, created on the initiative of Peter the Great during the Northern War, presented the Swedes with many unpleasant surprises. During the 18th century, other European countries followed Russia's example.

A unique feature of the Russian artillery of the 18th-19th centuries is the mixed composition of artillery batteries, each of which included an equal number of cannons and howitzers - "unicorns". With the same weight as a conventional gun, the short "unicorn" had a caliber of 152 mm and hit three times the large area with buckshot. But the nuclei released from it flew twice as slowly and practically did not give ricochets. At a great distance, fire was fired only with explosive shells.

In practice, this meant that the Russian artillery had an advantage in close combat, but was inferior to the enemy in long-range firefight - ricochets were much more dangerous than bombs. Cast iron spheres filled with black powder exploded weakly, yielding few lethal fragments. If they exploded at all.

On the other hand, the result of firing cannonballs strongly depended on the characteristics of the ground and relief. The shells got stuck in the sand, flew over ravines, bounced off hills and redoubts. Grenades, of course, also often drowned in swamps and broke on stones, but still they acted more accurately on rough terrain.

TACTICS OF THE ARMIES OF THE XVIII CENTURY

With the advent of the fuzei, the spades became superfluous. Now the infantry could drive off the cavalry with shots and move into the attack with bayonets at the ready. However, strategists still did not fully trust the new weapon. The Pikinerskie regiments were abolished by 1721 (the latest in Russia), but the pikes were also in service in the musketeer regiments, as were the muskets in the Pikinerskiy regiments. Systematically, these weapons continued to be used until the middle of the century, and sporadically (in the event of a shortage of guns) even at the beginning of the 19th century.

The techniques of bayonet fighting were not immediately mastered. At the beginning of the 18th century, musketeers continued to wear daggers or hatchets and even tried to use them in battle. According to the Swedish charter, during the attack, the first row of fighters was supposed to hold the fuzee in the left hand and the sword in the right. Physically it was impossible, but the army traditionally does not attach importance to such trifles.

Nevertheless, the bayonet rifle was gradually established as a universal infantry weapon. The uniformity made it possible to simplify the organization of the regiments. In fact, they turned again into battalions of 900 men each with two or four light cannons. Larger units - brigades, divisions, corps - already included several types of troops and consisted of infantry regiments, cavalry squadrons and field artillery batteries.

The regiments were divided into musketeer, grenadier and jaeger regiments. Theoretically, the types of infantry differed in the tactics of use: the grenadiers went to the breakthrough in close columns, firing only at point-blank range, the musketeers, lined up in squares, met the cavalry with fire, and the huntsmen acted in chains on difficult terrain. Almost all the infantry had the same training and fought as circumstances required. The only difference (except for the uniform) was that the jaegers' guns were shortened and adapted for more frequent shooting.

The cavalry was also divided into three types, but there the difference was real. Cuirassiers, representing the color and pride of the cavalry, on huge "knightly" horses attacked the infantry head-on. The swift hussars carried out coverage and pursuit. Dragoons occupied an intermediate position. Relatively long guns and "universal" boots allowed them to operate on foot, although dismounting was practiced very rarely.

The most important of all that the 18th century brought to military affairs was the appearance of regular armies. Industry and trade developed rapidly, and the kings seriously improved their financial affairs. Now they were able to constantly maintain a large army. It made sense to hire only already trained soldiers for a short time. Now, governments needed only recruits who could be armed and trained. It was not profitable to let the experienced warriors go. Military service, regardless of whether they entered it voluntarily or fell as a result of mobilization, became extremely long: from 16 to 25 years.

The 18th century is the era of bright uniforms. The armies multiplied, the battle formations stretched out, and now the commander, even through a telescope, found it difficult to see the banners: only by the shade of his camisoles he could distinguish his troops from strangers.

This is the time of clouds of gunpowder smoke floating over the battlefield, the time of drums and whistling cannonballs. The Middle Ages are over.

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LAND TROOPS The Armed Forces of the Russian Empire - the regular army and navy, as well as irregular troops (Cossacks), created by the first Russian Emperor Peter I. Initially, the Armed Forces of the Russian Empire was formed on the basis of conscription (also until the middle of the 18th century, mandatory service of nobles was preserved),

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until the middle of the 19th century, there were no particularly serious changes in the structure of the armed forces. In the second half of the 18th century, huntsmen appeared in the infantry, cuirassiers and hussars in the cavalry. Flintlock rifles of the 1753 model were adopted for service. By 1853, the size of the army was about 31 thousand command personnel, 911 thousand soldiers in the regular, 250 thousand in the irregulars.

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ARMED FORCES The armed forces (ground - Army) were divided into field (branches of the army - infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering troops), local (garrison troops and land militia) and irregular (Cossacks, Kalmyks and some other steppe peoples) troops. In 1722, a system of ranks (ranks) - the Table of Ranks - was introduced, the "clans" and "types" (in the modern sense) of the armed forces were determined (singled out): ground troops, guards troops, artillery troops and the navy.

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The Russian infantry during the Patriotic War of 1812 was divided into line (or heavy), light, naval and garrison infantry. The line infantry (regiments L-Guards Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Izmailovsky, Lithuanian, grenadier and infantry) were dressed in dark green double-breasted closed uniforms with folds and a standing collar. In l-guards. The uniforms of the Lithuanian regiment had red lapels. In the remaining shelves, uniforms were fastened with six rows of buttons. The coattails were trimmed with red dashboard cloth. The collars and cuffs of uniforms in the infantry and grenadier regiments were made of red cloth cloth.

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The infantry soldier's main weapon was a smoothbore flintlock rifle with a triangular bayonet and a red running belt. A single sample of guns did not exist, in one regiment, there could be up to forty calibers of weapons. The problem of supplying the soldiers with the appropriate ammunition was solved simply: each soldier cast round lead bullets for himself, since this could be done right on the fire, and equipped paper cartridges. For cartridges, bullets, gunpowder, as well as rifle accessories, there was a bag made of black hard leather with a copper plaque (coat of arms) on the lid, which was worn on the back on a bleached belt over the left shoulder. On the left side, the soldier wore a half-saber (cleaver) in a brown leather sheath. Ephesus and the sheath were made of yellow copper. The half-saber hung on a bleached leather harness over his right shoulder. On the same harness, the bayonet scabbard also lurched. A lanyard was attached to the hilt. By the color of the lanyard, it was possible to determine the soldier's belonging to a particular company. The warrior's personal belongings were placed in a leather knapsack. In the warm season, during the campaign, the overcoats rolled into a roller (roll), and this roll was worn over the shoulder. In this case, the knapsack was worn over the roll. Some small things were worn behind the lining of the shako.

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1.Batalion drummer of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky regiment (musician of the non-commissioned officer rank); 2. The flute player of the Oryol infantry regiment. The positions of musicians were often replaced by teenagers - the sons of soldiers. 3. Company drummer of the Oryol Infantry Regiment. 4. French horn player of the 1st Jaeger Regiment. Musician non-commissioned officer rank.

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The internal guard is a branch of the army that existed in Russia from 1811 to 1864 to carry out guard and convoy service. In addition to general military duties, the Internal Guard was also assigned special duties in relation to the provincial authorities. The rank and file of the Inner Guard wore gray uniforms with yellow collars and cuffs and gray trousers with leggings. The folds were gray with red piping. Instrument metal is white. Kivera - as in the garrison regiments. Non-commissioned officers were dressed in the same way as privates, on the collar and cuffs of their uniforms - silver lace. Non-commissioned officers were dressed in the same way as privates, on the collar and cuffs of their uniforms - silver lace. The uniforms of the officers of the Inner Guard were distinguished by dark green uniforms and valves on the cuffs: the first battalions or semi-battalions in each brigade were dark green; the second ones are dark green with yellow edging, the third ones are yellow.

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RUSSIAN RIVER'S HEAD-OFFICER OF THE LABEL GUARD OF THE EQUESTRIAN REGION. The Life Guards Cavalry Regiment was formed in 1730. During the Patriotic War of 1812, 4 operating squadrons of the regiment were in the 1st Western Army in the 1st cuirassier division of Major General N.I.Depreradovich. The regiment was commanded by Colonel M. A. Arseniev (after being wounded in the Battle of Borodino, he was replaced by Colonel I. S. Leontiev). The reserve squadron was in the corps of Lieutenant General P. Kh. Wittgenstein in the combined cuirassier regiment.

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Russian cuirassiers in 1812 wore a uniform (tunic) made of white tarpaulin (a kind of thick cloth). In full dress, they wore moose trousers and boots, while on a hike - gray leggings, hemmed with black leather lei. At the lower ranks on the tunic, along the seam of the armhole, there was an edging of the instrument (regimental) color. The cuirasses were black, with a red edging, the scales of the fasteners at the lower ranks were black, and the officers were gilded. Leather helmets, black, with a copper forehead.

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Private of the Glukhov Cuirassier Regiment The Glukhov Cuirassier Regiment was formed in 1796 from the carabinier regiment of the same name. In the Patriotic War of 1812, 4 active squadrons of the regiment were in the 2nd Western Army in the 2nd cuirassier division of Major General I.M.Duki, the reserve squadron was in the reserve corps of Lieutenant General F.V.Saken. The regiment was commanded by Colonel S. I. Tolbuzin 1st. Each cuirassier was armed with a broadsword, two pistols of the 1809 model of the year, and a cavalry rifle of the 1809 model without a bayonet (caliber 17, 7 mm, firing range 250 steps). 16 people in the squadron had cavalry fittings of the 1803 model (caliber 16, 5 mm).

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LITHUANIAN OF THE KAVALERGARD REGION The Cavalier Regiment was formed in 1800. In World War II, 4 active squadrons of the regiment were in the 1st Western Army in the 1st cuirassier division of Major General N.I.Depreradovich, the reserve squadron was in the combined cuirassier regiment in the corps of Lieutenant General P X. Wittgenstein. The cavalier guards (with a general cuirassier uniform) had a red collar and cuffs, with guards buttonholes, for lower ranks from yellow braid, for officers - from silver thread. Instrument metal is white. The saddlecloths and pigs are red, with a black border, lined with yellow braid at the lower ranks, for officers with a silver galloon. The Timpani, like the headquarters trumpeter in the Guards regiments, had a non-commissioned officer's distinction and a helmet with red bristles. The tunic was embroidered with yellow and red plaid braid

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PRIVATE LABEL GUARD OF THE DRAGON REGION The Life Guard Dragoon regiment was formed in 1809 "on the model of the dragoons of the Napoleonic guard." In World War II, 4 active squadrons of the regiment were in the 1st Western Army in the 1st Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General F.P. Uvarov, the reserve squadron was part of the Combined Guards Cavalry Regiment in the corps of Lieutenant General P. Kh. Wittgenstein. The commander of the Life Guards Dragoon Regiment was Colonel P.A. Chicherin. The Life Guards Dragoon regiment had a dark green uniform with red lapels of the Lancer type. Shoulder straps, collar, cuffs and folds are red. Guards tabs on the collar and cuffs. Instrument metal is yellow.

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GUSAR GENERAL Generals, numbered in the cavalry and former chiefs of the hussar regiments, wore, as a rule, the uniform of their hussar regiment. The general's hussar uniform differed from the officer's in more complex and delicate sewing. Over the dolman, general's order ribbons were worn.

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PRIVATE LABEL GUARD OF THE GUSAR REGION The Life Guard Hussar regiment was formed in 1796. In World War II, 4 active squadrons of the regiment were in the 1st Western Army in the 1st Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General F.P. Uvarov, the reserve squadron was in the Combined Guards Cavalry Regiment in the corps of Lieutenant General P. Kh. Wittgenstein. The guards hussars were commanded by Colonel N. Ya. Mandryka, and after he was wounded near Vitebsk, the regiment was headed by Colonel Prince DS Abomelik. Russian hussars in 1812 wore a dolman (a jacket embroidered with cords), a mentik (a jacket worn on the left shoulder and trimmed with fur, white in army regiments, black in the guards regiments), chakchirs (gray leggings on a campaign) and short boots with black woolen tassels. The shako was all-army, but with a white sultan, with a burdock and an instrument metal etiquette. The saddlecloths had sharp back corners and a scalloped lining trimmed with a cord. On the left side of the hussar was a bag - a tashka.

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RANGE OF NEGINSKY REGIONAL REGION On December 17, 1812, a number of dragoon regiments were transferred to other types of cavalry: 2 - to the cuirassier regiments, 1 - to the hussar, 8 - to the uhlans. In addition, "made up a new kind of cavalry regiments" - horse rangers. The Nizhyn Dragoon Regiment was also transferred to the Horse Guards. In World War II, he, as part of the 1st Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General F.P. Uvarov, fought at Ostrovno and near Vitebsk. In the Borodino battle he took part in a cavalry raid of Uvarov's corps on the enemy's left flank. Horse regiments received a dark green double-breasted uniform and leggings of the same color with double stripes. Edging on stripes and on a dark green collar, as well as shoulder straps, folds lapels and pointed uhlan-type cuffs were instrument-colored (turquoise in the Nizhyn Regiment). The shako of the horse rangers was of the hussar type, but with light green etiquette and burdock. Instrument metal in all shelves is white. Dragoon's saddlecloths remained.

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OVER OFFICER OF THE LABEL GUARD OF THE ULAN REGION The regiment was formed in 1809. In the Patriotic War of 1812, 4 active squadrons of Guards Lancers were in the 1st Western Army in the 1st Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General F.P. Uvarov, the reserve squadron was part of the consolidated guards regiment in the corps of Lieutenant General P.Kh. Wittgenstein. The commander of the Ulan regiment of the Life Guards was Major General A.S. Chalikov. Russian uhlans in 1812 wore a dark blue uniform: lapels, cuffs and piping along the seams of the back of the instrument color; garus (woolen) epaulettes of instrument metal; leggings are dark blue, with double-row stripes; a hat with a quadrangular top and a white sultan.

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CAVALERIAN GENERAL Cavalry generals wore a general general uniform. The plume on the hat is white with black and orange feathers. Generals who were in the heavy cavalry were supposed to have swords, in the light ones - sabers.

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SENIOR ADJUTANT Adjutants of the Russian army - officers who are with the commander to carry out official assignments or carry staff duties - at the beginning of the 19th century were divided into battalion, regimental, senior, or general. A distinctive detail of the senior, or general's adjutants, was a twisted half-flight on the right shoulder, turning into an aiguillette. Half-flight and aiguillette were made of cords of gold or silver thread, depending on the instrument metal of the regiment where the adjutant was listed. Aiguillette was a necessary accessory of adjutants not only as an element of distinction, but also as a handy tool for writing, for lead pencils were inserted into its tips.

Slide No. 21

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CAVALERIE OFFICERS IN VITSMUNDIRS of the Cavalry Guard, Her Majesty's Life Cuirassier and the Pavlograd Hussar Regiments) Outside the formation, the cuirassier and hussar officers, in addition to general army frock coats, wore a uniform, which was a ceremonial output uniform. Cuirassier officers had a white, infantry-cut uniform with a collar and cuffs, as on a tunic. The hussars' uniform was dark green, and the collar and cuffs were the same as on the dolman. To the uniform, the hussars wore dark green chakchiras without embroidery with short boots. In the Cavalry and Life Guards Cavalry regiments, the uniform was red. In the Life Guards Horse Regiment the collar and cuffs are dark blue, with gold tabs, and in the Cavalry - black velvet, with silver tabs; and the buttonholes were also embroidered on the sleeves and folds. In addition to red, these regiments had a second uniform — a dark green color: in the Cavalier Regiment — with black collars and cuffs and silver buttonholes; in the Horse Guards, the collar and cuffs were dark green, with red edging and gold buttonholes.

Slide No. 22

Slide Description:

RIDER OF THE DOVORYANSKY ESCADRON The officer cadres in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century were replenished mainly by graduates of cadet corps. But these corps could not provide the army with a sufficient number of officers, especially since the constant wars in which Russia participated at that time led to a large loss of officers. The riders of the Noble squadron with the general dragoon uniform had red shoulder straps, folds lapels, cuffs and cuff valves, lining and imperial monograms on saddles. Dark green edging ran along the collar and cuff flaps. The instrument metal was yellow.

Slide No. 23

Slide Description:

FIREWORKER OF THE GUARDS Mounted artillery The guards horse artillery in 1812 consisted of two horse batteries. Each of them had 4 quarter-pound "unicorns" and 4 six-pound cannons. Horse batteries were attached to the 1st Cuirassier Division. They were commanded by Colonel P.A.Kozen. Guards horse artillery was brought into action only in the decisive moments of the battle. Guards horse artillerymen wore a dark green uniform with red shoulder straps and stripes on leggings. The collar, cuffs, folds are black with red piping. On the collar and cuffs, there are yellow guards buttonholes. Shako, as in the guards foot artillery, but with a white sultan.

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As a result of the military reform, the regular army was strengthened, formed on the basis of regular recruitment. The reorganization of the army began in 1698, when the rifle regiments began to dissolve and regular regiments were created. A recruiting system was formalized, according to which the soldiers of the field army and garrison troops began to be recruited from the tax-paying estates, and the officer corps from the nobles. The decree of 1705 completed the folding of the "recruitment". As a result, from 1699 to 1725, 53 recruits were carried out into the army and the navy (23 main and 30 additional). They provided more than 284 thousand people called up for lifelong military service. By 1708, the army was brought up to 52 regiments. The new report card of 1720 identified 51 infantry and 33 cavalry regiments in the army, which by the end of Peter's reign had supplied a 130,000-strong army of 3 types of troops - infantry, cavalry and artillery. In addition, approx. 70 thousand were in the garrison troops, 6 thousand in the land militia (militia) and over 105 thousand in the Cossack and other irregular units. Since the 30s. heavy cavalry (cuirassiers) appears, which inflicted a decisive blow on the enemy in battle. Cuirassiers were armed with long broadswords and carbines, had protective equipment - metal cuirasses (armor) and helmets. Light cavalry - hussars and lancers - played a prominent role.

Manning the army in the 18th century

Since 1703, a unified principle of manning the army with soldiers is introduced, a recruitment set, which will exist in the Russian Army until 1874. Recruitment kits were announced irregularly by decree of the tsar, depending on the needs of the army.

The initial training of recruits was carried out directly in the regiments, but from 1706 training was introduced at recruit stations. The term of the soldier's service was not determined (for life). Those subject to conscription could put up a replacement for themselves. Only those who were completely unfit for service were fired. Quite a significant number of soldiers were enrolled in the army from among the soldiers' children, all of whom were sent to "cantonist" schools from an early age. Of these, barbers, healers, musicians, clerks, shoemakers, saddlers, tailors, blacksmiths, forged and other specialists entered the divisions.

The army was staffed by non-commissioned officers through the production of the most capable and efficient soldiers into non-commissioned officer ranks. Later, many non-commissioned officers were given cantonist schools.

The army was initially recruited for money (a voluntary principle) from among foreign mercenaries, but after the defeat at Narva on November 19, 1700, Peter I introduced the compulsory recruitment of all young noblemen into the guard by soldiers, who, after completing training, were released into the army as officers. Thus, the guards regiments also played the role of officer training centers. The service life of the officers was also not determined. Refusal to serve as an officer entailed deprivation of the nobility. 90% of the officers were literate.

From 1736, the service of officers was limited to 25 years. In 1731, the first educational institution for the training of officers was opened - the Cadet Corps (however, for the training of officers of artillery and engineering troops, the "School of the Pushkar Order" was opened back in 1701). Since 1737, it has been forbidden to produce illiterate officers as officers.

In 1761, Peter III issued a decree "On the freedom of the nobility". Nobles are exempt from compulsory military service. They can choose military or civilian service at their discretion. From this moment on, the recruitment of officers into the army becomes purely voluntary.

In 1766, a document was published that streamlined the system of manning the army. It was "The General Institution on the collection of recruits in the state and on the procedures which should be performed when recruiting." In addition to serfs and state peasants, the recruitment service was extended to the merchants, courtyards, yasak, black-haired, clergy, foreigners, persons assigned to state-owned factories. A monetary contribution instead of a recruit was allowed only to artisans and merchants. The age of the recruits was set from 17 to 35 years old, height not less than 159cm.

The nobles entered the regiments as privates and after 1-3 years received the rank of non-commissioned officer, and then, upon the opening of vacancies (free officer positions), received the rank of officer. Under Catherine II, abuses in this area flourished. The nobles, immediately after birth, enrolled their sons in the regiments as privates, received leave for them "for education" and by the age of 14-16 the underage received officer ranks. The quality of the officer corps has dropped dramatically. For example, for 3.5 thousand privates in the Preobrazhensky regiment there were 6 thousand non-commissioned officers, of which no more than 100 were actually in the ranks.Since 1770, cadet classes were created under the guards regiments to train officers from among the young nobles who actually served.

After his accession to the throne, Paul I decisively and cruelly broke the vicious practice of the fake service of noble children.

Since 1797, only graduates of cadet classes and schools, and non-commissioned officers from the nobility who have served for at least three years, could be promoted to officers. Non-commissioned officers from non-nobility could receive an officer's rank after 12 years of service.

Numerous manuals were prepared for the training of soldiers and officers: "Anticipation in battle", "Rules for a military battle", a "Military Charter" (1698) was published, summarizing 15 years of experience in continuous armed struggle. For the training of officers in the years 1698-1699. a bombarding school was founded at the Preobrazhensky regiment, and at the beginning of the new century, a mathematical, navigation (naval), artillery, engineering, foreign language and surgical school were created. In the 20s. 50 garrison schools operated to train non-commissioned officers. For training in military affairs, training of nobles abroad was practiced. At the same time, the government refused to hire foreign military specialists.

There was an active construction of the navy. The fleet was built both in the south and in the north of the country. In 1708, the first 28-gun frigate was launched in the Baltic, and 20 years later the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea was the most powerful: 32 battleships (from 50 to 96 cannon), 16 frigates, 8 shnyafs, 85 galleys and other small vessels. Recruitment into the fleet was carried out from recruits (from 1705). For training in naval affairs, instructions were drawn up: "Ship's article", "Instruction and article, military to the Russian Fleet", "Marine charter" and, finally, "Admiralty Regulations" (1722). In 1715, the Naval Academy was opened in St. Petersburg, which trained naval officers. In 1716, the training of officers began through the midshipman company.

In 1762 the General Staff was organized. In the army, permanent formations are created: divisions and corps, which included all types of troops, and could independently solve various tactical tasks. The main combat arm was the infantry. It was divided into a linear one, which acted in columns and inflicted a bayonet blow on the enemy, a light one - a jaeger. Jaegers were used to cover and bypass the enemy and cover their flanks, armed with rifled guns, daggers and knives. They fought in loose formation, firing aimed fire. In the 2nd floor. XVIII century the troops received more advanced smooth-bore flint and rifled ("screw") rifles, which were used by the huntsmen. New artillery systems are being created, howitzer guns - unicorns.

The number and proportion of the cavalry troops increased. The ratio of infantry and cavalry was approximately as follows: one cavalry regiment for two infantry. The bulk of the cavalry were dragoons.

At the end. century, the Baltic Fleet had 320 sailing and rowing ships of various classes, and the Black Sea fleet consisted of 114 warships.

Manning the army in the 19th century

In the first half of the 19th century, the army manning system did not undergo significant changes. In 1802, the 73rd recruitment was made at the rate of two recruits from 500 people. Depending on the needs of the army, recruitment may not be made at all per year, or maybe two sets per year. For example, in 1804 there was a set of one person from 500, and in 1806, five people from 500.

In the face of the danger of a large-scale war with Napoleon, the government resorted to a previously unused method of forced recruitment (now called mobilization). On November 30, 1806, the manifesto "On the Compilation of the Militia" was published. With this manifesto, the landlords exhibited the maximum possible number of their serfs capable of carrying weapons. But these people remained in the possession of the landowners, and after the dissolution of the militia in 1807, the warriors returned to the landowners. More than 612 thousand people were gathered in the militia. This was the first successful mobilization experience in Russia.

Since 1806, reserve recruitment depots have been created, in which the recruits were trained. They were sent to the regiments as needed for replenishment of the regiments. Thus, it was possible to ensure the constant combat capability of the regiments. Earlier, after battles and losses incurred, the regiment left the active army for a long time (until it received and trained new recruits).

Planned recruits were held in November each year.

1812 required three recruits, with a total of 20 recruits out of 500.

In July 1812, the government carried out the second mobilization in this century - the manifesto "On the collection of the zemstvo militia." The number of militia warriors was about 300 thousand people. The warriors were commanded either by the landowners themselves, or by retired officers. A number of large aristocrats from their serfs at their own expense formed and transferred several regiments to the army. Some of these regiments were later assigned to the army. The most famous are the cavalry squadron of V.P. Skarzhinsky, the Cossack regiment of Count M.A.Dmitriev-Mamonov, the hussar regiment of Count P.I. Saltykov (later the Irkutsk hussar regiment), the battalion of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna.

In addition, there were special units that were not included in the army in the first half of the 19th century, but participated in all the wars waged by Russia. They were Cossacks - Cossack units. The Cossacks were a special way of the compulsory principle of manning the armed forces. The Cossacks were not serfs or state peasants. They were free people, but in exchange for their freedom they supplied the country with a certain number of ready-made, armed cavalry units. The order and methods of recruiting soldiers and officers were determined by the Cossack lands themselves. They armed and trained these units at their own expense. The Cossack units were distinguished by high training, combat effectiveness. In peacetime, the Cossacks carried out border service in their places of residence. They closed the border very efficiently. The Cossack system will continue until 1917.

Recruitment by officers. By 1801, there were three cadet corps for the training of officers, the Page Corps, the Imperial Military Orphan House, and the Gapaniem Topographic Corps. (The fleet, artillery, engineering troops had their own educational institutions since the beginning of the 18th century).

Since 1807, nobles 16 years and older were allowed to enter the regiments as non-commissioned officers for training as officers (called cadets), or to graduate from the senior classes of cadet corps. In 1810, the Noble Training Regiment was created to train young nobles for officers.

After the end of the war and the overseas campaign, recruiting was carried out only in 1818. There was no recruitment in 1821-23. During this period, up to several thousand people were put into the army at the expense of trapping vagabonds, fugitive serfs, and criminals.

In 1817, the network of military educational institutions for the training of officers expanded. The Tula Alexandrovskoe Noble School began to train officers, the Smolensk Cadet Corps was opened. In 1823, the School of Guards ensigns was opened at the Guards Corps. Then similar schools were opened at the headquarters of the armies.

From 1827 Jews were taken into the army as soldiers. At the same time, a new recruitment charter was issued.

Since 1831, the recruitment duty was extended to the children of priests who did not follow the spiritual line (that is, did not study in theological seminaries).

The new Recruiting Charter has significantly streamlined the recruitment system. According to this charter, all taxable estates (categories of the population obliged to pay taxes) were rewritten and divided into thousands of plots (the territory in which a thousand people of the taxable class live). Recruits were now taken in an orderly manner from the sites. Some wealthy estates were exempted from nominating a recruit, but paid a thousand rubles instead of a recruit. A number of regions of the country were exempted from conscription. For example, the area of ​​the Cossack troops, the Arkhangelsk province, a strip of a hundred miles along the borders with Austria and Prussia. The recruitment deadlines were set from November 1 to December 31. The requirements for height (2 arshins 3 vershoks), age (from 20 to 35 years old), and state of health were especially stipulated.

In 1833, instead of general recruitment, private recruitment began to be practiced, i.e. recruitment of recruits not evenly from the entire territory, but from individual provinces. In 1834, a system of indefinite leave for soldiers was introduced. After 20 years of service, a soldier could be dismissed on an indefinite leave, but if necessary (usually in case of war) he could be taken into the army again. In 1851, the compulsory period of service for soldiers was set at 15 years. The officers were also allowed indefinite leave after 8 years of service in the chief officer ranks or 3 years in the headquarters officer ranks. In 1854, the recruitment was divided into three types: ordinary (age 22-35, height not less than 2 arshins 4 vershoks), reinforced (age not determined, height not less than 2 arshins 3.5 vershoks), extraordinary (height not less than 2 arshins 3 vershok). Quite a significant influx of quality soldiers into the army was provided by the so-called "cantonists", that is, children of soldiers who were sent from an early age to study in cantonist schools. In 1827, the cantonist schools were reorganized into half companies, companies and cantonist battalions. In them, the cantonists learned to read and write, military affairs, and upon reaching draft age they were sent to the army as musicians, shoemakers, paramedics, tailors, clerks, gun masters, barbers, treasurers. A significant part of the cantonists were sent to training carabinier regiments and after graduation they became excellent non-commissioned officers. The authority of the schools of military cantonists became so high that children of poor nobles and chief officers were often enrolled in them.

After 1827, the bulk of the non-commissioned officers was recruited from training carabinieri regiments, i.e. the quality of the non-commissioned officers was steadily improving. It got to the point that the best of the non-commissioned officers were sent to officer schools, the Noble Regiment, cadet corps as teachers of drill and physical training, and shooting. In 1830, 6 more cadet corps were opened to train officers. In 1832, the Military Academy was opened to receive higher education for officers (officers of artillery and engineering troops received higher military education in their two academies, which were opened much earlier). In 1854, it was allowed to admit young noblemen to the regiments as volunteers (on the rights of cadets), who, after training directly in the regiment, received officer ranks. This order was established only for wartime.

In 1859, it was allowed to release soldiers on indefinite leave (what is now called "retirement") after 12 years of service.

In 1856, the military cantonist system was liquidated. The children of the soldiers were freed from the previously obligatory military future for them. Since 1863, the age of recruits has been limited to 30 years. Since 1871, a system of super-conscripts was introduced. Those. A non-commissioned officer, after the end of the obligatory term of service of 15 years, could remain in service beyond this period, for which he received a number of benefits, an increased salary.

In 1874, the recruiting duty, which had existed for almost two centuries, was canceled. A new way of recruiting an army is being introduced - universal conscription.

All young men who turned 20 years old by January 1 were subject to conscription. The call began in November every year. Priests and doctors were exempted from military service, and a deferral of up to 28 years was given to persons undergoing training in educational institutions. The number of conscripts in those years far exceeded the needs of the army, and therefore everyone who did not qualify for exemption from service drew lots. Those to whom the lot fell (approximately one out of five) went to serve. The rest were enlisted in the militia and were subject to conscription in time of war or when necessary. They were in the militia for up to 40 years.

The term of soldier's service was set at 6 years plus 9 years in reserve (they could be drafted if necessary or in wartime). In Turkestan, Transbaikalia and the Far East, the service life was 7 years, plus three years in reserve. By 1881, the term of active soldier's service was reduced to 5 years. As a volunteer, it was possible to enter the regiment from the age of 17.

Since 1868, a network of cadet schools has been deployed. Cadet corps are transformed into military gymnasiums and progymnasiums. They lose the right to promote their graduates to officers and become preparatory educational institutions that prepare young people for admission to cadet schools. They were later renamed cadet corps again, but their status was not changed. By 1881, all new officers entering the army have a military education.

The military reform of 1874 was designed to reduce the size of the army and at the same time to raise its combat effectiveness. On January 1, 1874, universal military service was established. All men over the age of 21 were involved in the service, no matter what class they belonged to. The required number (about 20%) was selected from the conscripts by lot, the rest were enlisted in the militia (in case of war). The service life was determined - 6 years and after that 9 years in reserve (the fleet is 7 years and 3 years). Religious ministers, doctors, teachers, representatives of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Far North and the Far East were released from military service. Benefits were provided to recruits with education: higher education - 6 months, gymnasiums - 1.5 years, city schools - 3 years, primary schools - 4 years. This made it possible to reduce the size of the regular army in peacetime.

The system of higher military education has not undergone major changes. The curricula and programs were partially changed towards making military training more practical. Two new academies, the Military Law and the Naval Academy, were opened (by the end of the century there were only 6 academies. The number of students in them was 850). The secondary military school was reorganized. Instead of children's corps, military gymnasiums were created, which provided general secondary education and prepared for admission to military schools and pro-gymnasiums with a 4-year period of study to prepare for admission to cadet schools. The term of study at military schools was set at 3 years. The schools trained officers for the infantry and cavalry, gave the knowledge necessary to command a regiment. Junker schools were intended to train officers from persons who did not have a general secondary education, from the lower ranks of the army, who came from noble and chief officer families. Special schools were created to train technical specialists. The access to military educational institutions was slightly opened for representatives of other estates, but the nobles in them accounted for 75% of the students. In 1882 the military gymnasiums were liquidated and the Cadet Corps were restored as closed noble educational institutions.

The country's armed forces were divided into permanent troops (personnel army, reserve, Cossack regiments, "foreign" units) and militia, where they were enrolled, exempted from military service and served the prescribed period.

The Central Directorate was created - the Ministry of War, which included the Military Council, the Chancellery, the General Staff. Main Directorate: quartermaster, artillery, engineering, medical, judicial, educational institutions and Cossack troops. The territory of Russia was divided into 15 military districts, which included: Commander, Military Council, headquarters, directorates. This ensured the operational command and control of the troops and the rapid deployment of the army.

In 1891, the army adopted a 5-round magazine (7.62 mm) rifle of S. I. Mosin, which had high combat qualities. The artillery is armed with steel rifled guns, breech-loaded. The inventor V.S. Baranevsky creates a 76 mm rapid-fire field gun.

The transition to the armored fleet is under way.

Military reforms of the 60-70s. were of progressive importance, they increased the combat capability of the Russian army, which was confirmed by the Russian-Turkish war, in which Russia won.

In the Russian state, since the 30s of the 17th century. Attempts were made to create a more perfect military system. The archers and the local cavalry were no longer reliable means of strengthening the borders.

The regular Russian army arose under Emperor Peter I (1682-1725).

His Decree "On the admission to the service of soldiers from all sorts of free people" (1699) laid the foundation for the recruitment of the new army. In the Decree of February 20, 1705, the term "recruit" was first mentioned, the term of which was established by Peter I - "as long as strength and health allow." The recruiting system firmly consolidated the class principle of the organization of the army: the soldiers were recruited from the peasants and other taxable strata of the population, and the officers - from the nobles.

Each rural or bourgeois community undertook to provide the army with a man aged 20 to 35 from a certain number (usually 20) households.

In 1732, the favorite of the Empress Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740) - B.Kh. Munnich (President of the Military Collegium) approved the recruitment of recruits between the ages of 15 and 30 by lot.

Lifetime service was replaced by 10 years, moreover, military peasants could be promoted to officers, i.e. go out to the nobles. In addition, in 1736, an instruction was issued allowing the only sons in the family not to serve in the army, but to one of the brothers to avoid recruitment.

In 1762, Emperor Peter III (1761-1762) set the term of service in the army at 25 years.

In 1808-1815.

under Emperor Alexander I (1801-1825), military settlements were organized - special volosts inhabited by state peasants, who were transferred to the category of military settlers. Soldiers' regiments settled here, their families were discharged to the soldiers, the soldiers were married (often not at their choice). Military settlers served for life in military service and carried out agricultural work to provide for themselves.

shaved into the tsarist army for 25 years

All boys from the age of 7 became cantonists, dressed in uniforms and carried out both soldier and peasant service for life. The State Archives of the Chuvash Republic contains books on the registration of cantonists. In the 50s of the 19th century. settlers, cantonists, dismissed from the military department, were included in the rural societies of state and appanage peasants, as evidenced by revision tales and other documents.

Since 1834, under Emperor Nicholas I (1825-1855), a soldier was dismissed on indefinite leave ("reserve") after 20 years of service.

From 1839 to 1859, the service life was reduced from 19 to 12 years, the maximum age of a recruit - from 35 to 30.

From the formal (draft) list of the Cheboksary district presence for 1854:

Mikhailo Vasiliev (Note: this recruit entered hunting for his brother Kozma Vasiliev), age - 20 years, height - 2 arshins 3 vershoks, signs: hair on the head and eyebrows are dark blond, eyes are blue, nose and mouth are ordinary, chin is round, in general, the face is pockmarked. Special signs: there is a spot on the right side of the back from the disease. From which class it was adopted, according to which set: Kazan province, Cheboksary district, Sundyr volost, d.

Bolshaya Akkozina, from the state peasants, 11 private set, Orthodox, single. He doesn't know how to read, write, or any skill.

719. Vasily Fedorov, age 21/2 years, height - 2 yards 5 vershoks, signs: hair on the head and eyebrows - black, brown eyes, nose - wide-pointed, mouth - ordinary, chin - round, generally clean face. Special features: a birthmark on the lower back. From which class it was adopted, according to which set: Kazan province, Cheboksary district, Lipovskoy volost, d.

Bagildina, from the state peasants, 11 private recruitment, Orthodox, married to Elena Vasilyeva, no children. He doesn't know how to read, write, or any skill.

In the family recruitment list of the Cheboksary district of the Alymkasin volost of the Alymkassin rural society for 1859, there is information about the receipt of peasants in recruits since 1828, there is no data on the return of recruits.

The next changes in the terms of service are associated with the head of the Ministry of War D.A. Milyutin (1861-1881), who in 1873

carried out a reform. As a result, from January 1, 1874, the recruitment system was replaced by universal military service. The entire male population that reached the age of 20, without distinction of class, served directly in the ranks for 6 years and was in the reserve for 9 years (for the fleet - 7 years of active service and 3 years in the reserve).

Those who served their terms of active service and in the reserve were enlisted in the militia, in which they stayed for up to 40 years. They were exempted from active service: the only son, the only breadwinner in the family with young brothers and sisters, conscripts whose older brother is serving or has served a period of active service.

The rest of those fit for service, who had no privileges, drew lots. All fit for service, incl. and beneficiaries were enlisted in the reserve, and after 15 years - in the militia. Delays were given for 2 years in terms of property status. The terms of active military service were reduced depending on the educational qualification: up to 4 years for those who graduated from elementary school, up to 3 years for a city school, and up to one and a half years for those who had a higher education.

If the educated person entered active service voluntarily ("volunteer"), the terms of service were cut in half.

In the service, the soldiers were taught to read and write. The clergy were exempted from military service.

From the draft list with. Yandashevo, Alymkassinskaya volost, Cheboksary district for 1881:

... v. Chodinoy

No. 2. Nikita Yakimov, b. May 24, 1860, marital status: sister Ekaterina, 12 years old, wife Oksinya Yakovleva, 20 years old.

The decision of the Presence on compulsory military service: “Has benefits of the first category as the only worker in the family.

Enroll in the militia ";

village Oldeevo - Izeevo

No. 1. Ivan Petrov, b. January 4, 1860, marital status: mother is a widow, 55 years old, sisters: Varvara, 23 years old, Praskovya, 12 years old, wife Ogafya Isaeva, 25 years old.

The decision of the Presence on military service: “The privilege of the first category was given as the only worker in the family with his mother - a widow.

Enlisted in the militia. "

From the report of the assistant foreman of the Alymkasin volost government to the Cheboksary district police chief dated August 17, 1881: “... in the village. Yurakovo has a soldier now dismissed to the reserve Porfiry Fedorov - musician of the 66th Infantry Regiment's choir, who entered the military service on December 16, 1876, due to weakness he was enrolled in the Arzamas reserve battalion, in which he took part in the Turkish war ... ".

Under the Minister of War P.S.

Vannovsky (1882-1898), according to the new military regulations of 1888, there were new reductions in service life: 4 years in foot troops, 5 years in cavalry and engineering troops. The service life in the reserve has increased from 9 to 18 years. Those fit for service were listed in the militia up to 43 years of age, the draft age for active service increased from 20 to 21 years, the terms of service for persons who graduated from secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as for volunteers, increased by 2-4 times.

From the draft list of the Ishley-Sharbashevsky society of the Syundyr volost of the Kozmodemyansky district for 1892:

Markov Lavrenty Markovich, b. August 4, 1871. Marital status: brother Nikolai, 11 years old, sister Darius, 16 years old.

The decision of the Presence on military conscription: “Has the right to a privilege of the first category under Art. 45.

as the only capable brother with a brother and sister - full orphans ... Enroll a warrior of the 2nd category in the militia. "

Nikolaev Philip Nikolaevich, b. November 2, 1871. Marital status: father Nikolai Fedorov, 45 years old, mother Agrafen Stepanova, 40 years old, brothers: Peter, 17 years old, Ivan, 13 years old, Kuzma, 10 ½ years old, Nikifor, 6 years old.

The decision of the Presence: “He is entitled to the benefit of the second category under Art. 45. as the only son capable of work with a capable father and brothers under 18 years of age. Enroll a warrior of the 1st category in the militia. "

From the draft list of the Syundyr volost for 1895:

Elakov Roman Evdokimovich, b. November 12, 1873 Marital status: father Evdokim Ivanov, 50 years old, mother Nastasya Petrova, 45 years old, brothers: Grigory, 23 years old, entered the draft in 1892 and is in the service, Philip, 18 years old, sisters: Nadezhda, 15 years old, Tatiana, 12 years old; Orthodox, single, belongs to the fourth category by education (certificate of the Kozmodemyansk district school council dated August 17, 1888), number of an extended lot number 230, height 1.7 1 , is eligible for the third category benefit as the immediately next oldest brother in active service.

Solution: enroll in the militia, warrior of the 1st category.

The last change in the period of service in the tsarist army took place in 1906: they began to serve in the infantry for 3 years, in the rest of the troops - 4 years.

Military conscription in tsarist Russia - who and how much was taken into the army

Although, according to the "Charter on universal military service" in Imperial Russia, all 21-year-olds were conscripted into the army, with the exception of clergy of all faiths, but not all of them did military service. Since there were more conscripts every year than was required to be called up, the conscripts were selected by drawing lots in the order of the number drawn to each.

In addition, the only sons, eldest sons and necessary workers in the family were exempted from military service.

Benefits for education were given - a deferment of conscription and a reduction in service life to 1 year instead of the normal 3.5 years.

How many served in the tsarist army, what was the service life before

Those with an education in the 6th grade of secondary school and above served their military service as "volunteers". Refusing to draw lots, they served for a year (with a higher education for 9 months), with the obligation to pass the exam for the rank of a reserve officer. This also applied to the Jews, with the only difference that they did not receive the officer's rank.

All teachers were exempt from military service.

The Imperial Army was a means of educating the people.

The soldier was obliged to learn to read and write, acquired a well-bred, cultivated and assimilated the concept of duty.

a source:, July 1983

Additionally:

MILITARY OBLIGATION

Muscovy, Russian Empire, Russian historical vocabulary, Terms, Udelnaya (Horde) Russia

MILITARY OBLIGATION, the obligation of men to carry out military service to defend the Motherland, established by Russian law.

Certificate of attendance for the performance of military service, 1884

In Ancient Russia to K.

XV century conscription was carried out mainly in the form of the people's militia. In the following centuries, the main place was occupied by the militias of small and medium landowners (nobles), who received estates and money for military service.

The regiments of the "new system" created in the 1630s and 1950s, which gradually ousted the noble militia, from the 1640s were equipped with a compulsory recruitment of tributary people, for whom, from the beginning. In the 1650s, military service became lifelong.

"Army of the Russian Empire: composition, salaries of officers, allowances"

In the period 1699-1705, a system of conscription was formed, formalized by decree 1705 and the "Articles given to stewards on the collection of tacit soldiers or recruits" attached to it.

Military service remained permanent and lifelong for the soldiers, while the service of the nobility was limited to 25 years in 1732, and in 1762 they were completely exempted from military service. According to the Recruiting Charter of 1831, all the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the soldiers' children served out military service. The service life of soldiers in 1793 was reduced to 25 years, in 1834 - to 20, after the Crimean War of 1853-56 - to 12, and by 1874 - to 7 years.

Since 1854, a “drawing of lots” was introduced (the number of the conscription queue was drawn by lot) of three categories according to marital status. At the same time, first paid substitution was widely allowed, and then the ransom from military service, for which the government issued "credit" and "redemption" receipts. With edition 1 Jan. 1874 of the Charter on military service, which introduced universal military service, replacement and ransom were abolished, but exemptions, benefits and deferrals were established for physical condition, marital status, education, rank, occupation, property status and, finally, on a national basis ( "Foreigners"); in this way, at least 10% of the conscripts were legally exempted from military service.

The charter of 1874 established the draft age at 21 years, consolidated the existing draw system, determined the total service life of 15 years, of which active service is 6 (in the fleet 7) and in the reserve - 9 years. In 1876, the term of active military service was reduced to 5 years, in 1878 - to 4, and in 1905 - to 3. Russia entered the First World War with the following principles of conscription: draft age - 20 years (by January 1 of the year of conscription), total service life - 23 years (age limit 43 years); active service in the infantry and foot artillery - 3 years, in other branches of the military - 4 years; in reserve - 15 (13) years, the remaining 4-5 years - in the 1st category militia (to replenish the wartime field army), where, except for old soldiers, for 23 years all the surplus of the annual conscription contingent fit for service were enrolled; in the militia of the 2nd category (auxiliary and rear units of wartime), the surplus of those who were limitedly fit for military service and released due to marital status were credited for the same period.

Military reform: changing the system of military administration, recruiting and supply of the Armed Forces. Compulsory military service charter 1874 Military judicial reform 1867

Improve officer training

Re-equip the army with modern weapons

Improve the military control system

Eliminate the gap between the Russian army and Western European

Create an army with trained reserves

The reason for the introduction of this reform was the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War.

The main provisions of the reform:

Established 15 military districts to improve army management

The network of military educational institutions for the training of officers has been expanded (academies, military gymnasiums, cadet schools)

New military regulations were introduced

Rearmament of the army and navy

Abolition of corporal punishment

And in 1874 the recruiting system was abolished, universal (all-estates) conscription was introduced

The following terms of service in the army were established: in the infantry - 6 years, in the navy - 7, 9 years in reserve, for those who graduated from district schools - 3 years, for those who graduated from gymnasiums 1.5 years, for those who graduated from universities 6 months, i.e.

e. Service life depended on education.

Military service began at the age of 20. They were not called up for military service: the only son in the family, breadwinner, clergy, peoples of the North, Wed. Asia, part of the Caucasus and Siberia

The first Russian revolution 1905-1907: its preconditions and main stages.

Creation of Soviets as organs of revolutionary power.

Supreme Manifesto on the improvement of state order (October Manifesto)

Legislative act of the Supreme Power of the Russian Empire, promulgated on October 17 (30), 1905.

It was developed by Sergei Witte on behalf of Emperor Nicholas II in connection with the ongoing "turmoil". In October, a strike began in Moscow, which engulfed the entire country and developed into the All-Russian October political strike.

On October 12-18, over 2 million people went on strike in various industries. This general strike and, above all, the strike of the railroad workers, forced the emperor to make concessions.

First of all, the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 outlined the fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen, which were discussed in more detail in
Code of Basic State Laws. This was a significant step towards the development of the principles of constitutionalism in the country.

In addition, the Manifesto reflects the foundations of the state structure, the foundations of the formation and activities of the State Duma and
Governments, which also received their development in the Code.

The code, in turn, covered a wider range of issues.

In addition to these issues, this regulatory legal act reflects such important issues as the issue of state power, legislative initiative and the legislative process in general, the position of this Code in the legislative system that existed at that time, and much more.

The main state laws of the Russian Empire as amended on April 23, 1906: form of government, order of legislation, rights and obligations of subjects

A few days before the opening of the first Duma, on April 23, 1906, Nicholas II approved the text of the wording of the Basic State Laws of the Russian Empire.

Such haste was associated with the desire to prevent their discussion in the Duma, so that the latter would not turn into a Constituent Assembly. The basic laws of 1906 enshrined the state structure of the Russian Empire, the state language, the essence of the supreme power, the order of legislation, the principles of organization and operation of central state institutions, the rights and obligations of Russian citizens, the position of the Orthodox Church, etc.

The first chapter of the basic laws revealed the essence of the "supreme autocratic power".

Until the last moment, Nicholas II resisted the removal from the text of the provision on the unlimited power of the monarch in Russia. In the final version, the article on the extent of the tsarist power was formulated as follows: “ The All-Russian Emperor belongs to the Supreme Autocratic Power ... " From now on, the Russian emperor had to share legislative power with the Duma and the State Council.

However, the monarch's prerogatives remained very broad: he owned “ initiative in all subjects of legislation "(only on his initiative the Basic State Laws could be revised), he approved laws, appointed and dismissed high dignitaries, directed foreign policy, proclaimed “ the sovereign leader of the Russian army and navy ", was endowed with the exclusive right to mint coins, on his behalf war was declared and peace was concluded, and legal proceedings were carried out.

In the ninth chapter, which established the procedure for the adoption of laws, it was determined that “ no new law can follow without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma and take effect without the approval of the Sovereign Emperor. "

Bills not passed by both chambers were considered rejected. Bills rejected by one of the chambers could be reintroduced for its consideration only with the permission of the emperor.

Bills not approved by the emperor could be re-considered not earlier than the next session.

The main state laws laid the foundations for a new political system, which later became known as the June Third Monarchy.

The main state laws of 1906 were the constitution. As such, they were considered both by representatives of the authorities and by liberal historians of state law.

Thus, we can conclude that a dualistic monarchy was established in Russia.

A characteristic feature of this form in Russia was the incomplete separation of powers, which gave rise to a synthesis of elements of absolute and constitutional monarchy, with the former clearly predominating.

State Duma

The system of representative institutions was introduced in Russia by a number of state acts, starting with the Manifesto on August 6, 1905.

and ending with "The main state. laws "on April 23, 1906. According to the initial draft (August 6, 1905), the State Duma was supposed to be a" legislative institution ", elected on the basis of census representation from three curiae.

The aggravation of the political situation soon demanded a revision of the project.

On December 11, 1905, after the defeat of the armed uprising in Moscow, a decree was issued "On changing the provisions on elections to the State Duma", cat. the circle of voters is expanding significantly.

Almost the entire male population of the country over the age of 25, except for soldiers, students, day laborers and part of the nomads, received voting rights. The right to vote was not direct and remained unequal for voters of different categories (curiae).

The deputies were elected by electoral assemblies consisting of electors from each province and a number of large cities.

The electors were elected by four separate electoral curiae: landowners, city dwellers, peasants, and workers.

State Duma in the period from 1905-1907. was a representative body of power that for the first time limited the monarchy in Russia.

The reasons for the formation of the Duma were: the revolution of 1905–1907, which arose after Bloody Sunday, and the general unrest in the country.

The procedure for the formation and establishment of the Duma was established by the Manifesto on the establishment of the State.

The State Duma was supposed to work together with the Council of Ministers.

Universal military service in Russia in 1913.

The Council of Ministers was the permanent highest government agency headed by a chairman.

The Council of Ministers headed all departments for legislation and the highest state. management, that is, he to some extent limited the activities of the State. Duma.

Basic principles of work of the State. Duma:

1. freedom of conscience;

2. participation in elections of broad strata of the population;

3. Mandatory approval by the Duma of all laws issued.

All men over 25 had active suffrage in the State Duma (with the exception of military personnel, students, day laborers and nomads).

the State Institution came out. Duma.

The competence of the Duma on the Establishment: development of laws, their discussion, approval of the country's budget. All bills passed by the Duma were to be approved by the Senate, and later by the emperor. The Duma did not have the right to consider issues outside the scope of its competence, for example, issues of payments for the state.

debts and loans to the Ministry of the Court, as well as state. loans.

Term of office of the State. Duma - 5 years.

The State Duma was bicameral: the upper chamber was the State. council (it was headed by a chairman and vice-chairman, appointed by the emperor annually); lower house - representatives from the population.

In the period 1905-1907.

3 Dumas were convened different. compositions. The First Duma lasted 72 days. She was the most liberal-minded, because its convocation was the result of the revolutionary movement in Russia, there were no representatives from the monarchist movement in it.

After the dissolution of the Third Duma (when the popular uprisings were suppressed by the tsarist army), significant changes were made to the laws on the State. Duma, for example:

2. the number of representatives from Poland, the Caucasus and Central Asia was limited.

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Part (Volume) 3

Chapter XII. Stagnation

Russian army of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Vannovsky, Dragomirov, Kuropatkin

Nicholas I and Alexander II were military men by vocation. Alexander III was a military man in a sense of duty to the country. He had no passion for military affairs, but he saw and felt that the fate of the Fatherland entrusted to him depended on the state of his armed forces. “Russia has only two loyal allies - her army and her navy,” he said and, realizing this,unswervingly strived for the all-round development of Russian military power... At the same time The sovereign withdrew from the army. Alexander II could always be seen at divorces, frequent parades, regimental holidays, in camps and in meetings, talking with officers, interested in all their news, taking events in the regimental family to heart. Alexander III limited his communication with the army to the strictly necessary, closed himself in a close family circle in his cozy Gatchina palace. The main reason was, of course, his work overload, which left him little free time.

A well-known role was played here by the natural shyness of the Tsar, who did not like large society, and finally, the bitter residue that left on his soul on March 1, 1881.“The image of the late Tsar, bending over the body of a wounded Cossack and not thinking about the possibility of a second assassination attempt, did not leave us,” recalls the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich of those days. - We understood that something incomparably greater than our beloved uncle and courageous monarch had gone with him irrevocably into the past. Idyllic Russia with the Tsar-Father and his loyal people ceased to exist on March 1, 1881. We realized thatnever again will the Russian Tsar be able to treat his subjects with unlimited trust". Tsarist reviews began to be held less frequently, divorces were completely abolished, the adjutant and retinue monograms generously distributed by Alexander II to the army regiments have now become rare in the guards, becoming the privilege of a very small circle of people.

The beginning of this reign was marked by a complete change in the appearance of the troops. The graceful uniforms of the beautiful army of the Tsar-Liberator did not match the massive figure of the new Tsar.Alexander III did not reckon with aesthetics, demanding a national cut and practicality.

The new form was introduced in the summer of 1882. The army has become unrecognizable. Gone are the guards helmets with plumes, caps and shako with sultans, spectacular uniforms with colored lapels, lancers and mentics, sabers and broadswords. All this glitter was replaced by long-fringed caftans on hooks, wide trousers and low caps of a fake lamb. The officers began to resemble the chief conductors, the guards riflemen - like the district warders, the sergeant major - like the village heads in caftans with a badge. The soldiers in their homespun guise became like pilgrims, especially in the army infantry, where knapsacks were abolished and instead of them "duffel bags" - an exact copy of a beggarly knapsack - worn over the shoulder were introduced. The cavalry dejectedly wore the uhlanka, shako and mantics with the cords removed and the stitched sewing, before, following the example of the infantry, donning zipoons. The officers tried to soften the ugliness of the new form, each to his own taste. Some shortened the uniform to the previous model, others, on the contrary, lengthened it, bringing it closer to the frock coat, while others, following the example of the shooters, exaggerated the overlap of trousers, bringing them to the toes of their boots. As a result, foreign correspondents who saw the Russian army in Manchuria were amazed that it was impossible to meet two officers dressed in the same way.

This disfigurement of the army made a psychological mistake. Appearance means a lot to the military appearance, which also supports the military spirit. Alexander III looked at the shiny uniforms as if they were expensive tinsel. But in the eyes of officers and soldiers, it was far from tinsel. They maintained continuity with past heroic eras. The glorious memories of Shipka and Sheinov were already associated with the cap, and the legends of Friedland and Borodin were leaving the lapels and mentics. The utilitarian materialism of this reform (which, incidentally, was quite in the spirit of the century) manifested itself in the most negative way in the spiritual and educational area - the most important area of ​​military affairs. In the infantry regiments, both guards and army, soldiers, leaving in reserve, refused to take uniforms of a new "muzhik" cut, and at their own expense they altered them according to the old uniform - always with lapels. Those who went on leave were sporting a lapel in the village, which they took off when returning from a visit back to the regiment. The only positive side of this re-uniform was the introduction in the hot season of white shirts, until then worn only in the Caucasus and Turkestan.

* * *

The new reign needed new leaders. The first event of Emperor Alexander III in the military field was the appointment of the Minister of War to the place of Count MilyutinAdjutant General Vannovsky- his closest adviser in 1877 - 1878 as chief of staff of the Ruschuk detachment.

Vannovsky was the complete opposite of the enlightened and "liberal" Milyutin. In comparison with Milyutin, he was an obscurantist - a kind of "military Pobedonostsev", and in character - a second Paskevich.The man is extremely rude and picky, he treated his subordinates despotically. It was very difficult to serve with him, and rarely did anyone endure it for any length of time..

“After all, I’m a dog,” Vannovsky liked to say to his subordinates, “I bite everyone, I don’t let anyone sleep, and therefore the order is such that, perhaps, no one else has; when you are the boss, I advise you to be dogs too. "

The merit of Vannovsky wasthe abolition of Milyutin's disastrous military training reform... The strict head of the Pavlovsk military school sawpoor drillMilyutin grammar schools with their civilian educators, who did not inform their pupils of the military spirit, the result of which wastheir increasing departure after the end of the course "to the side".In 1882, the military gymnasiums were again transformed into cadet corps and properly trained. Civilian educators were replaced by officers, drill training was introduced, and our secondary military educational institutions regained the vigorous military spirit of the "Nikolaev" corps.At the same time, it was recognized as necessary to preserve military schools for the preparation of a homogeneous - equally educated and equally trained - officer corps. The question of restoring special classes disappeared. It should be noted thatIn the majority, the educators of the cadet corps were far from the best element of our officers (the bait here was a quiet life, a high salary and fast production).

Combat service began to be conducted more clearly... First of all wasthe guard has been tightened... Generals Vasmund in the Izmailovsky Life Guard Regiment, Meva in the Pavlovsky Life Guard led, each in his own way, his own unitsto a high degree of perfection... Others were equal to them, and characteristic of the Milutin era "Feldwebel, where is my place?" finally moved into the realm of legends. At the same time, the drill regulations were simplified by the abolition of a number of complex reorganizations, which characterized the utilitarian and "everyday" nature of the coming era.

The military reforms of the previous reign were revised by a special commission chaired by the Adjutant General Count Kotzebue... This commission was supposed to express itself on the issues of the structure of the War Ministry, the preservation of the military district system and the development of the Regulations on the field command and control of the troops. Count Kotzebue Commissionrejected the project of organizing a General Staff independent of the Minister of War on the Prussian-German model. The main headquarters continued to remain, as under Milyutin, one of the clerical "desks" of the War Ministry. Vannovsky's lust for power played, of course, a role in this decision.

The military district system was supposed to be preserved, subjecting it to only some partialtransformations. butThe Milyutin Regulations on the Field Command of the Troops of 1868, which proved its worth in the Turkish War, it was decided to replace, and the development of the new Regulations was entrusted to the commission of General Lobko.

V In 1881, the Orenburg military district was abolished (annexed to the Kazan one). V 1882 the West Siberian Military District was renamed Omsk. In 1884, due to its vastness, the East Siberian Military District was divided into two - Irkutsk and Priamursky.In 1889, the Kharkov Military District was abolished (partly annexed to Kiev, partly to Moscow).Three western border districts - Vilensky, Varshavsky and Kievsky - received in 1886 a control system similar to that of the same wartime army.The troops of these districtswere supposed to make up the main forces of the three armies in case of war with the Central Powers.

V In 1890, the Regulation on the field command of troops, worked out by the commission of General Lobko, was approved.In comparison with the previous one, it significantly increased the rights of the commander-in-chief and freed him from the guardianship of the Ministry of War. The position is infor the first time determined the rules of formation when mobilizing army directorates from military district(which was overlooked by the creator of the military district system, Count Milyutin). At the same timethe main ulcer of the Milyutin Regulations - the organization of detachments "according to the circumstances" - was preserved, and we will see what sad results this "detachment mania" led to in Manchuria.

The main concern of the War Department during the reign of Alexander III wasincreasing the trained reserve of the army by allowing a large number of people to pass through its ranks. The annual contingent of recruits was 150,000 people under Alexander II, in 1881, 235,000 people were already drafted.

At first, the service life was left the same: 6 years in service, 9 - in reserve.One of the last orders of Milyutin in the spring of 1881 was to reduce the service life to 4 years in infantry and foot artillery and 5 years in other types of weapons.... Vannovsky immediately canceled this order, fearing for the quality and strength of training. Really,in the entire million-strong army, there were only 5,500 non-commissioned officers out of the number of 32,000 planned in 1874 with the introduction of universal conscription (that is, 17 percent). In 1886, the service life of volunteers in the 1st category was increased to one year - six-month "Milyutin" volunteers gave too ignorant reserve officers.

In 1888 the number of extra-urgent ones has doubled (still accounting for about a third of the target number), and this year the terms of service have been reduced to 4 years in foot and to 5 in cavalry and engineer troops... At the same time there wasthe duration of stay in the reserve was doubled - from 9 years to 18, and the reserve ones were considered to be liable for military service up to 43 years of age inclusive.Vannovsky, however, did not establish any division of the reserve into categories - the mobilized troops were to be manned indiscriminately with 25-year-old reserve men who had just left the service, and 43-year-old "bearded men".

In 1891, the contingent of the trained reserve of the lower ranks was completed - there were 2.5 million trained people in the reserve, and up to 4 million soldiers had to be counted in the mobilized army (with the Cossack troops). WITH In 1887, general military service was extended to the indigenous population of the Caucasus (with the exception of the mountaineers).At the end of the reign, 270,000 people were called up annually - about twice as many as under Alexander II. 6,000 - 7,000 volunteers were enrolled annually. The capacity of the schools was increased: in 1881, 1750 officers were produced, in 1895 - 2370.In 1882, officer schools were opened - rifle, artillery (for the practical improvement of candidates for company and battery commanders) and electrical engineering.

The abundance of candidates to the General Staff prompted admission to the academy by competition from 1885 (a three-year marching qualification for candidates was established back in 1878).Half of the graduates were assigned to the General Staff - the rest returned to the ranks as "graduates of the 2nd grade".Skobelev, Yudenich and Lechitsky graduated from the academy by rank(ten) . This category of officers, having the opportunity all the time to apply in practice in the troops the knowledge they acquired at the academy, brought the army, perhaps, more benefit than those who graduated in the 1st category, who were wasted in various directorates and offices.Strong, independent characters, as a rule, were relegated to the 2nd category, and in the 1st category there were too often careerists, who in everything agreed with the opinion of their superiors.

In 1883, the rank of major (finally) and warrant officer (left only in wartime for reserve officers from volunteers) was abolished.The advantage of the Old Guard over the army team became only one rank, and not two, as before. The Young Guard was abolished, its regiments (Cuirassier of Her Majesty, infantry 3rd Finnish and 4th Imperial Family) were transferred to the Old.In fact, from that time on, the army regiments began to enjoy the advantages of the Young Guard. From the cadet schools (with a one-year course) they began to issue ensigns as junior officers. These ensigns in a year or two were made directly to the second lieutenants.

General Vannovsky sought to increase the combatant composition of the troops, and for the period 1881 - 1894 the number of combatants was increased from 84 to 95 percent, but only on paper. In the same timenothing was done to improve the officer's service in the ranks. These conditions were difficult and unattractive, the frontline officers could justly consider themselves stepsons of the army.As soon as they left the line, andin non-combatant positions, they had high salaries, and fast movement in the service, and a comfortable lifestyle - everything that was not given to combat workers who forged the power of the Russian army.

it created a pernicious temptation and resulted in the leakage of a significant number of capable officers to great harm to the service... The consequences of Milyutin's disregard for combat knowledge - the principle that, according to the winner Shamil, “constitutes the honor and glory of military service” ...

* * *

With the introduction in 1879 of the infantry regiments into a 4-battalion composition - 16 homogeneous companies, where all the people were armed with a small-caliber rapid-fire rifle, the organization of the Russian infantry in its main features remained unchanged until World War II. The construction part, as we have seen, has been greatly simplified. Plevna had the consequence of supplying all military ranks with a light entrenching tool, Sheinovo introduced dashes. In 1886, in all infantry and cavalry regiments, hunting teams were brought up from people who were especially capable of reconnaissance service and carrying out important assignments (4 people per company and squadron). In the same year, 1891, the reserve troops were transformed. Numbered reserve battalions received names, and some of them - in the border districts were deployed into 2-battalion reserve regiments, brought together by 4 in reserve infantry brigades and deployed when mobilized into infantry divisions of normal composition.

The year 1882 was marked by the defeat of the Russian cavalry by the so-called "dragoon reform". Its inspiration was General Sukhotin (11) - the actual inspector general of the cavalry (nominally, the inspector general was the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder, after whose death in 1891 this post was abolished altogether). Investigating the cavalry raids of the North American War, Sukhotin came to the conclusion that it was necessary to convert all Russian regular cavalry to the dragoon mode. Nothing could be objected to this essentially sound thought - the dragoon training was still recognized by Potemkin as "self-needed and useful." However, Sukhotin, a man of primitive thinking, a materialist and a bad psychologist, began by distorting the glorious names of the Russian cavalry regiments, taking away the uniforms that they were so proud of (in the eyes of the clerical utilitarians, these "trinkets" did not mean anything), encroached on the very the soul of the cavalry - its traditions. Carried away by the American riding infantry, he passed all the treasures of the rich and glorious experience of the Russian cavalry.

Brandy's station overshadowed both Schengraben and Fer Champenoise, and even the famous Strukov raid - a raid before which all of Stewart's and Sheridan's operations pale in color. This psychosis of "raids" on an American sample transplanted onto Russian soil had a sad effect later under Yingkou. The fashion for American cowboys led to the abolition of the pike, left only in the Cossack units. Sukhotin did not realize the full significance of this weapon, formidable in the hands of a strong-minded cavalry. He argued that with a short - "only six years" - service life, it was impossible to teach a cavalryman to wield this "heavy and inconvenient" weapon - a relic of antiquity, inappropriate in the "age of technological progress." It was ordered to intensively engage in foot formation and shooting, which was performed in the order of serving the number, but still significantly reduced the cavalry spirit. They began to look at the horse not as the first and main weapon of the cavalryman, but only as a means of transportation. The lack of a true cavalry leadership led to a routine that got along well with superficial innovation in the American design. "Fatty bodies" became the main concern of the cavalry commanders - the result was a tortoise gait on level ground and good paths.

Conditions of service in the cavalry became unattractive. New wild names - "Bug Dragoons", "Pavlograd Dragoons", "Akhtyr Dragoons" - cut the ear of the cavalrymen and pinched their heart. Many officers left the ranks of the cavalry, especially when the "podraguned" regiments were dressed in caftans and army jackets of a new pseudo-Russian cut and moved to the provincial camp on the western border, from where a threat began to be felt. In the Kiev hussar regiment, for example, all officers resigned when their regiment, which had existed for more than two hundred years, was renamed the 27th Dragoon. Sukhomlinov, who had just been appointed commander of the Pavlograd regiment of the “Shengraben hussars”, recalls this vandalism with bitterness: “Rationalism in our country for many years only destroyed and, not using the assistance of modern technology, did not give anything new, better in return. So, the part entrusted to me from the brilliant hussar regiment became the army dragoon number of the 6th regiment, with the traditions of which one could get acquainted only in the archives, and not by the form of clothing and the proud appearance of the people wearing it. "

The size of the regular cavalry was significantly increased. It was strengthened more than one and a half times. Regiments from the 4-squadron composition were transferred to the 6-squadron, and from the newly formed regiments, the 15th cavalry division was formed in the Warsaw district. But the Cossack cavalry was somewhat reduced, a number of regiments were lowered to a benefit, the 3rd Caucasian Cossack division was abolished, but a new one was formed - the 2nd consolidated Cossack - in the Kiev district. In general, the quality of the Russian cavalry in the 80s and 90s noticeably decreased, and it came closer to the type of riding infantry. The reform of General Sukhotin will remain in its history a sad monument of soulless materialism and rationalism that ruled the minds of the leading Russian military circles - all the same, the "Gatchina", "Milyutin" or "post-Milyutin" periods - the entire 19th century.

The situation was more consoling in the artillery, due to the efforts of its general-feldzheikhmeister, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, which remained at its usual height. She was all rearmed with wedge guns of the 1877 model of good ballistic qualities, hitting 4.5 versts. In the period 1889 - 1894, 5 mortar regiments of 4 - 5 batteries in six 6-inch mortars were formed. In 1891, a mining artillery regiment was formed, in which mining guns of various types were tested. Strange as it may seem, the mountain artillery was always with us in some kind of disregard of the ruling circles, despite the fact that the Russian army almost always fought in the mountains and the troops greatly appreciated these small, mobile, tactically unpretentious guns with their immediate readiness for shooting from any position.

With the increase in the number of officers, the artillery of the Mikhailovsky school was not enough, and in 1894 the Konstantinovsky school was also transformed into an artillery one. The Grand Duke paid special attention to shooting and encouraged it in every possible way by establishing competitions (the famous “cup of the general-feldzheichmeister”, “feldzheikhmeister's badge”, etc.).

In connection with the intensified construction of fortresses on the western border, the composition of the engineering troops has been significantly increased. At the end of the reign of Alexander III, there were 26 battalions (21 sapper, 5 railway).

The change in the political situation also affected the deployment of troops. In 1882-1884, all cavalry (with the exception of the 1st and 10th divisions) concentrated in the Western border districts. A third of the Caucasian troops were also moved there. In 1883, the 41st Infantry Division bid farewell to the Caucasus, and in 1888 the 19th and a number of cavalry regiments followed it to the West. Then the II Caucasian corps was disbanded and the administrations of new corps were formed - the XVI in Vilensky and XVII in the Moscow districts. All field troops (40th, and then 2nd infantry divisions) were moved from the Kazan district to the border, and only reserve brigades were left there. In the Moscow district, reserve troops accounted for a third of the total number of infantry battalions. In 1894, the XVIII Army Corps was formed in the St. Petersburg District.

* * *

In 1883, Russia lost the White General. Not only the army, but the whole country suffered a cruel, irreparable loss. Skobelev's death caused an explosion of disgusting jubilation in Austria-Hungary, and especially in Germany, where they realized that there was no man capable of watering his white horse in the waves of the Spree.

The British, the noblest enemies, had the decency not to show the deep relief that overwhelmed them.

Yet during the reign of Emperor Alexander III, there was no shortage of major military leaders. The troops of the Warsaw District were commanded by the harsh conqueror of the Balkans, Gurko, who left an indelible, distinct and belligerent "Gurkin" imprint on them. The Vilna district was headed by Totleben (who died in 1884), the Kiev district - since 1889 - by a bright, albeit paradoxical Dragomirov. General Obruchev was the chief of the General Staff throughout the reign, and Leer became the chief of the academy after Dragomirov (12).

The most peculiar figure was represented by M.I.Dragomirov. Zimnitsa and Shipka showed the brilliant training of his 14th division and created a well-deserved military reputation for him. A man of great merit, he also had great flaws, which made his influence on the army ultimately negative. He got along with a big mind with a lack of intuition - a striking analogy with Leo Tolstoy, a great writer and an insignificant thinker. Tolstoy, trying to create a philosophical system, became only an anarchist of Russian thought. Dragomirov, who fully shared Tolstoy's sophism about the uselessness of generally "non-existent" military science, can be called an anarchist of Russian military affairs. The same lack of intuition, which prevented Tolstoy from understanding the Gospel, prevented Dragomirov from comprehending the Science of Victory. He took it one-sidedly, in a doctrinal way. Taking as a basis the eternal and immutable truth about the primacy of the moral, spiritual element, he reduced it to the denial of military science in general, and strategy in particular, a kind of military nihilism. All military affairs were reduced to them to tactics, and tactics - to the fact that "to take in the gut."

Dragomirov opposed spirit to technique, not realizing that technique was by no means the enemy of spirit, but its valuable ally and assistant, allowing him to save the strength and blood of a fighter. The Dragomirovskaya school built all its tactical calculations on piles of human flesh, streams of human blood - and these views, taught from the department by an honored professor, and then by the head of the academy, had the most pernicious influence on the formation of a whole generation of officers of the General Staff - the future "minotaurs" of the World War ... Believing that all kinds of technology would certainly lead to the extinction of the spirit, Dragomirov, with all the power of his authority, opposed the introduction of a magazine rifle and a rapid-fire cannon, with which the armies of our probable adversaries had already been rearmed. When, despite all his opposition, rapid-fire guns were introduced, Dragomirov nevertheless made sure that they were without shields "conducive to timidity."

The result is the torn corpses of the Turenchen and Liaoyang artillerymen, and precious Russian blood was shed in vain. The system of training troops adopted by Dragomirov cannot be considered successful. During his tenure as division commander, he developed the initiative of private chiefs - battalion and company commanders - to a high degree of perfection. Having become the commander of the troops, he in every possible way suppressed the initiative of the corps commanders and divisions commanders subordinate to him. With all my attention

on the individual upbringing of a soldier ("holy gray cattle"), Dragomirov completely overlooked the officer, moreover, he deliberately ignored the officer (his always ironic and contemptuous "gasp-padin officer!"). By deliberate belittling, humiliation of the officer's authority, Dragomirov thought to create popularity for himself both in the soldier's environment and in society. His notorious order remained memorable: "The troops are fighting!" - an undeserved insult to the combatant officers ... Subsequently, painfully experiencing the first Russian turmoil, he recommended to the officers "correctness, restraint and a sharply honed saber." If Dragomirov had taken care of raising his officer's authority in his time, he probably would not have had to give such advice in his declining years ...

Dragomirov's influence was very great (and even went beyond the boundaries of the Russian army). In the French army, General Cardo, who made a name for himself in military literature under the pseudonym “ Loukian Carlowitch, Casaque du Kouban" (13) . Service in the headquarters of the Kiev district served as a "springboard" for the careers of many figures, of whom not all brought happiness to the Russian army. From here came Sukhomlinov, Ruzsky, Yuri Danilov, Bonch-Bruevich (14). The successor of M.I.Dragomirov as head of the academy was General Henrikh Antonovich Leer, the largest military scientific figure of the Russian army. He was a powerful mind, a thinker who “looked at the whole thing,” in Rumyantsev's way. Leer was a defender of a strategy so underestimated by his predecessor. In Russia, he can be considered the father of strategy as a science. In this area, he developed the doctrine of the main operating line, and severely condemned the concept of a strategic reserve ("in strategy, a reserve is a criminal phenomenon").

Unfortunately. Leer was completely misunderstood and not properly appreciated by his contemporaries. He did not conquer a single enemy fortress, and therefore he was considered a "armchair theorist." Meanwhile, it was he who in every possible way emphasized the subordination of theory, saw the meaning of science in the regulation of creativity. At his insistence, field trips of officers of the General Staff were introduced, which greatly expanded their horizons in the practical direction. Leer's strategic eye and his military flair stand out in relief from his note, presented at the end of 1876, where he warned against sending too small forces to the war with Turkey and in parts and insisted on the introduction of a large number of troops at once - "for it is better to have too many troops than too little. "

This note by General Leer in terms of clarity of strategic thought and synthesis of presentation left all the others far behind and was therefore not understood by our military bureaucrats: Count Milyutin considered it "insufficiently developed", for Leer, in presenting the very essence of the matter, neglected the little things that just and paid the main attention. Leer's times can be considered the brilliant era of the academy and of Russian military science in general. It is impossible not to mention the editing by Leer of the "Military Encyclopedia" in 8 volumes, usually referred to as "Leer". It replaced the outdated Zeddeler's Lexicon (1859 edition) and became an important conduit of military knowledge to the ranks of the combatant officers.

A significant figure was also the Chief of the General Staff, General Obruchev, with whose name all any positive measures in the military unit during this period should be associated: the construction of strategic roads, fortresses on the western border and, finally, a military convention with France. According to this convention, in the event of a war with the powers of the Triple Alliance, France pledged to put 1,300,000 people against Germany, Russia - 700 - 800 thousand, retaining both the choice of the main operational direction and freedom of action with respect to the rest of its armed forces. A significant drawback of this convention was the fact that, while obliging Russia to provide indispensable assistance to France in the event of a German attack, it was completely silent about France's similar obligations in the event of a German attack on Russia. This almost proved fatal to both allies in 1914.

Alexander III had great sympathy and confidence in Obruchev, despite the fact that Obruchev had a reputation as a "desperate liberal." In 1863, with the rank of captain, senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division, Obruchev demanded dismissal when the division was moved to the Vilensky district, "not wishing to participate in a fratricidal war." Argumentation of more than dubious nature (the riots of 1863 cannot be called a "fratricidal war"), but showing tremendous courage of character and independence of judgment - logically he would have to pay for it with his career. In 1877, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder flatly refused to admit Obruchev to the Danube army, and he was sent to the Caucasus, where he provided valuable support to the Grand Duke-Feldseichmeister. After the fall of Plevna, Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich was supposed to accept the Western detachment and lead it across the Balkans. The Tsarevich said that he agreed to this only on condition that Obruchev was appointed chief of his staff. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich did not want to hear about Obruchev. Then the Tsarevich refused the Western detachment and left Gurko to reap the laurels of the Trans-Balkan campaign - he himself remained until the end of the war at the head of the Ruschuk detachment, which had lost its significance.

The unsuccessful head of the War Department by General Vannovsky paralyzed, however, the creative work of individual figures. His heavy and imperious obscurantism turned the era that followed the Turkish War into an era of stagnation - and in this respect, Vannovsky can be easily compared with Paskevich. The experience of the war of 1877-1878 was not used at all and was wasted. It only affected the little things.

Strategically, war could not be studied at all. The commander-in-chief was the august brother of the late Emperor and the uncle of the Emperor who reigned happily. To analyze objectively from the pulpit his deplorable leadership, the countless blunders of the Main Apartment was completely unthinkable, as it could lead to undermining the prestige of the dynasty. The absurd plan of war, the dispatch of troops in parts, the failure to use the already mobilized reserves - all this was the work of Count Milyutin, and Milyutin was once and for all agreed to be considered the "beneficent genius" of the Russian army. Thus, the professor of strategy was presented with an insoluble task - at every step he stumbled upon "taboos" that he did not dare to touch.

The professor of general tactics met no less difficulties. Kridener, Zotov, Krylov, Loris-Melikov - they were all honored adjutants general, it was not befitting to expose them for mistakes.

Therefore, in the studies of that war, the "critical" method - the only productive one - was replaced by the "epic" method, descriptive - the mechanical stringing of facts and figures, the presentation of events "without further ado." The folios of official studies were full of unreadable texts of endless dispositions for countless "detachments", painstaking calculations of the spent cartridges in each half-squad, but we would in vain look in them for a guiding strategic thread, a clear formulation of tactical conclusions. The students of the academy of the 80s and 90s - the future chiefs of military headquarters in Manchuria - could learn nothing or almost nothing from such a defectively developed material, and the Russian army began a difficult war in the Far East, as if having no experience of war after Sevastopol. How much they were in no hurry with the development of this war can be seen from the fact that the official description of the campaigns of 1877 - 1878 was not completed in 1914.

Deprived of the "Ariadne thread," Russian military thought tried to pave its way in this dark and tangled labyrinth, and in most cases found itself on the wrong path. The aura of the bronze defenders of the Malakhov Kurgan was still bright, and the fresh glory of the staunch Shipka heroes was added to this glory. They began to see the meaning of the war in "fighting back", "sitting out", not so much to inflict blows themselves, but to reflect the blows of the enemy, giving that the initiative. The meaning of the battle was believed in the indispensable occupation of a position in which to fight back "to the last bullet", leaving the enemy "to break his forehead" against this position. Passive strategy entailed passive tactics. Outwardly, these passive views did not have a particularly strong effect on the regulations, where the dragomirov influence was felt, but they were firmly rooted in the subconscious of most military leaders and commanders - in particular, the "new formation" - headed by Kuropatkin.

In the failure of our offensive actions at Plevna and the Turks of Suleiman at Shipka, they saw a convincing argument for the preference for a defensive-wait-and-see course of action. They did not realize, however, that in both of these cases the decisive factor was not so much the strength of the defense, albeit a heroic one, but the mediocre organization of the attack (in particular, we have the weakness of the striking unit with the hypertrophy of the "reserves" and "barriers" and the confusion of the "detachment system" ). With good management, Suleiman's 60 camps would have flown around and sunk 6 of our Shipka battalions, and if not Zotov, but Skobelev, commanded near Plevna, Osman would have said goodbye to his saber on August 31. Whenever the Russian infantry had worthy commanders ahead and timely support behind, they did not know of failed attacks. All this, however, was not recognized. Religion - or rather heresy - of "reserves" and "barriers", in spite of Leer's efforts, took root firmly. The "detachment system" became flesh and blood, and the mysticism of positions defended in place "to the last drop of blood" took possession of the minds and hearts of the majority.

Others followed Dragomirov, whose courageous appeals sounded like a trumpet. However, this one-sided and biased doctrine led, at the first (and inevitable) misfire, to a loss of faith in oneself.

* * *

The military district system introducedinconsistency in the training of troops. In different districts, the troops were trained in different ways, depending on the views of the commanders of the troops. In the same district, the training system changed with each new commander... If this latter was an artilleryman, he was only interested in his brigades, leaving the infantry and cavalry commanders to train the troops as they pleased. A sapper was appointed - and the enthusiasm for "grave-digging" began: the construction of field fortifications, self-digging endlessly, with complete disregard for everything else in the world. The sapper was replaced by a crimson edging - the "fortification" was immediately abolished, and all training was reduced to knocking out a "super-excellent" percentage of hits on the shooting ranges. Finally, a representative of the Dragomirov school appeared, proclaiming that "the bullet is stupid, the bayonet is great!" And the thick chains, harmoniously going under the drum, began to gain brilliant and crushing victories over the designated enemy.

The favorite form of fire was volley firing - by platoon and the whole company (by the way, the command “battalion, fire!” Was far from uncommon). Volley fire was widely used in the Caucasian and Turkestan campaigns, and quite often in the last Turkish war. It produced an invariable effect on a brave, but disorganized and highly impressionable enemy, and it was cultivated all the more willingly because a friendly volley showed endurance and good training of the unit. The accuracy of such a "decorative" fire was, of course, negligible.

At the insistence of General Obruchev, large bilateral maneuvers began to be carried out periodically (approximately every two years), in which large masses of troops from various districts took part. In 1886, the troops of the Warsaw and Vilna military districts maneuvered near Grodna, in 1888 near Elisavetgrad - the troops of Odessa and the abolished Kharkov, in 1890 in Volyn - the Warsaw district against Kiev (up to 120,000 people and 450 guns took part in these latter).

In the early 90s, the rearmament of the troops began. shop rifles. Of the three samples presented in 1891, the 3-line rifle of the Colonel Mosin system was approved (15). Routineers of military affairs, led by Dragomirov, fiercely rebelled against technical innovations, seeing in technology "the death of the spirit." Vannovsky partly shared this regrettable sophistry, but only in relation to artillery - he was still enough to realize the urgent need to introduce shops. This important event was carried out in 1893 - 1895 - first in the infantry, starting with the border districts, then in the cavalry (which received a lightweight and shortened "dragoon model" rifle). Mosin's 3-line rifle has proven itself brilliantly. With a sight at 3200 paces, it significantly surpassed the simplicity of design and ballistic qualities of the gun of all other European armies.

The question of the introduction of rapid-fire artillery remained open.

General Feldzheikhmeister Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich did not manage to overcome the opposition of the routiners. At the same time, the wedge cannon had to be replaced: we began to lag far behind the armies of our western neighbors and potential adversaries. I had to compromise and re-equip the artillery with a slow-firing piston cannon of the 1895 model of the year with improved data in comparison with the previous light model (the shot range is 3 versts with shrapnel and 6 versts with a grenade with a projectile weight of 19.5 and 17 pounds, respectively, and a practical rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute ). The caliber was adopted monotonous - 3.42 inches - and the division of batteries into battery and light ones was abolished. Thus, instead of a radical transformation, a partial and, moreover, very expensive amendment, which was of a purely temporary nature, was undertaken. Sooner or later (and the sooner, the better) it was still necessary to start a rapid-fire cannon - only now, instead of one rearmament, two at once had to be undertaken - with double costs.

Russian army in the second half of the XIX - at the beginning of the XX century

Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin,

minister of war

The armed forces of the Russian Empire are the regular army and navy, as well as irregular troops (Cossacks), created by the first Russian emperor Peter I on the basis of those who began to appear in Russia during the reign of his father, the so-called. regiments of a foreign system, taking into account the latest European achievements in this area, were replaced by irregular local troops, which were a feudal remnant, and rifle units that opposed Peter I during the struggle for power and then were repressed by him. Initially, the armed forces of the Russian Empire were formed on the basis of conscription (compulsory service of nobles was also preserved until the middle of the 18th century), from the second half of the 19th century after the military reform of Alexander II - on the basis of universal conscription.

The Crimean War of 1853-1856 showed the shortcomings of domestic weapons, namely: with the proliferation of steam engines, steamers were invented, of which there were only 16 in the Russian fleet; mass production of rifled weapons became possible, but in Russia their number was also insignificant. Therefore, in 1860-1870 military reforms were carried out under the leadership of DA Milyutin. The first steps to reorganize the armed forces were taken during the Crimean War. In 1855, by decree of the tsar, the "Commission for the improvement of the military unit" was created. She was tasked with revising the regulations, discussing the issues of rearmament of troops, improving physical and combat training. On November 9, 1861, General D.A. Milyutin was appointed Minister of War; on January 15, 1862, he presented a report to Alexander II, in which the main principles, goals and objectives of military reform were formulated.

In 1864, a military district reform was carried out. On the territory of Russia, 15 military districts were created, replacing the corps organization of command and control of the armed forces in peacetime. As a rule, the governor-general was appointed commander of the military district. Each district was simultaneously a body of command and control and a military-administrative structure. This made it possible to promptly command the troops and quickly mobilize them. With the creation of the districts, the War Ministry got rid of a wide range of responsibilities that were now performed by the commanders; only those management issues that were important for the entire army remained in its jurisdiction. The General Staff was created. The recruitment system was replaced by general military service.

The standard squadron of the Tekinsky Cavalry Regiment, led by the regiment commander Colonel S.P. Zykov (left), at a review of the 9th Army troops conducted by Emperor Nicholas II near Khotin

On January 1, 1874, the "Charter on all-class military service" was adopted. In accordance with it, the entire male population, regardless of status, was subject to military service from the age of 21. The term of active service in the ground forces was 6 years and 9 years in the reserve, in the navy, respectively, 7 years and 3 years. Rearmament took place - the transition to rifled breech-loading weapons. In 1868, the American Berdan rifle was adopted, in 1870 - the Russian Berdan rifle No. 2, in 1891 - the Mosin rifle. The production of armored steam ships began in 1861, and submarines in 1866. By 1898, the Russian navy, consisting of the Baltic, Black Sea fleets, the Caspian and Siberian flotillas, had 14 battleships, 23 coastal defense battleships, 6 armored cruisers, 17 cruisers, 9 mine cruisers, 77 destroyers, 96 destroyers, 27 gunboats ...

At the beginning of the 20th century, the active development of military technology continued. In 1902, armored vehicles (automobile troops) appeared in the armed forces, in 1911 - military aviation (the Imperial Air Force), in 1915 - tanks (tank troops).

Large and small shipbuilding programs were adopted, battleships of the Sevastopol and Empress Maria types were laid down; cruisers of the "Izmail" class.

In 1901, an attempt was made to liquidate the separate armed forces of the Grand Duchy of Finland. This meant that Finnish recruits who had previously served in their country, from 1901, could be sent to any part of the Russian Empire. The result of such measures was the general discontent of the Finnish population. In 1902, only half of the recruits came to recruits, in 1904 the Governor-General of Finland Nikolai Bobrikov was killed by a Finnish nationalist.

After the outbreak of the First World War, in 1916, an attempt was made to extend the appeal to the "foreign" population of Turkestan, and it was assumed that the conscription was not to the front, but to military logistic work. This led to riots, suppressed with the help of the army and the Cossacks, and costing the lives of up to 100 thousand civilians.

As of 1898, the Russian Imperial Army was the largest army in Europe.

In the early years of the 20th century, the main organizational unit of the armed forces was a corps, which consisted of 1 cavalry and 3 infantry divisions, and a Cossack cavalry regiment was created at each infantry division in wartime.

Gabriel Tsobehia